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Abstract
This thesis advances a defence o f  Richard Rorty’s political liberalism. It is widely held 
that w hat Rorty calls anti-foundationalism either consciously proposes, or logically 
entails, the denial bo th  o f  ethical com m itm ent and the possibility o f  m oral justification. 
O thers argue that Rorty reduces com m itm ent to a parochial concern, and that 
justification is relative to the standards o f  a narrowly conceived community. 
Com m itm ent and justification, it is said, reduce to pointing out whatever it is that 
constitutes ‘the way we happen to  do things around here’. In  turn, anti-foundationalism 
is said to  render obsolete any norm ative project in political theory.
The thesis rejects these claims, arguing that Rorty does no t reduce com m itm ent and 
justification in this way. Anti-foundationalism  is shown no t to reduce reason-giving to 
‘w hat we happen to  think around here’, and it is also cleansed o f  claims that it is 
relativistic, irrational and nihilistic. Justification as the response for reasonable requests 
for explanation o f  our beliefs and practices remains im portant for Rorty, centrally in his 
account o f  justification through ‘wide reflective equilibrium’.
The thesis shows how  Rorty’s view o f  liberal ironism  is the completion, n o t the negation, 
o f  liberalism. It dem onstrates that he is able both  to justify and defend liberal principles 
and institutions, and to do so in a way that undercuts many o f  the criticisms o f  liberalism 
that have been levelled by comm unitarian critics and others. It examines his view o f  
liberal political thought no t as providing a philosophical justification o f  liberalism, but as 
offering an articulation o f  it. I t closes by considering the scope o f  liberal claims, 
suggesting that Rorty is, in  the only meaningful sense o f  the term, a liberal universaHst.
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Introduction
In  this thesis I advance a defence o f Richard Rorty’s political liberalism, which he 
characterises as liberalism shorn o f all forms o f what he calls ‘authoritarianism’ — both 
religious and secular — that claim to stand over and above freely arrived at agreement 
between hum an beings.
Rorty’s political liberalism is a form o f what he calls ‘anti-foundationalism’. Anti- 
foundationalism rejects the idea that there are unquestionable principles that exist 
independently of, and provide grounds for, our everyday practices. It is widely held that in 
advancing anti-foundationalism, Rorty either consciously proposes, or that his account 
logically entails, the negation o f ethical commitment and the practice o f moral justification. 
Others argue that Rorty reduces commitment to a parochial concern, and justification to 
correspondence to the standards o f a narrowly conceived community. Anti-foundationalism 
is held to render obsolete any normative project in political theory; comm itm ent and 
justification, it is said, are a matter o f  ‘the way we happen to do things around here’ or 
‘merely what we happen to think around here’.’
 ^ See for example Paul Kelly, ‘Political theory in retreat? Contemporary political theory and the 
historical order’, in Noël O ’Sullivan (ed.) Political Theory in Transition (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 
225 -  241 at 233.
The thesis rejects these criticisms, arguing that the misunderstandings captured in them  
disguise Rorty’s actual position, which does not reduce comm itm ent and justification in the 
way such comments imply. The two main claims o f the thesis are, first, that Rorty’s anti- 
foundationalism does not collapse into parochialism, and secondly, that political liberalism 
can be justified and defended, indeed better defended, on Rorty’s account, since it undercuts 
many o f the criticisms o f liberalism that have been levelled by communitarian critics and 
others.
1. The issues outlined
1.1 Foundationalism and com m itm ent
Rorty has been criticized from a variety o f perspectives for many different reasons. Narrowly 
philosophical criticisms claim that he has m isunderstood both  the history o f philosophy^, 
and issues within it, notably truth^, justification'*, and hermeneutics.^ O thers believe him to 
have misrepresented the claims o f other philosophers, including those w hom  he takes 
himself to be following up; criticisms o f his reading o f John  Dewey are particularly
2 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Philosophy, “Other” Disciplines and their Histories: A Rejoinder to Richard 
Rorty’, Soundings 65 (1982), pp. 127 — 145; Terence Ball, ‘Review Symposium on Richard Rorty’, 
Histoiy of the Human Sciences 3. 1 (1990), pp. 101 — 122 at 101 -  104.
3 Richard N. Manning, ‘Pragmatism and the Quest for Truth’, Metaphilosopiy 23 (1992), pp. 350 — 362. 
 ^Peter Munz, ‘Philosophy and the Mirror of Rorty, Philosophy of the Social Sciences 14 (1984), pp. 195 — 
238; Jakob Hohwy, ‘Quietism and Cognitive Command’, Philosophical Quarterly M  (1997), pp. 495 — 
500.
5 Georgia Warnke, Gadamer, Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Polity, 1987).
pronounced/ He has also been censured for his understanding o f  feminism^, natural 
science®, literary criticism,^ and economics and public choice theory/° The criticisms that I 
am concerned with in this thesis are those which engage with Rorty’s broader concern to 
show how what he calls ‘social hope’ can survive in a postm odern world. In  this respect, the 
consequences o f his position are not narrowly philosophical, but impact upon practices o f 
reason giving and the grounds for belief.
Rorty agrees with Elizabeth Anscombe that the notion o f unconditional, context-free, moral 
obligation only makes sense if  one believes in G od." The Moral Law requires a lawgiver, 
and, unlike Anscombe, Rorty argues for the absence o f any candidate for that role. Rorty 
accepts that this entails what for many are simply unacceptable consequences about the 
possibility o f appealing over particular hum an practices to a privileged realm o f  moral truth. 
As he puts it in a particularly vivid passage:
[...] when the secret police come, when the torturers violate the innocent, 
there is nothing to be said to them  o f the form “There is something within 
you which you are betraying. Though you embody the practices o f a
 ^ Matthew Festenstein, Tragmatism, Social Democracy and Political Argument’, in Matthew 
Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) 'Richard 'Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 
203 — 218; James Gouinlock, ‘What Is the Legacy of Instrumentalism? Rorty’s Interpretation of 
Dewey, in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr., (ed.) Rd)rty and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics 
(London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 72 — 90.
 ^Sabina Lovibond, ‘Feminism and Pragmatism: A Reply to Richard Rorty’, 'New Left Roview 193 (May 
-June  1992), pp. 5 -  28.
® Roy Bhaskar, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
5 Leon Surette, ‘Richard Rorty Lays Down the Law’, Philosophy and Uterature 19 (1995), pp. 261 — 275.
0^ Richard Posner, ‘Richard Rorty’s Politics’, Critical Review 7 (1993), pp. 33 -  49.
"  Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Jürgen Habermas’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Rorty and His Critics
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 56 — 64 at 61.
totalitarian society which will endure forever, there is something beyond 
those practices which condemns you,” ^^
Many critics believe that it foUows from what they take to be Rorty’s abandonm ent o f 
notions o f tru th  and rationality that there is no way to justify our beliefs, and that all we can 
do is to  point to current practices, be they good or bad. Thus, although Rorty speaks o f ‘the 
fact that our hum an rights culture is morally superior to other cultures’^^ , it is thought that 
this is merely an unsupported — and, on his account, unsupportable — assertion. I f  as he 
claims there is no ‘neutral ground’ but only an ‘indefinite plurality o f stand-points’^\ and that 
we ‘should simply drop the distinction between rational judgement and cultural bias’^ ,^ how 
far can one remain committed to any particular standard o f value? Against Rorty’s claim that 
'''Nothing is more important than the defence o f [the] liberal instimtions’,^  ^ many argue that he 
removes the resources with which we might go about making that defence. With respect to the 
example o f torturers, there is o f course something that can be said if, as Gary G utting points 
out, the torturers violate their own v a l u e s . T h a t  is however to grant the point that those 
values are the result o f contingent historical influences, and do not reflect the ahistoric moral 
order or facts about human nature.
12 Richard Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism (Minneapolis; University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. xlii.
13 Richard Rorty, Truth and Progress: Philosophical Pcpers volume 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), p. 170.
11 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 
51.
13 Richard Rorty, Objectivity, Pelativism, and Truth: Philosophical Papers volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 207 — 8.
11 Richard Rorty, ‘Thugs and Theorists’, Political Theory 15 (1987), pp. 564 — 580 at 567, emphasis in 
original.
17 Gary Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 54.
From  different political perspectives, and for a range o f specific technical reasons, critics 
unite in arguing that, although Rorty seeks to defend liberal democracy, his postmodernist 
account undercuts the philosophical and moral resources necessary to make that defence. 
Postmodernism, in Adam Swift’s summary, entails scepticism about the notion o f truth and 
a mistrust o f reason, notions which it is said are vital to  make sense o f  our moral 
commitments.^® In denying a substantive notion o f truth or rationality that exists 
independently o f the standards o f any particular community, Rorty is held to endorse a form 
o f relativism in which the standards o f truth or goodness are determined solely within 
particular communities. Writing o f ‘historicist’ accounts such as Rorty’s, Thomas Nagel 
claims that ‘[i]n the name o f liberation, these movements have offered us intellectual 
repression’.’^  Nagel thinks o f Rorty as grounding objectivity in  consensus^°, something that, 
together with his preference for ‘conversation’ rather that argument, is dangerous, denying 
truth or objectivity as existing independently o f the practices and beliefs o f any particular 
community.
A different concern has been raised by ‘communitarian’ writers who, in contrast for example 
to Nagel, censure Rorty for not taking the standards o f particular communities seriously 
enough. Philosophers such as Charles Taylor and Alasdair MacIntyre emphasise the 
situatedness o f hum an beings and the importance o f social embeddedness in shaping the 
shared meanings and understandings o f particular communities. In  ascribing ontological and 
moral significance to community, they charge their own critics with neglecting the role o f 
community and identity in giving content and meaning to morality. For them, Rorty is a
Adam Swift, Political Philosopfy A. Beginners’ Guide for Students and Politicians (Oxford: Polity Press, 
2001), p. 4.
Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), p. 11.
20 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 29.
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single manifestation o f a more general trend away from questions o f truth and judgements 
about what constitutes the good life towards prudential and utilitarian calculations that seek 
merely to secure accommodation between different views o f these matters. In  Taylor’s 
words, ‘Things that were once settled by some external reality — traditional law, say, or nature 
— are now referred to our choice’.^ ’ A t the same time, Rorty is an especially im portant target, 
since he is not merely agnostic on the question o f ultimate value, but holds that the capacity 
to set aside such questions is a desirable stage in  the development o f humanity. Significantiy, 
Rorty accepts MacIntyre’s purported criticism that liberals are, in  effect, utilitarians.^ For 
him, there is a relationship between the liberal view that ‘cruelty is the worst thing we do’^ , 
and the utilitarian claim, which he ascribes to William James and John  Dewey, ‘that in the 
end the only moral or epistemological criteria we have or need is whether performing an 
action, or holding a belief, will, in the long run, make for greater hum an happiness’.^  ^Rorty 
speaks approvingly o f the increasing ability o f more and m ore people and societies ‘to put 
aside the question W hat is the meaning o f human life? and to substitute the question W hat 
meaning shall we give to o//rlives?’^ ,^ and claims that ‘no past hum an achievement, no t Plato’s 
or even Christ’s, can tell us about the ultimate significance o f hum an life. N o  such
Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity (London: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 81.
22 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A  Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1985, second 
edition).
23 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. xv.
24 Richard Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism’, ^vue Internationale de Philosophie 1 (1999), pp. 7 
— 20 at 9. This connection between liberalism and utilitarianism is also seen in Rorty’s criticisms of 
the continuing interest within Anglo-American philosophy with the conflict between 
consequentialism and deontology. See Richard Rorty, ‘Trapped Between Kant and Dewey: the 
Current Situation of Moral Philosophy’, at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/kadish/rorty.doc, 
p. 9 (viewed 22 March 2003).
25 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Richard Bernstein’, in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (ed.) Rorty and 
Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 68 — 
71 at 71, emphasis in original.
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achievement can give us a template on which to m odel our future’ For  MacIntyre, 
however, Rorty’s account is one which, in contrast to his claims, exhibits not ‘moral 
argument freed from unwanted philosophical pretensions, but the decay o f moral
reasoning’/^
A criticism that unites rationalists Hke Nagel and ‘communitarians’ like MacIntyre is that 
Rorty is not simply anti-foundationalist but claims that, for some at least, anti- 
foundationalism has consequences, in that they recognise both  that current beliefs and 
practices cannot be regarded as final, and that it is impossible to resolve doubts about them  
by appealing to those beliefs and practices themselves. This situation, which Rorty terms 
‘ironism’, he describes as a form o f ‘private narcissism’,^ ® one which celebrates that 
recognition. It seems to many, however, that the problem  with ironism, over and above 
those identified with anti-foundationalism, is the question o f  detachment. Rorty’s view o f 
increasing individual freedoms as a form of private narcissism comports, it is said, badly with 
the needs o f public and political life. This concern is raised by John  H orton, for whom  
ironists are detached from their values, and thus from their communities. A t best, the ironist 
will, he writes, feign ‘a solidarity which cannot genuinely be felt. Indeed cynicism must be an 
abiding tem ptation for the ironist’.^  ^ Similarly, for Susan Haack, the ironist’s concern and 
preparedness to share in the moral commitments o f her community depends on whether
26 Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Countiy: Ijeftist Thought in Twentieth Century America (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1998), p. 24.
27 Alasdair MacIntyre, ‘Moral Arguments and Social Contexts: A Response to Rorty’, in Robert 
HoUinger (ed.) Hermeneutics and Praxis (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), pp. 222
— 223 at 222. See also Alasdair MacIntyre, Dependent Pjztional Animals: Why Human Beings Need the 
Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), pp. 151-153.
28 Rorty, Objectivity, Belativism, and Truth, p. 210.
29 John Horton, ‘Ironism and Commitment: An Irreconcilable Dualism of Modernity’, in Matthew 
Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) Bichard Borty: Critical Dialogues (Oxford: Polity, 2001), pp. 15
-  28 at 27.
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those standards enable her to secure private perfection through the provision o f freedoms 
that facilitate renewed self-description. It follows from  (what Haack believes to be) Rorty’s 
rejection o f the role o f truth that for him moral commitment, if  it exists at all, is cynical: 
“‘irony” reveals that Rorty’s supposed solidarity is no m ore than pro forma, cynical conformity 
with those [our local] practices’.^ °
1.2 Anti-foundationalism and politica l theory
Critics take different views o f w hat Rorty’s position entails for political theory. Liberal 
theorists tend, as H orton notes, to ignore Rorty.^’ In  part, this is an understandable 
consequence o f the fact that Rorty does not address in any detail many o f the questions that 
are central to current debates within political theory. H e does not offer his own theory o f 
justice, and although he endorses John  Rawls’s ‘justice as fairness’, he does not enter into 
discussion concerning interpretations or alternatives. Indeed he seems unconcerned by such 
debates, and his tendency to speak o f ‘we liberals’ seems to blur the differences between 
liberals. Insofar as he acknowledges differences, these are methodological, or more 
accurately, meta-philosophical, concerning whether liberals rely for example upon Kantian 
foundations. His interest is how, given his ‘anti-foundationaHsm’, liberalism and liberal 
theories o f  justice can be articulated and defended.
0^ Susan Haack, ‘Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect’, in Herman J. Saatkemp, Jr. (ed.) ^ rty  
and Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 
126 -  147 at 139.
31 Horton, ‘Ironism and Commitment’, p. 15.
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There is indeed confusion as to the nature o f these meta-philosophical commitments. Some 
see Rorty as a communitarian^^, whereas others take him to be a Hberal whose primary 
concern is to defend Rawls against his communitarian c r i t i c s . S u c h  confusion is 
understandable. The first criticisms o f Rawls were from writers who came to be known as 
communitarians, some o f whom  hold similar views to Rorty. Despite the differences spoken 
o f above between Rorty and writers Hke Taylor and MacIntyre, Hke them  Rorty is held to be 
proposing a communitarian rather than a rational justification o f HberaHsm.^^ LiberaHsm is 
held to possess nothing o f value other than its constituting part o f our current practices; as 
Paul KeUy puts it, ‘what pohtical theorists try to defend on the ground of universal abstract 
rationaHty is [for Rorty] merely what we happen to think around here’.^  ^ It is claimed that 
this rules out justification, or that, insofar as it aUows for reason giving, justification is made 
not by reference to notions o f truth or rationaHty but on the grounds that beHefs and 
practices are justified simply because they are our beHefs and practices.
As has been remarked upon, Hberals regard Rorty as passing over im portant differences 
among different thinkers, a tendency that has seemed to some to stem from his view o f 
moraHty as a matter o f ‘we intentions’.^  ^Richard J. Bernstein argues that on this point, Rorty 
substitutes an ‘historical myth o f the given’ for the ‘epistemological myth o f  the given’ that
32 Jean Hampton, ‘Should PoHtical Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?’, Ethics 99 (July 1989), 
791 — 814; Steven Kautz, Liberalism and Community (London: Cornell University Press, 1995); John R  
WaUach, ‘Liberals, Communitarians, and thé Task of Pohtical Theory’, Political Theory 15 (1987), pp. 
581-611.
33 Stephen Mulhall and Adam Swift, Liberals and Communitarians (Oxford: Blackwell PubHshers, 1996).
34 Although Rorty sees his account as following up on Rawls, his interpretation of Rawls as a 
pragmatist is one that some find problematic. See for example, Ian Shapiro, Political Criticism (Oxford: 
University of CaHfornia Press, 1990).
33 Kelly, ‘Pohtical theory in retreat?’, p. 233.
36 Rorty’s tendency speak in terms of ‘we Hberals’ and ‘we pragmatists’ is well known. For a Hst of 
many of his formulations, see Bhaskar, Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, p. 94.
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he has himself helped to expose, and that ‘[s]ometimes it seems as if  what Rorty means by 
“we” are “all those who agree with m e”.’^  ^ This is exacerbated because what Rorty calls 
‘ethnocentrism’ is taken to be the view that nothing can, and indeed should, be said to non­
liberals. I f  there are no principled grounds on which to justify liberalism, nothing can be said 
to those who call into question its legitimacy.
Rorty also seems not to allow for efforts to justify or rationally commend liberalism to non­
liberal societies, ruling out the normative task o f defending liberalism as something o f 
universal value. The moral requirement to seek to extend liberal values and insrimtions is for 
many integral to liberalism. For Brian Barry, this task is central, so m uch so that he has 
claimed that ‘[t]he point o f liberalism is that it is universahstic’.^ ® Rorty seems unable to  press 
for the truth or goodness o f liberalism in societies other than those where it is already taken 
to be true or good; liberalism on his account possesses, in Kelly’s words, ‘no philosophical 
warrant, and cannot be the basis for a philosophical imperialism o f the true and the good’.^  ^
By ‘[a]bandoning universalism’,""^ Rorty seems not only to be at odds with many liberals but, 
insofar as Barry is correct in identifying the point o f liberalism to be its universality, has also 
seemingly excluded himself from counting as a liberal at all. A t best, he appears to  be what 
John Gray calls a liberal relativist, holding liberalism to be suitable and legitimate only for 
liberal societies.
37 Richard J. Bernstein, The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodemity 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991), p. 247. For the ‘Myth of the Given’, see chapter 2 of this thesis.
38 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: A n Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), 
p. 138.
35 Kelly, ‘Political theory in retreat?, 233.
40 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 68.
41 John Gray, M ill on Liberty: A  Defence. 2"'* edition. (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 151.
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Rorty is further held to rule out the possibility o f genuine or meaningful social criticism, and 
his account is believed to entail uncritical endorsement o f the standards o f our community, 
whatever they may be. Rorty argues that political theorists ought to  be concerned not with 
offering a philosophical justification o f liberal democracy but with the articulation o f the 
practices o f liberal societies. The task for the theorist ought, he suggests, to be to draw 
attention to the ways in which the practices o f those societies fail to live up to their self- 
image. This type o f approach has been criticized, either for being critically impotent, since it 
cannot employ a standard o f value other than that which communities already endorse, or, if 
it does in fact implicitly draw upon such a standard, as incoherent, since the existence o f 
those standards is what it claims to deny."^  ^Rorty’s account is often charged with the former, 
that social criticism, if  it takes place at all, is a matter o f consistency, not o f moral value. Ian 
Shapiro criticizes what he believes to  be its conservatism in allowing culture too much 
importance: ‘The primacy Rorty ascribes to received beliefs in a culture generates a mindless, 
if  genial, political conservatism’.^  ^Though Rorty claims not to be a conservative, his account 
is said to lead to conservative conclusions in which radical social criticism is outlawed and 
where scrutiny can only be made by reference to our own particular standards.
It is interesting to note, finally, that for other critics it is precisely the supposed denial o f 
universaHst and normative concerns that does the work in  Rorty’s account. Like their Hberal 
counterparts, Marxist critics tend to  think o f him as removing the role for normative poHtical 
theory. They go on to  argue however that this is a justificatory move in itself, serving the 
ideological function o f providing an apologia for the pohtical and socio-economic status quo
42 Brian Barry, Justice as Impartiality: A  Treaties on Social Justice Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1995), pp. 3 -  10.
43 Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 41.
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by ruling out any criticism o f present practices by any standards other than those which lead 
to the legitimation o f those practices in the first place. Markar Melkonian writes that when it 
comes to defending liberalism, Rorty’s ‘conversation abruptly fades to silence, irony lapses 
into apologetics, and Hghtmindedness becomes heavy-handedness’.'^Jo Burrows claims that 
Rorty takes ‘liberalism as a non-ideological “given”’.^  ^ Rorty’s notion o f ‘we intentions’ is 
similarly held to serve this agenda by assuming a falsely homogenizing ‘we’ which claims to 
speak for the entire community; for Michael Billig, the use o f  the word ‘we’ ‘might be called 
the syntax o f hegemony’."^  Further, if  in judging other societies all that we have to do is 
evaluate them with reference to our particular standards, then this is merely a form o f 
cultural imperialism. Honi Haber believes this to be the case, arguing that it is perhaps 
especially pernicious through being cloaked in the language o f Foucault and Lyotard. For 
him, it is precisely the rejection o f  a radical philosophical critique o f liberalism, combined 
with his inability ‘to give up the m odernist demand for totality’, that means that Rorty can 
‘be viewed as an apologist for cultural imperialism’.'^  ^ Haber thus shares with liberals Hke 
Kelly the view that Rorty denies the possibüity o f principled philosophical justification, but 
draws exactly the opposite conclusion: far from removing any defence o f Hberahsm, it is by
Markar Melkonian, 'Richard Rorty's Politics: Liberalism at the End of the American Century (Amherst, NY.: 
Humanity Books, 1999), p. 183. See also Enrique Dussel, The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, 
Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosoply of Liberation, translated by Eduardo Mendieta (New Jersey: Humanities 
Press, 1996); Peter McLaren, Ramin Farahmandpur and Juha Suoranta, ‘Richard Rorty’s Self-Help 
LiberaHsm: A Marxist Critique of America’s Most Wanted Ironist’, in Michael A. Peters and Paulo 
GhiraldelH Jr. (eds.) Richard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, and Politics (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield 
PubHshers, Inc., 2001), pp. 139 -  162.
“^5 Jo Burrows, ‘Conversational PoHtics: Rorty’s Pragmatist Apology for LiberaHsm’, in Alan R. 
Malachowski (ed.) Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond) 
(Oxford: Basil BlackweU Ltd., 1991), pp. 322 — 338 at 329.
Michael BüHg, ‘NationaHsm and Richard Rorty The Text as Flag for Pax Americana', Neio Left 
'Review 202 (1993), pp. 69 -  83 at 77.
Honi Fern Haber, Byond Postmodern Politics: Lyotard, Rjorty, Foucault (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 
44.
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denying the possibility o f a radical philosophical critique o f liberal democracy that Rorty 
provides a defence by shielding it from criticism and challenge.
2. The aim of the thesis
It is perhaps no surprise then that in  academia, citing Rorty is rapidly becoming analogous to 
quoting Marx after October 1917 — something that cannot be done innocently.^ Against this 
prevailing view, in this thesis I advance two claims.
First, it is argued that summarising Rorty’s view o f truth, goodness and rightness as ‘merely 
what we happen to think around here’ misrepresents his views o f truth and moral value. 
Although the exact nature o f this criticism is rarely spelt out, it raises at least four separate 
issues: whether or not there is anything beyond contingent hum an practice; whether ‘around 
here’ must be narrowly conceived; whether Rorty has anything to say to those who want to 
challenge what we do ‘around here’, or do not feel themselves to be part o f it; and finally, 
whether it rules out any normative project in  political theory — if, as Steven Lukes believes, 
‘this is the way we do things here’ necessarily contrasts with ‘this is the way things ought to 
be done everywhere’."^  ^ By addressing these different concerns, I will argue that a better 
appreciation is available not just o f Rorty, but o f our understandings o f moral belief and 
conviction more generally.
I owe this observation to Rodney Barker.
Steven Lukes, Liberals and Cannibals: The Implications of Diversity (London: Verso, 2003), p. 36.
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Secondly, it is argued that Rorty is able both to justify and defend liberal principles and 
institutions, and does so in a way that undercuts many o f the criticisms o f  Hberahsm that 
have been levelled by communitarian critics and others. An adequate account o f Hberahsm 
m ust recognize the historical location o f Hberal values. LiberaHsm cannot be deduced from 
what Barry caUs the ^bare notion o f rationahty’^ ,^ and it cannot be justified without reference 
to particular, historicaUy formed and informed, values and interests. This does not, however, 
reduce to the claim that Hberahsm and Hberal societies are justified simply because they 
happen to exist, or that Hberahsm cannot be commended to other societies with a view to 
securing universal adoption and consent.
It wUl be argued that there are no necessary pohtical or moral conclusions to  be drawn from 
anti-foundationaHsm. For some, anti-foundationaHsm brings with it the consequence that 
there is no standpoint from which to make judgements o f other societies. For critics o f at 
least some forms o f Hberahsm, such as John  Gray, Hberahsm is sometimes an instance o f 
W estern cultural imperiaHsm’, reflecting a particular, spedficaUy N orth  American, form o f 
Hfe whilst claiming to be a neutral view from n o w h e r e . A  somewhat similar view is 
assumed by many multiculturaHsts, who tend to treat notions Hke ‘culture’, ‘community’, and 
‘tradition’ as g iv e n s .T h e r e  is however no need to accept either o f these conclusions. The 
alternative is to agree that any standpoint is bound to a particular form o f Hfe, but that it is 
none the worse for that. ContextuaHsm, or what Rorty caUs ethnocentrism, should not rule
50 Barry, justice as Impartiality, p. 8.
51 John Gray, ’Enlightenment’s Wake: politics and culture at the close of the modem age (London: Routledge, 
1995).
52 See especially Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1990), and Chandran Kukathas, ‘Cultural Toleration’, in Will KymHcka and Ian Shapiro (eds.) 
Ethnicity and Group Rights. Nomos XXXDC  (New York: New York University Press, 1997) pp. 69 — 
104.
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out normativity, either in justification, or in terms o f critical morality. For Rorty, traditional 
philosophical terms can be given sense, but m ust be ‘sodologized’, by treating them  as 
distinctions within contingent sets o f beliefs and practices.^^ Notions Hke ‘criteria’, ‘mistake’, 
‘tru th’, ‘justification, and ‘reasonableness’ can be given content, and can be given aU the 
content that they need, without foundationaHsm. Terms such as moral obHgation must be 
understood in a non-transcendental way, in terms o f  the obHgations that humans 
acculturated in a certain way recognise and accept as a result o f  that sodaHzation. Further, it 
win be argued that there is no reason why an historidst account o f Hberahsm needs to entail 
a relativistic account o f value, and that there is nothing wrong with the aspiration to a 
universal justification o f Hberahsm. I argue that pohtical theory on Rorty’s account is not 
reduced to explaining or justifying practices as something that we ‘happen to do around 
here’. For Rorty, hberahsm is moraUy superior to other forms o f hfe, even though this 
judgement is not, and cannot be, made from a standpoint outside o f  any particular practice.
3. The approach adopted in the thesis
In  arguing for these claims, I proceed by closely reconstructing the arguments o f both  Rorty 
and his critics. There are, I suggest, three advantages to such an approach. Firstly, some o f 
the critidsms leveUed against Rorty are, I wih show, largely styhstic rather than substantive. 
This is evidenced for example in Lynn A. Baker’s summary o f Rorty’s pragmatism as the 
Nike slogan ‘Just do it’.^ '^  A similar approach is evidenced when James Risser misconstrues
53 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 83 n. 4.
54 Lynn A. Baker, ‘’Just Do It”: Pragmatism and Progressive Sodal Change’, in Michael Brint and 
Wilham Weaver (eds.) Pragmatism in Imw and Society (Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 99 — 119.
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Rorty’s use o f the word ‘conversation’, Rorty speaks o f  replacing confrontation with 
conversation, summarising his view o f pragmatism as the view that there are ‘no constraints 
on inquiry save conversational ones’.^  ^Risser defines ‘conversation’ invidiously, associating it 
with superficiality and contrasting it with the rigour and rationality o f argument. These 
criticisms are especially effective i f  they are contrasted with a concern for truth, rationality, 
and objectivity, honorific titles that Rorty’s critics typically claim for themselves whilst taking 
him to deny. Such critics can o f  course be read sympathetically, as taking Rorty at his own 
word when he claims that philosophy tends to make progress no t by argumentation but by 
re-description; ‘Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination o f  the pros and cons o f a 
thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary 
which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises 
great things’.^  ^This thesis will proceed in  a similar manner, seeking to reconstruct both his 
position, and the arguments o f his critics, in order to understand precisely what is at issue 
between them.
More substantially, this approach helps to disentangle precisely what is at issue with 
purported criticisms. For upon inspection it is often difficult to see what it is with which a 
critic is concerned. To take a significant example, it is frequently said in respect o f Rorty’s 
anti-foundationalism that some form  o f higher-order, typically metaphysical, standard, is 
necessary to sustain moral value and political commitment. Rorty’s view that there is no such 
standard, which different people or communities can be closer to or further away from, is
This reference to Nike is taken up, rather more polemically, by Alan Johnson, ‘The Politics of 
Richard Rorty’, Neuf Politics (Summer 2000), pp. 103 — 221 at 115 — 116.
55 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 165.
56 James Risser, “Rortyan Pragmatism as Hermeneutics Praxis,” Modem Schoolman 63 (1986), pp. 275 — 
287.
57 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 9.
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held by critics to mean that there is no standard up to which any individual or society should 
be seeking to live. There are however two, quite separate, issues that arise in relation to  this. 
O ne is whether Rorty is correct to deny the existence o f a metaphysical order. The other 
whether humans need to assume its existence to make sense o f moral commitment. These 
are different claims, but not only is this difference frequently passed over, but these two 
points are often run together. Throughout the thesis, I seek to clarify what is at issue, 
showing that upon inspection, criticisms are often misguided and misplaced.
This leads to a third point, that, in attempting to summarise Rorty’s views, critics frequentiy 
read their own views into his, and criticise him by (explicit or implicit) reference to their own 
presuppositions rather than his. Thus they rephrase his claims in  terms that they, not he, 
hold, and then criticise him for the consequences o f holding his position once it is recast in 
this way. This is o f course natural, but it does mean that criticisms often make sense not only 
if  they assume things that Rorty does not, but also if  they assume things against which he is 
in fact setting out to argue. Rorty makes this point in a discussion o f how realists tend to 
project their ‘own habits o f thought upon the pragmatist’, criticising pragmatists for holding 
the views that they do were they to express them in the m anner o f  realists.^® It wiU be seen 
however that this tendency is not limited to Rorty’s realist opponents.
For some im portant criticisms, these three points come together. This is seen in the 
assertion that Rorty takes truth, rationality, and justification to  be merely ‘the way we do
58 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 30. This manner of argument is neatly summarized by 
Simon Thompson: ‘Since Rorty does not endorse the former account [foundationalism], the critics 
argue, he must endorse the latter [relativism]’. Simon Thompson, ‘Richard Rorty on Truth, 
Justification and Justice’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) Richard Rorty: Critical 
Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 33 — 50 at 34.
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things around here’. The use o f the terms such as ‘merely’ or ‘happen’ in  such phrases 
implicitly conveys a pejorative meaning, o f light-mindedness and lack o f intellectual 
substance. It also implies a contrast to something that is not ‘merely’ a function o f what is 
done ‘around here’. However, one o f the questions that Rorty raises is what happens if  there 
are no reasons that are universally valid or compelling. I f  there is no such thing, the ‘merely’ 
loses all sense, since it has no contrastive force, as there is nothing which is not a function o f 
the beliefs and practices o f a particular historically situated community.
O ne final point: pohtical Hberahsm is, for the purpose o f this thesis, a generic category, 
meaning hberahsm that does not make reference to any comprehensive view o f  the good. As 
such it includes, but is not limited to, John  Rawls’s 'Political Uheralis/n, and the writings o f 
hberals such as Brian Barry and Charles Larmore.^^ Although there are differences between 
these writers^”, ah are concerned with institutional arrangements designed to mediate conflict 
between different views o f the good, rather than to suggest or recom m end comprehensive 
or perfectionist (and therefore controversial) views o f the good. Rorty sums up this position 
by writing that ‘The point o f a hberal society is not to invent or create anything, but simply 
to make it as easy as possible for people to achieve their wildly different private ends without 
hurting each other’.*^  ^ My exemplar o f pohtical hberahsm throughout this thesis is primarily 
Barry. For although a pohtical rather than a comprehensive hberal, Barry is considered an
59 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, Charles Larmore, The Morals of Modernity (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996).
50 See for example Barry’s review of Political Uberalism, ‘John Rawls and the Search for Stabihty’, 
'Ethics 105 (July 1995), pp. 874 — 915. Barry argues that the concern for ‘stabihty’ that animated 
Rawls’s writings after A  Theory of Justice is superfluous since, insofar as stabihty is an issue, it was 
addressed perfectly adequately in that earher work. Contrary to Rawls’s claims in Political Uberalism, A  
Theoty of Justice does not contain a comprehensive philosophical doctrine, and stabihty is assured by 
reasonable people endorsing the principles of justice from behind the veil of ignorance.
51 Richard Rorty, Esseys on Heide^er and Others: Philosophical Papers volume 2  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), p. 196.
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uncompromising universalist, and as such serves as a good case against which to test and 
argue for my reading o f Rorty’s claims to be a political liberal.
3.1 Argum ent and re-description
In a rather condescending remark, Thomas Nagel writes that views such as Rorty’s ‘have a 
self-evident air if  they are not examined too closely, which may account for their greater 
popularity outside philosophy than in it’.^  ^ It is therefore somewhat ironic that Nagel 
himself does not examine them  too closely, preferring instead to speculate about the 
contents o f  Rorty’s psyche in an effort to  explain why he has been tem pted away from 
traditional philosophical concerns. H e thus informs us that ‘I always feel when reading Rorty 
that his philosophical position m ust reflect his own mental experience, which is very 
different from  the norm ’,^  ^ the norm  apparently being to take at face value the sort o f 
questions, about the external world and other minds, that Nagel believes force themselves 
upon every reflective mind.
It m ust be said that such conjecture does not sit well with the forceful warnings Nagel 
elsewhere issues against replacing reasoned argument with psychological and sociological 
explanation o f  beUef.*^ "^  Far better to heed those warnings, and take up Rorty’s claims at the 
level o f reason. There is however a question o f  whether it is possible to engage with Rorty 
through argument and reason. His reluctance to admit that he is making truth-claims, and
^  Nagel, The luist Word, p. 29.
63 Thomas Nagel, Concealment and E/xposure (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 160.
64 Nagel, The East Word, especially pp. 103 — 106.
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desire to change the subject m atter o f philosophical discussion, has given credence to those 
critics who present him as someone who has turned his back on tru th  and rationality. For 
Susan Mendus, Rorty is a ‘conversationalist’, and a ‘poet’,^  ^ the implication being that he 
opposes reason and the arguments o f philosophers. In  the view o f Stanley Rosen, this is just 
what Rorty intends. He writes that Philosop!^ and the M irror of Nature ‘contains no single 
instance o f what professional philosophers call a genuine argument purporting to  refute the 
traditional thesis [the Platonist and Cartesian views o f philosophy], either in its own terms or 
on the basis o f  Rorty’s own theoretical position’.^  ^ Some have gone on to argue that this 
means that Rorty’s own position cannot be challenged by reason or argument; that it is, as 
David L. Hall puts it, ‘closed to rational analysis, critique or dialectic’.^  ^This charge is taken 
up, and combined with criticisms o f Rorty’s supposed frivolity and intellectual decadence, by 
Akeel Bilgrami. Bügrami writes o f  the person who fails to  accord proper value to the truth. 
This person, who he terms ‘the bullshitter’, is ‘the person who merely sounds o ff at parties 
or, alas, gets published in some academic journals just because he is prepared to speak or 
write in the requisite jargon, without any goal o f getting things right’.^ * Bilgrami wavers as to 
whether or not Rorty is guilty o f such things, but Jonathan Culler is more forthcoming, 
suggesting that, aside from the desire for notoriety or (as Nagel suggests) concern to alleviate 
tedium, there lie more basic hum an motives. Culler writes that exponents o f pragmatism like 
Rorty and Stanley Fish attained their positions o f professional eminence by serious
65 Susan Mendus, ‘“What of soul was left, I wonder?” The Narrative Self in Political Philosophy’, in 
John Horton and Andrea T. Bauineister (eds.) Literature and the Political Imaÿnation (London: 
Roudedge, 1996), p. 53 -  69 at 55.
66 Stanley Rosen, The Ancients and the Modems: ^thinking Modernity (London: Yale University Press, 
1989), p. 177.
67 David L. Hall, LJchard Korty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1994), p. 6.
68 Akeel Bilgrami, ‘Is Truth a Goal of Inquiry?: Rorty and Davidson on Truth’, in Robert B. Brandom 
(ed.) L^rty and His Critics, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 242 — 262 at 260.
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engagement in intellectual disputes with other members o f academia, but that, once secure, 
they went on to claim that the practice o f intellectual inquiry should be abandoned. ‘They 
thus seek systematically to destroy the structure through which they attained their positions 
and which would enable others to challenge them  in their turn’.*^^
I will consider in some detail Rorty’s views on truth and rationality in subsequent chapters, 
but it is im portant at this point to consider the specific claim that he gives up on argument 
and is simply making rhetorical assertions. Rorty uses ‘argument’ in a specific sense. To 
argue requires some vocabulary, some structure o f thought: argumentation ‘requires that the 
same vocabulary be used in premises and conclusions — that both  be part o f the same 
l a n g u a g e - g a m e .O n  Rorty’s account however no structure o f thought is foundational or 
not open to revision. In  criticizing Rorty and others for giving up on the traditional 
problems o f philosophy, Nagel writes that certain questions are inescapable and that 
therefore ‘[pjhilosophy cannot take refuge in reduced ambitions’.^  ^ In  so doing, he makes 
two assumptions: first, that there is a fixed set o f problems that constitute genuine 
philosophical inquiry; and secondly, that they are necessary questions, ones that cannot be 
set aside without impoverishing the human condition. Rorty disputes both claims. Regarding 
the former, Philosoply and the Mirror of Nature is an historicist account o f the reasons why
Jonathan Culler, ‘In Defence of Overinterpretation’, in Umberto Eco et al, Interpretation and 
Overinterpretation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 109 — 123 at 118. Dianne 
Rothleder believes that, in its own terms, this strategy is successful: ‘If we wish to argue with Rorty 
... he puts us in the position of having to be the aggressors. That is, either we silence him into 
passivity, “helpless passivity” even, or we declare war. Either way, we look ridiculous for disagreeing 
with a platitudinous tautology, and we look criminal for attacking a helpless, good-natured 
philosopher.’ Dianne Rothleder, The Work of Friendship: Rorty, His Critics, and the Project of Solidarity 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 95.
™ Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 125.
'7^ Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 10. Similarly, Charles Taylor speaks of ‘the inescapabiUty of 
certain philosophical issues.’ Taylor, ‘Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition’, in Alan R. Malachowski 
(ed.) Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond) (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd., 1991), pp. 257 — 275 at 273.
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philosophical problems have come to us in the form that they have. Nagel’s claim for the 
eternal importance o f certain philosophical questions, specifically ‘the problem  o f the 
external world and the problem o f other minds’^  ^can, in  the light o f  Philosophy and the Mirror 
of Nature, be seen to assume that these name two fixed and readily identifiable problems to 
which different philosophers have successively sought answers, a claim that cannot on 
inspection be sustained.^^
In terms o f whether addressing the supposedly perennial questions o f  philosophy is 
necessitated by the needs o f hum an beings, Rorty believes that philosophy has often 
advanced not by the rigorous examination o f a thesis, but by changing the subject; no t by 
solving old problems, but by letting them  quietly pass out o f interest. He notes for example 
that scholasticism was never refuted, but simply left behind as an object o f  intellectual 
interest. H e goes on to point out that:
Hobbes did not have theological arguments against D ante’s world-picture;
K ant had only a very bad scientific argument for the phenomenological 
character o f science; Nietzsche and James did not have epistemological 
arguments for pragmatism. Each o f these thinkers presented us with a new 
form o f intellectual hfe, and asked us to compare its advantages with the 
old.""
■^2 Nagel, Concealment and'Exposure, p. 158.
23 For example, Rorty lists nine of the different ways in which philosophers have understood ‘the 
mental’. Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1979), p. 35.
24 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 156.
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Philosophers who wish to set aside one set o f problems or propose an alternative are 
however presented with a difficulty, for they m ust be careful to avoid relying on the same 
kind o f assumption to those that they are trying to leave behind. Rorty points out the 
tendency amongst those who engage in  argument against metaphysics to replace one 
metaphysical system with another. Heidegger called Nietzsche ‘the last metaphysician’, and 
Rorty views the later Heidegger to be suffering from the same contradiction, o f  substituting 
one form o f metaphysics with another.^^ In Consequences of Pragmatism, Rorty writes that 
pragmatists such as himself face a dilemma: ‘if  their language is too  unphilosophical, too 
“literary,” they will be accused o f changing the subject; if  it is too  philosophical it wiU 
embody Platonic assumptions which will make it impossible for the pragmatist to state the 
conclusion he wants to reach’.^ *^ In  both Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature and Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity, he claimed to have grasped the first horn o f this dilemma, seeking to 
change the subject in order ‘to avoid hinting that this suggestion gets something right, that 
my sort o f philosophy corresponds to the way things really are’,^  ^ a notion that he viewed as 
being tainted by metaphysics. His way of doing so in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity is to 
eschew any suggestion that he is arguing, or making truth claims.
Rorty however uses argumentation in a very specific way, and it is im portant to be clear that 
his rejection o f the term in this sense does no t commit him to discard the term in its
Rorty discusses the tendency of contemporary Continental philosophers to put forward a post- 
Nietzschean method in Richard Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1999), 
pp. XX — xxi. Steven Yates believes that Rorty himself falls foul of the same self-referential 
contradiction in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, by relying on the foundation of language to argue 
against foundations. Yates, ‘Rorty’s Foundationalism’, 'Rfason Papers 14 (1989), pp. 130 -  136.
Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. xiv. Rorty thus allows for some sense to Nagel’s assertion that 
Rorty’s views are more popular outside of philosophy than within: since Rorty is seeking to change 
the subject, this is what we might expect from those wedded to current concerns.
^  Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 8. See also Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 371 —
2.
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everyday sense. His point is that argumentation has no application beyond the interior o f 
vocabularies. This is seen in the following illustration;
Europe did not decide to accept the idiom o f Romantic poetry, or o f socialist 
politics, or o f Galilean mechanics. That sort o f shift was no m ore an act o f  
will than it was a result o f argument. Rather, Europe gradually lost the habit 
o f using certain words and gradually acquired the habit o f using others.^®
These stories, as Rorty writes elsewhere, could not be told in advance by appealing to a neutral 
criterion o f rationality. It is this claim, and this notion o f rationality, that Rorty takes to mark 
m odem  philosophy, namely to specify ‘in advance the terms in  which all possible problems 
are to be set, and the criteria for their resolution’.^  ^ I t is this sense o f  ‘rationality* that Rorty 
means when he writes o f the need to give ‘up on the idea that intellectual or political 
progress is rational, in any sense o f “rational” which is neutral between vocabularies’.®” This 
is true, but for all that, the change to Galilean cosmology was a rational one in the sense that 
there were causes for the change as opposed to their being random  or arbitrary events.®’ To 
give a further example, Rorty comments that Orwell’s writings help us to ‘see that it ju st 
happened that rule in Europe passed into the hands o f people who pitied the humiliated and 
dreamed o f human equality, and that it may ju st happen that the world wül wind up being
78 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 6, emphasis in original.
79 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 109.
8° Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 48.
81 As for example Jonathan Salem-Wiseman takes Rorty to be claiming. Salem-Wiseman, ‘Absolute 
Knowing and Liberal Irony: Hegel, Rorty, and the Criterion of Progress’, International Studies in 
Philosopiy 31 (1999), pp. 139 — 153. The &stinction between ‘reasons’ and ‘causes’ is discussed in 
chapter 2.
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ruled by people who lack any such sentiments or ideas’.®^ In this passage, Rorty’s concern is 
to contrast contingent historical events -  ‘just happen’ — with inevitability, for example the 
working out o f the logic o f pure practical reason, or the dialectical unfolding o f history. H e is 
no t however saying that such changes were not, and would not be, explicable in terms o f 
cause and effect and not random  events.
Tliere is I suggest therefore no need for Rorty to claim that he is no t arguing us into 
changing our way o f speaking. Bjorn Ramberg is quite correct to  say that Rorty argues in ‘the 
sense o f attempting to rationally persuade’,®^ where o f course ‘rationally’ is taken to mean 
that Rorty gives reasons and explanations in order to convince others and, for this reason, I 
also agree with Gutting that Rorty ‘sells himself short by suggesting that he is no t persuading 
us by argument’.^ Rorty has subsequently dropped the idea that he no t seeking to  argue with 
the aim o f getting things right. In Truth and Progress he writes that he is ‘happy to say that 
when I put forward large philosophical views I am making “claims to  truth” rather than 
simply a recommendation to speak differently’.®^ Nevertheless he continues to emphasise the 
dismissive rather than the argumentative aspects o f his writings, writing that the essays in the 
first part o f that book ‘are not constructive in tone, but dismissive: they dismiss various 
questions and controversies as leading nowhere’.®® This should not blind us to the fact that 
Rorty does not merely assert that philosophers should change the subject. From  Philosopiy
82 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 184 -  185, emphasis in original.
83 Bjom T. Ramberg, ‘Rorty and the Instruments of Philosophy’, in Michael A. Peters and Paulo 
GhiraldeUi Jr. (eds.) Richard Rorty: Education, Philosopiy, and Politics (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefirld, 
2001), pp. 15 -  45 at 29.
84 Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 58; see also Matthew Festenstein, 
Pragmatism and Political Theory (Oxford: Polity, 1997), p. 114, and Alan Malachowski, ‘Review 
Symposium on Richard Rorty, History of the Human Sciences 3 (1990), pp. 101 — 122 at 117.
85 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 92, n. 16. The quotes around ‘claims to truth’ reflect the fact that Rorty 
is quoting Charles Taylor.
86 Ibid., p. 11.
30
and the Mirror on Nature onwards, he has engaged with the tradition o f m odern philosophy in 
order to illustrate its failings and limitations. H e has done so in a way that, although 
‘therapeutic’ rather than ‘constructive’, addresses those issues from  the inside, not by 
explaining them away as for example the result o f  particular sodo-historical developments, 
Rorty, in  short, is engaging in argumentation. In  what follows I will proceed by taking Rorty 
to be making truth claims, claims that are opened to  challenge by reason and argument.®^
4. Organisation of the thesis
In  chapter 2 , 1 examine Rorty’s account o f the relationship between philosophy and politics. 
A lthough famous for his criticisms o f philosophy as an academic discipline, in  his recent 
writings Rorty has increasingly placed that critique within a broader narrative. This narrative 
is one o f what he calls hum an maturation, in which concern with philosophical notions o f 
T ruth  and Rationality is viewed as a half-way stage between the world o f  religious certainties 
and a fully matured humanity that can thrive without rehance on or backup from any non­
hum an authority. I examine criticisms o f this view, notably in respect o f Rorty’s 
understanding o f philosophy as foundationalism, by relating the criticisms o f 
foundationalism with his broader, political vision, taking up his view that post-m odernism  is
I will thus leave aside criticisms such as those of Culler’s, that amount to nothing more than petty 
slights and vague and unsupported conjecture about Rorty’s psychology and intellectual integrity. 
Interestingly, in such cases, where evidence is proffered, it often counts against the stated objection. 
Culler, by correctly pointing out that Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is a work of systematic 
engagement with philosophical questions, obligingly refutes himself, since that book was published in 
1979 when Rorty was a tenured professor at Princeton and so on Culler’s logic had no need to 
publish that type of work but ought rather have been busily attempting to immunise himself from 
critical challenge. It is also clear that if Rorty really had sought to protect himself from challenge, he 
has made an extraordinarily bad job of it.
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the culmination, not the negation, o f the hopes and aspirations o f  the Enlightenment. I 
conclude by considering Rorty’s view o f political liberalism, which he sees as the full 
application o f what he terms ‘anti-authoritarianism’.
The consequences o f Rorty’s anti-foundationalism for reason-giving are considered in 
chapter 3. In  the absence o f the sort o f foundations Rorty takes philosophers typically to 
have sought, many claim that Rorty reduces truth, goodness, etc. to a m atter o f what ‘we 
happen to think around here’. The chapter begins with an examination o f  the claim to 
‘universal validity’, made by among others Jürgen Habermas and Thom as Nagel. I argue that 
no substantive content can be given to this notion, and that the charge o f ‘merely’ fails 
because it has no contrastive force; there is nothing that is not a historically contingent belief. 
I go on to defend ethnocentrism by showing that beliefs and values are not morally arbitrary; 
they are the result o f particular historical influences, but that does not make them  relativistic 
or irrational.
In  chapter 4, I examine what for Rorty is a further consequence o f anti-foundationalism, 
ironism. It has been suggested that Rorty’s conception o f ironism  removes any basis for 
moral belief or conviction (even relativistic ones). For, as he accepts, awareness o f 
contingency wiU leave us with fears that we wiU be unable to dispel. Rorty’s account o f 
ironism is taken up by addressing the question o f whether it is possible to remain committed 
to beliefs if  we are aware o f their contingency and, secondly, whether ironism is compatible 
with liberalism. I suggest that ironism is not only compatible with holding liberal beliefs, but 
that a fuUy political liberalism ought to be an ironic liberalism.
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Having demonstrated that anti-foundationalism and ironism do not reduce to  ‘what we 
happen to think around here’, in  the second part o f  the thesis I take up the normative 
question o f the scope and application o f liberalism.
In  chapter 5, Rorty’s ethnocentric defence o f political liberalism is considered. 
Com m entators have claimed that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism entails unacceptable 
consequences for moral justification. I reject this reading, showing that justification is 
im portant, but that it is tied to the standards o f a particular ethnos. I go on to show how 
political hberahsm can be justified on ethnocentric grounds, by suggesting that it is the m ost 
successful way o f bringing together holders o f different views o f  the good with a degree o f 
fairness, but in a way that amounts to more than a Hobbesian modus vivendi.
I turn to consider the role o f political theory in chapter 6. For Rorty, the task for the political 
theorist is to draw attention to the ways in which the practices o f those societies fail to live 
up to  their self-image. This view is examined and defended against the objection that it is 
critically impotent. I then take up what has been seen as Rorty’s impoverished view o f 
philosophy and political theorising, and the criticism that he prom otes (either by design or 
by default) an uncritical endorsem ent o f the status quo. Finally, I compare Rorty’s account 
o f political theory with that o f  Michael Walzer’s account o f what he calls ‘internal social 
criticism’. While Walzer makes a strong contrast between the two projects, I argue that, 
properly understood, there is no difference, and that liberal political theorists such as John 
Rawls are engaged in the same enterprise as Walzerian social criticism, o f articulating the 
values o f Hberal society.
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In  chapter 7 , 1 consider how ethnocentric justification can escape making the standards o f  a 
particular ethnos the last word, and whether Rorty’s account adequately addresses challenges 
from  non-liberals. I show that Rorty avoids allowing justification to entail the uncritical 
endorsem ent o f values and practices by advocating what John  Rawls calls ‘reflective 
equilibrium’. I go on to argue against the claim that ‘we’ must, on Rorty’s account, be 
narrowly constituted by showing that there is no logical or moral reason why the boundaries 
o f  the liberal ethnos cannot potentially be global.
In  chapter 8, I examine the scope o f liberal claims. I argue that despite Rorty’s hostility to 
Kantian universaHsm, he is a universalist in the sense that he believes in  the desirability o f 
extending liberal values and institutions as widely as possible. Rorty’s hostility to 
universalism stems from a rejection o f the Kantian notion o f unconditional moral obligation, 
an idea not present in the accounts o f political liberals like Brian Barry. I contrast Rorty’s 
view o f universalism with that o f Barry, showing that he agrees with Barry about the 
desirability o f extending liberal values and institutions, ideally globally.
In  summary, the argument o f this thesis falls into two claims. Firsdy, anti-foundationalism is 
shown not to reduce reason giving and justification to merely what ‘we happen to think 
around here’. It is also cleansed o f claims that it is relativistic, irrational and nihilistic. 
Secondly, liberalism is shown to be capable o f being defended on an anti-foundationalist 
account, and that a correct understanding o f ethnocentrism leaves a robust and refreshed 
account o f political liberalism.
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The thesis is original in interpretation and goes beyond the standard critiques o f Rorty. It 
contrasts with the near-consensus that Rorty is a relativist, one who denies any normative 
project in political theory and for w hom  anti-foundationalism collapses into parochialism 
and conservatism. Against this, I argue that his position, far from  being antithetical to 
political liberalism, is able to support a liberal agenda.
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Chapter Two
Anti-authoritarianism and political liberalism
Fam ous for his criticisms o f  philosophy as an academic discipline, in  recent writings 
Rorty has come increasingly to  place that critique within a broader historical narrative 
revolving around what he views, controversially, to be a story o f  hum an maturation. In  
this narrative, humanity is held to be gradually putting aside non-hum an forms o f  
authority, be they religious or secular, and coming to recognise nothing other than the 
authority o f  hum an beings. This narrative, and its culm ination in political liberalism as a 
form  o f  w hat he calls ‘anti-authoritarianism ’, is examined in this chapter, which begins by 
examining Rorty’s understanding o f  philosophy as a foundational enterprise, one which 
takes knowledge to  be the attem pt to  represent the world in its own terms. 
Retrospectively, we can see Rorty’s earlier works, such as Philosophj and the Mirror o f "Nature 
and Consequences o f Pragmatism, as focusing on philosophical anti-authoritarianism, which 
rejects as nonsensical the attem pt to  represent the world as it is ‘in itse lf, and as putting 
forward his views o f  a ‘post-Philosophical culture’, in which ‘m en and w om en felt 
themselves alone, merely finite, with no links to  som ething Beyond’.^  This account has 
been criticised in many respects, bu t my concern here is to  examine Rorty’s view o f anti- 
foundationalism  specifically in the context o f  his narrative o f  m aturation. For Jo h n  
M cDowell, far from  being a sign o f  maturity, the ability to  set aside philosophical 
questions about ‘our answerability to the w orld’ is a regressive step; for him, the maturity 
to which Rorty refers is in fact secured by recognising our obligations to  the world. T he 
political side o f  this story is then examined, starting with Rorty’s account o f  the relation
 ^Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, pp. xlii — xliii.
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betw een Enlightenm ent and postm odernism. Rorty regards postm odernism  to be the 
culmination, no t the negation, o f  the aspirations o f  the Enlightenm ent. F or many, 
however, postm odernism  is antithetical to those aspirations o f  the Enlightenm ent that 
Rorty seeks to  preserve. For John  Gray, although Rorty is correct to  see the 
Enlightenm ent culminating in postm odernism , this also marks its undoing. I reject bo th  
claims, and go on  to  show how anti-authoritarianism is central to  Rorty’s view o f  
Uberalism which seeks above all the avoidance o f  cruelty. Critics like Jo h n  Kekes attack 
Rorty’s presentation on this point as vacuous, arguing that it tells us nothing substantial 
about w hat it is that is cruel, bu t that it is merely a ‘slogan’ that exemplifies liberal high­
m indedness. I show how  political liberalism thus understood is n o t vacuous, and is 
intimately related to  the fuH application o f  anti-authoritarianism.
5. Philosophical narrative of maturation
5.1 *Thephilosophical urge*
Rorty has becom e infam ous am ong philosophers for w hat m any take to  be his 
postm odern efforts to  displace philosophy as a discipline or field o f  knowledge. The 
association o f  Rorty with postm odernism  is often m ade carelessly — sometim es, as I 
show below, by Rorty him self — but it is clear that taken together, his books and essays 
am ount to  a rejection o f many o f the practices and concerns o f  W estern philosophy. His 
critique o f  ‘the tradition’ is, in part, a highly personal one. In  his essay ‘Trotsky and the 
wild orchids’,^  Rorty traces his intellectual developm ent as a process o f  breaking away 
fiom  the picture that he found attractive in his youth. In  this autobiographical piece.
2 In Rorty, Philosophj and Social Hope, pp. 3 — 20.
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Rorty says that he came to  study philosophy as a secular m eans to  access absolute Truth, 
to rise to the top o f  Plato’s divided Hne. However, he gradually came to  see the history o f 
philosophy as a series o f  failed attem pts, one m arked by an inability to  get %eyond 
hypotheses’, to  find the standpoint from  which alternative fiirst principles could be 
neutrally evaluated.
Rorty views this search — the history o f  philosophy — as a series o f  attem pts to  escape 
from  history by a discipline which claims to  possess access to  necessary truth. It is 
animated by w hat he calls *the philosophical urge’^ , the urge for som ething certain and 
eternal to  back up our hum an beliefs and practices. P re-m odem  (that is, pre-Cartesian) 
philosophy sought to do this by uncovering the reality behind the everyday world o f  
appearances, for example by reaching the top  o f  Plato’s divided hne. T he burgeoning o f  
the natural sciences from  the early sixteenth century led to  science taking the place o f  
philosophy as the means to uncovering and understand reahty, and that, together with 
later cultural changes such as those brought about by the F rench Revolution, led to  a 
turn inwards, to  a concern with how  we can be sure o f  the tru th  o f  the knowledge the 
new sciences claim to provide.
Descartes, w ho can be seen retrospectively as the founder o f  m odem  philosophy, w rote 
o f the m ind being cut o ff from  the w orld by a ‘veil o f  ideas’, creating the image o f  the 
mind as som ething that seeks to  represent the world, w ith philosophy seeking to  
guarantee the fidelity o f  those representations. Rorty writes that: ‘In  D escartes’ 
conception — the one which becam e the basis o f “m odem ” epistemology — it is 
représentations which are in the “m ind” . T he Inner Eye surveys these representations
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 179, emphasis in original.
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hoping to find some mark which will testify to their fidelity'/ Thus arises the problem of 
scepticism in its modem form, for if  knowledge is conceived o f in terms o f  accurate 
representations and the mind as an inner arena which scrutinises the sense impressions 
o f the outside world, a gap opens up between reality and the images that seem to 
represent it. The reconciliation between the two, between the representations of the 
individual subject and the object which is represented, has for Rorty been the goal o f 
m ost subsequent philosophy. It is thus ‘representationaHst’, concerned to represent 
accurately the nature o f reality: Thilosophy’s central concern is to be a general theory o f 
representation, a theory which wiU divide culture up into the areas which represent reality 
well, those which represent it less well, and those which do not represent it at all (despite 
their pretense o f doing so).’^
This aspiration to accuracy o f representation relies on the assumption o f a world waiting 
to be represented according to its own lights. Ancient philosophy was characterised by 
the distinction between Appearance and Reality, and although epistemology came to 
dominate modern philosophy over the ancient metaphysical concerns,^ it retains 
something o f the ancient distinction in its claim that a break exists between the mind and 
the world, with some representations being more accurate than others. Beyond the 
differences between philosophers, m odem  philosophy is characterised by a central 
metaphysical claim, that o f postulating the existence o f what Kant called the Ding an sich  ^
a world that exists before and behind the everyday world that we inhabit, a world which 
‘so to speak, looms behind such things — something august and remote.’^  Philosophy’s
Ibid., p. 45, emphasis in original.
5 Ibid., p. 3.
 ^ Recently, Rorty has called his claim, made in Philosopf:^  and the Mirror of Nature, that modem 
philosophy reversed the ancient priority of metaphysics over epistemology, ‘hopeless’. Richard 
Rorty, ‘Response to Michael Williams’ in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Rorty and His Critics, (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), pp. 213 - 219 at 213.
7 Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism’, p. 8.
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concern with w hat Rorty variously calls ‘Reality as It Is in  Itself^ or the ‘Intrinsic N ature 
o f  Reahty’^  through its attem pt to  represent ‘N ature’s O w n Vocabulary’ ®^ or ‘The O ne 
Right D escription ’^  ^ or ‘the O ne True A ccount o f H ow  Things Really A re’’^  led to  its 
self-description as serving as the foundation for aU areas o f  hum an inquiry, since its 
knowledge o f  necessary truths enables philosophers to  adjudicate the claims o f  the other, 
empirical, disciplines. It seeks, in Rorty’s words, ‘to m ap ou t all possible logical space, to  
m ake explicit our implicit grasp o f  the realm o f  possibility .. .  philosophy [on this 
account] consists in clarification, in patiendy m aking explicit w hat has remained 
implicit’.
The critique o f  the W estern philosophical tradition is however bu t one part o f  a broader 
narrative o f  maturity that Rorty has started to  tell about W estern society. Philosopiy and the 
M irror of Nature is a sustained analysis o f  the questions and issues that have been central 
to the W estern philosophical tradition since Descartes, bu t as is clear, particularly in the 
third part o f  the book, that Rorty regards the urge for certainty over and above the 
contingencies o f  everyday life as a sym ptom  o f  a m ore general immaturity, o f ‘a desire for 
constraint — a desire to  find “ foundations” to  which one m ight cling, frameworks beyond 
which one m ust no t stray’. H e  has come increasingly to see philosophy, w ith its origins 
w ith Plato, as a secular version o f religious abasem ent before G od, in  which the Form s 
take the place o f  God. This is seen for example in his view that today, ‘the role once 
played by defenders o f  religious belief is played by defenders o f  reahsm ’.’^
8 Rorty, Truth and Proems, p. 72.
 ^Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism’, p. 7. 
0^ Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 140.
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 40.
2^ Rorty, Philosopiy and Social Hope, p. 270.
13 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 12.
14 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 315.
15 Rorty, ‘Response to Michael Williams’, p. 217.
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The ‘philosophical urge’ is the secular counterpart o f the religious notion that only the 
eternal is o f ultimate value. W ithout the reassurance o f eternity, everything is transitory 
and thus for many merely contingent and so ultimately w o rth less .T h ere  is also a moral 
aspect to this concern, which is that without the standpoint o f eternity, we deny the 
possibility o f giving a final answer to those who challenge our views o f the content and 
purpose o f morality. These two concerns unite in the need Rorty diagnoses in many to 
feel in touch with something over and above the human, and leads to the contrast he 
sees between those who see fraternity between human beings as the highest hope for the 
future and those for whom this is not enough, and who seek a higher authority. ‘These 
two types o f people’, he writes, ‘are conveniently describable in Freudian terms: they are 
the people who think subjection to an authority-figure is necessary to lead a properly 
human life and those who see such a life as requiring freedom from any such 
subjection’.
In Philosophj and the Mirror o f Nature Rorty agrees with Sartre that the attempt to gain 
objective knowledge is an attempt to avoid responsibility for choosing one’s own 
projects^®. This is a claim that he has spelt out much more fuUy in later writings, notably 
the essay ‘Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism’:
Rorty suggests that the realist’s desire for objectivity over and above that o f solidarity is a 
disguised form of the fear that one’s community, and thus its values, may die. Rorty, Objectivity, 
^lativism, and Truth, pp. 3 1 —32.
Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism’, p. 15. Roy Bhaskar argues that Rorty himself 
remains trapped within the traditional philosophical problematic, and that his own ‘critical 
realism’ leads to full de-divinization of the world. It is clear that Rorty would not view critical 
realism in this way, particularly Bhaskar’s claim that it entails ‘the de-anthropomorphization and 
de-humanization of nature’. Bhaskar, Philosophj and the Idea of Freedom, p. 33.
18 Rorty, Philosophj and the Mirror of Nature, p. 361. He might also agree with Thomas C. Grey’s 
view of philosophy as ‘escapism’, the retreat from the problems of life into the supposed 
problems of eternity. See Grey, ‘Freestanding Legal Pragmatism, in Morris Dickstein (ed.) The 
A vivai of Pragmatism (London: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 254 — 274.
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The pragmatists’ anti-representationalist account o f belief is, am ong 
other things, a protest against the idea that hum an beings m ust hum ble 
themselves before som ething non-hum an, w hether the WiU o f  G o d  or 
the Intrinsic N ature o f  Reality, Seeing anti-representationalism  [as] a 
version o f  anti-authoritarianism perm its one to  appreciate an analogy 
which was central to John  Dewey’s thought: the  analogy betw een ceasing 
to beUeve in Sin and ceasing to  accept the distinction betw een Reahty and 
Appearance.^’
It is w orth pausing to  note that there is a tension in  Rorty’s writing regarding rehgion. 
Sometimes m onotheistic rehgion is seen as a form  o f  authoritarianism, one that in 
Rorty’s narrative o f m aturation is replaced by secular versions starting w ith the Platonic 
Form s. This idea is central to the  distinction draw n in the essay ‘Sohdarity or 
Objectivity’?’ where he writes that there are two ways in  which hum ans, by placing their 
hves in a larger context, give them  meaning: by contributing to  a comm unity, real or 
imagined, o r to  a non-hum an reahty.^® In  other places, notably the essay ‘Pragm atism  as 
Rom antic Polytheism’, Rorty seeks to  make space for rehgion by suggesting how  
rehgious visions o f  tru th  and goodness can be seen as one ‘poem ’ am ongst m any others, 
and he seeks to defend this view o f  rehgion against the aggressive atheism  o f  N ietzsche 
on  the one hand and scientism on the other.^^ Rorty, I suggest, resolves this tension in a 
way that coheres with his other concerns in his essay ‘Rehgious Faith, InteUectual 
Responsibihty and Rom ance’, where he writes approvingly o f  a rehgious faith that ‘is 
hard to  distinguish from  love for, and hope for, the hum an com m unity’.^  This is
19 Rorty, ‘Pragmatism as Anti-Authoritarianism’, p. 7. See also Rorty, Truth andPrv^ress, p. 78.
20 Rorty, Objectivity, PBlativism, and Truth, pp. 21 — 34.
21 Richard Rorty, Pragmatism as Romantic Polytheism’, in Morris Dickstein (ed.) The Revival of 
Pragmatism (London: Duke University Press, 1998), pp. 21 — 36.
22 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, pp. 148 — 167 at 160.
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however to  adopt a particular view o f religion, and although we do no t have to  go as far 
as Stanley Fish and say that Rorty is calling for a 'de-divinized' theology,^ he is certainly 
prom oting a particular image o f Christianity, and o f  religion in general, which is highly 
controversial,^'^ drawing as it does on Dewey’s view o f  the stages o f  religious 
consciousness.
5.2 A nsw erability to the world
T o claim that giving up on responsibility to  any form  o f  non-hum an authority, be it G od 
or the Intrinsic N ature o f  Reahty, is a form  o f m aturation is provocative, and it has been 
challenged in its own terms. For Thom as Nagel, Thhosophy is the childhood o f the 
intellect, and a culture that tries to  skip it will never grow up’.^  ^ It can further be argued 
that refusal to  recognise a responsibihty to  the w orld is itself a form  o f  immaturity. For 
John  McDoweU, ‘[ajcknowledging a non-hum an external authority over our thinking, so 
far from  being a betrayal o f our humanity, is merely a condition o f  growing up.’^  ^T o  see 
exactly w hat is at issue here, it is im portant to consider w hat Rorty m eans by 
responsibihty to  the world. His denial o f  ‘Reahty as It Is in I tse lf foUows up on W ilfred 
SeUars’ criticisms o f the empiricist foundationahsm  o f  Locke, w ho held that knowledge 
emerges through direct acquaintance w ith objects that appear immediately before the 
mind. SeUars argued that nothing — no thing — can require us to represent it in  any 
particular way. T he idea that it does he term ed the ‘M yth o f  the G iven’, the m yth that 
there is a pre-hnguistic ‘thing in itse lf which holds that tru th  is the result o f  a causal
23 Stanley Fish, The Trouble with Principle (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 297.
24 As we wiU see in chapter 5.
25 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 12.
26 John McDoweU, ‘Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Pjorty and His 
Critics, (Oxford: BlackweU, 2000), pp. 109 — 123 at 120.
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relationship betw een objects and the mind, which produces indisputable knowledge. 
D raw ing on Kant, Sellars claimed that sensations alone do no t count as knowledge, 
because there is no  ‘direct acquaintance’, w ith any object; there are no objects that are 
‘immediately before the m ind’.^  ^ Any report, be it o f  science o r com m onsense, is 
m ediated by language, which is itself the product o f  social practice.
Sellars follows up on K ant’s claim that intuitions w ithout concepts are bUnd, and Rorty, 
accepting the claim that there is no way to  distinguish w hat is innately given from  w hat is 
contributed by the m ind, has seemed to com m entators like McDoweU to  endorse the 
K antian notion o f  the m ind-dependence o f  phenom enal reahty.^ However, Rorty argues 
that K ant’s position is flawed because it preserves the misconceived Cartesian concern o f 
getting the content o f  our minds to  m atch up to the external world in its claim that the 
categories o f  the m ind constitute experience. It assumes w hat D onald  D avidson caUs ‘the 
third dogm a o f  empiricism’, that there is a pre-conceptual w orld upon  w hich hum ans 
im pose our own concepts and understandings.^^ In  contrast, Rorty argues that it is 
impossible to divide up the parts o f  the world contributed by the m ind from  the world 
itself; he quotes Hilary Putnam  approvingly w hen he says that ‘elements o f  w hat we caU 
‘language’ or ‘m ind’ penetrate so deeply into w hat we caU ‘reality’ that the very project o f 
representing ourselves as being ‘m appers’ o f  som ething ‘language-independent’ is fataUy 
com prom ised from  the start’.^ °
Rorty quoting SeUars in Rorty’s Introduction' to Wilfred SeUars, ‘Empiricism and the 
Philosophy of Mind’, (London: Harvard University Press, 1997) edited by Robert Brandom, pp. 1 
— 12 at 5.
28 McDoweU draws out the paraUels in his essay, ‘Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity’.
29 See chapter 7.
30 Hilary Putnam, 'Realism With a Human Face (London: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 28, 
emphasis suppressed. Quoted by Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 43.
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This claim has led several critics to  take Rorty to be proposing a form  o f  linguistic 
idealism. Frank Farrell understands Rorty to be saying that the world can be conceived o f 
in any way, simply by an act o f will. Rorty is said to  offer a ‘narcissistic version [of 
idealism] o f  encountering only ourselves w hen we think and talk. T o  com e to grips with 
the w orld is just to  encounter our own present cultural artefacts ... we never encounter 
anything but w hat we have m ade.’^  ^ Rorty’s point is no t however that hum ans ‘construct’ 
the world; he further agrees with Putnam ’s m etaphor o f  ‘cookie cutting’^ :^ unlike the 
relationship between the cookie cutter and her dough, hum ans cannot simply cut the 
world up in  any way that we please but are constrained by the w orld to  accept and reject 
different pictures. Rorty specifies this claim by distinguishing ‘causal’ relations to  the 
world from  ‘representational’ relations. The w orld causes us to  experience m any things; we 
cannot help our physical interaction with it. However, the sensations that we experience 
do n o t have to  be represented in any particular way: as Rorty puts it, ‘T he world is out 
there, bu t descriptions o f  the world are no t’.^  ^ The world is indifferent, for example, to 
how we measure tem perature, or geographical distance, and the ways in which 
tem peratures and distances are measured are conventions, created by hum ans for their 
own purposes. Rorty rejects bo th  the idea that dispositions are ‘in  the things themselves’, 
and the view that they are som ething we ‘project’ as, respectively, metaphysical realism, 
and idealism: ‘the idealists confused the idea that nothing has ... [an intrinsic nature to  be
Frank B. Farrell, Subjectivity, ^alism  and Postmodernism — The Recovety of the World in Recent 
Philosophj (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 139. See also Jim Garrison, Rorty, 
Metaphysics, and Human Potential’, in Michael A. Peters and Paulo GhiraldeUi Jr. (eds.) Rdchard 
Rorty: Education, Philosoplj, and Politics (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002), 
pp. 47 — 66; Bhaskar, Philosophj and the Idea of Freedom, p. 38; Gideon C alder, Rorty and Resdescription 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2003), pp. 40 — 41.
32 Hilary Putnam, The Manj Faces of Realism (LaSaUe, Illinois: Open Court, 1987), p. 19.
33 Rorty, Contingency, Ironj, and Solidarity, p. 5. See also Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 83.
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expressed or represented] with the idea that space and time are unreal, that hum an beings 
cause the spatiotem poral world to  exist.
O ther com m entators, recognising that Rorty is n o t a linguistic idealist, and that he 
affirms the existence o f  a world existing independently o f  us, think that he can only say 
this on pain o f  contradiction. Ian Shapiro writes that for Rorty ‘there is an external world 
that operates (at least partly) independently o f  our beliefs about it and indeed that it 
pardy shapes those beliefs’. In  saying this, Shapiro correcdy counters claims such as 
Farrell’s, but he does so only to  offer another criticism, that ‘this view rests on an implicit 
version o f  the realism that Rorty claims to  reject’.^  ^ However, hke Farrell, Shapiro misses 
the distinction between causal and representational connection to  the world. As Rorty 
has recendy written in response to a similar criticism, ‘if  all it takes to  be a realist is to 
grant that “hum an practices and languages are conditioned by determ inate features o f  the 
w orld”, then I certainly count as a realist’.^ *^ So does everybody else. T o  be a realist is to  
affirm  m uch m ore than this. It means that there is a way that the world really is, one that 
Hes behind our various attempts to  cope with it, and which determines the utility o f  these 
different attempts. For Rorty, realism is a form  o f representationahsm ; it is no t the view 
that there is a world that exists independendy o f  us, bu t rather the view that the world 
can be represented in its own terms. This Rorty rejects, and for the same reason rejects 
the label ‘anti-reahst’^ ,^ viewing the realism—anti-realism debate to presuppose the
34 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 4. See also Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 
276.
35 Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 34. See also Jacek Holdwska, ‘Philosophy and the Mirage of 
Hermeneutics’, in Alan R  Malachowski (ed.), P^ading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature (arid Beyond) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991), pp. 187 -  197.
36 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Kate Soper’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) 
Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 130 — 133 at 130.
37 Attributed to him by Ben H. Lets on, Davidson's Theory of Truth and Its Implication for Rorty's 
Pragmatism (New York Peter Lang, 1997), p. 20; Taylor calls Rorty a ‘non-realist’ in Taylor, ‘Rorty 
and the Epistemological Tradition’, p. 258.
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representationaHst picture o f  the world which he rejects, w ith reahsts and anti-reahsts 
differing over which areas o f  inquiry, if  any, represent the ‘facts o f  the m atter’.
5.3 U nderstanding under a description
Against the representationaHst/reahst claim that there is som e metaphysical order o f 
reahty, Rorty argues that understanding is always o f  objects under a description, a view 
w hich necessitates giving up the claim to describe the thing as it is in  itself,^® This point 
becom es clearer if  we consider the claims o f  those w ho adopt a representationaHst view 
o f  the world. Thom as Nagel refers to  ‘the world as it is in  itse lf the objective world 
w hich he beHeves Hes untouched behind the world o f  appearance produced by hum an 
subjectivity. Similarly, N orm an Geras writes that Rorty ‘cannot cope w ith explaining 
how, if  there is no t som ething which is what it is apart from  any description, there could 
be som ething which pre-existed aU description; as to  the best o f  our knowledge there 
is’.'^ But, given Rorty’s rejection o f  linguistic ideaHsm, and his claim that ‘there is such a 
thing as brute physical resistance’,'^  ^ what exacdy is it that exists prior to  description? 
N either Nagel or Geras teU us, and on  Rorty’s account, the reason for this is, 
straightforwardly, that it is impossible to  do so. I f  one specifies a feature o f  the world 
that is purportedly free o f  subjective features, questions arise as to  w hether that 
description reaUy is objective or, despite Nagel’s conviction, a m ere appearance. Rorty 
writes:
38 Calder is therefore mistaken to summarise Rorty as claiming that ‘“nature” and “reaHty” in 
themselves are strictly beyond the scope of our description’ (Calder, Korty and RBdescription, p, 31): 
they are not h^ond description, but have no referents without descriptions.
39 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 5.
40 Norman Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind: the Ungroundable Liberalism of Richard 
Rorty (New York: Verso, 1995), p. 138.
41 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 81.
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As soon as we start thinking o f  “the world” as atom s and the void, or 
sense data and awareness o f  them , or “stimuli” o f  a certain sort brought 
to  bear upon organs o f  a certain sort, we have changed the nam e o f  the 
game. For we are now well w ithin some particular theory about how  the 
w orld is."^ ^
Nagel fails to  specify content to  the world ‘as it is in  itself. Steven Lukes is m ore 
forthcom ing, writing that ‘no t all the w orld’s furniture is moveable, and bo th  gods and 
atom s are anchored in theory-neutral, if  no t theory-free, observations o f  a boring, 
m undane sort’.'^  ^ Lukes leaves the distinction between som ething being ‘theory-neutral’ 
and its being ‘theory-free’ unspecitied but, whatever it m ight be, it is no t the case that 
gods, or indeed atoms, have an existence that is neutral in  the sense that it is unm oved in  
the change from  one theory to  another. In  claiming that w hat he says is m undane and 
boring, the sort o f  thing we can infer that only a relativist would be crazy enough to  call 
into question, Lukes passes over the fact that w hat is taken to  be boring or m undane will 
vary from  person to  person, and comm unity to  community.
A m ore nuanced account is that o f  Bernard Wdhams, w ho discusses w hat he calls the 
‘absolute conception’ o f the world, the ‘world that is there anyway, independent o f  our 
experience’."*^ The absolute perspective is, he claims, the one that ‘finished science’ w ould 
ideally converge upon, since physics, unlike ethics, is in his view untainted by hum an 
perspectives that stem  from  our particular psychology. WiUiams distinguishes ‘absolute
42 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 14.
43 Steven Lukes, ‘Relativism in its Place’, in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.) Psztionality and 
P^lativism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982), pp. 261 — 305 at 271.
44 Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (London: Fontana, 1985), p. 138, emphasis 
in original.
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qualities’ from  ‘perspectival qualities’, arguing that the absolute description o f  the world 
w ould be a description that used only the former. Thus, the absolute conception o f  the 
w orld would use physical terms like ‘extension’ but no t ones like ‘colour’, the latter 
stem m ing from  a peculiarly hum an perspective. However, although Williams spells his 
position out in greater detail than either Nagel or Lukes, the same problem  remains, 
namely how  to distinguish non-perspective and perspectival states o f the world. W hy 
should we assume for example that scientific concerns, such as the abihty to  predict and 
control physical objects, is any freer o f  hum an perspectives than the ascription o f  
colour?"^ ^
Rorty is clear that there is no  description o f the world — commonsensical, scientific, 
ethical, etc., — that describes that w orld as it is in itself, that is, the world separate from  
any hum an interests or concerns and the vocabularies that they give rise to. This idea 
Rorty beUeves to  follow on from  a Darwinian account o f  hum an behaviour, which sees 
hum ans as seeking to cope with, rather than  represent, the world. Vocabularies are tools 
for coping with, rather than mirrors for representing, reahty: ‘O ne o f  the things we want 
to  do with language is to  get food, another is to  get sex, another is to understand the 
origin o f  the universe’."^  D ifferent historical and environm ental conditions m ean that we 
cope in  different ways, bu t there is no  overarching task o f  representing Reahty As It Is in 
Itself.
T he idea o f  correspondence to  the w orld ‘as it is in itse lf is w ithout content, because 
there are no  critetia specified by the world. W ithin a vocabulary, there are facts, but all
Rorty, Objectivity, Rjelativism, and Truth, pp. 57 — 59. In proposing some examples of absolute 
qualities, Williams also assumes that the world breaks down neatly into areas such as ethics which 
Qre claims) are perspectival, and natural science which (he says) is not. As Putnam shows, this 
division itself breaks down upon inspection. Hilary Putnam, ^newing Philosophy (London: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), pp. 80 — 107.
^  Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 127.
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knowledge-claims are regulated by those vocabularies, and there is no  neutral way to  test 
how  accurately different vocabularies represent reahty. For those in different language 
games, the claims o f  others will no t be reasons^  bu t errors and symptoms o f  irrationahty.'^^ 
Conversely, those w ho seek change will treat the old vocabulary as a m ere prejudice, etc. 
However, if  we give up on the idea o f  w hat Hilary Pum am  calls the ‘G o d ’s Eye View’ or 
Way the W orld Is that many assume afford us insight into which changes are rational and 
which irrational, then we m ust recognize that there is no standpoint from  which neutrally 
and definitively to  judge this m atter, and that our individual standards are reflections o f 
particular needs, behefs and interests.
Rorty suggests, therefore, that we should ‘limit the opposition between rational and 
irrational forms o f persuasion to  the interior o f language game[s], rather than try to apply it 
to interesting and important shifts in linguistic behaviour’.^ This entaüs a distinction 
between reasons and arguments on the one hand, and causation on the other. Arguments 
take place within an established set o f practices, and reasons are given within them. Rorty’s 
-difference with representationalists like Nagel, it is im portant to recognise, concerns the 
distinction between vocabularies and statements. Once one has ‘decided’ on a vocabulary, 
there are arguments to be had about truth-claims. Rodney Barker writes that “‘the language 
games o f one’s time” should not be dismissed as trivial. They are engaged in with serious 
and benign intent by many who seek thereby to advance the happiness o f humanity or the 
justice with which it arranges its affairs’."*^ Barker intends this as a challenge to Rorty, but 
Rorty would however agree about the importance o f reason giving within language games. 
His claim is that one cannot move beyond language games to ask whether one particular
47 Recall Nagel’s claim that views such as Rorty’s ‘have a self-evident air if they are not examined 
too closely, which may account for their greater popularity outside philosophy than in it’. Nagel, 
The hast Word, p. 29. Compare Rorty, Philosophj and the Mirror of'Mature, p. 370.
48 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 47.
49 Rodney Barker, Legitimating Identities: the self-presentation of rulers and subjects (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 19.
50
language game somehow represents reality m ore accurately than any other. That is, against 
the realist/representationalist, he denies that vocabularies themselves can be true or false. In  
opposing ‘argument’, his claim is that one cannot argue from one vocabulary to  another, for 
there is no independent ground for adjudicating between them:
[...] we often let the world decide the competition between alternative 
sentences (e.g., between “Red wins” and “Black wins” . ..) .. .But it is no t so 
easy w hen we turn from individual sentences to vocabularies as 
w holes... [here] the idea that the world decides which descriptions are true 
can no longer be given a clear sense.
Anti-foundationaHsm entails that we ‘give up on the idea there can be reasons for using 
languages as well as reasons within languages for believing statem ents.’^^  Here, ‘as well as’ 
means ‘over and above’, no t ‘and’; there are reasons within vocabularies, b u t no t across 
them.
The postulation o f  a Reality that stands behind our different descriptions o f  it has led to  
the fruitless bu t often pernicious tendency to  divide areas o f  inquiry according to  the 
cognitive or ontological status o f  academic disciplines and o f  the tru th  claims they make. 
It has led, notably, to the distinction between the ‘hard’ ‘factual’ subjects, such as 
mathematics and physics, and the ‘soft’ ‘subjective’ ones such as art and literary criticism. 
Foundationalists are Hkely to allow scepticism and subjectivity in to  ethics, and are m ore 
likely to be anti-realists in ethics than in physics, because it is harder to  see w hat m oral 
values, u nlike hard physical substances, represent. Nagel for example believes that
50 Rorty, Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, p. 5.
51 Ibid., p. 48.
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subjectivism is m ore credible in ethics than science: ‘The standpoint o f  moraUty is m ore 
objective than that o f private Hfe, bu t less objective than the standpoint o f  physics’^ ,^ and 
for morality he denies the existence o f  ‘a universe o f moral facts that impinge on us 
c a u s a l l y R o r t y  also denies the existence o f  m oral facts existing independently o f  us out 
there in the world, bu t unlike Nagel this is because he thinks there are no  facts o f  any 
kind ‘out there’ in the world. D ifferent areas o f  culture aim at different things, bu t none 
is closer to  representing reahty than any other. They are rather severally the products o f 
our culturally inform ed way o f  coping w ith the world that confronts us.
6. The political narrative of maturation
6.1 Postm odernism  and the Enlightenm ent
A lthough interesting in itself, Rorty has com e to  place this interpretation o f  the history o f 
W estern philosophy within a broader, pohtical, narrative. It is a narrative in which (as we 
wiU see) philosophy can play a role — for him, ‘the pragmatist tradition no t just as clearing 
up httle messes left behind by the great dead philosophers, but as contributing to  a 
world-historical change in hum anity’s self-image’^ "^ — but it is one that is clearly m uch 
wider than the scope o f philosophy.
In  Rorty’s account, by far and away the m ost significant milestone on the way towards 
full hum an maturity was the European Enlightenm ent, which called into question beliefs 
and traditions that claim authority over hum an beings. It is in his discussion o f  the
52 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 5.
53 Nagel, The Last Word, p. 101.
54 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 132.
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Enlightenm ent that Rorty’s philosophical and political narratives com e together. His 
account is indebted to Heidegger, who viewed W estern metaphysics as a series o f 
attem pts to  em pow er hum an beings by uncovering the tru th  behind the everyday world 
o f  appearances. Heidegger argued that philosophers have increasingly allowed hum an 
interests to  enter the philosophical enterprise, reaching its logical conclusion w ith the 
Enlightenm ent and Am erican pragmatism, which he takes to  hold that there is no  truth 
beyond that which we create to  satisfy our everyday finite — hum an — ends.
For Heidegger, this was a disaster,^^ and like him, postm odernists are often held to  be 
opposed to  the legacy o f the Enlightenment. Rorty has called his own view a 
postm odernist one, but his relation to  postm odernism  is complex, evidenced by his 
equivocation over his readiness to  identify himself with it. A lthough he em braced the 
term  in essays such as P ostm odern ist Bourgeois Liberalism’,^  ^ he subsequently came to 
be wary o f  it, writing at one point that ‘I now regret ever having used this term ’.^  ^ I t is 
possible to identify several interrelated reasons for this. Part o f  the regret is probably 
because the term  has come to m ean all things to  all people, relating to  everything from  
philosophy to  architecture. Rorty however means it very specifically, in the sense o f  what 
Jean-Francois Lyotard called “‘distrust o f  metanarratives,” narratives which describe or 
predict the activities o f  such entities as the noum enal self or the Absolute Spirit or the 
Proletariat.’^ ® Postm odernism  in this sense means a rejection o f  notions that history is
55 For Rorty’s overview of Heidegger’s account of the history of Western metaphysics, see Rorty, 
Essc^s on Heide^er and Others, pp. 27 — 49.
55 In Rorty, Objectivity, Kektivism, and Truth, pp. 197 — 202.
57 Rorty, ‘Thugs and Theorists’, p. 578, n. 23. See also Richard Rorty, Truth, Politics and ‘Post­
modernism”: the Spinof^ a Eectures (Amsterdam: Van Gorcum, 1997), p. 13, where Rorty says that the 
term has been ‘ruined by over-use’. Significantly, one of the papers in this book, ‘Is ‘Post- 
Modernism” Relevant to Politics?’ (pp. 35 — 52), was subsequently re-published with the title: 
‘The Continuity between the Enlightenment and ‘Postmodernism’’,’ in Keith Michael Baker and 
Peter Hannis Reill (eds.) Whafs Eefi of Enlightenment'? A  Postmodern Question (Stanford: Stanford 
UP, 2001), pp. 19-36 .
58 Rorty, Objectivity, P^lativism, and Truth, pp. 198 -  199.
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shaped by forces beyond human control, such as the Hegelian Absolute, the historic role 
Marx assigned the Proletariat by virtue of their function in bringing about communism, 
and Kant’s claim that the noumenal self is the essence o f humanity/^ Although Rorty 
continues to oppose metanarratives, he now thinks that calling this position 
postmodernism is misleading. In his paper ‘Thugs and Theorists’, Rorty writes that he 
was persuaded by Jürgen Habermas’s book The Thilosophical Discourse o f Modernity that 
calling his position ‘postmodernism’ failed to capture the distinction he wanted to draw, 
between historicists like Hegel who rely on metanarratives, and those like Derrida who 
do n o t“
A final reason that Rorty has equivocated over his status as a postmodernist is, I suggest, 
that it has come to be used largely as a term of censure, specifically from its supposed 
hostility to the Enlightenment. Rorty however takes himself to be unequivocally 
committed to the moral and political legacy o f the Enlightenment, o f freedom from 
unvindicated sources o f authority. He has expressed his view of the matter in the 
following way:
These days intellectuals divide up into those who think that something 
new and important called ‘the postmodern’ is happening, and those who,
Hke Habermas, think we are (or should be) still plugging away at the 
familiar tasks set for us by the Enlightenment. The ones who, Hke me, 
agree with Habermas typically see the secularisation o f pubHc Hfe as the 
EnHghtenment’s central achievement, and see our job as the same as our
59 1 will discuss the claim that Rorty’s view itself rests upon a metanarrative in chapter 8. 
<50 Rorty, ‘Thugs and Theorists’, p. 578, n. 23.
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predecessors’: getting our fellow citizens to  rely less on tradition, and to 
be m ore willing to  experiment w ith new customs and institutions.^^
As well as setting out his view o f the central issue confronting W estern intellectuals 
today, this passage knowingly subverts the expectations o f m any o f  Rorty’s readers as to 
his position within that debate. The first sentence, with its homely reference to  ‘plugging 
away at familiar tasks’ perhaps gives the  impression that Rorty is presenting the 
Enlightenm ent as som ething that, like a lo t o f  things he discusses, has com e to  outlive its 
usefulness and which ought therefore to  be replaced. This is however n o t the case, for he 
is clear that the political and m oral legacy o f  the Enlightenm ent is vital: ‘There is’, he 
writes, ‘no m ore w orthy project at hand; we have nothing better to  do w ith our lives’.^ ^
However, a different legacy o f the Enlightenm ent is rationalist philosophy. This aspect o f  
the Enlightenm ent has, he believes, com e to  stand in the way o f securing the m oral and 
political goals o f  full hum an emancipation, and it is this legacy that, in calling him self a 
postm odernist, Rorty seeks to oppose. T he rhetoric o f rationality, specifically scientific 
rationality was, he argues, vital for the first stage o f the Enlightenm ent. D uring the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, opposition to  the established religious authorities 
primarily came from  the newly emerging natural sciences, and it was therefore natural for 
liberals to use the language and m ethodology o f  science. However, its political rhetoric 
retained forms o f  the religious need for hum an projects to  connect w ith a non-hum an 
reality, evidenced in its view o f  scientists as priests.^^ The perceived need to  isolate an 
ahistoric reason which can guide m oral and political decision-making is, Rorty believes, 
no  longer necessary. H e welcomes the secularisation o f  the W est heralded by the
Rorty, Philosophj and Social Hope, p. 168.
62 Ibid., xiv.
63 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 52.
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Enlightenm ent as a significant stage in hum an maturity, bu t thinks that can now  ‘throw  
away a set o f  ladders which, though once indispensable, have now  becom e 
encum brances’^ "^ that our forebears erected. Therefore, although Rorty sides w ith critics 
o f  postm odernism  such as Haberm as in thinking the Enlightenm ent concerns the ones 
that rem ain salient to  us today, postm odernism  understood in the sense o f ‘distrust o f  
m etanarratives’ is, he believes, central to the realisation o f  those Enlightenm ent concerns, 
Reahsing them  is finally to  give up on  any non-hum an authority — G od, reason, history, 
o r nature — as dictating hum an happiness.
Enlightenm ent rationalism is for Rorty not merely superfluous, bu t now  stands as an 
obstacle to  finally securing the goals o f the Enlightenment: ‘the vocabulary o f  
Enlightenm ent rationalism, although it was essential to  the beginnings o f  liberal 
democracy, has becom e an im pedim ent to  the preservation and progress o f dem ocratic 
societies.’^  ^Liberalism can and should be defended politically and moraUy,^*  ^and does no t 
require the extra, philosophical, support that it has been thought to  need.
T o  claim that rationalism is no t only superficial, bu t positively harmful, to  the political 
legacy o f the Enhghtenm ent is highly controversial. For many, a lot would be lost if  we 
abandon these philosophical supports. J. Judd  Owen, writing o f  Rorty’s denial o f  
philosophical foundations, asks:
H ow  can Rorty ignore the possibility that his own rejection o f  political 
rationalism — his headlong rejection o f all “absolute truths,” such as “that 
all m en are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truth, p. 12.
65 R o r t y ,  Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p .  4 4 .
66 As we will see in subsequent chapters.
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certain unalienable rights” — could prove (as earlier cases have in  fact 
proved) m ore dangerous?^^
Rather than ignoring this possibility, Rorty urges that the attem pt to  provide rationalist 
foundations is in fact a conservative desire. It assumes that there is a fixed set o f 
problem s to  be solved, ‘a natural order o f  topics and argum ents which is prior to, and 
overrides the results of, encounters between old and new vocabularies.’^ ® In  doing so it 
becom es a further instance o f authoritarianism, o f  the view that there is som ething that 
can stand over freely arrived agreement between hum an beings. As Rorty argued in 
Philosopfy and the M irror of Nature^ ‘investigations o f  the foundations o f  knowledge or 
morality or language or society may be simply apologetics, attem pts to  eternalize a certain 
contem porary language-game, social practice, or self-image’.*^  ^ Far from  securing 
freedom, attem pts to  provide it w ith philosophical foundations endanger it by assuming 
a fixed set o f  questions that need to  be discussed. Rorty argues for instance that the sorts 
o f  thing O w en thinks vital have often perpetuated injustice. Thom as Jefferson could for 
example affirm the absolute tru th  that all m en are created equal whilst owning slaves. 
Similar language has also served to exclude wom en ‘from  true humanity: for example, 
using “m an” as a synonym o f  “hum an being.” As feminists have pointed out, such
7^ J. Judd Owen, Peliÿon and the Demise ofUberal Nationalism: The Foundational Crisis of the Separation 
of Church and State (London: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 94.
<58 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 52. This answers Daniel Conway’s question: ‘Why 
would a philosopher who is committed to the historical disenfranchisement of metaphysics avail 
himself so readily of the metaphysically freighted practice of utopian theorising?’ Conway, ‘Irony, 
State and Utopia: Rorty’s “We” and the Problem of Transitional Praxif, in Matthew Festenstein 
and Simon Thompson (eds.) Pdchard Rory: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 55 — 88 
at 66. The answer is that Rorty would say that utopian thinking need not be metaphysical; indeed, 
if it is truly utopian, it cannot be metaphysical.
69 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 9 — 10. For this reason, I think Jonny Steinberg 
simply mistaken when he writes that Rorty nowhere explains why rejecting ‘rationalism’ will 
benefit liberalism. Steinberg, Post-Fnlightenment Philosophy and Liberal Universalism in the Political 
Thought of Isaiah Berlin and Nichard Rorty (Thesis (D.Phil.) University of Oxford, 1998), p. 46.
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usages reinforce the average male’s thankfulness that he was no t born  a wom an, as well 
as his fear o f  the ultimate degradation: feminization’7°
6.2 The relationship between ph ilosoph y and dem ocracy
It is central to  Rorty’s account to  stress w hat he calls the priority o f  democracy to 
philosophy. This is captured in his claim that liberal societies are those which are ‘content 
to  call “ true” (or “right” or “just”) whatever the outcom e o f  undistorted com m unication 
happens to  be, whatever wins in a free and open encounter’.^ ’ There is nothing that 
stands over this process o f  com m unication or dictates the terms in  which it is to  be 
carried out. H e writes that,
[...] in its ideal form, the culture o f  liberalism w ould be one which was 
enlightened, secular, through and through. I t w ould be one in which no 
trace o f  divinity remained, either in the form  o f  a divinized world or a 
divinized self. Such a culture would have no room  for the notion that 
there are nonhum an forces to  which hum an beings should be 
responsible.^^
This sounds very anti-philosophical, and indeed Rorty is frequently held to  be giving up 
on philosophy as an academic disciphne.^^ His relationship with philosophy is rather 
subder than  this however, as is seen m ost clearly in his book Consequences o f Pragmatism.
70 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 169.
71 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 67.
72 Ibid., p. 45.
73 See for example Tibor R  Machan, for whom Rorty is a ‘pseudo-philosopher’. Machan, 
‘Indefatigable Alchemist: Richard Rorty’s Radical Pragmatism’, American Scholar 65 (1996), p. 417 
-424 .
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T here he distinguished Philosophy (witii a capital P) from  philosophy in order to  present 
w hat he takes to be two distinct forms o f  philosophising. W hereas Philosophy is the 
quest for the essence o f  T ru th  or G oodness, philosophy is w hat Sellars called ‘an attem pt 
to  see how  things, in  the broadest possible sense o f  the term, hang together, in  the 
broadest possible sense o f  the term .’^ '^  I t is n o t an attem pt to  uncover the intrinsic nature 
o f  reality bu t to  bring together and examine the findings o f  different areas o f culture. 
A lthough it is no t the way he formulates the distinction outside o f  Consequences of 
Pragmatism^ the distinction is present throughout his writings, for example in a distinction 
presented in Philosophj and the M irror of Nature betw een tough and tender-m inded 
philosophers, the form er w ho aim at T ru th  and the latter at Significance,^^ and between 
bo th  ‘systematic’ and ‘edicative’ philosophers and metaphysicians and ironists in 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
It is certainly the case that Rorty opposes w hat he takes to  be the central assum ptions o f 
philosophy w hen it has sought procedures or m ethods for neutrally arbitrating between 
beliefs and values. Rorty takes this to  be the desire to  avoid confronting difficult 
questions by closing o ff options in advance through the provision o f  an algorithm, and 
against it he joins with Putnam  in arguing that the idea that philosophy is concerned with 
making explicit criteria ‘contradicts the very idea o f  p h i lo s o p h y .H e  further recognises 
that one reason m any philosophers treat this view o f  philosophy with distain is that 
foundationalism  has becom e so central to philosophy that to  repudiate the idea o f 
foundations seems to  repudiate philosophy itself. This he rejects, pointing out the 
contrast between contemporary philosophers w ho defend their subject as a discipline that 
trains one for clear thinking with an older, romantic view o f philosophy which is utopian
74 Quoted in Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. xiv.
75 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 73.
76 Rorty, Objectivity, Pelativism, and Truth, p. 25.
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and hopeful. This latter type o f philosopher inspire us, bringing issues into the public sphere 
for discussion. Those philosophers can help the process o f  m aturation, turning away 
from  the eternal and towards the future. Rorty writes that philosophers should:
[...] agree with M arx that our job is to  help m ake the future different 
from  the past, rather than claiming to  know w hat the future m ust 
necessarily have in  com m on with the past. W e have to  shift from  the 
kind o f  role that philosophers have shared w ith priests and sages to  a 
social role that has m ore in com m on with the engineer or the lawyer.^^
Philosophy can help to  fulfil hum an needs and interests, but, as is consistent w ith Rorty’s 
‘anti-authoritarianism ’, he denies that philosophy has any privileged role in deciding w hat 
those things should be.^ ® Rorty’s account is, centrally, a political one^^, one in which any 
attem pt to  make oneself answerable to, or ‘m irror’, an independent reality or m oral 
order, is replaced w ith that o f  hum an answerability to each other, o f  attem pts to  forge an 
ever-greater degree o f  w hat he calls, controversially, solidarity.
6.3 Liberalism  and the ^Enlightenment Project*
Richard Rorty, ‘Philosophy and the Future’ in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (ed.) and
Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 
197-205  at 198.
The priority of democracy to philosophy precludes such an idea. His view o f what this means 
for philosophy is occasionally somewhat cynical, for example when he writes that ‘[djemocracies 
make political decisions about what principles to compromise. Philosophers then clean up the 
mess by formulating new principles which justify their having compromised the old principles’. 
Richard Rorty, ‘A Defence of Minimalist Liberalism’, in Anita L. Allen and Milton C. Regan, Jr. 
(eds.) Debating Democracy’s Discontent: essays on American politics, law and public philosopfy (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 117 — 125 at 121. For an illustration, see Brian Barry on crash 
helmet exemption for Sikhs in Barry, Culture andBqualiy, pp. 40 — 53.
Rorty claims that twentieth century philosophy was marked by three conceptions of the aim of 
philosophizing. ‘They are the Husserlian (or ‘scientistic’) answer, the Heideggerian (or ‘poetic’) 
answer and the pragmatist (or ‘political’) answer.’ Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 9.
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R orty has been challenged about his understanding o f  the relationship o f  philosophy, 
particularly, postm odernism , to  the Enlightenm ent. John  Gray argues that there is an 
inextricable relationship between the philosophy o f  what he calls ‘the Enlightenm ent 
pro ject’, and its political legacy in  liberalism. Gray views the Enlightenm ent project as 
‘refounding morality and society on universal, tradition-independent rational principles’,®^ 
the  attem pt to  free m orahty from  the contingent influences o f  traditional form s o f  life. 
Like Rorty, Gray characterises w hat he terms the Enlightenm ent project as secular and 
hum anist, animated by the belief that there are no limits to  w hat hum ans can achieve and 
no  problem s that they cannot solve. B oth  agree that whereas earlier forms o f  knowledge 
had  sought an accom m odation w ith the world, the Enlightenm ent came to  see the world 
as existing simply for the sake o f  humanity. H e further agrees with Rorty that post­
m odernism  is no t the rejection o f m odernist Enlightenm ent hopes, bu t its culmination.
G ray however draws a very different conclusion from  Rorty. H e argues that the  legacy o f 
the Enlightenm ent is one that cannot be sustained, because the very process o f  ceaseless 
rational disclosure came to apply to  itself, showing up the absence o f  its own 
foundations. This he calls its ‘self-underrnining effect’.®^ For Gray, although Rorty’s 
account has the advantage o f the expHcimess with which it accepts the philosophical 
groundlessness o f  the pohtical legacy o f  the Enhghtenm ent, he mistakenly thinks that 
legacy unaffected by the failure o f  the philosophy upon which it rests. His account is 
therefore ‘an exercise in  hlusion’®^ and, far from  being the culm ination o f  the 
Enhghtenm ent as Rorty takes it to be, postm odernism  culminates with its destruction.
80 Gray, Enlightenments Wake, p, 149.
81 Ibid., p. 150.
82 Ibid., p. 172. For Gray, it is an illusion that betrays Rorty’s modernism. This point is taken up 
by Raymond D. Boisvert, who claims that Rorty’s attachment to the pohtical legacy of the 
Enhghtenment means that he is a modernist, not a postmodernist Boisvert, ‘Philosophy.
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In  response to  Gray, Rorty writes that should this prove to  be so, it is postm odernism  
that ought to  be rejected, no t the pohtical aims that he hopes it serves;
[M]y reply to  Gray reaUy boils down to  saying that his empirical 
predictions are needlessly pessimistic. Maybe he is right that pohtical 
hope cannot survive in a post-m odernist intellectual chmate. B ut maybe it 
can. Only experiment will teU. I f  it turns out that it cannot, however, we 
should say “So m uch the worse for ‘post-m odernist’ and pragmatist 
philosophy”, rather than “So m uch the worse for the Enhghtenm ent 
pohtical project” .*^
This is to  beg Gray’s question, however. F or Gray’s poin t is that there is no  way back, 
and that once post-m odernism  has done its work, then there wiU be nothing left o f  the 
Enhghtenm ent pohtical project to recover, even if  it were possible to  disaggregate these 
different elements o f  the Enhghtenm ent.
W hat is ultimately at issue between Rorty and Gray is a view o f  the relationship between 
philosophy and pohtics. Rorty agrees with H orkheim er and A dorno, and thus with Gray, 
that ‘the forces unleashed by the Enhghtenm ent have underm ined the Enhghtenm ent’s 
own convictions’.*”^ However, for him  they then falsely infer that hberahsm is 
‘inteUectuaUy bankrupt’. This, for Rorty, is mistakenly to  assume that the rhetoric o f
Postmodern or Poly temporal?’. International Philosophical Quarterly 40 (2000), pp. 313 — 326. See 
also Hall, Richard Rorty: Prophet and Poet of the New Pragmatism, p. 51, and Justin Cruickshank, ‘From 
Metaphysics to Pragmatism: Rorty on Liberahsm and Social Justice’, in Gideon Calder, Edward 
Garrett and Jess Shannon (eds.) Uberalism and Social Justice: International Perspectives (Aldershot: 
Ashgate, 2000), pp. 113 — 127.
83 Rorty, Truth, Politics and ‘Post-modernism”, p. 50.
84 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 56.
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‘rationality’ (and ‘hum an nature’) is essential to  the political legacy o f  the Enlightenm ent. 
Rorty is keen to emphasise the priority o f  the latter over the former, and thinks that, at 
best, philosophy can be used to  support politics. It is no t a pedestal upon  which politics 
rests however, and should it — as he believes is the case w ith Enlightenm ent rationalism — 
come to be an obstacle, it should be abandoned. The question however is w hether this 
position is coherent. Can the different legacies o f the Enlightenm ent be so easily 
disentangled, and can we choose to  hold on to  some whilst rejecting others? Gray’s claim 
is that they cannot, and in saying so he is joined by am ong others Paul Kelly, w ho writes 
that Rorty’s mistake ‘is to  think that we can attack Enlightenm ent philosophical discourse 
and still engage in either constructive political theory or the assertion o f  liberal values’.®^
In  response, we can note that it is no t only those such as Rorty, w hom  Kelly term s ‘anti- 
Enlightenm ent critics’, w ho take the view that hberalism is no t bound up so tightly with 
the philosophical legacy o f  the Enlightenm ent as Gray and others believe. Brian Barry 
has repeatedly sought to  expose m isunderstandings o f  the origin and nature o f  hberalism, 
taking to  task Alasdair M acIntyre’s account o f  the relationship between hberahsm  and 
the Enhghtenm ent. For Barry, M acIntyre falsely asserts that hberahsm  was a conscious 
offshoot o f  the Enhghtenm ent, implying that ‘that hberahsm  was simply wiUed into 
existence quite gratuitously by som ething cahed “the Enhghtenm ent” .’*^  T o  be sure, as 
Barry writes, ‘Liberahsm is p a r excellence the doctrine o f  the Enhghtenm ent’*^ , bu t it is a 
philosophical articulation o f  specific events, namely the European wars o f  rehgion in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: ‘hberahsm  developed no t as an a priori doctrine but 
as an attem pt (or m ore precisely as a set o f  alternative attempts) to  rationalize an
85 Kelly, ‘Pohtical Theory in Retreat?’, p. 236. See also MacIntyre, ‘Moral Arguments and Social 
Contexts’; James Conant, ‘Freedom, Cruelty, and Truth: Rorty verses Orwell’ in Robert R. 
Brandom (ed.) R o ^  and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell Pubhshers Ltd., 2000), pp. 268 — 342.
86 Bsitry, Justice and Impartiality, p. 170, note e.
87 Brian Barry, Uherty and Justice: Essays In Political Theoiy 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 23.
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em ergent liberal social order.’®* The idea that a vast array o f writers, separated by time, 
distance, interests and concerns, can be united in any way other than for the m ost 
rudim entary classification is, he argues, illusory. I f  one can meaningfully talk o f  a concern 
which unites many o f  the thinkers o f  the Enhghtenm ent, then one could say that this was 
to  question the assum ptions o f  the day by, as in the famous phrase, throw ing hght into 
the dark, reacting against unquestioned forms o f received, traditional, wisdom. This 
concern may have a philosophical element, bu t it certainly does not entail a notion o f  
hberahsm that requires philosophical foundations. It is then at least plausible to  claim 
that there is no  such thing as the Enhghtenm ent project. Barry writes that ‘It is surely 
plain that there is no  party hne on  foundations am ong hberals. Liberahsm does not 
therefore stand or faU with the viabihty o f  the “Enhghtenm ent project’”®’ and that, as the 
case o f Barry him self iUustrates, it is perfecdy consistent to  deny the ‘reason-worshipping’ 
aspect o f the Enhghtenm ent and rem ain com m itted to  hberahsm. For Barry, the 
philosophical articulation o f  hberahsm was no t an a priori justification but an a posteriori 
rationahsation, and thus hberahsm has no need o f  the sort o f philosophical grounding o f 
which writers hke M acIntyre and Gray beheve it is now  being deprived.’®
My suggestion is that Barry is better able to  respond to  the charge leveUed by Gray, 
MacIntyre and others than Rorty, because Rorty grants too m uch, in his discussion o f 
Horkheim er and A dorno, to  those w ho view hberahsm as having started hfe as a 
philosophical project. Similarly, w hen Rorty argues that writers hke MacIntyre, Michael 
Sandal and Charles Taylor beheve that ‘that hberal institutions and culture either should 
not or cannot survive the coUapse o f the philosophical justification that the
88 Ibid., p. 118.
89 Ibid.
90 Barry makes this point in a discussion of the origin of hberal principles. The ‘harm principle’ 
stemmed from rehgious toleration; freedom of speech is a generahzation of freedom of the press, 
and equal citizenship status from the hberal rejection of servile civil status. Ibid., p. 23.
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E nlightenm ent provided for them ’,^  ^ this seems mistakenly to accept with them  that the 
Enlightenm ent started w ith just such a philosophical justification o f  Hberalism. Rorty 
goes on  to  argue that it is a mistake to  think that the term s in which a discussion was 
started rem ain the term s that should be used to criticise it. This may be so, bu t it also 
mistakenly grants them  the prem ise that the poHtics o f  the Enhghtenm ent stem med 
initially from  its philosophy, and thus gives some plausibihty to  the suggest Hberahsm 
cannot survive w ithout its philosophical foundations. It would be m ore accurate to  say 
that particular writers Hke K ant thought that Hberahsm depended on the philosophical 
foundations, bu t that they were mistaken, and to  agree w ith Barry that Hberahsm started 
Hfe as a pohtical project. This I take it is, in fact, Rorty’s point as weU, for example w hen 
he writes that ‘The idea that Hberal societies are bound together by philosophical behefs 
seems to  m e ludicrous. W hat binds societies together are com m on vocabularies and 
com m on hopes’,^  ^ a claim which is consistent w ith his view o f  the priority o f  pohtical 
m atters over philosophical speculation about them.
6.4 P olitical liberalism  as the avoidance o f  cruelty
T he culm ination o f  the Enhghtenm ent is for Rorty a truly anti-authoritarian society, one 
in which ah trace o f  non-hum an authority has been vanquished. This Rorty takes to 
result in pohtical hberahsm. Rorty is widely criticised for his ambiguity regarding the 
content o f  hberahsm. In  Contingeng, Irony, and Solidarity, he gives what initiahy appears to 
be a bland and unhelpful definition o f hberahsm: hberals are said to  hold that ‘cruelty is 
the w orst thing we do ’.^  ^ Eric G ander caUs this a ‘platitude’^ "^ , and it does indeed seem to
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 177.
52 Rorty, Contingeng, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 86.
53 Ibid., p .  XV.
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tell us nothing about that which characterises liberal writers, or what distinguishes them  
from  non-hberals. It is som ething less o f a platitude however once it is taken in  the 
context o f  Rorty’s narrative o f hum an maturity. H e tells us that his definition o f 
liberalism is borrow ed from  Judith  Shklar, bu t it is surprising that he tells us nothing 
more.^^ For Shklar, cruelty stands in  contrast to  sin. W hereas cruelty is to  inflict pain 
upon another hum an being, to  sin is to  transgress against G od. There is, says Shklar, no 
necessary conflict between sin and cruelty, bu t som eone w ho categorically puts cruelty as 
‘the w orst thing we do’ is necessarily relegating sin:
T o p u t cruelty first is to  disregard the idea o f  sin as it is understood by 
revealed religion. Sins are transgressions o f  a divine rule and offenses 
against God. ... However, cruelty — the wilful inflicting o f  physical pain 
on a weaker hum an being in order to cause anguish and fear — is a w rong 
done entirely to  another creature?^
Rorty develops Shklar’s definition to  make a contrast between obligation to  our fellows 
and obligation to a non-hum an authority, be it G od or the Intrinsic N ature o f  Reality. 
This distinction captures what Rorty takes to  be the central idea o f  liberalism, that it is 
wholly a m atter o f relations between hum an beings. Those w ho in  any sense privilege any 
goal over the practical avoidance o f  causing pain are not for him  liberals. Jo h n  Kekes
Eric M. Gander, The Last Conceptual devolution: A  Critique of Richard Rorty’s Political Philosophy. 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999), p. 65.
95 David Owen discusses this in his paper ‘The Avoidance of Cruelty; Joshing Rorty on 
Liberalism, Scepticism and Ironism’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) Richard 
Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 93 — 110. In his reply, Rorty says that he 
wishes he had developed the point in this way in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.
95 Judith N. Shklar, Ordinary Vices (London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1984), p. 8, emphasis in original. Shklar goes on to suggest that not all forms of cruelty entail 
physical pain. Annette Baier joins Shklar and Rorty in defining liberalism in this way. Annette 
Baier, ‘Moralism and Cruelty’, Ethics 103 (1993), pp. 436 — 457. She aligns herself with Shklar and 
Rorty on p. 437.
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complains o f  the ‘specious moralizing that inform s’ the idea that ‘cruelty is the w orst 
thing we do’, writing that if  genocide, terrorism, betrayal, exploitation, humiliation etc., 
are all form s o f  cruelty, then  this makes the account vacuous, since there is no  one w ho 
w ould disagree. Like Gander, Kekes is obviously correct w hen he says that non-liberals 
also worry about cruelty. Rorty’s point is however that liberals are concerned solely with 
cruelty. W hen G ander writes that medieval Christians were cruel to  make others com e to 
take G od  into their lives, and that no t to  have done so would for them  have been an act 
o f  cruelty,^^ we can respond by noting that this was n o t for the alleviation o f  cruelty 
itself, bu t to  a higher, metaphysical, end.
B ut even w hen we see Rorty’s point, we can still ask for greater content to  be given to 
the notion o f  cruelty. Some com m entators think Rorty has provided that content. 
Charles Jones, seemingly interpreting ‘cruelty’ exclusively in the Hght o f  Rorty’s 
discussion o f  torture, argues that Rorty is w rong to  be concerned simply w ith the cruelty 
produced by torture:
I f  we can sympathize w ith the pHght o f  persons w ho are victims o f  
torture in faraway lands, why can we not also sympathize with those far- 
o ff persons w ho lack access to  basic nutritional requirem ents, adequate 
housing, education, and health care? T hat is, there is nothing in this 
[Rorty’s] argum ent that explains why expressions o f  concern should be 
Hmited to  ‘instances o f  cruelty’.^ ^
John Kekes, ‘Cruelty and Liberahsm’, Ethics 106 (1996), pp. 834 — 844 at 835.
8^ Gander, The Last Conceptual devolution, p. 68.
^  Charles Jones, Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 146.
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Such things, as the surrounding discussion in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity and 
elsewhere illustrate, are however precisely the sort o f  things that Rorty thinks o f  as 
instances o f  cruelty. T he lack o f nutrition, education, housing and health care are forms 
o f  cruelty to  which Rorty says novelists and social critics hke Dickens were so good at 
alerting Victorians. Lying behind Jones’s m isunderstanding is the desire to give specific 
conten t to  cruelty. Daniel Conway addresses this point, asking Rorty to specify the 
conten t o f cruelty, to  give some indication o f  what actions are cruel, and which are not.^°° 
In  response, Rorty points out neither he, nor anybody else, has ever been able to  do 
this.^°^ T o  do so would require the Cartesian natural order o f  reasons o f the sort he 
denies.’®^ It is perhaps because he assumes such a thing that G ander writes that deciding 
w hat counts as cruelty forces us to  address metaphysical questions such as the 
relationship between m ind and body.’°^  Rorty o f  course denies this, arguing that we 
should give up on the attem pt to  specify the necessary and sufficient conditions o f  
cruelty precisely because we need to  be alive to  new instances o f  cruelty that we had 
previously no t recognised as cruel. Thus he would I think dissent from  Shklar’s view that 
cruelty m ust involve the wilful infliction o f  pain. Keeping the ‘definition’ o f  cruelty open 
allows for awareness o f  alternatives, even those which we previously did n o t notice or 
think o f  as cruel. Part o f  the value of, for example Dickens, was that he provided details 
o f  form s o f  cruelty that we had previously not thought o f  as cruel on people w ith w hom  
we had hitherto no t concerned ourselves. I f  specific content was given beyond this, this 
might well rule out such new forms being accepted as instances o f  cruelty in  the future. 
M atthew Festenstein is thus I think correct w hen he writes that ‘The injunction to  avoid.
100 Conway, ‘Irony, State and Utopia’. See also John Horton, ‘Irony and Commitment’, p. 26; 
Enrique Dus s el. The Underside of Modernity, pp. 103 — 106.
101 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Daniel Conway’ in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson 
(eds.) Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 89 — 92.
102 This notion is discussed in chapter 3.
103 Gander, The Last Conceptual Rovolution, p. 68.
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or minimize cruelty, is a placeholder for the ironist’s ethical behefs rather than an 
account o f  them ’/ '^^
T o  give content to  cruelty w ould be to  give the priority to  philosophy, o r at least 
foundationahsm , over democracy, whereas the poin t o f  hberahsm is that democracy 
decides w hat counts as cruel rather than seeking to  settle it a priori. As Rorty puts it.
Y our devotion to  democracy is unlikely to  be wholehearted if  you 
beheve, as m onotheists typically do, that we can have knowledge o f  an 
“objective” ranking o f hum an needs that can overrule the result o f  
democratic consensus. But if  your devotion is wholehearted, then you 
wih welcome the utihtarian and pragmatist claim that we have no  whl to  
tru th  distinct from  the wih to  happiness.’°^
Rorty writes that he regards his hberahsm to flow directly out o f  Mhl’s On Uherty. ‘J, S. 
Mih’s suggestion that governm ents devote themselves to  optimising the balance between 
leaving people’s private hves alone and preventing suffering seems to m e pretty m uch the 
last w ord’.^ °*^ This does no t mean that the balance betw een these two concerns is no t 
contested, or that w hat ‘preventing suffering’ means or entails whl no t be highly 
controversial and problem atic,’®^ The point is, once again, that is to  be settled 
democraticahy, no t philosophicaUy.
Festenstein, Vragmatism and Political Theo^, p. 131. The difference between cruelty as a category, 
and as a specific condition, is seen in an ambiguity present in Kekes’ paper, in which he moves 
between treating cruelty as a name for the different things, such as torture, that we think cruel, 
and as a fixed thing in itself and which therefore contrasts with for example torture.
105 Rorty, Tragmatism as Romantic Polytheism’, p. 27.
105 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 63.
107 It also says nothing about specific economic structures within liberal democracies: it does not 
indicate a preference for free market-style economy of North America or the social democratic 
ones of Western Europe. Rorty’s preference is for the latter, but he accepts this is not required by
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In  conclusion, in  this chapter I have examined the claims that he behind Rorty’s view 
that pohtical hberahsm, the freely arrived at agreement o f  hum an beings, is the 
culm ination o f the Enhghtenm ent, For Rorty, nothing can stand over and above this 
agreem ent, although he controversiaUy views bo th  rehgion and traditional philosophy as 
attem pts to  do just that. T he felt need for such a position he takes to  be a sym ptom  o f  
immaturity, one that in the W est at least he beheves we are coming to  cast off. However, 
the pohtical and m oral legacy o f the Enhghtenm ent is for him  vital. I t is m oreover a 
legacy that Rorty thinks enhanced by casting o ff Enhghtenm ent rationahsm, and focusing 
on  relations between hum an beings. Pohtical hberahsm as the avoidance o f  cruelty was 
seen, first, to  be exclusively a m atter o f  hum an relationships, and secondly, an open 
ended concern which reflects the constant need to  recognise and adapt to  new and 
presently unseen cases o f  cruelty. In  subsequent chapters, I take up in  detail specific 
criticisms o f  this vision, starting with the claim, in  chapter 3, that on  Rorty’s account, we 
have no  good reasons for our behefs and practices, and that they are merely ‘w hat we 
happen to  think around here’.
Mill’s characterisation of hberahsm as behef in the value of individual freedom. The creative, 
interpretive, aspect of pohtical theory will be discussed in chapter 6.
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Chapter Three
Contingency and universal validity
In  chapter 2 I sought to  show that Rorty regards his critique o f  the W estern 
philosophical tradition as part o f  a larger concern to  free hum anity from  forms o f 
‘authoritarianism ’ that he claims seek to  stand over and dictate to  it. In  the absence o f  the 
sort o f foundations philosophers have sought, it has been said that Rorty’s account 
reduces truth, goodness, etc. to  a m atter o f  ‘what we happen to  think around here’. By 
rem oving any transcendental standards, he is said to  leave hum ans to  the caprices o f  the 
traditions and communities in which they happen to  live. Rorty is thus said to be a 
relativist, or a conservative, taking values to  be o f value simply because they are ours. This 
chapter begins by exploring the accounts o f  philosophers such as Jurgen Haberm as and 
Thom as Nagel w ho argue that the presuppositions o f  thought and argum ent presuppose 
the universal validity o f  tru th  claims. I argue that no sense can be given to  this notion, 
because there is no  ‘order o f  reasons’ that structures thought and which m ust be adopted 
by any thinking hum an being. T he charge that Rorty’s account entails that beliefs are 
morally arbitrary therefore fails because it has no contrastive force; there is nothing that 
is not a historically contingent belief. In  the second part o f  the  chapter, I argue against the 
view that Rorty adopts a relativistic account o f value. Beliefs and practices are the result 
o f historical contingencies, bu t that does n o t m ean that beliefs are morally arbitrary or 
that they ‘merely’, or ‘happen’, to  be held. I argue, against the claims o f  writers such as 
Cheryl Misak, that for Rorty beliefs are endorsed for reasons, even if  they are reasons 
that need no t be shared or endorsed by aU rational hum an beings.
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7. The inescapability of ethnocentrism
7.1 E thnocentrism , acceptance, and validity
R orty’s central argum ent against foundationalism  is that no  sense can be given to  the 
notion  o f  the world being represented other than through hum an perspectives. H e writes 
that the attem pt to  do so, Philosophy (with a capital P) ‘is the impossible attem pt to  step 
outside our skins — the traditions, linguistic and others, w ithin which we do our thinking 
and self-criticism — and com pare ourselves w ith som ething absolute’.^  For Rorty, no  
standard o f  value exists beyond contingent social practices. W e cannot compare 
ourselves with som ething that is no t part o f  a practice; ‘the only thing that can transcend 
a social practice is another social practice.’^
For Rorty then, knowledge claims are constrained by the sociologically and historically 
conditioned rules o f  communities. This he term s, provocatively, ethnocentrism , a 
condition which he argues is inescapable. All concepts derive their status from  hum an 
comm unities, and even concepts such as rationality are values, n o t algorithms.^ This does 
not, importantly, m ean that we have no grounds or justification for our beliefs. Those 
grounds are the standards provided by hum an practices, including for example works o f 
authority, legal precedents, traditions, professional standards, etc. There is however no 
standard, or criterion beyond such things against which to appeal. Rorty therefore denies 
sense to  the notion o f  som ething being ‘merely w hat we think around here’ by denying
’ Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. xix.
2 Richard Rorty, ‘Universality and Truth’, Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Party and H is Critics (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 2000), pp. 1 — 30 at 7.
3 Rorty, Philosoplty and the Mirror of Nature, p. 331.
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the  force o f  the w ord merely. T o  describe a belief as merely being the result o f  contingent 
historical reasons only makes sense if  there is a way to  contrast that belief w ith beliefs 
that are no t contingent, som ething o f w hich Rorty thinks cannot be m ade sense. As he 
puts it, ‘no description o f  how  things are ftom  a G o d ’s-eye poin t o f  view, no  skyhook 
provided by some contem porary or yet-to-be-developed science, is going to  free us from  
the contingency o f  having been acculturated as we were’."^
Philosophers have however sought to make a contrast betw een w hat is merely thought 
around here and som ething m ore substantial by proposing a standard o f  purportedly 
universal validity. This contrast has been m ade by Shane O ’Neill, w ho claims that valid 
m oral argum ents are rational arguments, supported by w hat he calls ‘the m ost convincing 
reasons’. They contrast w ith argum ents that are accepted as a m atter o f  ‘convention’. 
O ’Neill believes that, by rejecting this notion, Rorty cannot distinguish between 
argum ents that are ‘valid’, that is, ‘m ost convincing’ krespective o f  context, and those 
that are simply ‘widely accepted’.^
I t is far from  clear however o f  what, exacdy, this distinction consists. T he tone o f 
O ’Neill’s piece suggests a contrast betw een and objective, rational reasons for viewing 
reasons as ‘valid’, and subjective, idiosyncratic reasons for thinking them  ‘attractive’. But 
w hat is that contrast? O ’Neill writes that for Rorty, views are held simply out o f  
‘convention’. I f  he means by that for Rorty, one does no t reflect upon  one’s beliefs and 
revise them  in the light o f  critical challenge or new evidence, then he is, I wiU show 
below, obviously w rong (indeed it is hard to imagine that anyone w ould ever hold a 
belief on that basis). O ’Neill continues by claiming that som ething is valid if  ‘it is justified
Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truths p. 13.
5 All quotations in this paragraph are from Shane O ’Neill, ‘Private Irony and the Public Hope of 
Richard Rorty’s Liberalism’, in Maurizio Passerin d’Entrèves and Ursula Vogel (eds.) Public and 
Private: Ijegal, Political and Philosophical Perspectives (London: Roudedge, 2000), pp. 51 — 67 at 54.
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as the m ost reasonable morality available to citizens o f  m odem  pluralist societies'/ Rorty 
need, and would, no t deny one interpretation o f  this notion. F or him, reasonableness is 
contextual, differing according to time and place. W hat he takes to  be the liberal view o f 
reasonableness, its openness to alternative viewpoints and willingness to  consider 
alternative sources o f  belief makes it, as O ’Neill says, particularly suited to  citizens o f 
m odern  pluralist societies. There is however no way to  prove this to  all comers: there is 
‘no  non-question-begging dem onstration o f the epistemic superiority o f  the W estern idea 
o f  reasonableness’.^  I f  O ’Neill accepts this point, then he is in agreement w ith Rorty, and 
the contrast he seeks to  draw betw een Rorty’s account o f  ‘acceptance’ and his own o f  
‘validity’ dissolves, since bo th  are relative to  context, the only difference betw een them  
being a function o f  the style in which O ’Neill chooses to  express them.
7,2 The order o f  reasons
I t has been argued however that the context- and practice-bound nature o f  hum an 
activity itself depends on the existence o f  a realm that is n o t so bounded, bu t which has 
universal validity. O n  this account, many claims can be ruled out as violating the canons 
o f  rationality upon which they necessarily depend. Thus, Richard W ohn rejects Rorty’s 
claim (discussed in  chapter 1) that torturers do no t violate some transcendental set o f 
values which therefore condem ns them. H e writes:
6 Ibid.
7 Richard Rorty, justice as A Larger Loyalty’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson 
(eds.) Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 223 — 237 at 230. In a recent 
response to Kwame Anthony Appiah, Rorty accepts that in his earlier paper he made too much 
of the ‘West — non-West’ contrast. By ‘Western’ I take it Rorty really means openness and 
tolerance, virtues that as I discuss in chapters 7 and 8 are for him not limited to Westerners. 
Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Appiah’, in Matthew J. Gibney (ed.) Glohalit^ng Rights: The Oxford 
yimnesty Lectures 1999 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 233 — 237 at 235.
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The self-justifications o f  torturers and inquisitors becom e self-negating as 
soon as thej are p u t into language-, for they fail to  m easure up to  the context- 
transcendent, m oral idealizations inherent in the linguistic expectations o f  
a posttraditional culture based on universahzable — hence, non- 
particularistic — norm s. According to  this logic, as soon as such 
particularistic worldviews partake o f the language-game o f  “justice and 
validity” — a necessity for aU m odern, as opposed to  traditional 
despotisms — they have lost — which does n o t o f  course m ean that they 
automatically cease to  exist.®
As it stands, it is no t clear precisely to which ‘context-transcendent, m oral idealizations’ 
W ohn is referring, or why the existence o f  such idealizations would or should bother the 
torturer, or indeed the practitioner o f  any other ‘particularistic worldview’. T he very fact 
that a norm  is universahzable does no t in  itself negate the claims m ade by torturers, for 
one can readily universalize a norm  saying that torture is perm itted in certain cases. The 
norm  W ohn has in m ind is, I take it, som ething hke the norm  o f  fundam ental equahty o f 
hum an beings. T he torturers may violate that norm , b u t presumably they w ould be aware 
o f  this. This issue is rather why this should strike them  as a problem , and why it would 
m ean that they would ‘have lost’. W hy should such people be bothered by the language- 
game o f  ‘justice and vahdity’, or concern themselves to  partake in  it, and why should they 
be concerned that they ‘lose’ if  they are judged by a standard that they do no t share? 
W olin claims that it is ‘a necessity’ for them  to  do so, bu t does n o t say w hy this is so; his 
claim seems to  suggest logical, historical and m oral necessity. In  short, W olin’s reason for 
thinking the justification o f  the torturers to  be self-negating stems from  pointing out that
8 Richard Wolin, The Terms of Cultural Criticism: The Frankfurt School, Existentialism, Poststructuralism 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), p. 156, emphasis in original.
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the values and norm s they caU upon  in  justifying themselves are inconsistent w ith an 
alternative standard o f  value that they do no t hold, and that W olin has no t dem onstrated 
that, on  pain o f  self-contradiction, they must.
Jürgen Haberm as and others however believe that it is possible to  dem onstrate that the 
torturers w ould be guilty o f  w hat he calls ‘perform ative self-contradiction’,^  because he 
thinks it possible to  dem onstrate that the torturers presuppose, and necessarily rely upon, 
norm s that they claim to be denying. As he puts it, ‘O ne cannot reduce all universals to 
particulars, all kinds o f  transcendence to  im m anence, the unconditional to  the 
conditional, and so on, w ithout presupposing these same distinctions and tacitly m aking 
use o f  them ’.^ ° This claim assumes w hat Descartes term ed the ‘order o f  reasons’, a notion 
that has recently been defended, w ith reference to  Descartes, by Thom as Nagel.”  Nagel 
adheres to  the representationalist view that different areas o f  inquiry ‘m irror’ reality m ore 
and less accurately. In  his discussion o f  the different levels o f  objectivity that typically 
obtain in questions o f morality, logic and arithmetic, Nagel notes that in contrast to 
arithmetic, morality usually fails to  produce certainty, because ethical m atters are ‘easily 
subject to  distortion by morally irrelevant factors, social and personal, as well as outright 
e r r o r . T h i s  claim depends upon  the existence o f  an independent order o f  reasons 
which determines w hat is and w hat is no t to count as distortion or an irrelevance in  ethical 
matters.
9 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) and His 
Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 31 — 55 at 39.
10 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Coping With Contingencies — The Return of Histohdsm’, in Joseph Nizmk 
and John T. Sanders (eds.). Debating the State of Philosophy: Habermas, Rorty, and Kolakoswki 
(Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996), pp. 1 — 24 at 5.
11 Nagel, The Last Word. For the reference to Descartes, see pp. 18 — 19.
12 Ibid., p. 101.
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There is, Nagel claims, a standard o f validity that is independent o f  the beliefs and 
practices o f  any particular community. H e writes that, ‘if  we think at all, we m ust think o f 
ourselves, individually and collectively, as submitting to  the order o f  reasons rather than 
creating it’.'^ I f  fully rational agents pursued their disagreements as far as they could, they 
would, in  his view, come to  agree on the resolution. The order o f  reasons is independent 
and universally vahd because all thoughts, regardless o f  their substance, depend upon  it: 
there are, Nagel writes, ‘some thoughts which we cannot get outside o f . ’"^ Reason is 
required for any thoughts at all, even those which claim to deny the existence o f  reason, 
and aU o f  our thoughts, even ‘relativist’ or ‘subjectivist’ ones, are m ade using reason; 
Nagel thus endorses David Wiggins’s claim that for som e thoughts, ‘there is nothing else 
to think’.
From  this Nagel concludes that relativism is self-refuting, because it relies on an 
objective standard o f  the sort it claims to  deny. Rorty’s position is held to  be incoherent 
because, in  order to  make the sort o f claim that he does, Rorty presupposes the very 
capacity for hum an reason o f the sort he claims to  deny. H e could no t voice the 
objections to  rationality w ithout using that same standard o f  rationality which, in  the very 
act o f  denying, he necessarily affirms. His views, Nagel writes,
[...] turn  out to  be inconsistent with the very consensus on which they 
propose to  “ground” objectivity. W hat hum an beings w ho form  scientific 
or mathematical beliefs agree on is that these things are true, full stop.
13 Ibid., p. 143.
14 Ibid., p. 19, emphasis in original. 
13 Ibid., p. 69n.
77
and would be true w hether we agreed on them  or no t — and furtherm ore 
that w hat makes that true is no t just that we agree to  say it!^^
In  com m enting on this type o f  claim, Rorty writes that it assumes that any truly rational 
agent could consider all possibilities and reason out the correct solution: ‘Universalists 
talk as if  any rational agent, in any epoch, could som ehow have envisaged all the possible 
morally relevant differences'/^ This might appear to be an instance o f  w hat Charles 
Taylor diagnoses as ‘Raving Platonism ’, Rorty’s caricatured characterisation o f  his 
philosophical opponents/® It is however precisely w hat Nagel means: he writes that 
rationality ‘should enable anyone else also to see w hat is the right thing for you to  do 
against that background’/^ Nagel thus supplies w hat is lacking in  W olin’s account, a 
reason why the torturers are logically com m itted to  the norm s o f  which W ohn speaks. As 
Nagel puts it, the ‘[rjeal character o f  reason is no t found in behef in a set o f  
“foundational” propositions, nor even in a set o f  procedures or rules for drawing 
inferences, bu t rather in any form  o f  thought to  which there is no  alternative.
Nagel articulates and defends his position in his polemical book The h a st Word, a w ork 
which throws up m any ambiguities. Regarding the claim that rationahty should ‘enable 
anyone else also to  see w hat is the right thing for you to  do against that background’, 
m uch depends on the meaning o f  the w ord ‘should’. M ost people do no t hold for 
example liberal views, so if  Nagel’s were an empirical claim he w ould be
Ibid., p. 29, emphasis in original.
1^  Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 205.
18 Taylor, ‘Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition’, p. 269.
19 Nagel, The L^st Word, p. 110. A similar account is developed by Andrew Jason Cohen. Cohen, 
who describes himself as a ‘liberal metaphysician’, argues in favour of ‘universal judgements — 
judgements that would be made by any person faced with the same question if  they consider it 
impartially’. Cohen, ‘On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty and (“Objectivist”) “Liberal 
Metaphysicians’”, Southern Journal of Philosophy 38 (2000), pp. 38 — 75 at 49.
20 Nagel, The Last Word, pp. 68 — 69.
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straightforwardly wrong. However, he clearly means ‘should’ in  a stronger sense, where 
‘should’ m eans people w ho are fully rational, and w ho reason according to  the standards 
o f  the ‘order o f  reasons’.
This is a very strong claim, and considering its im portance for his position, Nagel tells us 
remarkably little o f  w hat he m eans by the order o f  reasons upon  which it depends. 
Insofar as he examines it, he does so by reference to  w hat it is not: it is som ething that 
does no t in  any way depend upon  peculiar perspectives, practices, or histories. B ut apart 
from  ruling out ‘relativism’ — for (as we will see below) the same reasons as Rorty — 
Nagel gives no positive content to  those forms o f  thought to  which there is ‘no 
alternative’. Such arguments as he gives to  adduce their existence are circular: the 
universality and inescapabihty o f  reason depends upon the order o f  reasons, bu t the 
existence o f  that order is dem onstrated only by the universahty and inescapabiüty o f  
reason. There is no  independent test for either o f  these things, and the only evidence 
Nagel provides to  support it is his being convinced o f its existence himself. As Rorty 
puts it, som ew hat caustically, positing such a notion ‘seems merely a way o f  telling 
ourselves that a nonexistent G od  would, if  he did exist, be pleased w ith us.’^  ^ It is 
however pragmatically useless, since asserting validity does no t give those unconvinced 
o f  its validity a reason to  com e to  view it as valid.
T he circularity o f  his dem onstration o f  the order o f  reasons m eans that Nagel is open to 
the charge that his claims to universality are themselves ethnocentric. I f  Nagel asserts the 
existence o f  w hat Rorty calls a ‘metaphysical substrate’ which ‘grounds’ for example 
universal hum an rights and affords them  priority over cultural peculiarities and biases, 
how  can we know w hether or n o t the belief in  that substrate is itself n o t a cultural
Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truth, p. 27.
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peculiarity?^ That is, m ight Nagel’s claims to  universality and objectivity merely be the 
sort o f  thing we happen to do around here? T o give a specific instance, as Jo h n  Gray 
no tes,^  it is no t sufficient to  refute Rorty’s view to poin t out, as N orm an Geras and Jean 
Bethke Elshtain do, that those w ho rescued Jews from  the Nazis during the H olocaust 
claim to  have acted out o f  a shared sense o f  a universal, com m on humanity/'^ For it 
could just be that this sense was itself the m oral expression o f  particular cultures and 
traditions. W hen Rorty writes that ‘there is nothing to be said about either tru th  or 
rationality apart from  descriptions o f  the familiar procedures o f  justification which a 
given society — ours — uses in  one or another area o f  inquiry’,^ ® this is for Nagel 
quintessentially relativistic, bu t simply asserting that his ow n views are universal does not 
explain why they themselves escape ethnocentrism .
Nagel also runs together the claim that the universality o f  reason provides the fram ework 
within which hum ans necessarily think and act, w ith the claim that it also provides a test 
o f  an individual’s capacity to  think at all: this latter idea captured in his rem ark that ‘T o  
reason is to  think systematically in ways anyone looking over my shoulder ought to  be 
able to  recognize as correct’.^  ^ I t is no t clear to m e how  this claim fits together with the 
‘inescapabihty’ o f  reason: if  reason is inescapable, in w hat sense can it provide such a 
corrective? Nagel thus exemphfies w hat Rorty calls ‘the ambiguity o f rationahty’, whereby 
‘rationahty’ is used bo th  as a cognitive capacity and as a m oral virtue.^^ These two 
meanings are conflated w hen we say that som eone is rational w hen they draw the same
^  Ibid., p. 207. As I discuss in chapter 5, Rorty’s point is that it is, but that it is none the worse 
for that.
23 John Gray, 'Endgames:Questions in hate Modem 'Political Thought (Cambridge: Pohty, 1997), p. 58.
24 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Mankind, Jean Bethke Elshtain, ‘Don’t Be Cruel: 
Reflections on Rortyian Liberahsm’, in Daniel W. Conway and John E. Seery (eds.) The Politics of 
Irony: Essays in Self-Betrayal (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 199 — 217 at 211 — 214.
25 Rorty, Objectivity, Pelativism and Truth, p. 23, emphasis in original. I will consider how broadly 
the notion of a society, or an ethnos, should be interpreted in chapter 7.
26 Nagel, The East Word, p. 5.
27 Richard Rorty, ‘The Ambiguity of “Rationahty”’, Constellations 3 (1996), pp. 73 — 82.
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conclusions as us. O n  the one hand, Nagel uses ‘rational’ to  indicate those people who 
reach a particular conclusion if  they are reasoning correctly. B ut he also clearly intends 
‘should’ in  a com m ending way, as though this is what it w ould be good for people to 
believe. T hat is, he moves backwards and forwards betw een ‘rationality’ as a cognitive 
faculty that we either possess or not, and ‘reasonable’, w hat it would be good for us to  do 
in  a certain situation.
In  the absence o f  any further evidence, Nagel’s claim that ‘to think o f  reason as an 
abstraction fcom the contingent psychological phenom ena o f  hum an reasoning is to  get 
things backwards’^ ® is merely an unsupported assertion. O ne can go on to  suggest that it 
is in  fact Nagel w ho has got things backwards, reifying practices o f  reasoning by 
abstracting them  from  the context in which they emerge, and then proclaiming their 
objectivity and universal status by ignoring their particular origin. Thus, although he takes 
Rorty’s account to  be animated by a central failing, namely the rejection o f  the 
philosophical attem pt to  seek to  transcend hum an peculiarities and attain a view o f  the 
w orld uncoloured by such things — to attain as he famously puts it, the view from  
nowhere, the view o f  ‘the world as it is in  itse lf — it is unclear that Nagel has managed 
to  get closer to  this goal than Rorty.
7.3 Validity and the contingency o f  language
Following Willard van O rm an Quine, Rorty denies that the notion o f  ‘validity’ is any less 
conditional than other notions. W e can illustrate this point w ith an example raised by
28 Nagel, The hast Word, pp. 56 — 57.
29 Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 5.
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Nagel o f  the rules o f  grammar. Nagel points out that people can use a w ord wrongly, and 
thus invalidly: the examples he gives are that people often use the words ‘disinterested’ 
w hen they m ean ‘uninterested’ and ‘enormity’ w hen they should say ‘enorm ous size’. In  
answer to  the question o f  at w hat point does an invalid use become, because o f  its 
repeated use, a vahd one, Nagel writes that instances such as these ‘will probably 
continue to  strike m e as objectively w rong even if  I hve to  an age w hen alm ost no  one 
any longer recognizes them  as errors’.^ ® In  so doing, he draws a firm distinction between 
‘use’ with ‘vahdity’, between w hat people happen to  think and w hat is correct.
Nagel’s example is a good one o f  invahd use o f  language, though there are o f  course an 
infinite num ber o f  others. The rules o f the Enghsh language exist independently o f  any 
single speaker o f  that language. A t the same time however, words and the rules o f 
gram m ar have no  interests and concerns o f  their own, bu t get their m eaning through use. 
This po in t is m ade by Quine who, o f  the example o f  defining ‘bachelor’ as ‘unm arried 
m an’ asks simply enough, ‘W ho defined it thus, and w hen?’^  ^ I f  we appeal to  the 
dictionary, this only repHcates the question, for the lexicographer has recorded the 
antecedent fact that ‘bachelor’ and ‘unm arried m an’ are used synonymously. Quine 
concludes that the distinction between analytic truths and synthetic truths, although a 
philosophical article o f  faith, is no t one that can be specified. There is no  way to 
distinguish betw een these two kinds o f  truth, and show where empirical truths (truths 
‘m ade true’ by features o f  the world) stop, and logical truths, as relations betw een ideas, 
start. T o  make his point, Quine notes that an outside observer, or som eone learning a 
new language, cannot specify w hether the particular use o f  the w ord ‘true’ by m em bers 
o f  the observed com m unity or speakers o f  the learned language points to  an analytic or a
30 Nagel, The hast Word, p. 40.
31 W. V. O. Quine, Tram a Logical Point of V^ iew: 9 lj)gico-Philosophical Essays (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1980, second edition), p. 24.
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synthetic truth. For Quine, any difference betw een truths is merely ‘the degree o f 
stubbornness which [a] person exhibits toward giving up [a] belief.
People and communities come to  speak one language rather than  another as a 
consequence o f  a m ultitude o f  contingent historical circumstances rather than  the 
conscious decision o f  any individual or group. A t som e point, as the use o f  such words 
changes, so does the valid use o f  those words. Nagel writes o f  the use o f  ‘disinterested’ 
that it win probably seem w rong to  him  even if  ‘alm ost no one recognizes’ it as an error. 
B ut w hat if  no  one apart from  Nagel him self came to believe it to  be an error? W ould it 
still be meaningful to  describe it as an error? Nagel’s use o f  the w ord ‘recognize’ is 
significant, because it is again suggestive o f  representationahsm , that there is a correct set 
o f  rules o f  gram m ar that exists independently o f hum an beings and which people either 
recognise or not. A t a certain point however, certainly w hen no one any longer 
recognizes them  as errors and the use o f the w ord has becom e com m on, earning a place 
in the dictionary, Nagel him self w ould be mistaken to  describe them  as errors.
Nagel concedes that, in cases such o f  these which concern ‘usage, as opposed to validity’, 
objectivity ‘can’t really outstrip com m unity practice’.^  ^ W hat then is the distinction 
betw een ‘usage’ and ‘validity’? Nagel thinks it a firm one, bu t for Quine, it is a difference 
o f  degree, n o t o f  kind. There is, he argues, a continuum  running betw een beliefs that we 
cannot easily imagine giving up, through to beliefs that we w ould readily renounce if  
evidence pointed towards their contradiction. O ne way to explain this point is to  m ake a 
distinction between w hat Gary G utting calls a social practice and group consensus. 
G roup consensus is whatever a group o f people think, whereas a social practice is
32 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 120.
33 Nagel, The Last Word, p, 40 .1 discuss ‘objectivity’ in chapter 7.
34 Gutting, Pragmatic Ubera/ism and the Critique of Modernity, pp. 21 — 22.
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som ething that, though changeable, is recognisable independently o f  w hat anyone thinks. 
Consequently, we can appeal in  the name o f  a com m unity’s social practice, for example 
equality, again the current consensus o f that community.^^ Applying G utting’s term s to 
Nagel’s example, we can say that the rules o f  the English language are a social practice, 
no t merely a group consensus: it is meaningful to  speak o f  mistakes o f  gram m ar by both  
individuals and groups. W e know we have spelled a w ord incorrectly because we 
recognise that we were trying to  spell a specific word; if  we did no t recognise this, we 
would n o t be able to  say that we had misspelled it. A social practice wül be recognisable 
as such because it has becom e the practice o f  a community, whereas group consensus 
m ight merely refer to  the views o f  (sections of) the com m unity at a specific time. A t the 
same time however, the one leads to  the other, and no sense can be given to  the idea o f 
social practices, or anything else, claiming Validity’ entirely independently o f  the 
particular practices o f  a community.
The notion  o f  validity is further weakened if, as Rorty argues, languages are contingent. I f  
languages are no t attem pts to  represent reality bu t are attem pts to  cope w ith it, then there 
are a potentially limitless num ber o f  ways in which this m ight be done. Rorty follows 
Q uine by arguing that there is no  m eaning lying behind words. Rather, the m eaning o f  a 
w ord is, as W ittgenstein pu t it, simply the use o f  a w ord in  a language: ‘the “m eaning” o f 
typographical inscriptions is no t an extra “immaterial” property they have, bu t just their 
place in  a context o f  surrounding events in  a language-game, in  a form  o f  Ufe’.^  ^ F or this 
reason, there can be no  analytic truths, because there can be no truths by virtue o f  
meaning. Quine argues that the evidence o f  this is seen in  translations. W hen translators
35 As I will discuss in chapter 6, this is precisely what Rorty thinks political theorists ought to do.
36 Rorty, VhilosopJy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 25.
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attem pt to  render the term s o f  one language into that o f  another, there is no single 
correct way to  do so, with the result that different translations can aU be acceptable.
Rorty develops this point in  his discussion o f  m etaphor, or ‘unfamiliar noises’. A 
m etaphor comes from  outside the ‘order o f  reasons’. The m etaphorical or surprising use 
o f  language, for example in a claim like ‘love is the only law’ or ‘the earth whirls round 
the sun’, were surprising w hen first they were uttered.^^ The attem pt to  make sense o f  the 
surprise wiU require us to  alter our theories or vocabularies in order to  take account o f  it. 
M etaphors do no t fit in to  the pre-existent or antecedent order o f  reasons, but have 
rather the potential to  extend the frontiers o f  knowledge and o f  logical space; they are, as 
we saw in  chapter 2, causes, bu t no t reasons, for changing b e lie f s .T h e y  are thus no t 
cognitive, though they have the potential to  becom e cognitive and are therefore the 
engine for m oral change and progress: Rorty writes o f  the ‘genius w ho [by creating a 
m etaphor] transcends the predictable thereby transcends the cognitive and the 
m eaningful’.^  ^ But there is no way to  teU w ho is a genius and w ho an eccentric except 
retrospectively, by seeing which m etaphors happened to  catch on  and be Hteralised, and 
which did not. In  the absence o f  an order o f  reasons, there is no  way to  m ake this kind 
o f  judgem ent in advance o f  posterity. As Rorty puts it, the ‘“irrational” intrusions o f  
beliefs which “make no sense” (i.e., cannot be justified by exhibiting their coherence with 
the rest o f  w hat we believe) are just those events which intellecmal historians look back 
upon  as “concepm al revolutions” .’^
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 170. Rorty goes on to discuss the different intentions 
behind metaphors, between for example the use of language for poetic effect, or self-conscious 
political effect. Such differences, though interesting and important, are not my concern here.
38 Rorty, Contingency, Ironj, and Solidarity, p. 50.
39 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativity, and Truth, p. 169.
^  Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 15. Rorty also approvingly quotes Davidson’s claim that 
“‘the irrational” is essential to human progress’. Ibid., p. 14.
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This for Rorty explains why philosophers are hostile to  m etaphors, since they entail that 
inquiry is not, as foundationaHsts believe, converging, bu t proliferating, Nagel for 
instance claims that intellectual and cultural change can only com e from  within the order 
o f  reasons, writing that ‘[c]hallenges to  the objectivity o f  science can be m et only by 
further scientific reasoning, challenges to  the objectivity o f  history by history, and so 
forth .’"^  ^ This is however simply no t the case. It is quite possible for an idea which is 
internally consistent nevertheless to  be false. Sometimes the stimulus for change comes 
no t from  within a vocabulary, bu t from  external factors. Changes within philosophy as 
an intellectual discipline for example have occurred because o f  broader cultural changes, 
notably the grow th o f  the natural sciences, a fact which explains for example why 
D escartes bo th  founded m odem  philosophy, and why he did no t think o f  him self as 
doing so.
7.4 Truth and truthûilness
In  opposing the universal validity o f  tru th  claims, it is im portant to  be clear that Rorty is 
no t denying the existence o f  truth. Many critical accounts o f  Rorty claim that he is giving 
up on truth, either consciously or as a result o f  his philosophical position. F o r Cheryl 
Misak, ‘Rorty thinks that the philosopher should happily jettison the notion o f  tru th  
a lto g e th e r '.O th e rs  think that Rorty allows for truth, b u t that he defines tru th  in terms 
o f  justification or warrant; tru th  is what, for Rorty, we are allowed to  get away with in
41 Nagel, The Last Word, p. 21.
42 Cheryl Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Praÿnatism and Deliberation (London; Routledge, 2000), pp. 
12 — 13. Charles Taylor makes a similar claim in ‘Rorty in the Epistemological Tradition’. For 
Tom Rockmore, Rorty ‘has discarded the idea of truth’. He continues by asserting that Rorty 
maintains ‘that knowledge is impossible, and there is finally only fiction’. Rockmore, ‘Philosophy, 
Literature, and Intellectual Responsibility’, American Philosophical Quarterly 30 (1993), pp. 109 — 121 
at 112, 115.
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conversation. Hilary Putnam  for example takes Rorty to be offering an ‘emotivist’ view 
o f  truth, where tru th  as simply a com plim ent that we pay to  beliefs we approve of."^ ^
N either claim is, I suggest, accurate. Rorty’s point is, rather, that tru th  is forever 
unattainable. Habermas speaks o f  w hat he calls an ‘orientation toward unconditional 
tru th ’,'^ bu t for Rorty, such an orientation is impossible. T ru th  cannot serve as a goal o f  
inquiry since there is no  test o f  tru th  other than justification to  a com m unity o f  inquirers. 
W e have no  way to  grasp it, and, centrally, no  way o f  knowing w hen we are m oving 
towards o r away from  it. W ords such as ‘good’ and ‘tru th ’ are m eaningful and useful, bu t 
indefinable, because there is no  way to  give necessary and sufficient conditions o f  their 
application,'*^ and no way to  recognise them  even if  we had secured them. In  inquiry, 
although we m ight claim that we are seeking the truth, w hat is in fact aimed at is 
agreem ent from  our comm unity o f  inquirers. W hat is often called the pursuit o f  tru th  
entails m eeting standards o f  evidence, but these are themselves socially determined. I f  we 
have these things, we are content to  call our findings true. This is however an indication o f  
truth, n o t a definition o f  truth. Rorty does not define tru th  in  term s o f agreement, since 
w hat is agreed upon, he readily accepts, may no t be true, even though we have no other 
test o f  tru th  than agreement. Justification is all that we need, or indeed are able, to 
concern ourselves w ith since we possess no ‘criterion for achieving tru th  different from  
our criterion for achieving justification’.'*^
My claim that if  we take care o f  freedom  tru th  wiU take care o f  itself
implies that if  people can say that they believe w ithout fear, then, ... the
43 Putnam, R£alism With A. Human Face, p. 24. See also Cora Diamond, ‘Truth: Defenders, 
Debunkers, Despisers’, in Leona Toker (ed.) Commitment in Reflection: Essays in Literature and Moral 
Philosaphj (New York: Garland, 1994), pp. 195 — 222.
44 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, p. 48.
45 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 307.
46 Rorty, ‘Response to Susan Haack’, p. 148.
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task o f  justifying themselves to  others and the task o f  getting things right 
will coincide. My argum ent is that since we can test w hether we have 
perform ed the first task, and have no further test to  apply to  determ ine 
w hether we have perform ed the second, T ru th  as end-in-itself drops
This seems to  com m it Rorty to  saying that tru th  is whatever we think around here, and 
he has said things that support such an interpretation. In  Philosophy and the M irror of 
Nature, although he distinguished betw een tru th  and warranted assertability, saying that 
the existence o f  a difference is ‘unquestionable’,"^  he also claimed that tru th  is ‘justified 
true behef. This tied together justification and tru th  in a way that is unsustainable, as one 
o f  Rorty’s own examples illustrates. H e writes: ‘even w hen we have justified true behef 
about everything we w ant to  know, we may have no m ore than  conform ity to  the norm s 
o f  the day’."*^ In  saying this, Rorty is com m itted to  the incoherent position o f  saying that 
if  som ething is justified it is true, bu t also that what is justified may turn  out n o t to  be 
true.
In  subsequent writings, Rorty has come to recognise an im portant difference between 
justification and truth, which he term s the ‘cautionary’ use o f  truth, captured in the 
phrase ‘justified, bu t maybe no t true’.^ ° T he term  ‘justified true behef is m istaken, for if  
w hat is justified turns out to have been untrue, it never was true.^^ The cautionary view o f
Richard Rorty, ‘Response to James Conanf, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Rorty and H is Critics, 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 342 — 350 at 347.
48 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 281.
49 Ibid., p. 367.
50 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp. 127 — 8. He also allows for an ‘endorsing’ and 
‘disquotational’ meaning.
51 Even Rorty’s most sympathetic critics repeat this error. Ghiraldelh writes that for Rorty, 
something being justified means that it is, at least temporally, true: ‘true, of course, but here and 
nonl. Paulo Ghiraldelh Jr., ‘Truth, Trust, and Metaphor: Rorty’s Davidsonian Philosophy of
tru th  functions in  the same way as the notion o f  context-transcendence spoken o f  by 
Habermas: bo th  notions ensure the possibility o f  reform ing our current standards/^
Som e writers clearly w ant a m ore robust notion o f  truth. Susan Haack follows Peirce in 
believing that tru th  is w hat w ould be agreed upon  by aU inquirers i f  they were fuUy 
inform ed and concerned only with securing the truth: tru th  is as she puts it ‘the Final 
Representation that w ould be agreed in the light o f  the fullest possible logical scrutiny o f 
all possible e v id e n c e '.T o  make good her claim against those w ho Hke Rorty w ho doubt 
that inquiry can aim at truth, Haack seeks to show that som ething significant is lost i f  we 
drop claims for the pursuit o f  truth. For Haack, w hat is lost is intellectual integrity. The 
difference betw een writers w ho do aim at tru th  and those Hke Rorty w ho do not stems 
from  their respective motives:
The distinguishing feature o f  genuine inquiry is that w hat the inquirer 
wants is to fin d  the truth o f some question. ... T he distinguishing feature o f 
pseudo-inquiry is that w hat the “inquirer" wants is no t to  discover the 
tru th  o f  som e question bu t to make a case fo r some proposition determined in 
advancd}'^
The characteristic o f  no t caring about the tru th  o f  the proposition one is advancing 
Haack caUs ‘fake reasoning’.^  ^ The fake reasoner is concerned with style, and with the
Education’, in Michael A. Peters and Paulo GhiraldelH Jr. (eds.) VJchard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, 
and Politics (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield PubHshers, Inc., 2001), pp. 67 — 78 at 70, emphasis 
in original. This is an accurate summary of Rorty’s view in Philosoply and the Mirror of Nature, but it 
is not the position he holds now.
52 This issue is developed in chapter 7.
53 Susan Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate (London: The University of Chicago Press, 1998),
p. 26.
54 Ibid., p. 8, emphasis in original.
55 Ibid., p. 9.
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fame that arguing in a certain m anner will bring, rather than  the tm th  o f  w hat it is they 
seek to  assert.
This is unconvincing. There may well be people who self-consciously assert ‘fashionable’ 
views, n o t out o f  any belief in  their tru th  but in expectation o f  the fame (or infamy) this 
wiU bring. B ut m uch o f  the time, people w ho hold seemingly outlandish beliefs do not 
prom ote them  whilst simultaneously believing them  untrue. M oreover, history abounds 
with ideas which were thought strange, disgusting or evil, bu t which for aU that turned 
ou t to  be true. O ften, calling a view strange or outlandish, or an instance o f  sham  
reasoning, indicates simply a desire no t to  engage with the other position. Haack is quite 
correct w hen she says that inquirers should consider the evidence: ‘I f  you are shamm ing 
or faking, ... you will evade, obfuscate, fudge, to  avoid adm itting the force o f  awkward 
evidence’. B ut the relevance, and therefore the force, o f  a particular piece o f  evidence is 
som ething that is n o t given by the evidence itself. Rorty agrees w ith Haack by 
distinguishing ‘background beliefs’ from  ‘standards o f  evidence’. H e  agrees that the 
latter is fixed across epistemic communities, if  it is understood in the way that Haack 
shares w ith Rorty, o f  assessing its fit to  one’s experiences and other beliefs. How ever, the 
interesting question, and the one that epistemology has n o t been able to  answer, is to 
explain relevance — to specify exactly w hat should be taken as relevant and w hat 
disregarded. Unless Haack can show why the ‘Myth o f  the G iven’ is n o t mythical, and 
that ‘evidence’ is som ehow ‘given’ by the structure o f  the world or by the nature the 
hum an brain, she begs the question by appealing to evidence, since w hat counts as 
evidence, as well as its relevance, is open to  interpretation.
56 Ibid., p. 20.
57 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Susan Haack’, in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (ed.) Korty and 
Pragmatism: The Philosopher Kesponds to His Critics (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 
148 -153  at 151.
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H aack gives w hat I think o f  as convincing instances o f  pseudo-inquiry, citing for example 
the efforts o f  those w ho seek to  com bine evolutionary theory w ith the literal tru th  o f  the 
Bible. A lthough claiming to  be scientific, these ‘scientists’ do  no t hold the belief which is 
taken to  be central to  science, preparedness to  give up behefs in the face o f  insubstantial 
evidence. Their concern is no t disinterestedly to examine the claims o f  evolution and o f  
the Bible, bu t to  show that the form er m ust cohere with the latter. This is however to 
adopt a particular view o f  the nature o f  inquiry. Should scientists count the Bible as 
evidence to  counter their claims that the world is m ore that six thousand years old? I 
think not, bu t many think this is p ro o f positive that it is, and Haack gives no  non­
question-begging means to  resolve this matter.
8. Ethnocentrism, irrationality, and relativism
I now  tu rn  to  address the charge that, by depriving us o f  an extra-societal standard o f  
vahdity, Rorty cannot allow for any difference between com peting m oral positions, or 
that at m ost any difference is ‘morally arbitrary’.
8.1 Philosophical an dpolitica l freedom
H aberm as thinks it possible to  settle m oral controversies by deferring to  w hat he calls 
‘the force o f  the better argum ent’.^ ® This claim is developed in  relation to  Rorty by 
Thom as McCarthy, M cCarthy writes that the arguments for Nazism , Stahnism and the 
Inquisition are no t as ‘strong as the arguments against them ’, and that, i f  Rorty thinks
58 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, p. 46.
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they are, then  he is ‘obviously w rong'/^  However, bo th  term s ‘m ost convincing’ and 
‘better argum ent’ need to  be given content. It is no t clear that there is any content to  
these notions other than ‘persuasion’ and ‘conversation’, the standard that Rorty uses but 
that bo th  M cCarthy and Shane O ’Neill are at pains to  distinguish £rom ‘validity’. 
McCarthy assumes such a contrast, but does no t say w hat it is. After quoting Rorty’s 
objection on  this point, namely w hat to  do if  ‘Hitler rejoins that to  in terpret tm th  as a 
product o f  free and open encounters rather than as w hat emerges from  the genius o f  a 
destined leader begs the question against him ’^ °, M cCarthy simply notes that there are 
‘enorm ous social consequences attached to  the different m ethods o f  fixing behef and 
that for this reason Rorty is w rong to  reject the im portance o f  attending to general 
conceptions o f  tm th. As I have said, Rorty rejects the latter claim, but, as I wiU now 
examine, he agrees w ith the former.
Rorty views H aberm as’s ‘communicative rationahty’ and corresponding notion o f  the 
ideal speech simation as an uncom fortable half-way house between traditional subject- 
centred rationahty, and the pragm atist view that freedom  and equahty whl rem ove the 
need for notions o f  ahistoric rationahty or universal v a h d i ty . I t  agrees w ith pragmatism 
that ‘objectivity’ is a consequence no t o f a single hum an being reasoning bu t rather that 
reason is w hat emerges in conversation, bu t at the same time it suggests there is a natural 
terminus for that conversation, and that given ideal epistemic conditions everyone can be 
brought to  recognise it. As such, for Rorty it faUs short o f  the need to  embrace the fuU 
consequences o f  anti-foundationahsm, namely that there is nothing to respect apart from  
our feUows.
59 Thomas McCarthy, ‘Ironist Theory as a Vocation: A Response to Rorty’s Reply’, Critical Inquiry 
16 (Spring 1990), pp. 644 — 655 at 647.
<50 Richard Rorty, ‘Tmth and Freedom: A Reply to Thomas McCarthy’, Critical Inquiry 16 (Spring
1990), pp. 633 — 643 at 636.
<55 McCarthy, ‘Ironist Theory as a Vocation: A Response to Rorty’s Reply’, p. 647.
<52 See Rorty, ‘The Ambiguity of “Rationality”,’ pp. 74 — 75.
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Rorty however thinks the differences between H aberm as and him self unim portant. H e 
writes that they ‘do no t disagree about the w orth  o f  traditional democratic institutions, or 
about the sorts o f  im provem ents these institutions need, or about w hat counts as 
“freedom  from  dom ination” . R a t h e r ,  their differences are, as he puts it, ‘merely 
philosophical’. H aberm as in contrast regards them  as very im portant. H e proposes a 
distinction betw een acceptance and validity, claiming that the latter w ould be secured in 
w hat he calls the ‘ideal speech situation’. By providing ideally perspicuous epistemic 
conditions by excluding the distorting influences o f  pow er relations and ideology, tru th  
win emerge though free encounter. Haberm as summarises these conditions as follows: 
‘openness to  the public, inclusiveness, equal rights to  participation, im m unization against 
external or inherent compulsion, as well as the participants’ orientation tow ard reaching 
understanding (that is, the sincere expression o f utterances).’^
W riters such as Andrzej Szahaj believe that Rorty cannot endorse H aberm as’s view that 
com m unication should take place free from  distorting influences if  he abandons the 
metaphysics upon  which Haberm as grounds his position.^^ I suggest however that, w hen 
understood in  political term s, Rorty can readily share aU bu t one o f  these conditions that 
Haberm as specifies as constituting the ideal speech situation. Openness, inclusiveness, 
the equal right o f  participation and im m unization against external com pulsion are things 
Rorty thinks liberal democracies provide better than any alternative, bo th  w ith respect 
for equalizing freedoms and opportunities under the law by rem oving barriers to  
participation based on race or gender, and by economic egalitarianism to  create the 
freedom  and ability to  make use o f  those opportunities. W ith regard to  ‘im m unization
63 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 67.
64 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, p. 46.
65 Andrzej Szahaj, ‘The Task of Philosophy’, H istoy of European Ideas 20 (1995), pp. 559 — 566 at 
565.
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against internal com pulsion’, I suspect that he w ould gloss this as whatever results from  
the free discussion o f hum ans enjoying in the political social and econom ic freedoms and 
opportunities that are, ideally, provided in hberal democracies. So on each o f these 
points, R orty can agree w ith Haberm as, bu t understands his points in political rather than 
philosophical terms.
T he one condition that characterises the ‘ideal speech situation’ which is no t open to  
being ‘politicised’ in this m anner is H aberm as’s notion o f  ‘orientation toward 
understanding’. H aberm as glosses this as ‘the sincere expression o f utterances’. I f  that 
m eans simply that people be open and truthful in  their relations with each other, then 
Rorty certainly agrees w ith him  about its importance. However, ‘orientation toward 
understanding’ must, on  Rorty’s ethnocentric account, be m ade in reference to some 
particular goal or understanding, and it seems that H aberm as would disagree. Habermas 
argues that ‘W hat we hold to  be true has to  be défendable on  the basis o f  good reasons, 
no t merely in a different context bu t in aU possible contexts, that is, at any time and 
against anybody’.D r a w i n g  on H aberm as, O ’Neill seeks to  give content to  notions o f 
‘good reasons’ and ‘the better argum ent’ by distinguishing those w ho seek to  persuade 
others o f  the tru th  o f  their own position from  those w ho are com m itted to  a reasoned 
agreement. This distinction is, he claims, unavailable to  Rorty: ‘It is no t clear how Rorty 
could distinguish between a process o f  rational deliberation and a ruthlessly instrum ental 
quest for political victory’.^  ^Similarly, Steven E. Cole thinks that Rorty’s position reduces 
politics and morality to  m anipulation and power play. H e writes that anti-foundationalists 
think that:
Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, p. 46.
•57 O ’Neill, ‘Private Irony and the Public Hope of Richard Rorty’s Liberalism’, p. 54.
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[...] discourse should itself be m otivated by strategic interests and should 
thus frame its discussions in terms o f pragmatic questions about the local 
effectiveness o f  particular kinds o f arguments. Analysis o f the logical 
coherence o f  an argum ent is accordingly a discarded rehc o f the “quest 
for epistemic certitude”, and w hat remains is finally gossip writ large.^®
F or Rorty, there is no  such thing as an understanding that does no t make reference to 
som e standard, and that is no t directed towards some concrete goal. Conversation, like 
everything else, is goal-orientated. Cole m isrepresents this position, since Rorty is no t 
commending anti-foundationalism  in the sense o f  claiming that discourse should proceed in 
this m anner. The point rather is that this is w hat happens in  discourse, and that there is 
no  possibility o f  distinguishing at the level o f  theory betw een discourse that seeks truth, 
and that which seeks effectiveness.
M ost o f  the time, the difference between strategic and non-strategic uses o f  language is 
one that cannot in practice be specified. W e w ant to  be open enough to  Hsten to  cases in 
which we m ight learn something, bu t w hen engaged in persuasion, we are also seeking to  
press for the tru th  o f our view over others; there would be no reason for engagem ent if  
that were no t the case. In  terms o f  O ’Neill distinction betw een ‘rational deliberation’ and 
a ‘ruthlessly instrum ental quest for political victory’, for the m ost part people seem to  be 
somewhere in the middle. Rational deliberation is undertaken precisely in  the quest for 
‘political victory’ in the sense o f  dem onstrating that our view is that which should carry 
the day. It is only by employing a com bination o f  a negative adjective (‘instrum ental’) and 
adverb (‘ruthlessly’) that O ’Neill makes this appear som ething sinister, or, in the case o f
•58 Steven E. Cole, ‘The Poverty of Contingency Theory’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) Roa^; Sage 
Masters of Modem Social Thought, volume 3 (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 267 — 284 at 267. 
The term ‘quest for epistemic certitude’ is Christopher Norris’s.
95
Cole’s w ord ‘gossip’, som ething petty and inconsequential. W ithout these qualifiers, we 
w ould probably accept that there is nothing w rong with a quest for ‘political victory’ 
w hen this is understood as a process o f  com m unication and persuasion through free 
discussion. Clearly there is a distinction between dogm atism  and fanaticism on  the one 
hand, and open-m indedness and tolerance on the other. B ut this difference is for Rorty 
explicated in  social and political term s, no t at the level o f  theory.
T hat inquiry is goal-orientated is, I suspect, part o f  the reason why Rorty has no time for 
the notion  o f  convergence at the ‘end o f  inquiry’, since there are no norm s that specify 
w hen we m ight have reached it. Rorty recognises that the ideal speech situation is a 
regulative ideal, one unlikely ever to  be achieved, bu t queries w hether it can thereby make 
any difference to  our practices o f  inquiry. For him, ‘[njothing can have critical or 
regulative force — can serve to  change our beliefs — except a concrete contribution to  an 
argum ent’.*^  ^W e can tell when, for example, we have better understood a particular issue 
or object, bu t we cannot tell w hen we have reached som ething as unspecified and un- 
specifiable as ‘the end o f  inquiry’. Rorty makes this point w hen he notes that we could 
never know  w hen we had reached that point, rather than having simply secured 
agreement: ‘[h]ow would we know that we were at the end o f  inquiry, as opposed to 
merely having gotten fired or unimaginative?’^ ® M cCarthy provides no test for such a goal 
other than  the agreement o f  inquirers, bu t this is no  different to  the ‘wide acceptance’ 
that O ’Neill wants to  contrast validity against. In  either case, there is no  reason to  claim
Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Simon Thompson’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson 
(eds.) ^chard 'Éjorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 51 — 54 at 52. I suspect that 
Rorty would agree with Simon Thompson’s claim that ‘if these ideal standards have not yet been 
spelt out, then the belief now that such standards will enable us to determine the truth in the 
future is no more than an act of faith’. Thompson, ‘Richard Rorty on Truth, Justification and 
Justice’, p. 44.
70 Rorty, Objectivity, 'RBlativism, and Truth, p. 131.
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that w hatever is agreed upon  is true. As Rorty points out, looking to history, we see that 
our current superstitions were the last century’s ‘trium ph o f  reason’.^ ^
8,2 Irrationality and m oral relativism
F or Rorty, claims such as M cCarthy’s stem  from  a form  o f  ‘faculty psychology’, the view 
that hum ans divide up into different faculties — reason, desire, passion, wiU,^  ^ and that 
fully rational hum ans are able to  rise above their passions in  order to  see which options 
are fully rational. Faculty psychology lies behind M cCarthy and Habermas w hen they 
com plain that Rorty collapses validity into persuasion; that as Haberm as puts it, there are 
‘intuitive distinctions between convincing and persuading, betw een m otivation through 
reasons and casual exertion o f  influence, between learning and indoctrination’.^  ^ As we 
have seen, Rorty certainly agrees that there is a difference betw een learning and 
indoctrination, bu t it is one o f  degree, no t o f kind, one that is explicable in term s o f the 
m ethods o f  teaching used and the result that was desired, rather than in  term s o f  a 
philosophical distinction. For Rorty, the m anner in which H aberm as and M cCarthy draw 
the distinction relies on the notion that the rational part o f  the hum an m ind can, if  
unclouded by passion, recognise the truth. Against this, he adopts a view o f  humans 
holding a plurality o f  beliefs and desires. There is thus no firm distinction betw een what 
people happen to  think, and what, if  they are being rational, they should think.
71 Rorty, Philosop!:^  and the Mirror of Nature^ p. 367.
72 Rorty, Essays on Heide^erand Others, p. 150, n. 10.
73 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn', p. 52; McCarthy, ‘Ironist Theory as a Vocation’, 
p. 647.
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Rorty develops this point by agreeing with Alasdair M acIntyre that m odern m oral and 
political philosophy is a confused mixture o f  notions/'* O n  the one hand, it utilises terms 
such as ‘reason’ and ‘hum an nature’ that make sense only on an Aristotelian worldview, 
one which had at its core a teleological account o f  hum ankind in which m an’s essence 
defines his ends. O n  the other, it endorses a Baconian, mechanistic, view which explicitly 
contradicts that account. In  the absence o f  such a teleology, M acIntyre argues that these 
term s have com e to be used merely as incoherent expressions o f  individual preference: as 
he puts it, ‘m oral judgements are linguistic survivals from  the practices o f  classical theism  
which have lost the context provided by these practices’.^  ^Unlike MacIntyre, Rorty thinks 
we should drop the last vestiges o f Aristotelianism, including Aristotelian moral psychology, 
in which the hum an faculties break down into categories such as reason, wül, and deske, 
and adopt instead a Hum ean view o f  a plurality o f beliefs and judgements. I f  we do, the 
charge o f  emotivism, and the contrast with ‘universal validity’ vanishes, because there is 
nothing else that judgements could possibly be.
It also follows that ethnocentrism  is inescapable. H um ans create value, and the values 
that we create reflect specific needs and interests, no t an independent order o f  reasons. 
Rorty believes that as a consequence, the world divides in to  those w ith w hom  we share 
enough beliefs to  make conversation fruitful, and those w ith w hom  we do not. It is in 
this sense that he believes notions o f  rationahty and irrationahty should be thought of. As 
he puts it.
T o  conclude that som eone is irredeemably irrational is n o t to  realize that
she is no t making proper use o f  her God-given faculties. I t  is rather to
Rorty, Essc^s on Heide^erand Others, p. 159. 
75 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 60.
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realize that she does n o t seem to share enough relevant beliefs and 
desires with us to  make possible fruitful conversation about the issue in 
dispute/^
Som e values are, as Bernard Williams puts it, n o t ‘real options’^  ^ for us. A  real option is 
an encounter where we are able to  take other beliefs seriously, and where failure to  
convince others o f  the w orth  o f  our beliefs w ould be o f  concern to  us. Liberals cannot 
for example take seriously the claims o f  Nazis, or religious fundamentalists, in the sense 
that their values are no t ones that liberals could ever conceive o f  themselves coming to  
adopt. In  som e cases, ‘we would rather die than share the beliefs which we assume are 
central to  their self-identities. Some people think o f  Jews and atheists in  these terms. 
O thers think this way about Nazis and religious fundam entalists’.^ ® Liberals are not 
w orried by the failure o f  Nazis to  accept liberalism. But they w ould be worried if  they 
could no t justify some o f  their beliefs to  people they take to  be reasonable.
It has seem ed to  many however that ethnocentrism  is synonymous with, or at the least 
entails, re la tiv ism .R o rty  is widely regarded as the quintessential relativist, bu t it is clear 
that there is no  consensus on Rorty’s position with respect to  relativism. Some argue that 
Rorty regards him self as a relativist. W olin writes o f  the kind o f  ‘thoroughgoing 
relativism — which Rorty (and here, one can only admire his consistency) freely
76 Rorty, Justice as a Larger Loyalty’, p. 234.
77 Quoted in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 31, n. 13.
78 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 203.
79 This claim is partially, but not wholly, circular. We define reasonable as those who hold similar 
beliefs to ours. However, we do not think that every disagreement is a symptom of 
unreasonableness.
80 For an example of the former, see Jonathan G. Allen, ‘Rationality, Relativism, and Rorty’, South 
African journal ofThilosoply 11 (1992) pp. 52 — 61. O f the latter, see Andrew R. Smith and Leonard 
Shyles, ‘On Ethnocentric Truth and Pragmatic Justice’, in Lenore Langsdorf and Andrew Smith 
(eds.) Recovering Pragmatism’s Voice: The Classical Tradition, Rorty, and the Philosophy of Communication 
(Albany. State University of New York, 1995), pp. 71 — 96.
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em braces’.®^ In  stark contrast, and consistent w ith the fact that Rorty never claims to 
em brace relativism (freely or otherwise), Bernard Williams notes that ‘Rorty is n o t a 
relativist’.®^ O thers, aware that Rorty would not accept their account o f  him, think that, 
irrespective o f  his own claims, he is logically com m itted to  holding that position because 
o f  his broader philosophical position. F or M artin HoUis, ‘there is no  mistaking a 
relativism in  Rorty’s underm ining o f  the search after tru th ’.®^
O nce Rorty is identified as a relativist, the issue becomes one o f  specifying o f  w hat that 
relativism consists. Some writers seem hard pressed to  do this. W hilst Hilary Putnam  
agrees w ith Rorty that there is no  trans-historical standard o f  reason, and that hum ans 
cannot break out o f  their standards o f  justification to  the view from  nowhere in order to 
com pare their particular standards to  naked reality, he continues to  speak o f  ‘a Rortian 
relativism w ith respect to  ethics’.®'* In  another place, Putnam  is m ore equivocal and, after 
confessing him self confused as to  exactly w hat Rorty’s position is, switches his 
discussion o f  relativism from  Rorty to  focus on a nameless bu t supposedly ‘typical 
relativist’.®® A nd Steven Best and Douglas Kellner write that Rorty ‘is no t a “relativist” in 
the sense o f  som eone w ho thinks aU claims are equally good or viable’, and yet, on  the 
very same page, go on to  teU us that for him, ‘ultimately, one description is as good as 
any o ther’.®^
81 Wolin, The Terms of Cultural Criticism, p. 152.
82 Bernard Williams, ‘Auto-da-Fé: Consequences of Pragmatism’, in Alan R  Malachowski (ed.) 
Reading Rorp: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond) (Oxford; Basil 
Blackwell Ltd., 1991), pp. 26 — 37 at 28.
83 Martin Hollis, ‘The Poetics of Personhood’, in Alan R. Malachowski (ed.) Reading Rorty: Critical 
Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Beyond) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd.,
1991), pp. 24 5 -2 5 6  at 248.
84 Hilary Pumam, The Collapse of the Tact (Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (London: Harvard 
University Press, 2002), p. 92.
83 Pumam, Renewing Philosophy, p. 69.
86 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, ‘Richard Rorty and Postmodern Theory’, in Michael A. 
Peters and Paulo Ghiraldelli Jr. (eds.) Richard Rorty: Education, Philosophy, and Politics (Oxford: 
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2001), pp. 101 — 110 at 103.
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This variety o f  views reflects the fact that ‘relativism’ does n o t nam e a single, readily 
grasped issue. In  part, this is because relativism is no t confined to  morality, bu t includes 
cultural, moral, cognitive, and epistemic relativism. W ith regard to  morality, relativists are 
typically held to  endorse one or (inconsistently) bo th  o f  the following positions: that one 
value or practice is as good as any other another; and that it is impossible to  form  and 
m ake judgem ents about the w orth o f  different values or practices. T he central difficulty 
w ith describing Rorty as a relativist however is that he endorses neither position. Indeed, 
in  a discussion o f  m oral relativism he joins Nagel in claiming that that relativism is 
incoherent,®^ though he does so whilst claiming that no one is a relativist, and that 
relativism is merely a philosopher’s fiction: ‘I f  there m re any relativists, they would, o f 
course, be easy to  refute. O ne w ould merely use some variant o f  the self-referential 
argum ents Socrates used against Protagoras. B ut such neat little dialectical strategies only 
w ork against lightly-sketched fictional characters’.®®
Relativism, conceived o f  as the claim that any belief about a subject is as good as any 
other, is said by Rorty to  be held by no one. The real issue as he sees it concerns the 
ground upon  which it is possible to  stand in order to  decide betw een different beliefs and 
practices. In  casting doubt on the availability o f  neutral ground, philosophers hke him self 
are attacked for denying the very possibility o f  m aking that choice at all:
“Relativism” is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps 
about any topic, is as good as any other. N o  one holds this view. Except 
for the occasional cooperative freshman, one cannot find anybody w ho
87 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 202.
88 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 167, emphasis in original.
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says that two incom patible opinions on an im portant topic are equally 
good. T he philosophers w ho get called “relativists” are those w ho say that 
the grounds for choosing between such opinions are less algorithmic 
than had been thought.
The algorithm that is relied upon, be it ‘universal validity, ‘objectivity’, or 
‘correspondence to  reality’, is taken to  be central to the distinction between things 
conditioned by hum an needs and peculiarities, and the way they are apart from  that 
conditioning. Rorty is clear that there is no  neutral ground upon  which one can stand to 
make judgements about the w orth o f  cultures, or anything else. In  his view, there is as we 
have seen no basis for ethical judgements outside o f  the standards o f  som e hum an 
comm unity or vocabulary. Any concern that the awareness o f  the contingency o f  beliefs 
brings w ith it is m oreover, irresolvable, since there is no  way to  check that one’s beliefs 
are any m ore accurate than any other’s because the only test for accuracy is that provided 
by the language game in  which one’s beliefs are situated, and no  way to  stand between 
vocabularies and the w orld to  see how  well the form er represents the latter. T he ground 
on which we stand is always that o f  a particular community, or ethnos^  and it is for this 
reason that Rorty, though just as com m itted to liberalism as say Jo h n  Rawls, is often held 
to  endorse cultural and m oral relativism. T he question is w hether it is legitimate to use a 
standard o f  value if  no  neutral, perspective-free standard is available. F or Rorty, there is 
no  way the world is apart from  the different ways that hum an beings describe it. Yet for 
this very reason, the issue o f relativism does no t arise, because there is no  way things are 
in themselves and therefore no standard to  which m oral judgements can be said to  be 
relative to. ‘Only the assum ption that there is some such standpoint to  which we m ight 
rise gives sense to the question, “I f  one’s convictions are only relatively vaHd, why stand
89 Ibid., p. 166, emphasis in original.
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for them  unflinchingly?’” ®^ Only the idea o f  a view from  now here can give sense to  the 
idea that there are better and worse representations o f  that viewpoint. In  the absence o f 
such a perspective, we are left w ith different hum an views, and argum ents about which 
should prevail.
8.3 E thnocentrism  and m oral arbitrariness
Rorty seeks to  scrape o ff  the label ‘ethical relativist’ by turning away from  epistemology 
and metaphysics towards ethics:
W e do care about alternative, concrete, detailed cosmologies, or 
alternative, concrete, detailed proposals for political change. W hen such 
an alternative is proposed, we debate it, no t in term s o f  categories or 
principles but in terms o f  the various concrete advantages and 
disadvantages it has.^^
How ever, in denying the possibility o f  appealing to ahistoric standards, categories or 
principles, this sldU implies that the standards o f  ‘advantage’ and ‘disadvantage’ are 
dependent upon  w hat different groups o f  people take to  be concrete advantages or 
disadvantages. W e are still left w ith w hat many see as a problem , namely that there is no  
good reason for choosing one position over another, other than it simply being what we 
happen to  like — or prefer, or believe to  be ‘true’ — around here.
90 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 50.
91 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 168. See also Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 57.
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R orty denies that this is relativism because, in the absence o f  such a standpoint, w hat 
rem ains are hum ans in a web o f social and m oral relations. F rom  within this context, we 
m ake judgements. A nother way o f  putting this is the suggestion that ethnocentrism  
occupies the middle ground betw een rationalism and nihilism. I t aftirms values, bu t 
recognises that the values held at any given time are a function o f socialisation and 
circumstance.
M any critics, either explicitly or by implication, maintain that for Rorty there is no  
m eaningful standard by which comparisons can be made, and that it is therefore morally 
arbitrary to  value one position over another. This claim has been spelt out in a variety o f 
ways. F o r Geras the absence o f  ‘universal neutral values’ itself that m eans that for Rorty 
ranking beliefs is only ‘an arbitrary, unarguable preference’.^  ^ R obert H einem an writes 
that Rorty ‘is simply unable to  distinguish betw een good and evil w ithin his philosophical 
term s’.^  ^ Eric G ander concurs, writing that Rorty’s account leaves us ‘in  a conversation 
w ith our e>:act conversational equal’,^ '^  and that as a result it is simply a m atter o f  ‘chance’ 
w hether our opponent or we ourselves prevail. For Richard J. Bernstein, ‘[djebates about 
our basic values and norm s are no t [on Rorty’s account] rational. They are only rhetorical 
strategies for getting others to  adopt our attitudes’.^  ^Similarly, J. Judd  O w en understands 
Rorty to  be saying that ‘There is no  answer to  the question why liberal should be liberals 
... Hberals are liberals simply by chance ... Liberalism is no t som ething we came to  
accept, or can com e to accept, rationally’.^  ^A nd for Rachel Haliburton, ‘the liberal ironist
2^ Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind, p. 120.
Robert Heineman, Authority and the Liberal Tradition: From Hobbes to Rorty (London: Transaction 
Publishers, 1994), p. 187.
Gander, The Hast Conceptual RBVolution, p. 168, emphasis in original.
95 Bernstein, The Neiv Constellation, p. 278.
96 Owen, Rfli^on and the Demise of Liberal Rationalism, p. 78, emphasis in original.
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. . .  can only say that we should avoid "humiliating" others as m uch as possible, bu t he 
can give no  reasons why this ought to  be the case’.^ ^
In  contrast, others recognise that Rorty can give reasons, bu t that, in  the absence o f  any 
higher order standard o f  value to  which we can appeal, that there is no  final way to  judge 
betw een them , and that as a consequence reason-giving is reduced to m ere assertion. 
Cheryl Misak allows that Rorty beUeves that there are reasons for belief, bu t that these 
are ‘merely historically conditioned reasons, no t different in  status or w orth  from  the 
neo-N azi's reasons based on inequahty and hatred o f  those w ho are foreign’.’® H enry 
V eatch beheves that Rorty’s pragm atism  confirms ‘the u tter arbitrariness and 
permissiveness o f  those category choices: we choose them  and then  repudiate them , 
because now  they appeal to us, and now  they do not’.”  H e goes on  to  suggest that if  (as 
he beheves Rorty to  be claiming) we cannot make ‘rational choice’, then  our choices 
m ust be som e ‘sort o f  sheer N ietzschean W hl-to-Power’. M orahty seems to  be, as 
M atthew Festenstein puts it, at best ‘anarchic’.’’’
In  summary, there seem to be two interrelated causes o f  concern: first, that Rorty 
reduces behef to  a m atter o f  pure chance or luck; second, that insofar as there are 
reasons for us to  hold our behefs, in the absence o f  philosophical notions such as 
ahistorical reason and universal vahdity, those behefs are o f  equal status to  any other, o f  
value simply because we have come to value them. B oth understandings o f  Rorty are I
Rachel Halburton, ‘Richard Rorty and the Problem of Cruelty’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 23 
(1997), pp. 49 — 69 at 65, emphasis in original. Here Hihburton uses ‘ironist’ as a synonym for 
‘anti-foundationahst’. As I will discuss in chapter 4, they are not synonyms.
58 Misak, Morality, Politics, Truth, p. 16.
55 Henry B. Veatch, ‘Deconstruction in Philosophy: Has Rorty Made It the Denouement for 
Contemporary Analytic Philosophy?’ Keview of Metaphysics 39 (1985), pp. 303 — 320 at 319.
100 Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory, p. 129.
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will now  argue mistaken, bo th  in term s o f  what they think o f  Rorty’s stated position to  
be, and in  term s o f  w hat they think follows (either by design or by default) from  it.
Rorty argues that it is a m istake to  infer that the absence o f a privileged perspective such 
as the ‘view from  now here’ leaves us, as G ander claims, in a conversation w ith our exact 
conversational equal. Holders o f  two different sets o f belief will n o t regard themselves as 
equal. I f  one disagrees w ith som eone else, one will have reasons why one’s view is 
superior to  that o f  one’s interlocutor. The reason for the disagreem ent in the first place is 
that som ething is at stake, some difference that has led the parties to  converse with each 
other; as I suggested above, this is why there is no  firm distinction betw een strategic and 
non-strategic usage o f  language. O ne will no t be able to  say that one’s position is justified 
because it accords w ith reason, or the world as it is in itself, bu t will say that it is fairer, 
m ore just, etc. Liberals for example do no t see liberty as just one m ore value. It cannot 
be held to  contrast w ith for example love o f G od, or nationalism, as a value; these are 
no t ‘real options’ from  the liberal’s point o f  view.
This distinction is captured in the following way:
It is one thing to  say, falsely, that there is nothing to  choose betw een us 
and the Nazis. It is another thing to  say, correctly, that there is no  
neutral, com m on ground to  which an experienced N azi philosopher and 
I can repair in order to  argue out our differences. T hat N azi and I wiU 
always strike one another as begging all the crucial questions, arguing in 
circles.
0^1 Rorty, Philosopf^ and Social Hope, p. 15. See also Rorty, ‘Truth and Freedom: A Reply to 
Thomas McCarthy’, p. 636.
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I t  is because m any fail to  grasp this distinction, taking Rorty to  be denying any form  o f  
reason-giving, that they draw conclusions such as Misak’s, w ho claims that for Rorty 
‘[ejmancipatory m ovem ents m ust reject argum ent and rational persuasion and then  they 
are left w ith two choices — violence or prophecy’/*^  ^However, Rorty nowhere denies the 
need fo r rational persuasion in  the sense o f  freely and sincerely offering reasons with a 
view to  seeking agreement. The unspoken assum ption lurking behind Misak’s claim is 
again that w ithout some grounding in  Reahty as It Is in Itself, we are left merely w ith what 
people think. She continues by saying that ‘to think that we just hempen to  believe that he 
[the com m itted neo-Nazi] is w rong seems a rather pitiful reason to give ourselves to  justify 
our anti-Nazi stance’.^ °^  I t certainly w ould be, bu t Rorty does n o t suggest that w e ‘just 
happen’ to  beheve anything in  this sense; a fortiori^ this is n o t a reason to  give, either to  
ourselves o r to  the Nazi. N o  one w ould ever say o f  their own behefs that they ‘just 
happen’ to  hold them , or describe one’s own attachm ents as being ‘merely’ historically 
c o n d i t io n e d .M is a k  seems to  beheve that ethnocentric webs o f  behefs are merely 
contingent. She writes: ‘how, we wih want to ask, can he [Rorty] assert that democracy, 
hberahsm, and unforced agreement are best, i f  w hat is best is simply w hat is taken by 
som e group to  be best?’ °^^  B ut again, w hat is the force o f  the w ord ‘simply’? T o  be sure, 
they are contingent in the sense that we could equaUy have been b o m  into a different 
web o f  relations, bu t since we were b o m  into this particular web, they take on substance.
102 Misak, Morally, Politics, Truth, p. 16.
103 Ibid., emphasis in original. Geras makes the same claim. Solidarity in the Conversation of 
Humankind, pp. 87 -  88.
104 Admittedly, David Miher claims to. Writing of support for the National Health Service in 
Britain, he writes that ‘I may not know these reasons myself, and may simply take it for granted 
that supporting a national health service is part of what we believe in round here; none the less, 
the point remains that the obligations have a grounding in something more than mere tradition.’ 
David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 70. I suspect that this is not 
really the case, and that he (and everyone else) clearly has reasons for that support, reasons that, 
as he says, extend beyond brute appeals to tradition.
105 Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p. 13.
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They provide the context o f value in which we make m oral choices. T o  take seriously an 
alternative, it will have to be shown to  be superior by our ow n lights.
I t is then  clearly not, as G ander believes, a m atter o f  pure chance w hether we are 
converted to  Nazism, because there will be disagreements about the w orth  o f  different 
practices, debated no t at the level o f  philosophical principles bu t in  terms o f  the felt 
virtues and evils o f  both. Owen is correct to  say that for Rorty, m ost people are liberals 
because o f  contingent chance. However, to say as he does that Hberalism cannot be 
accepted rationally is ambiguous as to  w hat rationality m eans in  this context. I f  Ow en 
m eans that one cannot be persuaded to  see the virmes o f  liberalism com pared to  
alternatives, then (as I argue in chapter 5) he is wrong. I f  he means that liberalism can be 
justified by reference to  the natural order o f  reasons, the burden is on  him  to show how 
hberahsm  is m ore rational in this additional way.
For som e though, this is no t sufficient. For them  it is no t ‘enough just to  prefer 
dem ocratic societiesV°^ but necessary to  claim that there m ust be objectively good 
reasons for that preference (which, for them , is therefore n o t adequately described as a 
preference); this is w hat underpins the distinction O ’Neill and others draw between
0^6 In one sense this is of course to make Misak’s point: some people think of their behefs as true 
in this stronger sense that Rorty denies, and in suggesting otherwise he could be said to have 
failed to account for the phenomenology of behef. But although this is what people might think, 
it does not alter the fact that no sense can be given to this stronger notion. There is a desire, 
which Rorty acknowledges, for more than to be able to show that for example the Nazis were 
not only morally inferior to us by our standards but were ‘absolutely wrong’; and that if they 
cannot, then one cannot make any judgments of any sort. The problem here though is, as Gary 
Gutting notes, that the requirement that we have objective grounding opens the door to moral 
scepticism, since we do not have such grounding for many of our most cherished beliefs. 
Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 53.
Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 4, emphasis in original. Elsewhere, Rorty claims that ‘it is 
misleading to speak of a “preference” for liberal democracy’, because that word does not capture 
the importance of that attachment Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 187. In the former 
case however, ‘preference’ is to be compared to something ‘Objectively Good’, whereas in the 
latter, it contrasts with terms like ‘commitment’ and ‘loyalty’.
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Validity’ and ‘attractiveness’. For Rorty as we have seen, this account rests on faculty 
psychology, bu t he goes on to  turn  the charge o f  relativism around on this point, 
criticising those w ho make w hat he describes as ‘the bad inference from  “no 
epistemological difference” to  “no objective criterion o f  choice’” as being guilty o f ‘silly 
relativism’.^ °® It is one thing to  accept that we cannot refute or ‘answer’ for example the 
Nazis by appealing to  first principles, quite another to  accept that we cannot argue with 
them , attem pting to  convert them  by for instance ‘com paring our culture invidiously with 
others by reference to  our own standards.’ °^^  I t  is no t possible to  show that they are 
acting irrationally (when rationality is held as a ‘bare notion’) o r caught in a self­
contraction. A nd to  confirm  the fears o f  com m entators like G ander” ®, it is possible in 
the process o f  arguing ou t our differences that the Nazi may convert us; although 
extraordinarily unlikely, w hat could serve as an absolute guarantee against this?
This is to  accept, as we wiU see in chapter 5, that there can be no ultimately non-circular 
dem onstrating o f  our beliefs and claims. But accepting this is different to  saying, as 
Haliburton does, that one ‘can give no reasons’ at all. Georgina W arnke asks, 
paraphrasing Rorty, w hether we have anything ‘non-Fascist to  suggest which meets our 
... fascist purposes better?’”  ^ In  contrast to  the negative answer she believes Rorty m ust 
give, he can perfectly consistently return  an affirmative reply, in the m anner o f  offering 
up alternatives, suggesting for example to  the fascist that they m ight prefer things in a 
liberal democracy. D epending on  our purpose, we can rank the better options 
available.”  ^ I f  our purpose is hum an freedom, then liberalism is better than fascism. T he
108 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 89.
109 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 57.
110 Gander, The Last Conceptual Revolution, p. 168.
111 Wamke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason, p. 154.
112 For Rorty, ‘if the other guys have different beliefs from ours, and if we are trying to 
accomplish the same goals, then one o f us just has to be inferior to the other. Pragmatists like me 
think tiiat beliefs are habits of action. So insofar as projects are identical and habits of action
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standards that we use to  make this judgem ent are ours. Liberal values are better than 
non-hberals ones, no t by reference to an absolute, ahistoric standard, bu t by our 
standards. Following Hilary Pum am , Rorty asks rhetorically: ‘we should use som eone 
else's conceptual scheme? A
T o  conclude, the argum ent in this chapter is that there can be no force to  the claim that 
Rorty reduces notions o f  goodness or righmess to  what we ‘happen to  think around 
here’, because no sense can be given to those notions that does n o t make reference to 
particular communities o f  hum an inquiry and standards o f  value. There is no  natural 
o rder o f  reasons against which historically contingent beliefs can be said ‘merely’ to  be 
held. There are no beliefs that swing free o f  acculturation, o f  historical and sociological 
influences and conditions — including our belief in  universal standards o f  validity and 
views o f  the particular standards that constitute ideal speech situations. Some writers 
assum e that, in  the absence o f a philosophical perspective which could guarantee the 
superiority o f  our convictions, they have no defence, an assum ption that Rorty feels 
betrays the im m ature fear that, w ithout a backup outside o f  our beliefs, aU may be lost. 
This does no t m ean however that we ‘just happen’ to  hold those beliefs in  the sense that 
w e fail to  think or reflect about them , or accept them  solely by vh tue o f  being b o m  into 
a com m unity that values them , for many people com e to hold them  after serious and 
considered reflection. T he question o f  m oral com m itm ent will be examined in  chapter 4 
by considering Rorty’s account o f the ‘ironist’. T he issue o f  ironism  is, I argue, different 
to  that o f  ‘anti-fbundationahsm ’, since ironism  leaves ironists w ith doubts that they are 
unable to  remove. It is therefore widely thought that ironists are incapable o f  m oral
differ, somebody is doing something wrong’. Rorty, ‘Reply to Simon Thompson’, p. 54, emphasis 
in original.
113 Richard Rorty, ‘We Anti-representationaHst’, Radical Philosophy 60 (Spring 1992), pp. 40 — 42 at 
41, emphasis in original. In subsequent chapters, I will take up in greater detail Rorty’s emphasis 
on the nature and importance of such comparisons.
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conviction, and that they are therefore badly suited to  m em bership o f democratic 
communities.
I l l
Chapter Fout
Ironism. liberalism, and conviction
I t was argued in  chapter 3 that Rorty, whilst rejecting the notion  o f  ‘universal validity’, 
can readily claim that m oral behefs are no t reladvistic or arbitrary. H e goes on to propose 
w hat he calls ‘ironism ’, which he takes to  follow from  the absence o f  philosophical 
foundations. Ironists accept that, in the absence o f  foundations, there is no  way finally to  
resolve the anxiety that their absence brings w ith it. Rorty’s view here has been criticised 
at a num ber o f  levels. Stanley Fish has argued that Rorty is m istaken in thinking that 
anything at all follows from  anti-fbundationahsm. However, m any other are concerned 
about the consequences o f  ironism. Alasdair M acIntyre and Jo h n  H orton  for example 
beheve that ironism  rem oves any basis for moral behef or conviction. I f  the ironist 
‘spends her time worrying about the possibihty that she has been initiated in to  the w rong 
tribe, taught to  play the wrong language game,’^  it is argued that this weakens the 
possibihty o f  m oral comm itm ent. A lthough the awareness o f  contingency wih, Rorty 
beheves, be a desirable and decisive step in  hum an progress, it wih leave us with fears 
that we wih be unable to  dispel and wih thereby, it is said, com prom ise our com m itm ents 
as m em bers o f  communities. I wih consider this objection, arguing that once it is 
recognised that ironists cannot be sceptical o f  their entire vocabulary, there is no  reason to  
think ironism  weakens m oral behef. M oreover, against the view o f  those critics hke Eric 
G ander w ho see ironism  as incom patible with hberahsm, it wih be seen that they are no t 
merely compatible but are in fact (contrary to  Fish’s claim) intricately interrelated, the
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 75.
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liberal desire to  avoid cruelty being intimately related to  the ironist’s concern with other 
vocabularies.
9. Ironism and the possibility of moral commitment
9.1 Anti-foundationalism  and ironism
The central consequence o f  anti-foundationalism  is that there is no  standard o f  value 
other than the historically contingent values o f  specific hum an communities. A lthough as 
we have seen many critics think this leads to  relativism and subjectivism, I have argued 
that Rorty can properly deny this. F or Stanley Fish, however, that entire debate is 
misplaced, because precisely nothing follows from  the recognition o f  contingency. Since 
there are, and can be, no  beliefs other than contingent, historically conditioned ones, 
there is no  reason to  fear the consequences o f  recognising that this is so. Fish writes:
It is because all arguments owe their force to  contingent historical factors 
that no  m eta-argum ent can make contingency a m atter either o f  
suspicion or o f celebration; contingency is a given and can count neither 
for no r against an argument; any argum ent m ust still make its way by the 
same routes that were available before contingency was recognized as a 
general condition ... a strong historicism leaves our practices precisely 
where it found them , resting on the bottom  o f  their own histories.^
2 Stanley Fish, There’s No Such Thing A s Free Speech, and I t’s a Good Thing Too (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), pp. 20, 21, emphasis in original.
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T he view that we can have, and need, firmer grounding than  that which is provided by 
the practices w ithin which we live our lives is. Fish argues, philosophical fiction, and 
fears o f  relativism, nihilism, etc., that are said to  follow from  the absence o f  such a 
perspective is only a concern to  those philosophers w ho have convinced themselves that 
som ething m ore is needed. For the same reason. Fish argues that Rorty is m istaken to  
think there are consequences o f  pragmatism, consequences that he suggests include greater 
tolerance and sensitivity; as I examine below, Rorty thinks that anti-foundationaUsm 
‘helps makes the w orld’s inhabitants m ore pragmatic, m ore tolerant, m ore liberal, m ore 
receptive to  the appeal o f  instrum ental rationality’.^  Fish argues that bo th  Rorty and his 
critics are caught up in the same error, o f  elevating the recognition o f  contingency into 
significance rather than recognising it as a truism  o f no  consequence. Insofar as anti- 
foundationalism  has relevance, it is limited only within philosophy as an academic 
discipline and has no  consequences for w hat happens beyond the confines o f  Anglo- 
Am erican philosophy departments. In  the real world, people talk o f  tru th  and objectivity 
w ithout giving any thought to  defining those terms, w ithout for example any reference to  
realist theories o f  truth.
It m ight be thought that Fish, presenting him self as having m ore successfully set aside 
the philosophical problem atic than Rorty, is truer to  the later W ittgenstein w hom  Rorty, 
and those developm ents in analytic philosophy that he m ost values, take as one o f  their 
points o f  departure. Be that as it may. Fish’s discussion overlooks the difference implicit 
in Rorty’s writings betw een ‘anti-foundationalism ’ and ‘ironism ’. T he exact relation 
betw een the two words sometimes leads, 1 suggest, to  indistinctness on own Rorty’s part 
regarding the consequences o f  the awareness o f contingency. Sometimes, he appears to 
agree w ith Fish that nothing m uch turns on  the awareness o f  contingency. H e writes that
Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truth, p. 193.
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‘the fundam ental prem ise’ o f  Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity ‘is that a belief can stdl 
regulate action, can still be thought w orth dying for, am ong people w ho are quite aware 
that this belief is caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical circumstance’/
A t other times, there seems rather m ore to  it. In  Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty 
captures w hat he takes to  follow from  the account he has developed by describing w hat 
he calls ‘ironism ’. Ironists stand in  a very specific relationship w ith their beliefs and 
values:
(1) She has radical and continuing doubts about the final vocabulary she 
currendy uses, because she has been im pressed by other vocabularies, 
vocabularies taken as final by people or books she has encountered; (2) 
she realizes that argum ent phrased in her present vocabulary can neither 
underw rite nor dissolve these doubts; (3) insofar as she philosophizes 
about her situation, she does no t think that her final vocabulary is closer 
to reality than others, that it is in touch w ith a pow er no t herself.^
In  part, this is a re-statem ent o f  the anti-foundationalism  that Rorty shares w ith others 
such as Fish. Poin t (3) is clearly a form ulation o f  anti-foundationalism, and if  that were 
aU it was, then  for the reasons Fish gives, it m ight be the case that, as was argued in 
chapter 3, there is no reason why we could no t com bine this w ith m oral and political 
com m itm ent. O ne could accept that one’s ‘final vocabulary’ is no closer to  ‘reality as it is 
in itse lf than  any other whilst taking it to  be better than any alternative. Anti- 
foundationalism  is however no t a synonym for ironism , bu t is only one aspect o f  it. T he
4 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 189.
5 Ibid., p. 73.
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first (1) and second (2) elements go beyond this, and suggest that anti-foundationalism  
(point 3) has consequences for belief.
This distinction betw een anti-foundationahsts and iconists is exhibited if  we consider 
w ho ironists are. There is, I suggest, a tension in Rorty’s account concerning precisely 
w ho the ironists in  the ideal Liberal society wdl be. A t one point, he writes that
[...] the citizens o f  my liberal utopia would be people w ho had a sense o f  
the contingency o f  their language o f  m oral deliberation, and thus o f  their 
consciences, and thus o f  their community. They w ould be liberal ironists 
.. .  people w ho com bined com m itm ent with a sense o f  the contingency 
o f  their own commitment.^
Later on, he says:
In  the ideal liberal society, the intellectuals would still be ironists, 
although the nonintellectuals w ould not. The latter would, however, be 
commonsensically nom inalist and historicist. So they w ould see 
themselves as contingent through and through, w ithout feeling any 
particular doubts about the contingencies they happened to  be.^
In  the first passage, Rorty claims that all citizens o f  the liberal utopia w ould be ironists; 
one m ight infer that it will be the m ark o f  such a society that all o f  its m em bers are such. 
In  the second, a distinction is drawn betw een intellectuals and non-intellectual m em bers
6 Ibid., p. 61.
7 Ibid., p. 87.
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o f  that society, and, although ‘commonsensically nonm etaphysical’, the non-intellectuals 
will no t be ironists. O ne can be commonsensically non-metaphysical (point (3) in Rorty’s 
sum m ary o f  ironism) w ithout experiencing the sort o f  doubts that the ironist feels 
(points (1) and (2)).
This second passage coheres better with Rorty’s general account o f  ironism, for example, 
his claim that whilst the public culture o f  hberal societies is anti-foundationalist, it cannot 
be ironist:
B ut even if  I am  right in thinking that a Hberal culture w hose pubHc 
rhetoric is nominaHst and historicist is bo th  possible and desirable, I 
cannot go on to  claim that there could o r ought to  be a culture whose 
pubHc rhetoric is ironist. I cannot imagine a culture which socialised its 
youth in such a way as to  make them  continually dubious about their 
ow n process o f  socialization.^
There is on  this second account a limit on  the num ber o f  people in a Hberal society with 
‘radical and continuing doubts’ about their final vocabularies. This distinction, which 
Rorty characterises as one between inteUectuals and the non-inteUectuals, has been 
criticised for eHtism. Rorty writes that the purpose o f  Hberal society is to  ‘make Hfe easier 
for poets and revolutionaries’.^  Roy Bhaskar suggests ‘that Rorty provides an ideology for 
a leisured eHte — inteUectual yuppies — neither racked by pain nor im m ersed in  toil — 
whose Hves may be devoted to  the practice o f  aesthetic enhancem ent’. S o m e  critics go 
further, inferring from  the claim that only a few people will becom e ironists to the claim
8 Ibid., emphasis in original.
9 Ibid., pp. 60 — 61,
10 Bhaskar, 'Philosophy and the Idea of Freedom, pp. 134 — 135.
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that the rest o f  society m ust dutifully follow the dictates o f these would-be phüosopher- 
kings. H oni H aber claims that the ironist is the ‘intellectual spokesperson o f  the non ­
ironist’, and that as such, ironism  serves ‘as a means o f  oppression.’’  ^ However, I can see 
no  textual or logical reason for the inference. Rorty’s point seems to  be, 
straightforwardly, that we all have private lives, in which Rorty romantically proposes 
that we be ‘poets’, people ‘w ho makes things new ’.’  ^ Robert E. Foelber quotes Rorty’s 
claim that ‘the heroes o f Hberal society are the strong poet and the utopian 
revolutionary’,’  ^ and claims that this it is significant that the heroes are ‘no t the bourgeois 
poet, intellectual, entrepreneur, educator, poHtical reform er, or statesm an’.’'’ B ut o f 
course, any o f  these people could be a strong poet or a utopian revolutionary in Rorty’s 
sense o f  these terms. ‘Revolutionaries’ have a social function, o f  trying to  get Hberal 
societies to  be m ore true to themselves.’  ^ Similarly, ‘poet’ is conceived o f  in  the broad 
sense o f  som eone w ho wants to  make their Hfe their own. For Rorty, anyone is a poet 
w ho wants to  break free from  his or her inherited vocabulary, and any o f  the character 
types Foelber m entions could fit this description. Rorty does no t urge that everyone 
should be a poet in this sense, bu t that they should be safe to  be if  they so wish. H e does 
no t m ean that the non-inteUectuals should never be aUowed to  becom e inteUectuals and 
thus ironists, bu t rather than  non-inteUectuals wUl no t be interested in  such things: his is 
the empirical claim that they are no t bookish, no t the proposal that they be banned from  
Hbraries, bookshops and institutions o f higher education. I t is certainly the case that 
ironism  requires the tim e and resources that m ost people in  the w orld lack. But Rorty’s
Haber, B^ond Postmodern Politics, pp. 70, 54.
12 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 13.
13 Ibid., p. 60.
14 Robert E. Foelber, ‘Can an Historicist Sustain a Diehard Commitment to Liberal Democracy? 
The Case o f Rorty’s Liberal Ironist’, The Southern Journal ofPhilosoply'XXXll (1994), pp. 19 — 48 at 
34.
13 This point wiU be considered in chapter 6.
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poin t is that as egalitarians, we should be concerned to  extend these opportunities as 
widely as possible, bo th  within our own societies and (as we wdl see in  chapter 8) abroad.
I t is im portant to  see however that if  we follow this understanding o f  w hat ironism  is, it 
is clear that it is som ething distinct from  anti-foundationalism. T he non-intellectuals in 
Rorty’s ideal liberal society wiU be anti-foundationahsts: historicists aware that their 
com m itm ents are to  historical contingencies. T he ironist, exemphfied by R orty’s 
com parison o f  ironism  with com m on sense, is aU o f  this and m ore. Ironism  opposes 
com m on sense, the assum ption that the vocabulary one speaks is the ‘correct’ one. So 
whereas the non-inteUectuals in Rorty’s ideal Hberal society wih be commonsensically 
nominaHst and historicist, the inteUectuals whl be ironically nominaHst and historicist.
9.2 The im pact o f  ironism  on conviction
T he non-inteUectuals in Rorty’s Hberal utopia share w ith the ironist point (3), bu t n o t 
points (1) and (2) which go beyond anti-fbundationahsm  and concern one’s attitude 
towards one’s behefs once one has becom e anti-foundationahst. Rorty claims that 
ironism  entails a radical, continuing, and irresolvable doubt about aU o f  our behefs 
stem m ing from  the recognition o f  consequences o f  anti-foundationahsm . This doubt 
cannot be dispeUed by further inquiry, since that wih at m ost dispel the  doubts that occur 
within that vocabulary, no t those that arise from  the interest taken in  a different 
vocabulary. It is for this reason that there is som ething troubling about ironism, which is 
why, even if  we are anti-foundationahsts, we m ight recoh fearing, as John  H orton
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suggests, that ironism  ‘distances the ironist from  the behefs and values she holds’/*^  For 
the ironist, it is said, is likely to  be detached and even ahenated from  the non­
metaphysical bu t nonetheless largely unquestioned ‘comm onsensical’ behefs o f  her 
community.
Ironism  encapsulates the alarm that Charles Taylor has expressed about w hat he calls the 
m odem  ‘culture o f  narcissism’. Taylor describes this culture to be m arked by a 
‘subjectivation’ that holds self-fulfilment as the end o f  m oral hfe w ithout substantial 
reference to external m oral standards, and by a resultant ‘fragm entation’, the inabihty to 
identify with and thus see oneself as a participant in a shared way o f hfe.^^ Similarly, for 
Alasdair M acIntyre, there is a connection between the possibihty o f  m oral reasoning and 
w hat he calls tradition-bearing communities. H e argues that only a com m unity o f  shared 
behefs and practices can be a m oral community, one that has standards o f  justification 
and reason-giving which are enduring and which can be passed through successive 
generations. By fragmenting such a comm unity and its shared behefs, M acIntyre claims 
that Rorty cannot make sense o f m oral reasoning or comm itm ent:
Ironic detachm ent involves a withdrawal from  our com m on language 
and our shared judgements and thereby from  the social relationships 
which presuppose the use o f  that language in  m aking those judgements.
But it is in  and through those relationships ... that we acquire and sustain 
no t only our knowledge o f  others, but also that self-knowledge which 
depends on the confirm atory judgem ents o f  others.
Horton, ‘Irony and Commitment, p. 19.
1'^  Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity^ p. 55.
18 MacIntyre, Dependent National Animals, p. 152.
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Irony is, he claims, ‘morally evasive’, since it avoids this requirem ent, and leads to  a 
withdrawal from  hum an relationships/^ F or H orton, irony weakens the possibility o f  
m oral belief by underm ining the reasons we have for holding our beliefs. H e writes: 
‘being told that we should value those com m itm ents simply as the result o f  some m ixture 
o f  causes (such as socialization) and choices seems to underm ine the claim they have on 
us’.^  Foelber claims that ironists believe their values ‘to be purely fictional’.^  ^ I t is thus, 
he writes, ‘extremely unhkely’ that a society o f  ironists could sustain liberal dem ocracy.^ 
H e goes on  to  claim that ‘the idea that aU values are just personal or social creations can 
be horribly destabilizing and can lead to cynicism, despair, wilful fanaticism, mindless 
pleasure-seeking, or other nihilistic “ethics” .’^  Thus, although Rorty thinks that irony will 
in fact com port well w ith solidarity, critics have charged that this is merely an 
assum ption, and have gone on  to  point ou t why it m ight well be an unfounded one. 
Charles B. G uignon and David R. Hiley claim to dem onstrate that ironism  leads to  
increased cynicism and lack o f  public com m itm ent by drawing on the results o f  
psychotherapy.^"^ I suspect therefore that M acIntyre would wholeheartedly agree w ith 
H o rto n ’s suggestion that ironism  teUs us som ething about the contem porary condition, 
and that w hat he takes to be Rorty’s inability to  give a satisfactory account o f  the 
dilemma o f  ironism  and com m itm ent reflects a m ore general contem porary malaise.^^
Similarly, for Simon Blackburn, irony amounts to a form of ‘indifference to the events around 
one’. Blackburn, ‘Postmodernist Relativism’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) Rorp: Sa e^ Masters of 
Modem Social Thought^  volume 4 (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 269 — 276 at 275.
20 Horton, ‘Irony and Commitment’, p. 27.
21 Foelber, ‘Can an Historicist Sustain a Diehard Commitment to Liberal Democracy?’, p. 25.
22 Ibid., 3 4 -3 5 .
23 Ibid., p. 38.
24 Charles B. Guignon and David R. Hiley, ‘Biting the Bullet: Rorty on Private and Public 
Morality’, in Alan R. Malachowski (ed.), fad in g  Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the 
Mirror of Nature (andBejond) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991), pp. 339 — 365 at 358.
25 Horton, ‘Irony and Commitment’, p. 18.
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In  response to  the perceived dangers o f  ironism , com m entators have suggested that 
ironists m ust hide their ironism, b o th  from  themselves, and from  their fellows. Foelber 
believes that a ‘historicist’ can m aintain a com m itm ent to  liberalism only if  hers is no t an 
ironic historicism; that is, only if  she does n o t experim ent ‘too  vigorously w ith new 
vocabularies’,^  ^ and Daniel Conway writes that ironists m ust ‘voluntarily harmoniz[e] 
their ironist insights with the reigning ideals o f  their Hberal society’,^  ^ or else risk 
subverting those pubHc ideals. O ther have gone on  to argue that Rorty him self calls for a 
form  o f  deception to  protect pubHc Hfe from  the corrosive effects o f  ironism. Peter 
Lawler claims that ‘Rorty’s defense o f  soHdarity is ... acknowledged as a com fortable 
He’,^ ® because Rorty is said to accept that we may never eradicate the sort o f  non-ironic 
hope provided by reHgion, o f  a hope over and above that provided by a secular 
nominaHst culture.
In  saying this, Lawler is mistaken. Rorty accepts that reHgion may well always be w ith us, 
and that beHef in G od is one way to  avoid feeHngs o f  isoladon,^^ bu t he does no t think 
that the state should go around deHberately trying to inculcate reHgious sensibiHties.^'^ 
M ore generaUy, responding to  Conway’s call for, in  effect, a ‘noble He’, Rorty claims to  
have no  tim e for this suggestion:
This idea, famiHar from  the w ork o f  Leo Strauss and his followers, is one
for which 1 have no sympathy. It presupposes that the masses are still
26 Foelber, ‘Can an Historicist Sustain a Diehard Commitment to Liberal Democracy?’, p. 41.
27 Conway, ‘Irony, State, and Utopia’, p. 80.
28 Peter Augustine Lawler, ‘Bloom’s Ineffectual Response to Rorty Pragmatism, ExistentiaHsm, 
and American PoHtical Thought’, in Peter Augustine Lawler and Dale McConkey (eds.) 
Community and Political Thought Today (London: Praeger, 1998), pp. 147 — 173 at 162.
29 Rorty, Objectivity, Pelativism, and Truth, p. 70.
30 Indeed, he thinks that a genuine soHdarity will be achieved when people are concerned first and 
foremost with cruelty towards other human beings.
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unable to kick theic metaphysical habit, and that we ironical types m ust 
therefore be prudently sneaky in our dealings w ith them.^^
T here is, he argues, no  reason to  think that ‘the masses’ wiU be unable to  live in  a 
historicist nominalist culture. H e also, I take it, has no time for the sort o f  self-deception 
proposed by Foelber; indeed, although Conway’s suggestion is at least workable, it seem 
bizarre even to  suggest that one self-consciously limit one’s historicism in the m anner 
that Foelber suggests.
However, if  we recognise that Rorty does n o t propose a form  o f  ‘noble lie’ to  pro tect the 
pubHc culture o f Hberal democracies, how  is he able to  guard against the apparently 
negative effects o f  ironism  upon that culture? There remains o f  problem  that ironists 
seem unable to  participate in pubHc Hfe, because their ironism  breeds scepticism, perhaps 
even rem oving their Hberal democratic convictions in their entirety.
9.3 Two suggestions in  support o f  ironic conviction
Rorty’s response to this concern is, firstly, to  recourse to  ‘a firm distinction’^  ^ between 
the pubHc and the private worlds.^^ H e thinks that one can get around the inevitabiHty 
and irreconcilabiHty o f  doub t — points (1) and (2) in  his definition o f  ironism  — by
Richard Rorty, Response to Daniel Conway*, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson 
(eds.) Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: PoHty, 2001), pp. 89 — 92 at 92.
32 Rorty, Contingent, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 83
33 Nancy Fraser beHeves that Rorty only comes to endorse what she calls ‘the partition position’ 
because his earHer claims — first, that irony (Romanticism) enhances soHdarity, and second, that it 
subverts it — were both untenable. Nancy Fraser, ‘SoHdarity or Singularity? Richard Rorty 
between Romanticism and Technocracy*, in Alan R  Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty: Critical 
Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and Byond) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 
1991), pp. 303-321.
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privatising ironism  and its attendant uncertainties. This distinction that has attracted a lo t 
o f  criticism, notably from  feminists w ho have pointed out the various ways in which the 
personal is p o l i t ic a l . I  will no t dwell on  these criticisms, as Rorty is clear that he does 
no t m ean the tradition division betw een the domestic hearth and the public forum.^^ His 
is rather a distinction betw een one’s concern for oneself, and one’s concerns for others. 
U nderstood in this way, Rorty believes ironism  can escape the problem  o f  conviction in  
shared forms o f  life, since if  ironism  is contained in the private sphere, o f  concern only 
to individuals, ironists can still participate w ith conviction in public matters.
However, if  one has doubts, it is hard to  see how  they avoid being doubts that affect 
one’s life as a citizen. Rorty’s ‘firm distinction’ seems to  imply the need to  quarantine 
ironic doubts, b u t it is hard  to  see how  this m ight be done, which perhaps explains why 
he has wavered on  precise status o f  ironism  with regard to the public-private division. 
H e notes that irony ‘seems inherendy a private m atter’.^  ^ However, later in Contingency, 
Irony, and Solidarity he qualifies the firm distinction, writing that ‘irony is o f  little public 
use’.^  ^ In  subsequent works he allows for public irony, for example the re-description o f  
political leaders, which he thinks better done by satirists and cartoonists than 
philosophers: he writes that ‘w hen pubHc irony is w hat is wanted, philosophers and 
social theorists (except for the occasional Veblen) are usually n o t the best people to  turn 
to.’^ ® Clearly then, for Rorty ironism  may have some public impact. This I suggest simply 
m ust be tme. Irrespective o f  how  the individual ironist conceives o f  the distinction
34 Ibid., pp. 312 — 313. See also Dianne Rothleder, The Work ofFriendship.
35 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 308, n. 2.
36 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 87.
37 Ibid., p. 120, emphasis added.
38 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Simon Critchley’, in Chantai Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction and 
Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 41 — 46 at 45. Admittedly, this comments was made as 
a response to Simon Critchley, who wrote that Rorty refuses the critical potential of writers like 
Nietzsche and Foucault as public ironists, and so it might be that Rorty replied to Critchley’s 
question in its own terms.
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betw een public and private, the consequences o f  their ironism  follow on w ithout regard 
to  this understanding. Conway suggests a ‘friendly am endm ent’ to the distinction, 
allowing some interaction betw een private and public.^^ A lthough in  his response to  
Conway, Rorty says that he is happy to  accept this amendm ent,'^ I w onder how  far it is 
an am endm ent at all, rather than recognition o f  the inevitable.
Rorty also defends the claim that ironists can be good citizens com m itted to  participation 
in a shared form  o f  hfe by drawing out the parallel betw een the grow th o f  ironism  and 
that o f  secularism. M oral conviction survived the decline o f  religious faith, and he 
expresses his hope that the sort o f  warnings ironism  attracts will one day seem as quaint 
as the concerns expressed about the decline o f  the strength o f  religious devotion.
Rorty thus responds to the question o f  w hether it is psychologically possible to  be an 
ironist and be morally com m itted by focusing on  the anti-metaphysical elem ent o f  
ironism.'^’ This does no t however fully address the concerns throw n up by ironism, 
because it does no t address parts (1) and (2) in Rorty’s definition. O ne can, in the m anner 
o f  Fish, reject the claims o f  metaphysics, and still think that one’s beliefs are true; for 
him, conviction remains unaltered by the realization that our convictions are grounded in 
nothing m ore than the practices in which they are embedded. Fish however is n o t an 
ironist; he holds only to point (3) o f  Rorty’s definition o f  ironism. Ironism  in contrast is 
no t solely a m atter o f  the absence o f  metaphysics, because it goes on  to  say that there is 
an ineliminable elem ent o f  doubt that Fish for example does no t share. It is, I will now 
suggest, elsewhere that evidence is found to support the compatibility o f  ironism  and 
conviction.
39 Conway, ‘Irony, State and Utopia’, pp. 79 — 80. 
'K) Rorty, ‘Response to Daniel Conway’, p. 92. 
Rorty, Contingency, Ironj, and Solidarity, p. 85.
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9.4 The nature o f  ironic doubt
I t  is difficult to  say w hat would count as conclusive evidence o f  the effect o f  ironism  on 
m oral conviction. O ne possible way is to  see if  there are any examples o f  ironists w ho are 
com m itted to  their behefs. A n example is Rorty himself, bu t we should obviously look 
for examples beyond this. A n interesting recent account w ith parallels to  Rorty is that o f 
G. A. Cohen. In  a discussion o f  w hat he calls the ‘paradoxes o f  conviction’, Cohen 
worries about the question o f  grounds we have for holding beUefs.'^^ W e aU o f  us hold 
many behefs very deeply, bu t at the same time, Cohen argues, we know that if  we had 
been brought up differendy, notably in a different family environm ent, we w ould hold 
different behefs. C ohen gives the example o f  his m eeting his previously unknow n 
identical twin brother w ho held different behefs to  his own. This he says would disturb 
him, no t because that twin could produce new and winning argum ents he had previously 
no t considered, bu t because he would recognise, in a very powerful way, that simply 
because o f  a different upbringing, one could come to have very different values.
C ohen writes that this should make us pause and think, to ‘recognise that we w ould no t 
have behefs that are central to  our hves — behefs, for example, about im portant matters 
o f  pohtics and rehgion — if  we had n o t been brought up as we in fact w ere’.'*^  H e reahses 
that there is nothing within his specific behefs, about justice, equahty, o r anything else, 
that can stop his doubts about the contingent origin o f  those behefs. H e is aware that his 
behefs are the result o f  accidental historical influences, and says that this in itself makes
42 G. A. Cohen, If You’re an B.galitarian, How Come You’re So Rich? (London: Harvard University 
Press, 2000), pp. 7 — 19.
43 Ibid., p. 9.
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him  pause, no t because the realisation has brought w ith it a damaging challenge to  his 
specific behefs, bu t because o f  the way that reahsation affects all behefs, whatever they 
are. Cohen then is no t just m aking Fish’s point about anti-foundationahsm  (point (3) in 
Rorty’s definition), bu t also poin t (2) concerning the impossibihty o f  rem oving doubts by 
recourse to  the terms o f  one’s own vocabulary: his doubts about his imaginary twin 
brother are n o t answerable by reference to the terms o f  his ow n vocabulary.
However, despite his being unsettled by the ‘paradoxes o f  conviction’ that he iUustrates, 
Cohen gives no  sign that he is preparing to  give up his behefs. H e is no t about to  
abandon his particular com m itm ents, even though he knows that his reasons for holding 
them  go back to  his childhood and in particular the influences o f  his com m unist parents. 
That is, C ohen does n o t exhibit po in t (1) o f  ironism: he does no t exhibit ‘radical and 
continuing doubts about the final vocabulary [he] currendy uses’. H e differs from  the 
ironist no t on  w hether one w ould die for one’s contingent behefs, bu t on  the different 
question o f  w hether one would be prepared to  die for a contingent behef about which 
one had inescapable doubts. Can Rorty address this point?
I think so. D avid O w en has suggested that rather than seek recourse in the objective as 
the source o f  confidence in one’s behefs, confidence is secured because the ironist has 
held her views open to criticism.'^ T he ironist recognises the contingency o f  her behefs 
and the impossibihty o f  resolving every possible doubt, bu t this does n o t m ean that she 
has failed to  resolve every doubt that she has confronted. She wih have engaged with 
other behefs, and wih have ‘selected’ her behefs over others. So although there is no  way 
o f finaUy assuring herself o f  the tru th  o f  those behefs and convictions, she has at least no  
better truth candidates on  hand at the m om ent. Ironists, that is, may have doubts and
^  Owen, ‘The Avoidance of Cruelty’, p. 99.
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m ight even be som ew hat detached from  their vocabulary, bu t they will still think that the 
vocabulary they speak is true (or at least, m ore likely to be true than any alternative).
A  problem  with O w en’s suggestion as it stands, however, is that it does n o t fully address 
the issue throw n up by ironism, since it serves only to  m ove the issue back one stage. 
Certainly, one can say that one has tested one’s behefs in this m anner against all 
alternatives, and found the others wanting. However, the ironist’s doubts w ould seem to 
extend to doubts about the process o f  sociahsation that produced one’s standards o f 
judgem ent themselves. A n ironist may think th a tp  is true, better, or whatever, than not-p. 
However, she will equally be aware that the reasons for thinking this, the standard o f 
value that she is employing to  make this judgement, is itself the result o f  contingent 
circumstances. So it is n o t clear how  far the sort o f  test O w en proposes will underwrite 
the doubts that the ironist, i f  she is being truly ironic, experiences.
I suggest that the reason why Rorty can account for the ironist’s m oral concerns about 
her final vocabulary is because final vocabularies are not fixed, self-contained things. 
Rorty’s mistake, which carries over in to  O w en’s commentary, is to  define the ironist as 
som eone w ho is sceptical o f  her entire vocabulary. This brings with it ideas o f 
vocabularies m atching up  to Reality as It Is in  Itself, implying that the ironist can stand 
back from  her vocabulary as a whole, som ething that Rorty, as we have seen, has denied 
is possible. M oreover, such a process o f  standing back depends on a notion o f  a self that 
exists prior to  its ends, and which can potentially cast each o f  them  in to  doubt. For Rorty 
however, the self is n o t som ething that sits back and scrutinizes one’s web o f  beliefs, but 
is that web, a netw ork o f  beliefs and desires that is continually rew oven throughout our
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lives/^ T o  think o f  the self as som ething that has behefs is to  adopt an implausible 
Cartesian view o f  the self. Michael Sandel has recently attributed this view to Jo h n  Rawls 
in  his account o f  the ‘unencum bered self, a self that is prior to  its end, needs, purposes, 
and views o f  the good, and can chooses these things unencum bered by social 
attachm ents. Rorty argues that no t only does such a notion  have no place in A . Theory of 
Justice, bu t that it could not, since it is incoherent.'^ F or the same reason however, he is 
him self m istaken to suggest that the ironist can be worried about her entire vocabulary, 
rather than particular elements within it.
I f  my claim is correct, we can see that J. Judd  O w en is m istaken w hen he writes that the 
ironist ‘is no t enthralled by any final vocabulary — they all seem equally rem ote from  the 
truth. O ne is tem pted to  say that the ironist partakes o f  the “god’s eye view,” detached 
from  or som ehow beyond aU final vocabularies’.'^  ^ O ne should resist this tem ptation, 
because the ironist is and could n o t be beyond aU final vocabularies. It is the m ark o f  the 
metaphysician to  think they can m ove beyond the contingencies o f  particular 
vocabularies to  the G o d ’s-eye view. T he ironist is defined as som eone w ho recognizes 
the impossibility o f  such a position. By the same token, we cannot doubt our entire 
vocabulary at once, for there is no  perspective from  which we can do this; as Rorty puts 
it elsewhere, all o f  our beliefs can be called into question, bu t no t all at the same time.'^ 
T hat is, there is no  possibility o f the sort o f  radical detachm ent, scepticism, or cynicism 
that critics hke M acIntyre, H orton , Haack, and Foelber think Rorty proposes, and no  
reason then  to  think that ironic doubts entail that the ironist cannot wholeheartedly (that
'*5 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 32.
^  In his essay ‘Postmodernist Bourgeois Liberalism’ (in Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp. 197 — 
202), Rorty himself ascribed Sandel’s account of the self to Rawls (p. 199). As I will argue in 
chapter 6, he subsequently argued that his view of Rawls was mistaken. See Rorty’s criticisms of 
Sandal in Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, pp. 184 — 189.
^^7 Owen, Religion and the Decline ofUberal Rsitionalism, p. 83.
"^8 Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, pp. 180 — 181.
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is, non-cynically) participate in the public life o f  her cotnmunity. O nce this is recognised, 
D avid O w en’s poin t that the ironist’s behefs have been reflectively endorsed follows on 
and, I think, supports the view that ironists can be morally comm itted.
10. Liberalism and ironism
10.1 The liberal ironist?
Recalling the distinction betw een anti-foundationahsm  and ironism, we can accept that it 
is possible to be anti-metaphysical and com m itted to  hberahsm. However, whilst this 
provides an affirmative answer to  w hether it is possible to  be a hberal and a nom inahst 
and historicist, it is no t to answer the question o f  w hether it is possible to be a hberal 
ironist. Ironists experience n o t just doubts about metaphysics, bu t doubts about aU forms 
o f  behef. H ow  then  is it possible, no t merely as a nom inahst and historicist, bu t as an 
ironist, to  be com m itted to Rorty’s view o f  hberahsm in which cruelty is the w orst thing 
that we do?
There is indeed a further problem  concerning the coherence o f  liberal ironism. This is no t 
merely an instance o f  the general question o f  w hether one can com bine com m itm ent 
w ith ironism, bu t a further im portant one, since on Rorty’s definition o f  those terms, 
hberahsm appears to be particularly incom patible with ironism. Ironism  does no t com m it 
one to any particular substantive values, which is why Rorty can legitimately remain 
untroubled by the fact that none o f  the ironists that he m entions — Nietzsche, Heidegger
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and Foucault — were liberals/^ However, precisely because ironism  does n o t endorse any 
particular substantive values, it seems potentially very cruel, entailing openness to 
alternative vocabularies and o f  re-description, and thus violating the liberal view that 
cruelty is the w orst thing we can do. As Rorty puts it,
Ironism , as I have defined it, results from  the awareness o f  the pow er o f 
redescription. B ut m ost people do no t w ant to  be redescribed. They w ant 
to  be taken on  their own term s — taken seriously just as they are and just 
as they talk. T he ironist tells them  that the language they speak is up for 
grabs by her and her kind. There is som ething potentially very cruel 
about that claim. F or the best way to  cause people long-lasting pain is to  
humiliate them  by m aking the things that seemed m ost im portant to 
them  look fulile, obsolete, and powerless.^*^
Rorty then  seems to  be proposing two mutually incom patible positions. H e advocates 
ironism , which is centrally concerned w ith re-description. H e thereby opposes the feature 
com m on to  m ost people, o f  no t w anting their beliefs questioned, by saying that these 
behefs can and should be questioned, and thus appears to  contradict the hberal desire to 
avoid cruelty above ah else.
Some are clear that hberal ironism  is a clear-cut contradiction in terms. For Eric G ander,
With regard to Foucault, Rorty says: ‘In presenting Foucault’s Nietzschean attitude I am not 
commending it. I have no wish to do so, espedaUy since much of Foucault’s so-cahed 
“anarchism” seems to me self-indulgent radical chic.’ Richard Rorty, ‘Foucault and Epistemology’ 
in David Hoy (ed.) Foucault: A. Critical V^ader (Oxford: Basil BlackweU, 1986) pp. 41 — 49 at 47.
50 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 89.
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Rorty’s vision o f  liberalism and his vision o f  irony are fundamentally 
incompatible. ... [T]he Hberal wishes the desire to avoid acts o f  cruelty 
(in particular acts o f  humiliation) to  be an invariant part o f  everyone’s 
final vocabulary, whiles the ironist rebels against the suggestion that any 
part o f  anyone’s jfinal vocabulary should be seen as invariant.^^
Tim othy Cleveland makes a similar claim, reasoning that since (as he claims) ironists give 
up on rational argum ent and focus instead on  ‘rhetoric’ and ‘propaganda’, all that remains 
is a struggle for power.^^ H e writes that although ironism  is itself a coherent position, ‘it 
will be a totaHtarian, Fascist, or MachiaveUian ironist, no t a Hberal one’.^ ^
I suggest however that there is a rather m ore nuanced connection betw een ironism  and 
Hberahsm than such com m ents allow. T o  explain, w hat Rorty caUs a post-metaphysical 
‘poeticized culture’ should, he argues, be com m itted to  the creation o f  w hat he calls new 
‘cultural artifacts’ in an effort to  construct a richer pubHc Hfe.^ "^  Gary G utting objects to  
this view o f  that culture. I t  is he writes one thing to  strive for culture that is aware that 
it is a product o f  history; that is, one that is ‘commonsensicaUy nom inahst and historicist’. 
It is however quite another to  assert (Gutting thinks that it is merely an assertion) that 
such a culture ought to  engage in the creation o f  ‘ever m ore various and multicolored 
artifacts’. G utting argues that Rorty aUows his own som ew hat N ietzschean preferences 
for w hat an ironist’s Hfe ought to  consist in  to  dictate the m oral goal o f  society as a 
whole. O n  Rorty’s own account however, once culture has been historicized, there is 
nothing about ironism  that leads to  a preference for a Hfe o f  self-creation over a Hfe o f
51 Gander, The hast Conceptual devolution, p. 114.
52 Timothy Cleveland, ‘The Irony of Contingency and SoHdarity’, Philosophy 70 (1995), pp. 217 — 
241 at 227, 235.
53 Ibid., p. 240.
54 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 53 — 54.
55 Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critique of Modernity, p. 64.
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conform ity. Thus w hen Rorty argues that hum an fulfilment requires individual self­
creation, for ‘[t]o fail as a hum an being is to  accept somebody else’s description o f oneself, 
to  execute a previously prepared program,’^  ^ this may be his own view, but he cannot 
enforce it on everyone else if  he claims to be a liberal, for then he would be violating liberal 
neutrality between views o f  the good hfe. Conway suggests that Rorty is merely following 
MiU in his view that there is pubhc utihty in  ‘experiments in  Hving’,^  ^ bu t that there is in 
fact no  reason for the citizens o f hberal democracies to  seek a hfe o f  self-creation — to  
make this a requirem ent for all citizens would be, as G utting says, to  universahse Rorty’s 
ow n view o f  the good. Rorty is thus said to  be guilty o f  extending the private concerns 
and interests o f  the ironist, who, if  they truly are solely the ‘intellectuals’ will be a 
m inority o f  any culture, into the pubhc culture o f  hberal societies.^®
Against this understanding, I suggest that it is an error to  view Rorty as crudely 
projecting his private interests into the pubhc culture o f  hberal democracies. His claim is 
that a hberal culture, one com m itted to  eradicating cruelty, will be required to  create 
‘cultural artifacts’ if  it is to  be truly hberal. I f  the point o f  hberahsm  is the avoidance o f  
cruelty, this concern coheres with those fears o f the ironist that stem  from  doubts about 
the limitations o f  their current vocabulary. This point can be seen if  we turn  again to  
Judith  Shklar’s account o f  cruelty. She writes that ‘T o  hate cruelty m ore than any other 
evil involves a radical rejection o f  bo th  rehgious and pohtical conventions. It doom s one 
to  a hfe o f  skepticism, indecision, disgust, and often m isanthropy’.^  ^ This seems to  
support the view o f  those such as M acIntyre w ho take ironism  to  weaken pohtical
56 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 28.
57 Ibid., p. 45.
58 Cf Richard Shusterman’s comments about Rorty's ‘aesthetic programme’. Shusterman, ‘Reason 
and Aesthetics between Modernity and Postmodemity: Habermas and Rorty’, in Matthew 
Festenstein and Simon Thompson, ^chard Rorp: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Pohty, 2001), pp. 
134 -  152 at 148.
59 Shklar, Ordinary Vices, p. 8.
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convention and thus m oral life. However, I think that it is precisely because o f  the 
awareness o f  cruelty that one will becom e sceptical, indecisive, as well as disgusted and 
(on occasion) even m isanthropic towards some current practices. Liberals w ho are also 
ironists are doubly com m itted to  the pubhc creation o f ever-more ‘pubhc artefacts’ in an 
effort to  guard against cruelty; as David O w en puts it, ‘the hberal ironist as both ironist and 
liberal is unconditionaUy com m itted to  dialogue, directly or via trusted representatives, 
w ith non-hberals and non-ironists conducted in term s o f  recognition of, and respect for, 
the o ther.’*’® Rorty writes,
[A]s I am  a hberal, the part o f  my final vocabulary which is relevant to  
[pubhc] actions requires m e to  becom e aware o f  aU the various ways in 
which other hum an beings w hom  I m ight act upon  can be humihated. So 
the hberal ironist needs as m uch imaginative acquaintance with 
alternative final vocabularies as possible, no t just for her own edification, 
bu t in  order to  understand the actual and possible hurmhation o f  the 
people w ho use these alternative final vocabularies.^^
The hberal ironist, as anti-foundationahst and one w ho seeks to  avoid cruelty, is 
com m itted to  creating the pubhc space to  enable others self-creation, even though the 
non-ironic bu t nom inahst citizens o f  hberal democracies are not. Liberahsm provides the 
opportunities for people to  formulate and pursue their visions o f the hum an hfe, and the 
creation o f  ‘m ulticolored artifacts’ affords them  the greatest opportunity to do so by 
reducing the instances o f  cruelty they may be subjected to, or visit on  others. It would, as
60 Owen, ‘The Avoidance of Cruelty’, p. 103, my emphasis. For this reason, Jonathan G. Allen is 
mistaken to say that the abihty of the ironist to die for her behefs ‘is sheer stubborn attachment 
and an implacable deafness to new and unexpected claims and experiences’. Allen, ‘The Situated 
Critic or the Loyal Critic? Rorty and Walzer on Social Critidsim’, Phibsopfy and Social Criticism 24 
(1998), pp. 2 5 - 4 6  at 33.
61 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 91 — 92.
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G utting  says, be inconsistent for Rorty to  require his own view o f  the good to  be 
inculcated in to  those w ho do no t share or welcome it. T he link betw een ironism  and 
freedom , however, is that ironism, which will no t allow for the absolute privileging o f  
any vocabulary, in concert w ith the anti-authoritarian denial o f obhgation to anything 
above hum an beings, combines with liberalism to  allow space for ‘experiments in living’. 
Terry Eagleton is m istaken w hen he characterises w hat he dismissively calls ‘Am erican 
voluntarism ’ as the view that ‘You may ... reinvent yourself whenever you want, an 
agreeable fantasy which Richard Rorty has raised to  the dignity o f  a philosophy’^ ,^ since it 
is precisely because o f  the enorm ous difficulties conftonting people w ho seek to  
‘reinvent them selves’ that liberalism fits so well w ith ironism, providing the social and 
econom ic conditions that are necessary to  enable people to  do so.*^ ^
This also serves as a further response to  the objection that ironism  is antithetical to  
pubhc com m itm ent, for on the view suggested here, it m ight well be increased. I f  the 
ironist is also a Hberal, the impHcation is that the experiments in  Hving have pubhc utihty. 
Rorty can avoid G utting’s com plaint that he hlegitimately universahses his personal view 
o f  w hat makes for a good private hfe by saying that this view is a precondition o f  
liberalism once we hve in  a non-metaphysical society.^
62 Terry Eagleton, The Idea of Culture (Oxford: Blackwell Pubhshers, 2000), p. 91. Jane Heal makes 
the same point in greater detail in Heal, ‘Pragmatism and Choosing to Beheve’, in Alan R  
Malachowski (ed.), Reading Rorty: Critical Responses to Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (and 
Btyond) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1991), pp. 101 — 114.
63 At the same time, it is not as difficult to be an ironist as some have claimed. Noting that the 
ironist creates herself. Gander argues that because one cannot use another’s vocabulary to invent 
oneself that it is very difficult ever to be an ironist. Gander, The Last Conceptual Revolution, p. 56. 
Gander is utterly mistaken here; Rorty’s claim is that ultimately one creates one’s own finally 
vocabulary through engagement with others. Indeed, Gander himself mentions Rorty’s exemplar 
of self-creation, Harold Bloom, for whom meaning occurs with one’s struggle with a previous 
meaning (Gander, p. 60).
64 If  he does so, he will need to abandon claims for a firm distinction between the public and the 
private. I think however that he can do so without it impacting upon his broader position.
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R eturning to  G ander’s account (quoted above) it is a mistake to  argue as he does that the 
inconsistency o f  liberalism and ironism  stems from  the fact that liberals are com m itted to  
holding certain parts o f  their final vocabulary ‘invariant’. The desire to  avoid cruelty, like 
the desire to  frame and revise a view o f  the good life, does no t nam e a substantive end, 
bu t summarises an aspiration that captures very different substantive goals for different 
people. Ju st as the whole point o f  A  Theory of Justice is to  leave people w ith the space to  
frame, pursue and revise their own particular conceptions o f  the good within principles 
o f  justice that are held to  be fair, the point o f  saying that liberals seek to avoid cruelty is 
to  leave open w hat is and is no t cruel. As I argued in chapter 2, ‘cruelty’ is a category, one 
that is necessarily open-ended to  take account o f  instances o f  cruelty that we have n o t yet 
encountered, or recognised as cruel.
Liberahsm  as the avoidance o f  cruelty, it should be noticed, is only one o f  the ways that 
Rorty defines hberahsm. H e speaks o f  hberal hope, by which he m eans ‘the sort o f  social 
hope w hich characterises m odem  hberal societies — the hope that hfe wiU eventually be 
freer, less cmel, m ore leisured, richer in  goods and experiences, no t just for our 
descendents bu t for everybody’s descendents’.^  ^ This sort o f  hope will, he thinks, be 
increased by the m ovem ent towards a post-metaphysical, ironic, culture, one in  which it 
is an open question as to  w hat counts as cruelty. Michael WiUiams notes that ‘Rorty 
him self is aware o f  anti-hberal pohtical views bu t is certainly n o t im pressed by them ’.*^  ^As 
argued above however, it is no t possible to  be sceptical about all o f  our behefs, and I 
suggest further that for that very reason, hberahsm is pecuharly suited to  ironism, 
providing the fram ew ork that allows us to  be sceptical about our substantial behefs.
65 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 86.
66 Michael Wilhams, Unnatural Doubts: Epistemological ^alism  and the Basis of Scepticism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1991), p. 365.
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10.2 R e-description and the avoidance o f  cruelty
In  order to  justify this interpretation o f  the relationship betw een ironism  and liberalism, 
I need to  show  that it is no t inconsistent for a hberal w ho is concerned primarily with 
cruelty to  re-describe others in a way that is, potentially, cruel. Rorty’s concern to  avoid 
cruelty is sometimes held to  com m it him  to  deny the legitimacy o f  any form  o f  activity 
that challenges or re-describes the self-understandings o f  individuals or communities. As 
a consequence, Rorty’s account appears empty and thus useless w hen it comes to 
addressing m oral and pohtical dilemmas. T o  take up an example given by H orton , w hat 
are we to  do w hen confronted by a white supremacist?*^^ D o  we w ant to say that 
criticizing such a person is cruel? A nd if  so, does that m ean that we may no t do it? As 
Rorty presents it, the compadbihty o f  hberahsm and ironism  consists in dividing ironism  
and hberahsm  into different spheres, answering the apparent contradiction o f  affirming 
that hberals w ant to avoid cruelty whilst acknowledging the inherent cruelty o f  ironism  
by m aking re-description a m atter for individuals, w ho refrain from  making pubhc 
pronouncem ents that m ight humihate. M atthew Festenstein sums this up by writing that 
‘in pubhc at least, she [the hberal ironist] wih refrain from  hum ihating redescription o f  
her feUow citizens; in private, o f  course, she may describe them  as she pleases’.*^® Stuart 
Rennie beheves that w hat he caUs Rorty’s ‘wet hberal’ position entails that ‘the practices 
o f  her [the hberal’s own] group are no m ore m oral or rational than any other group, and 
that she is thereby in no  position to pass judgm ent on  foreign practices o f  behefs’.^  ^
These understandings n o t only seem consistent with Rorty’s view that the hberal is
67 Horton, ‘Ironism and Commitment’, p. 25.
68 Matthew Festenstein, ‘Richard Rorty: Pragmatism, Irony and Liberahsm’, in Matthew 
Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Pohty, 2001), 
pp. 1 -  14 at 10.
69 Stuart Rennie, ‘Elegant Variations: Remarks on Rorty’s Liberal Utopia’, South African Journal of 
Philosoply 17 (1998), pp. 313 — 342 at 315.
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concerned to  avoid cruelty, bu t also bring liberalism coherendy together with ironism: it 
is clear from  Rennie’s summary that the ‘w et Hberal’ has been impressed enough by other 
cultures to  be unprepared to judge them  as inferior to her own.
However, as we saw in chapter 3, it is a mistake to  think that Rorty’s view commits him  
to claiming that two different views are o f equal value. It is also, I have argued, difficult 
to  m aintain the ‘firm distinction’ between the pubhc and the private. In  addition to  these 
two points, Rorty is clear that no description can serve as a foundational one, im m une to  
challenges concerning its value. It is a reductio ad absurdum to  say that if  one seeks to  avoid 
cruelty that one m ust avoid criticism o f  others, because to  do so w ould itself be to  
sometim es acquiesce in  practices which are themselves c r u e l . I n  response to  Charles 
Taylor, w ho privileges the self-understanding o f individuals and communities and w ho 
expresses opposition to  attem pts to  understand and criticize them  from  alternative 
viewpoints, Rorty writes that this is to  conflate epistemological and m oral concems.^^ It 
is, he writes, a ‘mistake to  think o f  som ebody’s own account o f  his behaviour or culture 
as epistemicaUy privileged. H e m ight have a good account o f  w hat he’s doing or he 
m ight n o t’.^  ^W e do not, for example, think that a mass m urderer’s account o f  his actions 
is the one that we need take very seriously as an explanation for his actions, and we turn
70 This absurdity has not deterred PhiUip E. Young from declaring that Rorty contradicts himself 
by allowing ironists, in re-describing the philosophical commitments of metaphysicians, to 
humiHate them. Young, ‘The Irony of Ironic Liberahsm’, International Studies in Vhilosophy 29 
(1997), pp. 121 -  130.
71 I think that, although in 1980 Rorty was prepared to make this distinction in these terms, he 
would probably now eschew reference to epistemology. However, he would still maintain the 
importance of the distinction, and would probably now talk about it in terms of different moral 
concerns.
72 Rorty, Consequences of Pra^matis/n, p. 202. Rorty has been criticised for not allowing greater 
significance to individual’s reports of their own behaviour. Lets on argues that Rorty’s failure to 
treat ‘first-person internal reports’ with the seriousness they deserve has morally unacceptable 
consequences. Ben H. Letson, ‘Richard Rorty and the Meaning of the Social Sciences’, 
International Social Science P£view 70 (1995), pp. 43 — 52.
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instead to  psychiatrists, Rorty’s point is that it is for moral, no t epistemological, purposes 
we should listen to  w hat a person, or a culture, thinks o f  itself. Rorty continues:
W e have a duty to  listen to  his account, n o t because he has privileged 
access to  his own motives bu t because he is a hum an being like ourselves,
Taylor’s claim that we need to  look for internal explanations o f  people or 
cultures or texts takes civility as a m ethodological strategy. But civility is 
no t a m ethod, it is simply a virtue. T he reason why we invite the m oronic 
psychopath to  address the court before being sentenced is no t that we 
hope for better explanations than expert psychiatric testimony has 
offered. W e do so because he is, after all, one o f  us. By asking for his 
ow n account in  his own words, we hope to  decrease our chances o f  
acting badly,^^
T he case o f  a mass m urderer is one where no one would seriously m aintain that that 
person’s understanding o f  their actions was necessarily the correct one. In  this case we 
are likely to  defer to  psychiatrists. In  order to  see how  far Rorty is prepared to  challenge 
self-understandings, it is illuminating to  com pare two examples he considers in a 
discussion o f  exploitation, the subjugation o f  w om en and the exploitation o f  the poor. In 
the past, the poo r were led to believe that they were singled out, for example by G od, as 
deserving their fate. Today, at least in  m uch o f the world, arguments along these lines are 
seen as a sham. In  contrast, Rorty believes that regarding the exploitation o f  wom an, very 
m any w om en today are n o t aware o f  the nature o f  their situation, ‘So, though I think that 
w om en still are in  the process o f  working out a new set o f  practices, the weak and the 
poor are already enm eshed in a practice o f  calculating w ho gets what ou t o f  their labor
Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p, 202, emphasis in original,
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and suffering.’^ "^ W hereas the poor and the weak are still exploited, by recognising that 
this is so, they have been able to  start figuring out ways o f  dealing w ith this; in contrast, 
m any w om en do n o t even see themselves in this way. In  his discussion o f  these two 
cases, Rorty makes no  distinction between w hat should happen based upon  the 
understandings o f  w om en or the poor themselves. H e is perfecdy prepared to  call in to  
question self-understandings, writing for example in support o f feminists trying to  
enfranchise women.^^
Rorty beheves people can be mistaken in  their ow n self-understandings, no t in the 
representationaUst sense that that understanding fails to reflect their real interests (as for 
example ‘feminist standpoint’ theorists beheve), bu t in  the sense that re-shaping self- 
understanding w ould increase happiness. H e writes: ‘Sometimes subordinated groups are 
clay — happy slaves w hom  we try to  make unhappy as a step toward helping them  
becom e even happier than they were before.^"^ There is indeed no  way that Rorty could 
consistently claim that a person’s understanding o f  themselves is always correct and 
closed to  challenge and revision. His anti-foundationahsm  denies the possibihty o f  any 
description being intrinsicaUy correct. There is no  description that is correct in its own 
terms, only a description that is useful for a given purpose (with no purpose being any 
m ore intrinsically valuable or im portant than any other).
Rorty then  does n o t say that we, even if  we are hberals, may never re-describe or pubhcly 
humihate, because no t to  do so can itself lead to, or perpetuate, humiliation. The poin t is 
rather the concern that, as a hberal, one m ust be aware o f  the potential harm  that 
hum ihation causes to  the person w ho is re-described. The hberal ironist, worrying first
74 Richard Rorty, ‘Letter 6’, in Anindita Niyogi Balslev, Cultural Otherness: Correspondence with 
~Richard Rorty (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991), pp. 89 — 101 at 100, emphasis in original.
75 Rorty, ‘We Anti-representationahsts’, p. 42.
76 Ibid., emphasis in original.
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and forem ost about avoiding cruelty, wül necessarily be concerned about potential 
blindness to  instances o f  cruelty going on around her: she is required ‘to  become aware 
o f all the various ways in which other hum an beings w hom  I m ight act upon can be 
humiliated’. It does no t however require Rorty, or any other liberal ironist, to  refcain 
from  re-description.
10.3 Ironism  and scepticism
Liberal ironism  combines two desirable things: it encourages us to  criticise, to  n o t take 
beliefs as given just because people or cultures happen to  hold them. A t the same time, it 
cautions us to  recognise that so doing may entail questioning and trying to overturn 
beliefs that many hold dearly. Thus I agree with Alan Malachowski w hen he argues that 
irony need not lead to  the sort o f  radical detachm ent o f  a N ietzsche, bu t may rather 
entail a form  o f  w hat he calls ‘social reserve’.^  ^ Irony, Malachowski goes on to  say, ‘is 
closer to  “impartiality” than  cynical withdrawal’. I t  is even closer though to  sensitivity, to  
concern that we may be missing som ething im portant, and w ith the m oral com m itm ent 
to  seek to  overcom e this ignorance and insensitivity. Following on from  a discussion o f  
the Albert Cam us’s story about a G erm an officer w ho asks a G reek m other to  choose 
one o f  her sons for him  to shoot, Rorty goes on to  speak in  favour o f  w hat he calls a 
‘totally decosmologized ethics’, the ethics he takes to be highlighted by ironism:
It is no t the  smallest advantage o f  such an ethics that it helps a child 
realize that, had Lady Luck given him or her the w rong parents in the 
w rong country at the w rong time, he or she m ight have been that
77 Alan Malachowski, Richard Rorty (Chesham: Acumen Publishing, 2002), p. 149.
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G erm an officer. Making such ironies vivid, it seems to  me, im portant for 
the inculcation o f  tolerance and sensitivity’,^ ®
R orty’s hope is that if  one alters or enlarges one’s vocabulary, this is likely to  increase 
one’s concern  for others, and lead to  one’s greater awareness o f  pain and humiliation. It 
is this, I take it, that Rorty m eant w hen he spoke o f  ‘freedom  as the recognition o f 
contingency’.^ ^
Rorty suggests that ironism  has a constructive role to play: it makes one m ore sensitive to 
w hat is going on  around one. This makes ironism  a political project; in particular, David 
O w en’s account, w ith which I am very sympathetic, sees ironism  and liberalism as 
intimately related because ironism  makes one particularly sensitive to  cruelty. In  so doing, 
it com bines descriptive and norm ative concerns in a way o f which no t everyone 
approves. F or Fish, a genuine pragm atism  has no consequences o f  any kind. T he anti- 
foundationahst enterprise that Rorty and others undertake, in  presenting its conclusions 
as i f  they had significance itself becom es as m istaken as that which they seek to 
overcome: ‘once pragm atism  becomes a program ’. Fish writes, ‘it turns in to  the 
essentiahsm it challenges’;®^ the sense o f  ahenation that the ironists experience stem, he 
suggests, from  the same source that led metaphysicians to  seek a vantage point separate 
from  that o f  their community. Pragmatism  (a term  which like Rorty, Fish uses as a 
synonym for anti-foundationahsm) ought. Fish beheves, to  have no consequences o f  any 
kind. T o  m ake this point, he distinguishes w hat he caUs a ‘pragm atist account’ from  a
78 Richard Rorty, ‘Robustness: A Reply to Jean Bethke Elshtain’, in Daniel W. Conway and John 
E. Seery (eds.) The Volitics of Irony: Essays in Self-Betrayal (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), pp. 
21 9 -2 2 3  at 223.
79 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 46.
80 Fish, There’s No Such Thing A s Free Speech, p. 215.
142
‘pragm atist program ’,®' A pragm atist account is an account that dispenses w ith 
com prehensive (typically metaphysical) theories, whereas a pragm atist program  is w hat is 
said to  follow from  this, often. Fish suggests, resulting in a further (for him) 
m isconceived com prehensive program.
Fish’s criticism is the converse o f  those presented by com m entators w ho think 
pragm atism  does no t have enough to  offer,®^ B ut I suggest that bo th  sets o f  criticism 
miss the point. Pragmatism is n o t a program. O ne cannot straightforwardly increase 
sentimentality by for example encouraging ironism. Indeed, the assum ption lying behind 
this view seems to  be that Rorty thinks there will be a direct and inevitable correlation 
betw een the grow th o f ironism  and the strength o f  m oral sentiment. B ut o f  course to  
think that is to  think along the lines o f philosophers w ho thought that aU that was 
required to  understand the nature o f  reality, and the m oral demands it makes upon  us, 
was to  think about the nature o f  that reality with greater care, to  think for example that 
anyone looking over one’s shoulder ought to  reach the same conclusion. It is m oreover a 
mistake to  think that ironism  always com ports weU with liberalism. Foelber writes: ‘It 
seems im possible in any case to  imagine how  an ironist could be bo th  a D ahm erian 
torturer (rabid anti-Semite, racist) and a good hberal dem ocrat.’®^ It does no t just seem 
impossible, it is in fact impossible. There is no  guarantee that the ironism  may result in a 
person w hose interests are antithetical to  the demands o f  hberal democracy. B ut nothing 
can guarantee that. Torturers and anti-Semites are no t exclusively ironist, so ah Foelber
Stanley Fish, ‘Truth and Toilets: Pragmatism and the Practices of Life’, in Morris Dickestein 
(ed) The Revival of Pragmatism: New Essays on Social Thought, Eaw, and Culture (London: Duke 
University Press, 1998), pp. 418 — 433 at 420.
82 Ronald A. Kuipers beheves that ‘Our times caU for a more robust ethics than merely the 
contingent desire to aheviate suffering when it is brought to our attention’. Kuipers, Solidarity and 
the Stranger. Themes in the Social Philosophy of Richard Rorty (Oxford: University Press of America, 
1997), p. 88. See also Richard Rumana’s ghb comment that Rorty seeks to create ‘a sense of 
justice based on nothing more than a good story’. Rumana, On Rorty (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 
2000), p. 69.
83 Foelber, ‘Can an Historicist Sustain a Diehard Commitment to Liberal Democracy?’, p. 34.
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succeeds in doing is point ou t that some people are no t good liberal democrats. There is 
no  absolutely compelling reason for ironists to  be liberals, for they may value diversity 
w ithout being troubled by the cruelty that results from  their actions. F or Foelber’s point 
to  take on weight, however, he would need to  show that there is som ething about 
ironism  that makes it especially Uable to  cruelty; for example, why ironists any m ore than 
metaphysicians tend towards cruel re-descriptions. For, as Rorty, notes, ‘Redescription is 
a genetic trait o f  the intellectual, n o t a specific m ark o f  the ironist’.®'^
B ut although not all ironists are Hberals, Rorty gives reasons for thinking Hberals 
particularly suited to  ironism  because o f  the ironist’s inabüity to  take herself seriously.®^ 
D oubts about our final vocabulary m ean that we are less Hkely to  seek to  im pose it on 
others, and be m ore concerned to  create as m any ‘cultural artifacts’ as possible. Rorty’s 
account, I suggest, therefore inform s one o f  the m ore pressing questions in pohtical 
theory, the problem  o f how to  resist the im position o f  a particular form  o f  the good on 
those w ho do no t share it. It is an answer which has some paraUels w ith an account given 
by Brian Barry who, in Justice as Impartiality^ defends the claim that ‘no conception o f  the 
good can justifiably be held w ith a degree o f  certainty that warrants its im position on 
those w ho reject it’.®^ In  making this claim, Barry opposes Thom as Nagel’s 
‘epistemological restraint’, which holds that a higher standard o f  objectivity operates in 
the pubHc than in the private sphere. Nagel uses this to  argue that we can beheve our 
own behefs are justified for ourselves, but, because o f  the different level o f  objectivity 
that obtains, no t be sure enough, and therefore n o t justified, to  prom ote them  w ith the 
use o f  the power o f  the state. Barry accepts that i f  we are unsure o f  the tru th  o f  our 
behefs, we have no right to  im pose them  on others, but he defends this claim no t
8"^ Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 90.
85 Ibid., p. 73.
86 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 169.
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because privately held beliefs require a lower level o f  objectivity than public ones, bu t 
because o f  the doubt that all behefs carry with them. E ven  behefs w ith we typicaUy take 
to  be incorrigible, for example reports o f  physical pain, Barry points out are sometimes 
mistaken. H e argues that no behef can be held beyond ah possible doubt, and, 
consequendy, no view o f  the good hfe can fairly be im posed on others w ho deny it.
Barry is quite correct to say that epistemological restraint is incoherent. There is no  
different level o f  assurance prevalent in the pubhc sphere than in the private, and N agel’s 
talk o f  different levels o f objectivity obtaining in those different spheres adds nothing to 
persuade us otherwise.®^ For Barry, if  we are unable to  persuade others o f  the tru th  o f  
our behefs, this m ust im pact upon  our own views o f  them : ‘I f  I concede that I have no 
way o f  convincing others’, he asks, ‘should that n o t also lead to  a dent in my own 
certainty?’®* The strength o f  Barry’s scepticism is that it grows out o f  the need to  limit 
personal conviction in pohtical decision-making. Susan M endus claims that Barry’s 
approach is misconceived and that the im portant issue, addressed by epistemological 
restraint, is to  severe the connection betw een certainty and the use o f  state power.®^ 
Epistemological restraint however gives no reason for such separation, since it merely 
asserts that objectivity means different things in the pubhc and private spheres. 
Suggesting that inabihty to  persuade others ought to limit certainty at least offers a reason 
to  pause and reflect. I suggest that we see the worries that Rorty takes to be integral to 
ironism  in the same way. That is, ironism  wih bring w ith it critical reflection in the face o f
87 Nagel, as Barry notes, later gave up on epistemological restraint. Mendus however continues to 
endorse it. Susan Mendus, Tlurahsm and Scepticism in a Disenchanted World’, in Maria 
Baghramian and Attracta Ingram (eds.). Pluralism: the Philosophj and Politics of Diversity (London: 
Routledge, 2000), pp. 103 — 119.
88 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 179. It must be said that Barry does not seem particularly 
convinced by his own argument on this point, seemingly deducing scepticism as the answer to 
the question of why we ought not impose our view of the good on others in heu of anything 
better.
89 Mendus, Tlurahsm and Scepticism in a Disenchanted World’, p. 114.
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contingency, what Cohen described as the need to ‘pause’, and Barry ‘the need for
5 90scepticism .
In  sum, in this chapter I have argued that ironism, which includes bu t goes beyond anti- 
foundationalism  in respect o f the doubts ironists have about their current vocabularies 
and about the possibility o f resolving those doubts, is compatible with m oral conviction. 
I f  we realise that the sort o f  doubts the ironist experiences apply n o t to all o f  her beliefs, 
then  the ironist should be viewed as som eone com m itted to m ost o f  her beliefs whilst 
fully aware o f  their contingency and thus the possibility that they may need to  be revised. 
For this reason I suggest that ironism  is particularly compatible with liberalism. O nce it is 
appreciated that ‘cruelty’ is a category, one which is forever changing to  reflect new 
instances o f  cruelty, the ironist interest in alternative vocabularies fits very well w ith this 
need for awareness. In  the next chapter, 1 examine how  liberalism can be defended on 
Rorty’s anti-foundationalist, ironist, account.
90 This interpretation has been resisted, Susan Haack writes that the claim that ironist are less 
dogmatic than non-ironists is ‘thoroughly misleading; Rorty’s ironist is no fallibilist, he is cynic 
hiding behind a euphemism’. Haack, ‘Vulgar Pragmatism: An Unedifying Prospect’, p. 138. Her 
reason for thinking the ironist ‘cynical’ is that the ironist cannot make sense of the idea that 
practices of justification are an indication of the truth. Ironists engage in social practices in this 
‘cautious way’ not because of awareness that standards might need revision, but because they 
think it makes no sense to ask whether those practices of justification point towards the truth. In 
saying this however, Haack as we have seen begs the question of whether truth can serve as a 
recognisable and achievable goal of inquiry.
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Chapter Five
Context and the justification of liberalism
A lthough the compatibility o f  ironism  and hberahsm  was argued for in  chapter 4, it is 
said by m any that Rorty’s anti-foundationahsm  and ironism  do n o t aUow for the 
justification or defence o f  hberahsm, or o f  anything else. Critics such as Ian Shapiro 
claim that, in the absence o f foundations, what we think is merely w hat we think, and 
there is no  scope for justifying those behefs. In  this chapter, it is argued that in Rorty’s 
view, justification is an im portant m oral requirem ent, bu t in the absence o f  foundations 
is necessarily relative to  communities. It is further argued that, although justification m ust 
inevitably be m ade by reference to particular standards, it does not, as Brian Barry has 
suggested, becom e a crudely ‘anthropological’ matter. I then go on to  examine how 
Rorty seeks to  justify hberahsm. For writers hke Stanley Fish, despite its claim neutraUy to 
bring together holders o f  different views o f  the good, hberahsm is iUegitimate because it 
is in fact a partial, value laden, form  o f  hfe. Against these com m entators, Rorty’s account 
o f pohtical hberahsm  is examined, ihustrating how  he thinks it justifiable because it 
succeeds in  bringing together holders o f  different views o f  the good with a degree o f 
fairness. I then  consider an account w hich takes itself to foUow up on Rorty’s historicist 
account o f  hberahsm  m ore fuhy than Rorty himself, John  Gray’s account o f  hberahsm as 
the pursuit o f  a modus vivendi betw een different form s o f  hfe. I suggest, however, that 
Rorty tightly regards pohtical hberahsm, w ith its emphasis on individual hberty, to  be an 
im portant aspect o f  any form  o f  hfe w hich contains people w ho belong to  a plurahty o f  
such forms, and that Gray and Rorty’s accounts are rather closer than perhaps either 
thinker would acknowledge.
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11. Pragmatism and justification
11.1 Rorty*s ^abandonment* o f  justiGcadon
F or some writers, justification is im portant as they see it as an indicator o f  tru th / O thers, 
claiming to set aside questions o f  truth, focus on the m oral requirem ent to  respond to  
reasonable requests to  explain and defend our actions and beliefs/ Many com m entators 
have argued that Rorty rules out justification/ A lthough he claims otherwise, writing for 
example that Thilosophers, like everybody else, should seek to  justify their beliefs’,"^ 
many think that he is guilty o f  w hat Cheryl Misak calls ‘the abandonm ent o f 
justification’/  The reason critics think this is, I suggest, because they believe that by 
confining justification to  the standards o f  particular comm unities and by denying any 
sense to  values such as ‘rationality’ independendy o f  their use by those communities, 
Rorty drains justification o f  any substance. They equivocate however betw een arguing 
that Rorty rejects justification in its entirety, and that he offers w hat they regard as an 
inadequate account o f  justification, in which the beliefs and practices o f  a particular 
community are justified simply insofar as they are held and practiced by the m em bers o f  
that community. Misak for example criticizes Rorty bo th  for ‘the  abandonm ent o f 
justification’ and for claiming that ‘justification [is] relative to  one group o f  inquirers or
 ^Nagel, The Last Wordr, Haack, Manifesto of a Passionate Moderate.
2 Larmore, The Morals of Modernity.
3 Shapiro, Political Criticisnr, Bhaskar, Philosophj and the Idea of Freedom; Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, 
Wamke, Gadamer. Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason; Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of 
Humankind; Gander, The Last Conceptual Revolution; J. Judd Owen, Religion and the Demise of Liberal 
Rationalism.
 ^ Richard Rorty, ‘Response to MoUy Cochran’, in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson 
(eds.) Richard Rorty: Critical Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 200 — 202 at 201.
5 Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality, p. 12.
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another’.^  Similarly, Ian Shapiro m oves between arguing tha t Rorty gives up on 
justification by reference to  universally valid standards, and that he thinks ‘we should no t 
be interested in justification at a ll '/  Justin Cruickshank, in  contrast, although he 
recognises that Rorty does no t claim to  give up on  justification, thinks that he 
nevertheless removes the possibility o f justification by his rejection o f  traditional 
philosophical n o tio n s/ Such com m entators make a com m on inference from  the claim 
that justification is inevitably tied to  particular standards to  the claim that those standards 
are self-justifying. In  their view, we respond, if  at all, to  calls to  justify our practices by 
describing how they are in  fact here and now.
This is however to  m isrepresent Rorty’s reasoning. It is true that, for him, justification 
takes places against a particular background o f  values, and that the reasons people offer 
to justify their behaviour will be form ed by the same contingent historical circumstances 
that framed the background conditions against which the would-be justifier offers her 
justification. It a mistake however to  infer, fcom the fact that knowledge claims are 
constrained by, and only by, the sociologically conditioned rules o f  a community, that we 
cannot justify our beliefs to  others, including those o f  o ther communities.
M ost people would agree that a belief can be said to be justified if  we can say that there are 
good reasons for believing it. Controversy arises however once we ask what the basis is for 
thinking those reasons good ones, for we then have to cite further beliefs, which in turn 
have to be justified. W hen we ask on what basis these further beliefs are justified, we begin 
to become aware o f  a problem  o f infinite regress; we can always ask o f  a belief, ‘W hat 
justifies that^’ W riting o f  the need for m oral justification, Christine Korsgaard recognises
6 Ibid., p. 13.
7 Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 43.
8 Justin Cruickshank, ‘Ethnocentrism, Social Contrast Liberalism and Positivistic-Conservatism: 
Rorty’s Three Theses on Politics’, Res Publica 6 (2000), pp. 1 — 23.
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that one will inevitably be con&onted by a dilemma concerning the authority o f  morality. 
She writes: ‘[ejither its authority comes from  morality, in which case we have argued in  a 
ciccle, or it comes from  something else, in  which case the question arises again, and we 
are faced with an infinite regress.’^  W e can, she notes, always ask o f  a proposed standard 
o f  justification whether that standard is itself justified. As Michael Williams points out, we 
ultimately confront three, seemingly equally undesirable, situations. W e are left w ith an 
infinite regress, m ust decide arbitrarily to rest our beliefs in unfounded assertion, or argue 
around in a circle.^®
W hat Rorty, Williams and others call representationahsm is a response to this ‘trilemma’, the 
claim that there are intrinsically credible representations o f the world which do not rest on 
further beliefs but are self-justifying; they are what Rorty calls ‘privileged representations’ 
and Williams ‘epistemically basic beliefs’, beliefs that as he says are ‘intrinsically credible’, 
justified without inference. One way to view Philosopfy and the M irror of Nature is as the 
history o f the evolution o f  different proposals for such beliefs, notably forms o f thought 
that humans cannot get outside of, such as those that express analytic truths or which rest 
on empirical sense-data. The reason representationahsm fails is, as we have seen, that there 
is no way the world is apart from the various descriptions we give o f it and thus there are no 
behefs that can serve as basic behefs in this way.
This does not, as his critics tend to  beheve, com m it Rorty to  denying that justification is 
impossible or unim portant. I f  we accept that justification is sought by reference to  
particular standards and to a particular hum an community, the regress o f  justification is 
arrested once that community accepts the justification. In  Philosophy and the M irror of
 ^ Christine M. Korsguaard, The Sources of Normativity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996), p. 30.
0^ Michael Wilhams, Groundless Belief: A n  Essay on the Possibility ofEpistemolog^ (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999, second edition).
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Nafure Rorty sketches what he calls ‘epistemological behaviorism / the claim that 
rationality and epistemic authority are explained by reference to  w hat one’s com m unity 
allows to  be said, rather than the latter by the former. Statements and beliefs are justified 
no t because they tally with reality, but because they secure ‘warranted assertabiUty’, namely 
Svhat our peers wiU, ceferisparibus, let us get away with saying’.” As we have seen in chapter 
3, Rorty argues that the factors influendng what is discussed and believed are determined 
sociologically. Thom as K uhn challenged the view o f physical science as the paradigm of 
pure disinterested inquiry with his claim that science develops by the integration o f  new 
facts into an already existing network o f  beliefs. Rorty generalises K uhn’s point by claiming 
that it is the way all knowledge is acquired. Justification is inferential and coherentist, and 
takes place within the context o f  a particular vocabulary. In  justifying a belief, it m ust 
cohere w ith o ther beliefs from  which the proposed justification can be inferred. As Rorty 
puts it, ‘nothing counts as justification unless by reference to  w hat we already accept, ... 
there is no  way to  get outside our beliefs and our language so as to  find some test other 
than coherence’.^  ^A lthough in  Philosophy and the M irror of Nature Rorty declined to  call this 
position pragmatism, fearing that term  ‘a bit overladen’” , it is the term , and the 
philosophical tradition, with which he has subsequentiy allied himself. Rorty’s preferred 
characterisation o f  pragm atism  is, ‘the doctrine that there are no constraints on  inquiry 
save conversational ones.’”  There is nothing about the nature o f  truth, o r the structure o f 
the world, or o f  language, that constrain the outcom e o f  inquiry. T he only limitations on 
w hat we think and say are those o f  our fellow inquirers. Justification is influenced by the 
particular sociological and historical factors that influence communities, and w hat counts 
as a justification depends on hum an peculiarities, and these vary according to  tim e and 
place.
Rorty, Philosop/y and the Mirror of Nature, p. 176.
12 Ibid., p. 178.
13 Ibid., p. 176.
14 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 165.
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Rorty adopts K uhn’s distinction between norm al and abnorm al discourse in place o f  the 
division between ‘hard’ verses ‘soft’ intellectual disciplines. N orm al discourse exists 
where there is widespread agreement about w hat is sought from  an inquiry — for 
example, to predict and control the environm ent, and where there exist agreed upon  
criteria for evaluating com peting claims. A bnorm al discourse exists w hen there is no 
such agreement either about w hat is sought from  inquiry, or the m anner in which it is 
sought. Even with normal discourse, however, criteria do no t reflect the natural order o f  
reasons but rather the standards o f  a particular com m unity o f  inquirers that are currently 
unchallenged.^^ It is a process o f  using som e beliefs currently no t in  doubt in  order to  
support those claims for which justification is sought. T he notion o f  Reality as It Is in 
Itself is w ithout content, bu t as soon as it is given content, we are able to  engage in 
justification. O nce one has adopted a vocabulary — o f  N ew tonian physics for example, or 
o f  Hberal egalitarianism — one adopts norm s against which justification can take place.
Insofar as Rorty denies justification, he means justification o f  the sort exemplified by 
Socradc questions, such as ‘W hy are you a liberal? W hy do you care about the 
humiliation o f  strangers?’^  ^ His po in t is that there is no  possibility o f  offering a 
justification that wiU finally answer such questions. There is no  way to  justify a belief that 
does no t beg certain im portant questions for other people, since w hat counts as a 
justification depends upon  the practices and norm s against which a justification is 
offered, and how  far one can accept challenges to  those standards. This po in t is reached
Gutting puts it well when he writes: ‘Normal discourse is not supported by any privileged 
representations, but the deep agreement of the interlocutors allows them to proceed as if it were.’ 
Gutting, 'Pragmatic Liberalism and the Critic of Modernity, p. 19.
This is not to say, as I argued in chapter 3, that the choice of standard is arbitrary.
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 87.
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w hen we are called upon to justify the term s that constitute w hat Rorty term s our ‘final 
vocabulary’:
All hum an beings carry about a set o f  words which they employ to  justify 
their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in  which 
we formulate praise o f  our friends and contem pt for our enemies, our 
long-term  projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes. They 
are the words in  which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes 
retrospectively, the story o f  our lives. I shall call these words a person’s 
“final vocabulary” .’®
A final vocabulary is final because the words o f  which it consists are the standards that 
one cannot m ove beyond w hen justifying one’s values and beliefs. They cannot be 
backed up  w ith non-circular argument, and are grounded in nothing deeper than 
themselves. I f  we are asked to  specify for example why we think a certain action is /is  no t 
cruel, we are no t able to  give reasons that are no t themselves ultimately circular, that is, 
which do n o t repeat (though perhaps rephrase) our original claim. W hen asked to  explain 
why slavery is w rong or why one cares about the humiliation o f  strangers, one is Hkely to 
say things like ‘I t  offends against the equality and dignity o f  hum an beings’ and ‘It leads 
to  great unhappiness for those held as slaves’. I f  somebody (Augustine for example) 
replies by asking why we should care about hum an happiness, or (Nietzsche) why 
hum ans should be treated equally, one can only talk about the pain and misery that 
people treated in  certain ways feel, ask the questioner to  put themselves in  the position o f  
a slave, etc. These responses still beg questions, for example why we should be
Ibid., p. 73. A person’s final vocabulary contains thin flexible words like ‘good’ ‘true’ and 
‘beautiful’, and thicker, more parochial words like ‘kindness’, ‘progressive’, and ‘creative’. The 
latter, more parochial words are the ones which as Rorty says ‘do most of the work’ in 
conversation.
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concerned about pain, w hether and in w hat ways hum ans really are equal, etc. T hat is, if 
som eone continues to  press us, and ask us why som ething we believe to  be w rong is 
wrong, eventually we will have to  appeal to  other beliefs w hose justification at least partly 
depends on  the belief being questioned.
As discussed in chapter 3, Rorty distinguishes ‘background behefs’ from  ‘standards o f 
evidence’. Standards o f  evidence rem ain constant: justification is a
coherentist/inferentiahst m atter in which the justification o f  a behef is necessarily a 
function o f  the other behefs a person has. However, those behefs vary enormously, and 
different background behefs wih lead to different views o f  w hether a particular 
proposition  is justified or not. It foUows that we cannot justify a behef to  ah possible 
audiences, because o f  the diversity o f  background behefs, o r truth-candidates, which 
m ight emerge in the future. Even if  we could justify a behef to  ah current audiences, that is 
no  guarantee that it would be accepted as a justification to  ah future audiences, as new 
behefs and ‘final vocabularies’ emerge. T o  claim otherwise would, Rorty writes ‘be like 
the vihage cham pion, swohen with victory, predicting that he can defeat any chahenger, 
anytime, anywhere. Maybe he can, bu t he has no good reason to  think so, and it w ould 
be pointless for him  to make such a claim’^ °. It would only be possible to  justify a behef 
to  ah audiences were ‘background behefs’ or criteria o f  justification set in advance and 
rem ained fixed. However, in  m ost cases the criteria are no t set dow n in advance, and 
even w here they are, there is no  reason to  beheve, in the absence o f  a natural order o f 
reasons, that everyone in the future wih continue to fohow these criteria rather than 
reform ing them  or inventing their own.
Rorty, ‘Response to Susan Haack’, p. 151.
20 Rorty, ‘Response to Jürgen Habermas’, p. 56.
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11.2 The need for justification
Against the kind o f  global need for justification implied by Korsgaard, Rorty separates 
‘justifying’ w ith ‘being justified’. For pragmatists, the need to  justify som ething arises only 
w hen som ething is questioned and throw n into doubt. For m ost o f  our beliefs, we may 
have good grounds (be justified) w hen we do no t doubt or question (without any attem pt 
at justifying). In  a claim with which I am sure Rorty w ould agree, Michael Williams 
su ^ e s ts  that the correct response to  the question ‘W hat justifies all o f  your beliefs?’ is ‘Why 
should we want to?’^  ^ His point is that justification is a contextual matter, made in response 
to a specific request to account for a particular actions or belief. M odern philosophy’s 
concern to  answer, rather than ignore, the Cartesian sceptic has led philosophers to  think 
that justification is required for things that we do n o t doubt. It has, as Rorty writes o f  
H aberm as, sought to  scratch where it does not itch .^
The felt-need for global justification is addressed by Bernard Williams. H e is sceptical 
about the possibility o f  justification that will satisfy anyone irrespective o f  their particular 
beliefs, a justification that, in being independent o f  aU hum an peculiarities, m ust 
com m and the assent o f  all rational people. H e argues however that there is no  way to 
convince the ethical sceptic that they ought to  act morally, bu t that, although this 
question has exercised many philosophers, it is no t in fact at issue:
[..,] it is a mistake ... to  think that there is some objective presum ption
in favor o f  the nonethical Hfe, that ethical scepticism is the natural state.
21 Williams, Groundless Belief, p. 99.
22 Rorty, Essays on Heide^erand Others, p. 167.
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and that the person we have been iniagining [the amorahst] is w hat we all 
would w ant to  be if  there were no justification for the ethical life and we 
had discovered that there was none.^
T he focus should rather be on those w ho are already in  som e way moral. For him, the 
justification that the philosopher has sought to  give to  the sceptic is ‘in  fact designed for 
the people w ho are largely within the ethical world, and the aim o f  the discourse is n o t to  
deal w ith som eone w ho probably wiU no t listen to  it, bu t to  reassure, strengthen, and give 
insight to  those w ho wiU.’^ "^ T hat is, the justification is addressed to  people and 
com m unities that are already ethical.
Rorty is similarly sceptical about the need for a justification that will satisfy everyone, 
irrespective o f  their beliefs. H e takes philosophers w ho have sought justification from  
first principles as having being concerned with w hat follows — typically am orahsm  or 
relativism — if  such justification cannot be given. Fear o f  such things has led 
philosophers to  misdiagnose w hat is at issue with justification; as he puts it, ‘Plato set 
things up so that m oral philosophers think they have failed unless they convince the 
rational egoist the he should no t be an egoist’.^  ^ However, the fact that there can be no  
non-question-begging justification does no t alter the im portance o f  offering justification 
for people w ho already possess w hat Bernard Wilhams calls a ‘m oral sense’, w hich they 
exhibit in  their relations with certain other people. T he task o f  philosophy should he 
suggests be to  seek to  extend the frontiers o f  this m oral sense, that is, attend to  those 
w ho are already, in  W ilhams’ phrase, ‘largely within the ethical w orld’. As Rorty writes, 
we should ignore ‘the rather rare figure o f the psychopath, the person w ho has no
23 Wilhams, Bothies and the Um its ofPhilosop!^, p. 26.
24 Ibid.
25 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 177.
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concern for any hum an being other than h im self’ and concern ourselves with, for 
example, the otherwise ‘gallant and honorable Serb w ho sees Muslims as circumcised 
dogs’ “
11,3 Justiücation as anthropology?
Rorty thus joins m any other philosophers in  viewing justification as a contextual practice, 
m ade in particular circumstances to  specific audiences with reference to  specific values. 
Unlike m ost o f  these, however, he is frequently said to  oppose the practice o f 
justification and to  hold that insofar as reasons are offered for actions, this am ounts to 
asserting that ‘that’s the way we do things around here’. I suggest that the reason he is 
said to  oppose the practice o f  justification is because critics erroneously conflate his 
rejection o f  justification by reference to  standards that should persuade all rational people 
— for example, his rejection o f  Nagel’s claim that reason ‘should enable anyone else also 
to  see w hat is the right thing for you to  do against that background’^  ^— with a rejection 
o f  justification tout court. There remains, however, the question o f  w hether w hat Rorty 
calls a ‘sociological’ form  o f  justification — justification to  particular comm unities o f 
hum an beings rather than by reference to  universally valid standards — is morally 
satisfactory. For som e it is no t since it reduces, they claim, the norm ative task o f  m oral 
justification to  a description o f  w hat it is that counts as justification in  particular 
communities.
26 Ibid.
27 Nagel, The Last IVord, p. 110.
157
A lthough he does no t discuss Rorty, it is helpful to  consider a distinction m ade by Brian 
Barry. Barry distinguishes the sorts o f  justification that a person will give for his or her 
action from  the explanation an ‘outside observer’, such as an anthropologist, w ould give 
o f  that person’s justification.^® Outside observers explain the reasons given by showing 
how people use ideas and draw on values that they were brought up w ith and that are 
shared by other m em bers o f  their community. A n anthropological or sociological 
account o f justification is, Barry claims, no t a form  o f  justification at all. I f  one makes the 
brute appeal to  one’s culture or to  the norm s o f  a com m unity by saying ‘that’s the way 
we do things around here’, he argues that one has conflated these two things: w hen asked 
for a justification, one has responded w ith a sociological or anthropological account of 
justification. In  so doing, Barry claims that one has taken oneself outside o f  the realm  o f  
m oral discourse and becom e an anthropologist.
Barry regards the claim ‘that’s the way we do things around here’ to  be the form  o f 
justification standardly offered by multiculturalists who, in his view, seek to  justify the 
practices o f  communities no t on the basis o f  any standard o f  worth, bu t simply because 
they are currently practices. H e makes his point in a comm entary on Charles Taylor’s 
essay ‘The Politics o f  Recognition’. W riting o f reasons why the British governm ent does 
no t allow the m urder o f  Salman Rushdie, Taylor writes that in ‘increasingly multicultural’ 
societies,
[...] there is som ething awkward about replying simply, “This is the way
we do things here.” ... T he awkwardness arises from  the fact that there
28 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 253.
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are substantial num bers o f  people w ho are citizens and also belong to  the 
culture that calls into question our philosophical boundaries/^
In  his discussion o f  this passage, Barry argues that no t handing Rushdie over to  be 
m urdered is the right thing to  do no t because ‘this is how  we do things here’, b u t because 
no t doing so would be the right thing to  do everywhere'.
[T]he correct defence o f  the British governm ent’s n o t punishing Rushdie 
or handing him  over to  others for punishm ent (whether within som e 
legal process or outside it) is no t ‘This is the way we do things here.’ I t  is, 
rather, that this is the way things ought to  be done everywhere: we do 
things that way here no t because it is part o f  our culture but because it is 
the right thing to  do.^°
However, this does no t address Taylor’s concern, which is the phenom enology o f  
justification. Taylor does n o t endorse the crudely anthropological account ascribed to  
him  by Barry, whereby som ething is justified simply because it is a cultural practice. 
Rather, Taylor is concerned, hke Rorty, to  point out the sociological nature o f 
justification. T he increase o f  m ulticulturahsm (or, less pointedly, pluralism) brings w ith it 
an increasing need for justification. W ith the increase in m oral perspectives brought 
about by ethnic and religious diversity, previously unquestioned behefs and assum ptions 
begin to  be challenged. Taylor’s concern is that w ith this new found questioning, it would 
be insensitive and contem ptuous simply to  continue to justify our behefs and practices by 
saying ‘This is the way we do things here’.
29 Charles Taylor, ‘The Pohtics of Recognition’, in Amy Gutmann (ed.) Multiculturalism: B^xamining 
the Politics of Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994), pp. 25 — 73 at 63.
Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 284.
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Barry is critical o f ever making that claim. H e asks, ‘H ow  could anybody seriously 
imagine that citing the m ere fact o f  a tradition or custom  could ever function as a self- 
contained justificatory move?’^  ^ However, he then contradicts him self by arguing that in 
some circumstances, ‘that’s the way we do things here’ can serve as a justification. H e 
writes for example that states cannot be neutral about languages, and that it is quite 
acceptable to  appeal to  convention and culture w hen justifying policy on  language: ‘This 
is one case involving cultural attributes in which “This is how  we do things here” — the 
appeal to  local convention — is a self-sufficient response to  pleas for the public 
recognition o f diversity’.^  ^ In  this case, he seems in fact m ore prepared to  rely on a 
crudely anthropological justification than Taylor, w ho is concerned by the possible 
inadequacy o f  such a response, and how one should deal with those w ho do no t agree 
that ‘it is the right thing to  do’.
Contrary to  what he claims w ith respect o f  governm ent policy on  languages, Barry’s real 
point is I suggest that nothing can serve as a self-sufficient or self-contained justification, 
bu t rather that justification is m ade by reference to  liberal principles. Those things that 
fall within liberal rights are ‘indifferent’ and can be decided on through discussion, so 
long as it remains within liberal constraints. I f  that is the case however, why should the 
appeal to what is thought or done ‘around here’ enter into the picture at all? I f  Barry 
were to  say that som ething is justified insofar as it is consistent w ith liberalism, this 
would eliminate the contradiction presented by his example o f languages, and therefore 
the paradox o f  his making the same m ove that he decries w hen m ade by
3^ Ibid., p. 253. 
32 Ibid., p. 107.
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multiciilturalists, namely insulating cultural practices from  scrutiny/^ It w ould however 
also be seen to  beg the sort o f  question about which Taylor is concerned, which is what 
to  do in increasingly pluralistic societies where liberal values are themselves questioned.
This helps to  illustrate that Rorty’s concern is no t the multiculturahst point that 
som ething is justified because it is held to  be part o f  a practice,^"^ O ne justifies one’s 
behefs and actions from  where one is, and by reference to  certain standards: ‘justification 
is relative to  an audience’.^  ^Particular historical and sociological factors m ean that in some 
comm unities, justifications for certain practices are required, and asked for, whereas in 
others they are not.
12. Justifying liberalism
12.1 The im possib ility  o f  a non-question-begging justiücation
Far from  being a lone denier o f  justification, Rorty is in fact no  m ore vulnerable than 
other hberals w ho, like Barry, assume the value o f  equahty and hberty that, i f  pressed, 
would take them  back to  a position similar to  his, or which w ould entail them  making 
other, metaphysically problematic, claims. Rorty does no t give up on the practices o f 
justification and reason-giving, bu t recognizes that they are required in specific contexts, 
and m ade in respect to  specific requests. W hen he writes that the citizens o f  the ideal
As it stands, it is ironic that it falls to James TuUy to point out why this might not fairly be a 
self-sufficient justification at all. TuUy, ‘The Illiberal Liberal: Brian Barry’s Polemical Attack on 
Multiculturalism’, in Paul Kelly (ed.) Multiculturalism Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and it its 
Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002), pp. 102 — 113.
34 Though even that does not function as a self-sufficient justification, since it relies upon claims 
about the significance of group identity and its relation to ‘culture’.
35 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 22.
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liberal society ‘would no t need a justification for her sense o f  hum an soHdarity, for she 
was not raised to  play the language game in which one asks for and gets justifications for 
that sort o f  belief/^  Eric G ander misrepresents the reasoning behind this claim, 
erroneously summarising it as: ‘It would be a culture whose citizens refused even to  
attem pt to  justify their practices to  themselves or to  nonliberals’.^  ^ In  the ideal liberal 
society, HberaHsm wiU not need to  be justified since everyone accepts Hberal values. Rorty 
does not, as G ander claims, rule out justification by edict, bu t argues that, in this context, 
it has becom e superfluous; in the ideal Hberal society, justification will simply no t be 
needed for those convictions. G ander provides a m ore accurate account w hen he takes 
Rorty to  be seeking to  ‘bring about a culture in  which we do n o t need to  be prepared to  
explain on w hat grounds we defend the First A m endm ent’.^ ® T hat we do n o t need to  do 
so is because, in an ideal Hberal society, no  one wiU ask us to  do so. I f  pressed, one could 
undertake to  justify it, but the caU to do so would reflect the fact that one was not Hving 
in such a society.
It is clearly the case however that legitimate questions about the justification o f  HberaHsm 
have been asked and deserve a response. Some think that Rorty has nothing to say to  
these objections. Stephen MulhaU and Adam  Swift for example assert that since Rorty is 
opposed ‘to  any attem pt to provide rational foundations for systems o f  values and 
conceptsV^ the only justification o f  HberaHsm that he thinks available is to  say that it is 
part o f  our tradition to  be Hberals.
T o  be sure, Rorty accepts that he is unable to  offer a non-question-begging justification 
o f HberaHsm. H e writes that his account:
36 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 87.
37 Gander, The Last Conceptual Revolution, p. 16, emphasis suppressed.
38 Ibid., p. 138, emphasis suppressed.
39 MulhaU and Swift, Liberals and Communitarians, p. 259.
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[...] would m ean giving up on  the idea that hberalism could be justified, 
and Nazi or M arxist enemies o f liberalism refuted, by driving the latter 
up against an argumentative wall — forcing them  to admit that liberal 
freedom has a “m oral privilege” which their ow n values lacked. F rom  the 
point o f view I have been commending, any attem pt to  drive one’s 
opponents up against a wall in this way fails w hen the wall against which 
he is driven comes to  be seen as one m ore vocabulary, one m ore way o f  
describing things.'*®
It is however a mistake to  claim that Rorty thinks that liberalism cannot and need never 
be justified. His point is, once again, that there is no  possibiHty o f  a providing a general 
justification o f  liberalism that will persuade any rational inquirer. H e writes: ‘I do no t 
know how to “justify” or “defend” social democracy ... in a large philosophical way (as 
opposed to  going over the nitty-gritty advantages and disadvantages o f  the alternatives 
these people propose).’'** The caveat contained in  parentheses is im portant. A lthough 
justification by reference to  an absolute standard is impossible, one can seek to  justify a 
proposal by com paring it w ith another. H e writes that the best way to  justify hberahsm  is 
to  make comparisons w ith non-liberal regimes. In  his ideal hberal pohty, ‘the justification 
o f  Hberal society [would be regarded] simply as a m atter o f  historical com parisons with 
other attempts at social organization — those o f  the past and those envisaged by 
Utopians.’'*^ It is by making such comparisons with non-Hberal regimes that Rorty 
beheves that Hberahsm can be justified.
40 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 53.
41 Rorty, ‘Thugs and Theorists’, pp. 577 — 578, n. 20.
42 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 53.
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Rorty suggests that there is no  fairer o r m ore just alternative to  Hberalism, given the 
circumstances o f  m odern plural societies. LiberaHsm deals w ith conflict fairly by 
providing for the m axim um  degree o f  freedom  o f  behef and action consistent w ith the 
enjoym ent o f  those freedoms by others w ho have a different view o f  the good. Rorty 
proposes:
[...] a story o f  increasing wiUingness to  Hve with plurahty and to  stop 
asking for universal vahdity. I w ant to  see freely arrived at agreement as 
agreement on how  to  accompHsh com m on purposes (e.g., prediction and 
control o f  the behavior o f  atoms or people, equalizing Hfe-chances, 
decreasing cruelty), bu t I w ant to  see these com m on purposes against the 
background o f  an increasing sense o f  the radical diversity o f  private 
purposes, o f the radically poetic character o f  individual Hves, and o f  the 
merely poetic foundations o f  the “w e-consciousness” which Hes behind 
our social institutions.'^^
A lthough he variously describes it as ‘pragmatic Hberahsm’ and ‘minimahst hberahsm ’, 
Rorty’s position is w hat Jo h n  Rawls has called pohtical hberahsm, which holds that that 
one should set aside attem pts to  answer questions about the ultimate significance o f  
hum an hfe w hen seeking to  settie pohtical questions about the way to  hve. This view 
stems from  two premises: first, a behef in  the equahty o f hum an beings and the right o f  
every individual to  choose her own ends, and secondly, a behef in  the unavailabihty o f  
any m eans to  determ ine a uniquely rational way to  judge or adjudicate betw een different 
ends. This point unites Rorty w ith Rawls: for them  both, hberahsm addresses those 
differences by providing for the maximum  degree o f  freedom  o f  behef and action
Ibid., pp. 67 — 68.
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consistent with the enjoyment o f  those freedoms by people w ho adhere to different 
views o f  the good. Liberalism is m andated no t by ahistoric facts, bu t simply because it 
has proven successful. Liberals, he suggests, ought to  claim ‘only an experimental 
success: we have come up with a way o f  bringing people in to  some degree o f comity, and 
o f  increasing hum an happiness, which looks far m ore prom ising than any other way 
which has been proposed so far’."^
Rorty’s pragmatic justification o f  hberalism stems from  a view about its fairness. H e is 
no t alone in  m aking this claim. The same defence has been advanced by Barry, w ho 
disclaims w hat he calls ‘grandiose designs’ which pu rport to  ground hberahsm  on  a 
foundation such as that provided by G od or Nature."^^ In  their place, he urges that ‘hberal 
principles are the fairest way o f  adjudicating the disputes that inevitably arise as a result 
o f  conflicting interests and incom patible behefs about the social conditions o f  the good 
hfe’."^  Barry is no t a Kantian, and it is no t open to  him  to  claim for example that 
hberahsm  is underw ritten by pure practical reason; rather, such controversy is a reason to 
set these issues aside and focus on  fairness. Unlike Rorty however, Barry shies away 
from  the full consequences o f this position. W hen he writes that hberahsm is the fairest 
way o f  adjudicating disputes, he leaves open the context o f  ‘fairness’. F o r ‘fairness’, hke 
‘reasonableness’ bu t unlike traditional ‘grandiose’ foundations hke G od and N ature, is an 
inherently contextual notion. ‘Fairest’ is an adjective, and adjectives m ust be m odified by 
a noun  (that is, a context). To say simply ‘Liberahsm is fairest’ makes no  sense, unless it 
is stated in  a specific context. T hat context is clearly w hat Rawls caUs the facts o f  
plurahsm.
44 Rorty, 'Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 273.
45 Barry, Culture and 'Equality, p. 122.
4<5 Ibid.
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W hen it comes to  liberal principles, it w ould seem that Barry has reached the limits o f  his 
‘final vocabulary’. H e takes it as axiomatic that liberal principles are the fairest m eans to  
adjudicate conflicts between different interests and views o f  the good, and thinks it 
sufficient to  justify things, such as governm ent policy on  language, that he takes to  be 
consistent with liberal principles by saying ‘that’s the way we do things around here’. In  
the same way, w hen arguing against multiculturahst criticisms, he asserts that a 
‘rudimentary sense o f  humanity is quite enough’'^  ^ to see w hat is w rong with denying that 
groups should be pubhcly accountable for w hat goes on inside them. B ut although we 
might wish that he were right about this — that saying ‘that’s the way we do things 
around here’ is enough to  end the m atter w hen it comes to  practices that are consistent 
w ith liberal principles, and that a basic sense o f hum anity should be sufficient to  justify 
some practices and rule others out — clearly it is not, or else the need to  address the 
issues throw n up by increasingly pluralist societies would no t have arisen in the  first 
place. W hat Barry thinks o f  as ‘the right thing to  do’ reflects, as Taylor points out, a 
particular W estern liberal disposition. It is open to  som eone to  ask for example why not 
handing Rushdie over is the right thing to  do. T he only answer that is available to  Barry 
is to  give reasons, such as it is im m oral for people to be punished for writing books, or 
that it is w rong for the British authorities to  defer their authority to  external sources, the 
im portance o f  rights such as freedom  o f  speech and expression, etc. Some will agree 
with Barry, others sadly wiU not. B ut this claim is no less ‘anthropological’ than the claim 
that something is justified because it has form ed part o f  a culture for a long time. B oth 
depend upon background conditions specifying w hether they count as a justification.
In  other places, Barry him self recognises that his claims for the tru th  o f  liberahsm are 
contextual and ethnocentric, and therefore ultimately question-begging. H e writes that.
Ibid., p. 146.
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‘|l]ike any creed it [liberalism] can be neither justified no r condem ned in  terms o f  
anything beyond it’,"^  and that ‘there can be no completely general justification o f liberal 
institutions that does no t itself invoke liberal values’/^ In  saying this, he is logically 
com m itted to  agree with Rorty that liberalism cannot be given an epistemological 
justification, one that wiU necessarily silence the sort o f  doubt about which Taylor is 
concerned, or stop the infinite regression feared by Korsgaard. Particular historical and 
sociological factors m ean that in som e communities justification for certain practices is 
required and asked for, whereas in  others it is not. Sometimes it wiU be sufficient to 
respond by saying ‘that’s the way we do things around here’, whereas sometimes it wiU 
not.
12.2 Reasons for supporting liberal institu tions
For Rorty, political liberalism is no t prem ised on views about the ultimate source o f  
value, and therefore contrasts with, for example, religious orthodoxies in  that it requires 
and im poses no com prehensive doctrine on its citizens. I t  values freedom  and equality 
no t for doctrinal reasons, bu t in  order to  give everyone a chance o f  framing their own 
view o f  the good, and the opportunity to  foUow and alter it. Rawls has argued that 
political philosophy should no t concern itself w ith truth^°, should avoid controversies 
betw een realist and subjectivist claims about the status o f  m oral and political values, and 
focus rather on the pursuit o f  ‘free agreement, reconciliation through public reason’.^ ^
^  Brain Barry, The Uberal Theoiy of Justice: A. Critical Examination of the Principal Doctrines in A 
Theory of Justice by John P^wls (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), p. 127.
Barry, Uberty and Justice, p. 2.
50 Rawls: ‘the political conception does without the concept of truth’. John Rawls, Political 
Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 94.
51 John Rawls, ‘Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical’, in Samuel Freeman (ed.) John 
Pawls: Collected Papers (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 388 — 414 at 395.
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Rorty agrees, believing public debate should no t focus on  comprehensive doctrines but 
on  seeking free agreement between individuals.
In  earlier writings such as Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, Rorty seemed unconcerned with 
the reasons people have for supporting liberal institutions. H e writes: 'W e should see 
allegiance to  social institutions as no m ore m atters for justification by reference to 
familiar, com m only accepted premises — but also as no  m ore arbitrary — than choices o f 
friends or heroes’.^  ^ H ere it seems that Rorty believes that the reasons for allegiance to  
social institutions do n o t m atter so long as enough people have such allegiance, there 
being no  single com m only accepted premise or set o f  premises that everyone has to 
accept. However, fiom  the fact that there is no  possibiHty o f  a final, non-question- 
begging justification, it does no t necessarily follow that, w ithin a particular context, there 
should no t be justification by famiHar, comm only accepted premises. T hat Rorty thinks 
such com m only accepted premises irrelevant makes his account sound like the 
H obbesian project o f  securing a modus vivendi, where all that m atters is agreem ent on 
com m on institutions, irrespective o f  motivation. This idea has been criticised because it 
places too  m uch weight on w hether or no t a particular conception o f  the good happens 
in fact to  endorse com m on institutions, since this leaves unanswered the issue o f  what 
happens if  it does not.^^ This point emerges clearly in  Rorty’s account w hen he writes 
that non-Hberals Hke N ietzsche can stHl be good Hberals for ‘pragmatic rather than m oral 
reasons’.^ '^  This may be so, bu t we can question w hether such pragmatic reasons wHl lead 
to lasting stabiHty. H e writes that such people may ‘regret’ that their private m oral 
identity is n o t the interest o f  the state but, it m ight be asked, w hat if  that regret, tem pered 
as it may be by the calculation that this situation is better than the loss o f  their pohtical
52 Rorty, Contingeng, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 54.
53 Justice as Impartiality, pp. 31 -  39.
54 Rorty, Objectivity, Belativism, and Truth, p. 192.
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freedom, nevertheless leads them  to  support measures to  destroy liberal institutions? 
W hat happens that is if  their loyalty to  hberahsm exists only because they do no t happen 
to  have the pow er currentiy to  enable them  to  coerce their view o f  the good on  others?
Perhaps in  order to  take account o f  such objections, m ore recently Rorty has come to 
offer reasons for why people should support the principles o f  justice that stand over and 
above H obbesian appeals for peace. H e appeals to  what Rawls has caUed people’s ‘sense 
o f  justice’, discussed in Chapter 8 o f ^  Theojy o f Justice, in which Rawls writes that people 
w ho are properly brought up do no t act out o f narrow self-interest, bu t out o f  a feehng 
that this is the right thing to  do. Rorty summarises this position in  the following way:
The only notion o f  rationality we need, at least in m oral and social 
philosophy, is that o f  a situation in which people do no t say “your own 
current interests dictate that you agree to  our proposal”, bu t rather “your 
ow n central behefs, the ones which are central to  your own m oral 
identity, suggest that you should agree to  our proposal” .^ ^
Rorty’s response to  the question o f  why we are able to  affirm  the priority o f  the right 
over the good is that m  are able to  pu t the right over the good, because we are correctly 
brought up, and have becom e pragmatic and tolerant enough to  do so. This follows 
Rawls’s notion o f  a ‘sense o f  justice’, which is to say that it is an indication o f  being well 
bought up that one will be prepared to  pu t aside one’s comprehensive views in  favour o f  
the right. People wiU support the principles o f  justice because, whatever else they 
disagree about, they recognize that they are right, a position which Rorty glosses by 
writing that ‘[t]o urge that the right be m ade prior to  the good is, am ong other things, to
55 Rorty, justice as a Larger Loyalty’, p. 232.
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suggest that trust in people wishy-washy enough to  make tactful, unprincipled, political 
com prom ises is often, ironically enough, preferable to  trust in one’s initial m oral and 
rehgious convictions.’^  ^ Failure to  do so is what Rorty calls irrationality, which for him  is 
n o t a failure o f  abstract hum an reason, bu t the inability to  pu t aside one’s particular 
interests in this way.
In  Rawlsian terms, Rorty here distinguishes an ‘overlapping consensus’ from  a modus 
vivendi. Political Hberahsm seeks an accom m odation betw een people w ho differ in their 
conceptions o f  the good Hfe. This accom m odation is characterised by two features. It 
claims no t to  assume any comprehensive account o f  the good, bu t at the same time it 
seeks accom m odation which does n o t simply reflect the narrow interests o f  individuals 
and groups. A ccom m odation wiU no t in itself necessarily be a desirable or a reasonable 
one, bu t is reasonable if  it accords with basic Hberal freedoms. In  an overlapping 
consensus, the different parties to  the consensus accept the rightness o f  the framework 
over and above its practical expediency. A modus vivendi in contrast is said by Rawls and 
Rorty to  be merely a pragmatic calculation that one’s interests are best served by Hving 
under the conditions o f  a particular fram ework o f  law. For Rorty, it may be the case that 
i f  people cannot be brought to  com prom ise their views o f  the good in  search o f  an 
acceptable pubHc poHty (view o f  the right), we wiU have to  settle for a modus vivendi’, in his 
words, ‘we have to  give up on the attem pt to  get her to  enlarge her m oral identity, and 
settle for working out a modus vivendi — one which may involve the threat, o r even the use, 
o f  force’.^  ^ B ut ideaUy, it wiU be possible to  go beyond a modus vivendi to  w hat Rorty 
thinks o f  as a fair constitutional settlement.
56 Rorty, ‘A Defense of MinimaHst LiberaHsm’, p. 122.
57 Rorty, Justice as a Larger Loyalty’, p. 234.
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12.3 Challenges to po litica l liberalism
Like Rawls, Rorty has been criticised for smuggling peculiarly liberal notions into a 
supposedly neutral account o f  justice. This presents an ambiguity in  his account which 
parallels that exhibited by Rawls, between on the one hand claiming that political 
hberalism aims at free agreement whilst on  the other claiming that such agreement 
am ounts to  m ore than a modus vivendi. I t has frequently been objected to  this view that it 
fails to  do justice to  the im portance o f  people’s views o f  the good, given its concern to  
bring about the circumstances in  which people are prepared to  com prom ise rather than 
insist upon  their convictions. Rorty sums up Jefferson’s view o f  hberal democracy (‘the 
Jeffersonian com prom ise’) by writing that citizens ‘m ust abandon or m odify opinions on 
m atters o f  ultimate im portance, the opinions that may hitherto  have given sense and 
point to  their hves, if  these opinions entail pubhc actions that cannot be justified to  m ost 
o f  their feUow citizens’.^ ® However, for those required to  abandon or modify their behefs, 
those behefs are no t merely ‘opinions’ bu t central to  their identity. Why, we can imagine 
many theists saying, should I worry about my mistaken (and possibly heU-bound) 
fellows? T hat is, why should one grant the right priority over the good?
It is claimed therefore that hberahsm  entails a false neutrahty about the right, since it 
embodies a view that com prom ise and consensus is good, and that in so doing it 
triviahses alternative views o f  the good hfe, particularly rehgious ones. This argum ent has 
been m ade very forcefuhy by Stanley Fish, w ho is interesting for my discussion because 
his m eta-philosophical position is very similar to  that o f  Rorty. Fish argues that hberals 
cannot m ake good the claim that hberahsm  is m ore reasonable because it is impartial or
58 Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism, and Truth, p. 175.
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neutral, because this stems from  its own, partial, perspective. T he Hberal approach, o f 
privatising comprehensive doctrines, especially rehgious doctrines, itself rests upon  a 
com prehensive doctrine. D espite its professed aim o f  seeking tolerance and 
accom m odation o f  as many different views as possible, he notes that Hberahsm excludes 
many views that it considers unreasonable. Fish writes that Hberals claim that their 
‘reasons com e from  nowhere, that they reflect the structure o f  the universe or at least o f 
the hum an brain’, bu t that this is false; whatever Hberals may claim, ‘in  fact reasons 
always com e from  somewhere, and the somewhere they com e from  is precisely the realm 
to which they are (rhetoricaUy) opposed, the realm o f particular (angled, partisan, biased) 
assum ptions and agendas’.^ ^
Fish considers the grounds on which people are supposed to  p u t aside their interests and 
come together in search o f agreement; that is, why they should be prepared to  pu t the 
right over the good. H e concludes there are only two reasons for them  to do so: a 
pragmatic or prudential calculation that one wiU benefit from  such an arrangement, or 
because one holds it to  be o f  m oral value. Fish notes that prudential calculations are 
anathem a to  m ost Hberals. H e argues that the only alternative is that one should pu t aside 
one’s interests because one beHeves that it is the right thing to  do. H e concludes that in 
this case, one is clearly acting out one’s own view o f  the good: if  one did no t beHeve it 
was good to  pu t aside one’s interests in this way, why w ould one do it? T o  assert that in 
doing so one is no t advancing a particular understanding o f  the good is therefore false. 
As Fish puts it.
I t  makes no  sense to  set aside som e o f  your behefs unless in  doing so you
are affiim ing another o f  your behefs as higher. D eferring to  a higher
59 Fish, There’s no such thing as free speech^  p. 135.
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order impartiality is n o t to  constrain or bracket ow n beliefs” but to
enact them; it is to  testify to the truth, as you see it/°
Fish continues that liberals overlook the significance o f  setting aside particular views o f 
the good (the exception, o f  course, being their own) by trivialising those views. Religious 
beliefs are, he says, pushed — quarantined — to the private sphere, and are treated as a 
m atter o f  private concern, and certainly no t som ething that ought to  im pact upon 
political decision-making. In  this way religious beliefs are held to  be ‘partial’ or ‘special’, 
in contrast to  the ‘generality’ that is required by liberalism. But in so doing, it 
m isrepresents the seriousness o f  those beliefs, the holders o f  which do n o t treat them  as 
partial or special, bu t as true.
Rorty’s m ost sustained discussion o f  leaving com prehensive views outside o f public 
debate is his discussion o f  religion, in a consideration o f  Stephen L. Carter’s book The 
Culture o f Disbelief: How American Taw and Politics Trimali^e Religious D evotionf As its title 
indicates. Carter’s argum ent is that w hat Rorty calls the Jeffersonian com prom ise o f 
privatising religious belief leads, as Fish argues, to  the ttiviahzation o f  those beliefs. 
Rorty’s response is to  deny the central claim o f  this argum ent, namely that privatisation 
entails trivialization, by denying that the non-political is necessarily trivial. ‘The search for 
private perfection, pursued by theists and atheists alike, is neither trivial nor, in  a 
pluralistic democracy, relevant to  public poUcy’.^  ^ This is itself however highly 
controversial. For m any theists, Rorty’s proposal to  make it a m atter o f  private perfection
•50 Fish, The Trouble With Principle^  p. 182.
Stephen L. Carter, The Culture of Disbelif: How American Taw and Politics Triviali:^ Religious 
Devotion (New York Basic Books, 1993). Interestingly, Fish discusses this book, concluding that 
in the end, Carter shows himself to be a liberal by accepting the partitioning o f the public and 
private, and thus acquiescences in the ttivialisation of religion. Fish, The Trouble With Principle^  pp. 
254-257.
2^ Rorty, Philosophj and Social Hope, p. 170.
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is m ost emphatically to  trivialize it.*^  ^ Rorty^s response, that privatisation is no t the same 
as trivialization, may be correct for som e Christians, bu t no t all; and indeed for this very 
reason it becom es doubly controversial since it reflects a particular vision o f  
Christianity/'* Rorty writes that the Jeffersonian comprise is a reasonable one ‘to atheists 
Hke m e’,*^  ^ responding to  the picture Carter paints o f  the bias against theism  in American 
legal and political discussion by noting that in  fact it is atheists w ho are discriminated 
against, evidenced for example by the fact that atheists cannot stand for public office 
w ithout being disingenuous about their religious views. T hat is however because Rorty 
regards reasonableness in this pragmatic, tolerant, pluralistic, manner.
Is it reasonable though to im pose such measures upon  those w hom  think them  
unreasonable? In  a discussion o f Roe v. Rorty argues that the U.S. Supreme Court
acted wisely and took a suitably pragmatic and consensus-orientated approach to  abortion. 
This may be so, but it says nothing to those who oppose abortion, for many o f w hom  social 
justification and compromise are irrelevant. For them  there is a moral absolute which is not 
negotiable, and Rorty’s view as it stands is insufficiently sensitive to  such absolutes. Thus, in 
contrast to  the objection that Rawls’s notion o f  an ‘overlapping consensus’ mistakenly 
focused on  reasonable doctrines rather that reasonable people,^^ it m ight be said that 
Rorty goes too  far in the other direction, assuming that people, whatever theic religion 
faith, win be willing and able to  pu t aside their views in pursuit o f  com prom ise with 
those w ho do no t share their faith.
See Scott Roulier, ‘Beyond Richard Rorty’s Public: Relegitimizing the Quest for 
Transcendence’, Jourva/ oflnterdisciplinaiy Studies 9 (1997), pp. 19 — 38.
64 Ian Shapiro believes that Rorty’s is a Lutheran view of the relationship between man and God. 
Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 39.
65 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 169.
66 It is, Barry rightly responds, people, not doctrines, that go around endorsing things. Barry, 
‘John Rawls and the Search for Stability’, p. 898.
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Fish concludes from  this that ‘liberalism doesn’t exist’, because w hat distinguishes 
Hberalism, ‘its no t being the program  o f any particular group or party’, i s  no t in fact the 
case. This is perhaps a needlessly paradoxical way o f  saying that the liberal task o f finding 
a way for people to  give up their view o f  the good fails if  it rests, explicitly or imphcidy, 
on  the belief that the reason to  do so is itself no t a part o f  one’s view o f  the good.
Together w ith m any critics o f  liberalism. Fish makes great play out o f  exposing the 
inconsistency o f  liberal rhetoric as the search for accom m odation and tolerance, and 
liberal practice o f  excluding non-Uberal forms o f  life, concluding that liberahsm in fact 
reflects a particular form  o f  life. It is unclear however w hether this really marks out an 
inconsistency in  the case o f  Rorty. H e agrees with Carter’s criticisms o f  those liberals 
w ho claim that they alone are entitled to  base their views on  controversial premises. H e 
writes that: ‘T he claim that [in basing our views on  Enlightenm ent philosophy] ... we are 
appealing to  reason, whereas the religious are being irrational, is hokum . Carter is quite 
right to  debunk it’.*^® However, as a political liberal, he seeks to  settle political questions 
no t by reference to  notions such as reason, but by securing consensus. As such he does 
no t claim to be neutral betw een every view o f  the good. W hat Shapiro takes to  be 
‘Rorty’s Lutheran view’ would only be a problem  were Rorty claiming to  be offering a 
neutral account o f  the good. This he does no t do. Rather, he argues, again following 
Rawls, that there are good reasons for keeping religion ou t o f  politics, and that the 
tolerance o f  different beliefs should be enough m otivation for religious groups to accept 
this. T he Jeffersonian com prom ise, he thinks, remains fair, and a reasonable price for 
rehgious liberty. M oreover, such controversy is itself a reason to  set these issues aside 
and focus on  fairness. ExpHcidy accepting this point strengthens, I think, the pragmatic
67 Fish, There’s no such thing as free speech, p. 138.
68 Rorty, Philosophj and Social Hope, p. 172.
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point about the Jeffersonian compromise. T he point o f  privatising religion is that 
religious arguments, together w ith many others, are w hat Rorty calls conversation- 
stoppers. There is nothing to  be said to  the person w ho claims that their views on a 
particular issue follow on  from  their understanding o f  the dictates o f  their faith. It is no t 
clear why the origin o f  one’s convictions is relevant to  public policy, and it for this reason 
that Rorty, following Rawls, suggests putting aside whatever comprehensive doctrines 
gave rise to  that viewpoint, and focus instead on w hat com m on ground (if any) is 
available to  construct a compromise.
It is perhaps misleading to  express this point by reference to  Rawls’s distinction between 
the right and the good, because clearly the right will be inform ed by notions o f  what 
counts as good. Better to distinguish, as Rorty does, betw een one’s view o f  one’s own 
good, and one’s capacity to  be concerned with the public good. As was argued in chapter 
4, this cannot be a ‘firm distinction’, bu t these two concerns are clearly separate. I f  we 
accept this point, then we can respond to  Fish by claiming that he fails to distinguish 
between reasonable views and reasonable people. A lthough one’s beliefs will sometimes 
m ean that we wRl no t be able to  pu t aside one’s personal convictions in  favour o f the 
public good, sometimes we wiU, a possibility that Fish does no t seriously consider. His 
discussion focuses exclusively on  religious fundamentalists and how  liberalism cannot 
deal w ith any degree o f  tolerance with them , but by focusing on this extreme case he 
ignores the greater num ber o f  religious people w ho are able to  com e together with those 
w ho hold different beliefs in an attem pt to  construct fair institutions and laws.
In addition, following Rorty’s view o f  justification as a m atter o f  invidious comparison, it 
is interesting to  note that although political liberahsm is widely criticised, those criticisms 
typically are n o t m atched by well worked out alternatives. Carter, though he goes into
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detail about the unfairness o f  the exclusion o f religious conviction from  public debate, 
gives no alternative; he does not, importantly, say w hat it w ould m ean to  afford rehgious 
convictions a greater status by virtue o f their status as rehgious convictions. N either does 
Fish and, as Rorty points out. Fish’s own convictions seem  entirely hberal.^^ Fish says that 
the partiahty o f  hberahsm is hidden behind its claims to  neutrahty, justified by reason, but 
that in fact, since these reasons are partial, hberahsm is just another ideology. However, he 
him self identifies significant differences betw een hberahsm  and som e o f  its critics, 
namely the way it treats those opponents, and how  far the bounds o f  its toleration can 
extend. These latter, as Fish sometimes accepts, are far w ider than in  m ost non-hberal 
states. T he core o f  Rorty’s position, the one that I take to  be the point o f  Barry’s claim 
that hberahsm is ‘fair’, is that there is no  fairer or m ore just alternative, given the 
circumstances o f  m odem  plural societies, characterised by a plurahty o f  individual and 
coUective goods and ways o f  hfe.
12^ Modus vivendi as the successor to po litica l liberalism
Such a defence o f  hberahsm has led to  Rorty being rebuked for ‘hberal self-satisfaction’.^ ° 
This can in tu rn  been seen as criticism o f hberahsm m ore generahy: the claim that 
hberahsm  is fairest given the facts o f  plurahsm, and the failure o f  any apparent 
alternatives, has m eant that hberahsm  has been criticized for w hat Ronald Beiner regards 
as ‘hberal complacency’.^ ’ Rorty’s response to  such claims would, I take it, be to  ask such 
critics to  offer a better alternative to  address the plurahsm  o f  m odem  societies. As I have 
suggested. Fish and others fail to  offer altematives to  the hberahsm  they criticise.
69 Richard Rorty, ‘Aristotle Had it Right’, The New Ijeader, December 13 — 27,1999, pp. 5 — 6 at 6.
70 Bilhg, ‘National and Richard Rorty’, p. 70.
71 Ronald, Beiner, ‘Richard Rorty’s Liberahsm’, Critical Review 7 (1993), pp. 15 — 31 at 20.
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However, an im portant alternative has been suggested, which is no t only responsive to  
the facts o f  pluralism but which seeks to  take them  m ore seriously. This is Jo h n  Gray’s 
proposal for a return to  the original form  (or ‘face’) o f  liberalism, the pursuit o f  ‘term s o f 
coexistence among different ways o f  life’.^ ^
Gray would, I think, agree with many o f  Fish’s points, bu t he takes up the view that 
liberalism proposes a false neutrality in a different way by focusing on the idea o f  value 
pluralism. For him, liberals assume the value o f  individual liberty, ignoring or 
downplaying im portant alternatives. A lthough political Hberahsm claims to  take as its 
starting point the fact o f  plurahsm, it fails to  take that fact seriously. T o  do so would. 
Gray argues, be to  address the needs and concerns no t o f individuals bu t the plurahty o f 
communities and ways o f  hfe. H e writes: ‘The variety o f value-plurahsm that is m ost 
sahent in  the context o f  the world today is no t o f  this diluted and individuahstic variety, 
bu t arises from  the plurahty o f  whole ways o f  hfe, w ith their associated m orahties and 
often exclusionary allegiances’.^  ^ Genuinely to  recognise and accept this plurahty is to  
accept that the ‘hberal project’,^  ^o f  seeking a universal consensus on values, fails. Liberal 
principles reflect a way o f  hfe which affords priority to  individuals to  form  and pursue 
their own ends, but Gray argues that sometimes other interests, such as the preservation 
o f  social stabihty, m ust be aUowed to  take priority.
Liberals are said to mistakenly elevate theit own notion o f  the good (re-describing it as 
the right) which was born  o f  a particular time and place, and iUegitimately claim that it is 
vahd for ah forms o f hfe. The hberal view that individual rights stand over any particular 
form  o f  hfe is however a chimera, since they are as m uch the product of, and bound  up
■^2 John Gray, Tm  Faces of Liberalism (Cambridge: Pohty, 2000), p. 33.
'^ 3 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p. 136.
Gray, Tm  Faces of Liberalism, p. 25; Fish uses the same term in The Trouble With Principle, p. 175.
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with, forms o f  life as any other value, and make sense only within those forms. I f  liberal 
rights are n o t valued by a particular community, or if  they are held to  be o f  less value 
than some other com peting value, then  liberals cannot legitimately object to  their being 
set aside to  m ake way for altematives. Liberals should. Gray argues, renounce the 
pretension o f  liberalism as containing any historical or m oral privileges at all. The task for 
those w ho appreciate this is ‘to  go further along the path  that Rorty has opened up’ by 
examining the conditions required for a modus vivendi betw een different forms o f  Hfe, one 
in  which Hberahsm is bu t one am ong m any other equaUy legitimate forms,^^
Gray thinks that Hberahsm misrepresents the fact o f  plurahsm  by focusing on  plurahsm 
o f  individual hum an projects rather than betw een forms o f  hfe. T he notion o f  a ‘form  o f 
hfe’ is however ambiguous. I f  we are to  take w ith appropriate seriousness the idea that, as 
Gray points out, m any people today belong to  m ore than one form  o f  hfe,^ *^  a case can be 
m ade for individual freedoms o f  the sort that hberals favour. H e writes that the tru th  o f  
strong value plurahsm  ‘subverts hberal morahties that accord a unique primacy to  some 
good, such as negative hberty or personal autonom y’,^  Negative hberty is however no t 
merely a good, bu t is also the means o f  choosing betw een goods. Thus, we can agree that 
ways o f hfe give m eaning to  individual hves, whilst recognising that in a world o f  plural 
ways o f  life, hberty is n o t just another value, bu t is one that is necessary to  aUow for a 
degree o f freedom  to  chose betw een different forms.
■75 Gray, Endgames^  p, 60,
Gray, T m  Faces of Liberalism, p, 1,
77 John Gray, ‘Where Plurahsts and Liberals Part Company’, in Maria Baghramian and Attracta 
Ingram (eds,) Pluralism: the Philosophy and Politics of Diversity (London: Routiedge, 2000), pp, 85 — 
102 at 87,
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D espite erroneous criticisms to  the contrary^®, Gray does no t claim that ways o f life 
cannot be compared; his point is rather that there is no  uniquely rational way o f  so doing: 
‘They can be com pared endlessly — but they cannot be com pared with one another in 
overall value’ Thus we can, for example, ‘judge the life o f  a crack addict to  be a poorer 
hum an Hfe than that or either a carer in a leprosarium or judicious bon viveur w ithout 
being able to  rank the carer’s against the hedonist’s.’®^ I f  this is so, then a degree o f 
individual Hberty becomes a pre-requisite for any hum an Hfe in which such choices are 
available. This is I think especiaUy the case if, Hke Gray, we hold strong value plurahsm to 
be true. Rorty has recently argued for a form  o f  strong value plurahsm in  a defence o f 
w hat he caUs ‘polytheism ’, the view that ‘there is no  actual or possible object o f 
knowledge that w ould perm it you to  com m ensurate and rank aU hum an needs’.®^ I f  he 
and Gray are correct, and there is no  uniquely rational or best way to  choose between, 
for example, the Hfe o f  carer and that o f the bon viveur, then it can be argued that it should 
faU to  individuals to  make such choices for themselves.
W e m ight then  say that only if  people are wedded to  a single way o f  Hfe is it legitimate to  
claim that individual Hberty is o f  lesser im portance than for example social stabihty. But 
there is a further point, which is that individuals ought to have the freedom  to express 
(or withhold) such identification. As Rorty puts it in respect to  the call for the 
preservation o f  ‘cultural identity’.
The value o f  free discussion o f  possible changes by participants in  a
culture should always take precedence over the value o f  preserving
Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 265.
79 Gray, Tm  Faces of Liberalism, pp. 41 — 42.
80 Gray, ‘Where Plurahsts and Liberals Part Company’, p. 94.
81 Rorty, ‘Pragmatism and Romantic Polytheism’, p. 23. Elsewhere, he calls this position 
‘philosophical plurahsm’. Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 268. I wiU take up Rorty’s discussion 
of incommensurabihty in chapter 7.
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cultural identity. W ithout such discussion, nobody will ever know which 
cultural traditions are excuses for the strong to  oppress the weak and 
which are traditions that even the weak would, given the option, prefer to  
preserve,®^
T o  support his claim for the im portance o f individual liberties, Rorty suggests that 
people prefer such liberties whenever they are given the choice in the matter. H e argues that 
countries that have experienced liberal rights and freedoms have liked them  and sought to 
maintain them. *No country has tried them  and willingly given them  up, any m ore than any 
patient whose headaches have been relieved by aspirin has ever decided to cease using it’.®^ 
G iven free choice, people hke, am ong other things, freedom  o f  speech, to  w orship (or 
not) the reUgion o f  one’s choice, and freedom  o f  participation in  the social and pohtical 
activities o f  one’s own choosing.
G ray argues that values, and therefore principles, are the product o f  particular form s o f 
hfe, and cannot claim validity beyond the cultures that have com e to value them . This 
apphes centrally to  the hberal notion o f  individual rights. Gray objects for example to  the 
classical hberal notion o f  negative hberty that ‘its content is radically indeterm inate’.®^^ 
Liberal rights, hke any other value, only make sense within the context o f  a particular set 
o f  practices. Communities have definite views about the good Hfe, and will by definition, 
and contrary to  the claims o f  hberal theory, n o t be neutral w ith respect to  the good.
82 Richard Rorty, ‘The Communitarian Impulse’, Colorado College Studies 32 (1999), pp. 55 — 61 at 
60.
83 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Randall Peerenboom’, Philosophy East and West 50.1 (2000), pp. 90 
-  91 at 90.
84 John Gray, Beyond the New PJght: Markets, Government and the Common Environment (London: 
Routledge. 1993), p. 78.
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Thus, as he writes: ‘The right can never be prior to the good. W ithout the content that 
can be given it only by a conception o f  the good, the right is empty.
W ith all o f  this, I think Rorty can agree. As we have seen, he certainly dismisses the idea 
that values exist independently o f  hum an practices; Hke principles, they are summaries o f 
contingent practices, and take on substance against a background o f  such practices. So he 
w ould agree w ith Gray’s view that values are ‘radically indeterm inate’, insofar as this 
m eans they take on substance only in  the context o f  practice. In  asserting the priority o f 
democracy to  philosophy, and the need for a poHtical Hberahsm which recognises 
nothing over and above free agreement, he would object to  the idea that principles, even 
Hberal principles, stand apart from  practice. This is to  say that he does no t hold to  the 
view that rights, in  Ronald D w orkin’s term, ‘trum p’ every o ther consideration, since 
rights are no t free standing, existing outside o f  pubHc debate; he  writes for example that 
in the ideal Hberal society, one o f  the questions o f discussion in pubHc affairs wHl 
concern ‘how  to  balance the needs for peace, wealth, and freedom  w hen conditions 
require that one o f  these goals be sacrificed to  one o f  the others’.®^ This however requires 
that pubHc discussion be free and open, som ething that is secured no t by reading o ff a 
determ inate Hst o f  Hberal freedoms that som ehow stands apart from  practice (a view 
which Gray criticizes as ‘legaHsm’), bu t by the sort o f  concrete freedoms and 
opportunities that Rorty takes to  be provided by Hberal poHties: freedom  o f  the press, 
free universities, etc.
I f  there is a single form  o f  Hfe that Hberals are said to value above all others, it is the 
autonom ous Hfe, which is further said to  be held to be o f universal value. Liberahsm is
85 Gray, Tm  Faces ofUberalism, p. 19.
86 Rorty, Contingence, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 85.
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thus held to  inflate one particular virtue, that o f  the self-chosen, autonom ous Hfe, to the 
level o f  the universal condition; it m ight for example be objected to  my claim (on page 
167) that Hberahsm is no t prem ised on a view o f  the ultimate source o f  value that this is 
contradicted by the Hberal beHef in  free and equal hum an beings. This point is taken up 
in reference to  Rorty by Jonny Steinberg, w ho argues that Rorty’s account contains its 
own, very thick, view o f  the good,*^ Rorty’s Hberahsm depends, he says, on  a view that aU 
hum an Hfe should be one o f  self-creation, a view which Steinberg counters by asserting 
that there is no  reason to  think this is so.
This criticism rests, I suggest, on running together the notion o f  the autonom ous Hfe as 
one that is universaHy valuable, and the concern to  provide space for those w ho wish to  
turn away from  the precepts and practices o f  the form  o f  Hfe to  which they belong. For 
Rorty, the Hberal poHty can help make people autonom ous by providing the material 
conditions (peace, education, security, leisure) to  enable m ore and m ore people to strive 
for it. But autonom y is no t a condition that he thinks the state should enforce. ‘The 
desire to be autonom ous is’, he writes, ‘no t relevant to  the Hberal’s desire to  avoid cruelty 
and pain’.®® H e thus distinguishes between m aking people autonom ous, and providing 
the conditions in which they can becom e autonom ous if  they so wish, arguing that while 
only a few wHl ever seek an autonom ous Hfe, the option should be available. W riting o f 
Alasdair M acIntyre’s dismissive view o f  the character-types brought about by Hberal 
democracy, Rorty responds by saying:
I w ould welcome a culture dom inated by [in M acIntyre’s phrase] “the
Rich Aesthete, the Manager, and the Therapist” so long as everybo(^ w ho
87 Steinberg writes that ‘There is a thick, value-laden anthropology at the bottom of Rorty’s 
HberaHsm’. Steinberg, Post-Enlightenment Philosophj and UberalUniversalism, p. 193.
88 Rorty, Contingenj, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 65.
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wants to  gets to  be an aesthete (and, if  no t rich, as com fortably o ff as 
m ost — as rich as the Managers can manage, guided by Rawls’s D ifference 
Principle).
This is however no t to  say that the autonom ous life is one which each individual should 
want. Rorty writes that one o f  the aims o f  the ideal Hberal society is to  ‘equalize 
opportunities for self-creation and then  leave people alone to  use, or neglect, their 
opportunities’.^ ® Clearly, Hberal institutions help foster the conditions which afford 
people the freedoms and opportunities to  seek autonom y, bu t it is no t part o f  the state’s 
role to  make them  autonom ous, for example by com pulsory inculcation o f  autonomy.®^
Steinberg gives his claim an interesting twist, first because unHke m ost com m entators he 
thinks Rorty a ‘Hberal universaHst’,^  ^ bu t also because he thinks the Hberal com m itm ent 
to  autonom y depends upon  an AristoteHan functionaHst account o f  hum an capacities. 
Steinberg writes that Rorty’s ‘com m itm ent to  Hberal forms o f  Hfe is anim ated — despite 
his claims to  the contrary — by a revised conception o f  A ristode’s eudaimonia, com bined 
w ith a Rom antic thesis on  \si^ the irreducibiHty o f  each hum an individual’.^  ^However, he 
does no t specify in  detail w hat he m eans by describing Rorty’s view as an AristoteHan 
one. T he idea that there are ends for hum ans qua hum an that are determ ined by reason 
or nature are, for reasons given throughout the present thesis, ones that Rorty 
emphaticaUy rejects. T he point o f  Hberal institutions is that they assume that individual
89 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 159, emphasis in original.
90 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 85, emphasis added.
91 An idea that Brian Barry notes is strange to the point of contradiction. Barry, Culture and 
Equality, p. 120. Barry is clear that liberals are not committed to the attempt to eradicate all 
traditional ways o f Hfe in order to further some ideal o f free-floating personal autonomy’. Ibid., p. 
66 .
92 See chapter 8.
93 Steinberg, Post-Enlightenment Philosophy and Liberal Universalism, p. 3.
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purposes are multifarious, and thus seek to  allow for co-existence between holders o f 
different views o f  the good.
Returning to  Gray, he presents his proposal for a modus vivendi as continuing dow n the 
path that Rorty has opened up. In  his paper ‘W here Plurahsts and Liberals Part 
Com pany’, he argues that ‘The fact o f  reasonable divergencies in judgem ents o f  the 
relative im portance o f  the various ingredients o f  the hum an good underm ines aU Hberal 
m orahties’.^ '^  But, as he says in  the m ore recent T m  Faces o f Uberalism^ this is n o t always 
the case. I f  individuals belong to  m any different ways o f  Hfe, and if  there is indeed no 
uniquely rational way to  choose between them , then individual Hberty in this non­
perfectionist sense is, I suggest, som ething that Gray is in  fact as com m itted to  as Rorty. 
Gray should, I think, be happy with this similarity if  it is seen, further, that Hberahsm 
does no t entail autonomy, and that it is, as Rorty accepts, ‘merely one form  o f  Hfe am ong 
others’.^ ® Rorty also claims that it is nevertheless ‘the best form  o f  pohtical Hfe yet 
invented’. Gray would probably object to  the ‘American chauvinism ’^  ^ exhibited in  this 
claim but, given that Hberahsm ahows for the im portance o f  individual choice in  a world 
marked by people w ho belong, as he says, to  many different form s o f Hfe, many o f  which 
are in turn  incom mensurable, he should not, I suggest, dem ure from  the substance o f 
Rorty’s claim.
In  sum, in this chapter I have sought to explain and defend Rorty’s view o f  pohtical 
Hberahsm. I argued first against the widespread view that Rorty abandons any notion  o f  
justification. This view is a mistaken inference from  two premises that Rorty does hold, 
first that justification is necessarily relative to  an audience, and second that active
Gray, ‘Where Plurahsts and Liberals Part Company*, p. 98.
95 Rorty, Truth, Politics, and ‘Post-Modernism” p. 49; quoting Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p. 177.
96 Rorty, Truth, Politics, and ‘Post-Modernism”, p. 48.
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justification is only tequired w hen our beliefs and practices are called into question 
through reasonable challenge. These have seemed to  m any to  m ean that Rorty either 
abandons justification in its entirety, or reduces it to  a m atter o f  asserting ‘that’s the way 
we do things around here’. Both claims are mistaken. Far from  abandoning justification, 
the practices o f  reason-giving and seeking justification am ongst one’s peers are central 
for Rorty, bu t it is, as is consistent with his ‘anti-authoritarianism ’, solely a m atter o f  
securing the consensus o f  a comm unity o f  inquirers. T he chapter then argued that 
Rorty’s defence o f  political liberalism is similarly contexmal. Liberalism provides a way o f  
adjudicating betw een and accom m odating holders o f  different conceptions o f  the good 
in a way that can be said to  be fair. Liberahsm can be defended by invidious com parison, 
by pointing ou t that hberahsm  has so far been better a t such accom m odation than any 
other form  o f  hfe. In  this way, Rorty joins with other hberals, and his position differs 
from  theirs only to  the extent that he is prepared to  recognise the particular, 
ethnocentric, origin o f  hberahsm. This last claim impacts, as we wih see in  chapter 6, on  
Rorty’s view o f  the role and purpose o f  pohtical theory.
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Chapter Six
Interptetatinn and political theory
I t was argued in  chapter 5 that justification is im portant for Rorty, but in particular contexts 
in response to particular challenges and by reference to  particular needs and values. It was 
then argued that Rorty thinks that liberalism can be justified pragmatically, by showing that it 
is the fairest way to bring people together who hold diverse views o f the good hfe. In  this 
chapter, pohtical hberahsm is taken up in a discussion o f the task o f the pohtical theorist. For 
Rorty, pohtical theorists ought to be concerned not with justifying hberal democracy, but 
rather with an articulation o f the practice o f hberal societies. The task for the theorist is an 
interpretive one, in which the theorist draws attention to  the ways in which the practices of 
those societies fail to hve up to their self-image. In  this chapter this approach is defended 
against two objections. The first is that it is ineffective. Richard J. Bernstein for example 
argues that Rorty’s account cannot help us choose between two incompatible but consistent 
interpretations o f  hberal principles. It is argued that this view is mistaken, showing how for 
Rorty, pohtical theory is inescapably creative. The second objection is that it does not aUow 
for meaningful criticism o f current practices. Rorty claims that an ironic culture could be 
‘every bit as self critical and every bit as devoted to human equahty as our own famihar, and 
stiU metaphysical, hberal culture — if  no t more so’.^  Christopher Norris however denies this 
wUl be the case, writing o f ‘Rorty’s conservative hberahsm’ which has ruled out any
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 87.
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possibility o f  rationalist, or radical, critique o f the self-image o f  the day / Against this view, it 
is argued that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism does not, as has been suggested in previous 
chapters, entail uncritical or unreflective endorsement o f current values and practices. 
Finally, Rorty’s view o f political theory is compared with Michael Walzer’s account o f 
‘internal social criticism’. Walzer’s account suggests that social critics should draw on the 
‘shared understandings’ o f their societies in  order to suggest reform  and improvement, a 
position which is very similar to Rorty’s view. Walzer however presents his account as an 
alternative to liberal political thought. Against this understanding, I argue that Rorty is 
correct to see this account as similar to that of, amongst others, John  Rawls, and that 
Walzer’s approach is not an alternative to Rawls’s but is substantially the same.
13. Liberalism, interpretivism, and creativity
13.1 Interpretation and creation
Justification for Rorty is not a m atter o f justifying ourselves from first principles, but rather 
one o f reason giving amongst people who already inhabit what Bernard Williams calls the 
‘moral world’. Consistent with this position, Rorty sees the task o f political theorists in 
liberal societies as not to justify Hberahsm from the ground up, but to draw attention to 
failures o f Hberal societies to Hve up to Hberal ideals. Liberals should protest ‘in the name o f
2 Christopher Norris, The Contest of ¥  acuities: Philosophy and Theoiy Jifter Deconstruction (London: 
Methuen, 1985), p. 153.
188
society itself against those aspects o f the society which are unfaithful to its own self-image'/ 
Liberal philosophers can do this by, for example, summarizing intuitions about the right 
thing to do as general principles, and then applying these principles to criticise the practice 
o f  liberal societies. W hat they cannot do is show that these generalisations can be shown to 
be true independently o f our particular intuitions.
Although Rorty's principal philosophical heroes are John  Dewey and D onald Davidson, 
John  Rawls is a significant influence on his political writings. Rorty views A. Theory of Justice, 
with its emphasis on the importance o f ‘reflective equilibrium’, as marking a major break 
away from the epistemological concerns o f moral philosophy. For Rorty, ‘Rawls’s willingness 
to adopt “reflective equilibrium” rather than “conceptual analysis” as a methodological 
watchword sets him apart from the epistemologically orientated moral philosophy that was 
dominant prior to the appearance o f A  Theory of Justice’.^  Reflective equilibrium is hoHst. 
There is no ‘natural order or reasons’ for conversation to follow, necessary truths to be 
identified or respected, or intrinsic nature o f the self or hum an nature to be taken into 
account in decision-making. It makes no reference to epistemological notions such as 
necessary truths or privileged representations, emphasising instead the views o f individuals.
Like Rorty, Rawls rejects the idea o f deriving principles o f justice from  self-evident 
principles. As he puts it, a ‘conception o f justice cannot be deduced from self-evident 
premises or conditions on principles; instead, its justification is a m atter o f the mutual
3 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 60. See also Richard Rorty, ‘Human Rights, Rationality, and 
Sentimentality’, in Rorty, Truth and Progress, pp. 167 — 185.
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 186 n. 29.
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support o f many considerations, o f everything fitting together into one coherent view '/ This 
process o f  securing coherence is obtained through reflective equilibrium, in which different 
moral beliefs are tested against each other, intuitions tested against principles and conversely, 
revising them  in order to secure coherence. Rawls speaks o f ‘going back and forth, 
sometimes altering the conditions o f the contractual circumstances, at others withdrawing 
our judgements and conforming them  to principle’.^  Those intuitions are themselves open to 
challenge and revision, but not by reference to necessary principles that stand behind 
particular intuitions.’ The task for the liberal theorist is to show up the difference between 
professed belief and practice, and to draw on the one to reform  the other. Similarly, for 
Rorty, ‘political theory should view itself as suggestions for future action emerging out o f 
recent historical experience’.® Progress is secured by playing parts o f a tradition off against 
other parts, not seeking to overcome that traditional as a whole.
There is however an ambiguity as to exactly what liberal convictions and intuitions are, and 
questions to be asked about the claim that they are central to W estern culture. Standards o f 
w orth are provided by our, liberal, standards, but what happens if  two incompatible but 
equally consistent interpretations o f those standards can be given? For Richard Bernstein, 
Rorty ‘ignores the historical fact that we are confronted with conflicting and incompatible
5 John R aw ls,^ Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 21.
 ^Ihid., p. 20.
7 David Owen has distinguished Rorty’s political liheralism, which Owen believes grows out of the 
shared understandings of a particular community, fiom that of Rawls, which is said to he a response 
to pluralism. Owen, Nietr^ sche, Politics and Modernity: A  Critique of Liberal Keason (London: Sage 
Publications, 1995), p. 7. Although Owen takes these to be two separate accounts of political 
liberalism, I wül suggest below that they both grow out of same concern, namely to articulate a 
notion of freedom and toleration that grows out of, and can deal fairly with, the fact of pluralism.
* Rorty, Philosoply and Social Hope, p. 272.
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practices — even in so-called Hberal dem ocracy'/ Rorty is further held to pass over im portant 
differences between Hberal theorists. Bernstein goes on to  argue that Rorty is concerned 
exclusively with the foundations o f  HberaHsm, and passes over the many diverse and 
sometimes incompatible Hberal positions on specific substantive issues: ‘Rorty simply speaks 
globaUy about “Hberal democracy” without ever unpacking what it involves or doing justice 
to the enormous historical controversy about what Hberal democracy is or ought to be’.^ ° 
Given this bHnd spot, Rorty’s approach is, Bernstein claims, ineffective since it does not 
point in any particular direction. This point is given specific content by Ian Shapiro, who 
chides Rorty for his claim that America betrayed its highest ideals by fighting the Vietnam 
war, since, he argues, a plausible case could be made in Rorty’s own terms for saying those 
ideals required the war to be fought and won.^^ By denying that any description is any truer 
than any other, Rorty seems to offer nothing but an endless series o f accounts, w ith no way 
to judge their respective value.
There is however a potenfiaHy more fundamental difficulty for Rorty, for no t only is there a 
question o f the form o f HberaHsm to which Rorty subscribes, but there is also the question 
o f whether his account leads to HberaHsm at aU. This point has been urged against Hberals in 
general by John  Gray, who draws attention to the difference between the hegemony 
HberaHsm has secured within academia, and its irrelevance beyond. M atthew Festenstein 
concurs, to the extent that he beHeves that ‘it is not clear what values or principles constitute
9 Bernstein, The New Constellation, p. 241, emphasis in original.
10 Ibid., p. 238.
11 Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 45.
12 See in particular Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake.
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the liberalism he [Rorty] wishes to defend, or why any particular set o f values should be seen 
as an appropriate interpretation o f “N orth  Adanric” intuitions’.^ ^
This latter point can, I think, be addressed fairly briefly. Rorty is clear that the values and 
principles that he takes to characterise the pubHc culture o f  the Hberal democracies are 
contested, and is emphatic that he is engaging in a creative enterprise w hen drawing on the 
ideals latent in m odem  society. He writes:
Stories about what a nation has been and should try to be are not attempts at 
accurate representation, but rather attempts to forge a moral identity. The 
argument between Left and Right about which episodes in our history we 
Americans should pride ourselves on wtil never be a contest between a true 
and a false account o f our country’s history and its identity. It is better 
described as an argument about which hopes to allow ourselves and which to 
forgo.
He recognises that ‘shared understandings’ do not exclusively underwrite HberaHsm, and that 
different and conflicting stories can be told using the resources provided by tradition. He is also 
clear that values and practices form the background to our Hves, but that they do not do so 
in any deterministic way. Konstantin Kolenda is somewhat misleading when he writes that
Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory, pp. 128 — 129. See also Glen Newey, After Politics: the 
rejection of politics in contemporay liberal philosophy (New York: Palgrave, 2000), p. 191. Critics have 
similarly suggested that Walzer uses Western Hberal shared understandings rather than as he claims 
North American ones. See Joseph Carens, ‘Complex Justice, Cultural Difference, and PoHtical 
Community’, in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.) Pluralism, Justice, and 'Equatity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), pp. 45 — 66.
PorXy, Achieving Our Country, pp. 13 — 14.
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for Rorty, ‘attempts to decide what one ought to do m ust start with the awareness o f the 
beliefs, ideals and guidelines embedded in [one’s] tradition’,^  ^ for awareness o f the beliefs, 
ideals and guidelines embedded in one’s tradition is no t for many people a conscious 
process/'^ Kolenda’s implicit assumption, that there is an exhaustive, agreed upon set o f such 
things which is readily and fully articulated, is one that Rorty regards as false: he writes that a 
‘perfected society wiU not live up to a pre-existent standard, but wül be an artistic 
achievement, produced by the same long and difficult process o f  trial and error as is required 
by any other creative effort’/^ He can therefore agree with Shapiro that it is consistent with 
American values to claim that America should have fought the Vietnam War, and that that is 
why there needs to be a creative, interpretive enterprise that seek to use these traditions in order 
to make the best o f them. A similar response can be offered to Festenstein: there is no clear and 
unambiguous set o f values or principles that constitute American liberalism, and the purpose o f 
writing is to commend some of them over others.
13.2 Contested interpretations: liberalism  versus multiculturalism
Turning to the issue o f divergent traditions mthin liberalism, if  we follow Rorty and view the 
task o f the political theorist to be to make the practice o f liberal society cohere better with its 
principles, one might say that he has nothing m uch to teU us, since current debates about
15 Konstantin Kolenda, Humanistic Pragmatism: Philosophy Democratised. (Tampa: University of
South Florida Press, 1990), p. 45.
15 In saying this, Rorty makes a different claim to both Michael Oakeshott and Alasdair MacIntyre, 
both of who write of the need to learn morality in a form of apprenticeship. Alasdair MacIntyre, 
Three Pdval Versions of Moral Hnquiry (London: Duckworth, 1990), pp. 60 — 66; in the essay ‘Political 
education’ Oakeshott argues that we have to be acculturated and educated into a tradition. Michael 
Oakeshott, Rationalism in Politics and other essays (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1991), pp. 43 — 69.
1”^ Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 270.
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multiculturalism demonstrate that at least two very different interpretations can plausibly be 
given o f Hberal principles. WHl KymHcka and James TuUy are both  interesting in this regard 
because, unHke for example Iris Marion Young, they both  claim to be Hberals. I f  they are 
correct to say this, it means that on Rorty’s own account there is a pluraHty o f  interpretations 
o f a community, and therefore an im portant — and, insofar as Rorty’s discussion focuses at 
the level o f ‘we Hberals’, unanswered — question o f how it is possible to decide between these 
competing conceptions o f HberaHsm.
Several commentators have asked Rorty to provide greater substance to his own 
understanding o f HberaHsm, in particular as to what counts as the cmelty to which Hberals 
are opposed. Rorty is reluctant to do so because, as I have suggested in chapter 2, his 
concern is to  leave open what counts as cmelty. However, we might suggest that he could 
give a thicker or richer description o f Hberahsm if  he drew on the values that he takes to 
characterise W estern societies. In  so doing, he might be able to go on to say, with for 
example Brian Barry, that multiculturaHsts Hke TuUy and KymHcka, despite their claims, are 
not in fact Hberals.
However, this approach would be unsatisfactory. For not only do both  KymHcka and TuUy 
claim to be Hberals, but claim that by seeking legal recognition for cultural identity, they are 
being tm e to Hberahsm in a world marked by cultural diversity. In  TuUy’s words, their 
arguments are premised on ‘a third-generation norm  o f legitimacy, respect for reasonable 
cultural diversity, which needs to be considered on a par with the norms o f freedom and
Barry declares that KymHcka, Hke Walzer, ‘is quite clearly not a Hberal’. Barry, Culture and Equality, 
p. 137.
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equality, and so to modify policies o f “free and equal treatm ent” accordingly.’^  ^ Kymlicka 
believes that multiculturalism is now central to liberal discourse, and that what he calls 
‘liberal culturahsm’ has become so dominant in the field that ‘m ost debates are about how to 
develop and refine the liberal culturalist position, rather than to accept it in the first place’.^ ° 
I f  true, he could go on to claim, with some justification, that he, not Barry, has the stronger 
claim to be a liberal.
Against the sometimes acrimonious exchange between liberals and multiculturaHsts, Rorty’s 
cathoHc view o f who quaHfies as a Hberal is I think refreshing. I suspect that he would accept 
that Hberal egaHtarianism and Hberal multiculturaHsm can both  fairly be seen as two aspects 
o f a single tradition.^^ He would I think further claim that the difference between them  is a 
matter o f degree, no t o f kind.
O ne way to  support this view is to consider a distinction drawn by Stanley Fish between 
what he calls ‘strong multiculturaHsm’ and ‘boutique multiculturaHsm’. Boutique 
multiculturaHsts value cultural diversity at a superficial level. They may Hke rap music or 
ethnic cuisine, and accept the strength o f opinion on both sides o f the abortion debate. But 
they wiU oppose affirmative action, an Afro-centrist university curriculum, and anti­
abortionists who seek to block the entrance to clinics. That is, ‘the boutique multiculturaHst
TuUy, ‘The IlHberal Liberal’, p. 102.
20 Quoted in Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 6.
21 If he did that, he would not be alone, but would be in agreement with, amongst others. Gray, for 
whom the controversy about multiculturaHsm is a ‘trifling local debate on American national identity 
that has occupied many in the USA’. John Gray, ‘PluraHsm and Toleration in Contemporary PoHtical 
Philosophy’, in Rodney Barker (ed.), Political Ideas and Political Action (Oxford: BlackweU PubHshers, 
2000), pp. 101 — 111 at 103. One does not have to accept this dismissive view of the debate to agree 
with Gray that the debate can seem unimportant, and that the differences between the two sides is 
not as great as it may appear in Anglophone poHtics departments.
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resists the force o f the culture he appreciates at precisely the point at which it matters m ost 
to  its strongly committed members’.^  This is because at bottom , the boutique 
multiculturaHst thinks that cultural identity is superficial, and secondary to the equal value o f 
hum an beings as hum an beings. In  contrast, strong multiculturaHsm, o f  which Charles 
Taylor’s ‘poHtics o f difference’ is said by Fish to be an instance, is multiculturaHsm that 
‘values difference in and for itself rather than as a manifestation o f something m ore basicaUy 
constimtive’.^
However, when faced with a culture that is itself intolerant, such as one whose members 
would kiU Salman Rushdie if  they got the chance, the strong multiculturaHst faces a dilemma: 
either he tolerates the intolerance o f that culture, in  which case he negates tolerance, or he 
condemns it whereupon, Hke the boutique multiculturaHst, he fails to accord it respect at the 
point where it matters most. Fish concludes from this that the difference between these 
forms o f multiculturaHsm is simply one o f degree, because at some point aU multiculturaHsts 
wiU concede the need to stamp out the distinctiveness o f some culture since the alternative, 
o f going aH the way with one culture and aUowing aU o f its intolerances, is similarly to 
endorse intolerance. CharacterisficaHy, he concludes that multiculturaHsm doesn’t exist: as 
the attem pt to recognise and tolerate aU cultures, ‘no one could possibly be a multiculturaHst 
in any interesting and coherent sense’.^ '^
F ish’s discussion is helpful, because it iUustrates that the Hberal-multiculturaHst debate should 
be seen within a broader (though specific) debate about the direction o f pubHc poHcy in the
22 Fish, The Trouble With Principle, p. 57.
23 Ibid., p. 60.
24 Ibid., p. 63, emphasis in original.
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ethnically and culturally diverse liberal democracies. In  the sense o f  recognising 
multiculturalism as a demographic fact, everyone is a multiculturalist. A t some point 
m oreover, everyone stops being a multiculturalist. Taylor for example is emphatic that 
Rushdie should be protected against his would-be killers, and even when, as in  the writings 
o f Chandran Kukathas, multiculturalism is taken to what are for many absurd limits, those 
limits exist. Thus whilst Kukathas accepts that his position ‘leaves many vulnerable people, 
including children, at the mercy o f their groups’ and that ‘a liberal order’ m ust also tolerate 
female genital mutilation and ritual scarring, he denies that ‘parents are entitled to kiU their 
children’.^ ^
Correspondingly, it is not the case that liberal egalitarians oppose all manifestations o f 
multiculturalism. For all his criticisms, Barry allows for a degree o f multiculturalism in a way 
that violates his own claims for universalism. His position is that ‘[l]iberal tolerance 
extends to the internal affairs o f illiberal groups, provided that they stay within the 
framework o f liberal laws. W hat is not up for grabs, however, is that framework itself 
However, he also allows for what he what he calls ‘a pragmatic case for exemptions’, 
permitting Sikhs exemption from motorcycle helmet regulations, and Jewish and Muslim 
butchers from humane slaughter requirements. In  response to the call for consistency in  the 
law by abolishing these anomalies, Barry responds that ‘surely ... it is preferable to give up 
on consistency than abandon the advantages o f the present legislation.’^  ^ In  allowing for
25 Chandran Kukathas, ‘The Life of Brian, or Now for Something Completely Difference-Blind’, in 
Paul Kelly (ed.) Multiculturalism 'Reconsidered: Culture and Equality and it its Critics (Cambridge: Polity, 
2002), pp. 184-203 at 197.
26 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 131.
27 Ibid., p. 51. Barry takes the principled liberal position to be that motorcycle helmet laws ‘mean that 
devout Sikhs have to find an alternative means of transport’. Brian Barry, ‘Political Theory, Old and
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pragmatic exemptions, he tacitly concedes Fish’s point that the real issue is at bottom  not to 
provide a formula that will reconcile aU culturalist claims, but what Taylor calls ‘inspired 
adhoccery’, which Fish glosses as the need ‘to figure out a way for these differences to occupy 
the civic and political space o f this community without coming to b lo w s .B a r ry  thinks such 
pragmatic solutions to be the exception that proves the rule, assuring his readers that they 
m ark ‘not the thick end of the wedge — they are the wedge itse lf However, there is no 
reason to think this, especially if, as he says, the test o f the law is that ‘rescinding the existing 
exemptions would over all do m ore harm than good’.^ ° For what if  granting m ore 
exemptions does more good than harm? M ore generally, it is clear that liberalism does not 
point unambiguously in any one direction. Although Barry sees liberalism and 
multiculturalism as antithetical, other liberals take a different view. Samuel Freeman for 
example sees liberalism as compatible with certain multiculturalist proposals. In  contrast, 
Clare Chambers thinks that by granting tolerance to the internal practices o f illiberal groups, 
Barry in  fact concedes too much to the multiculturaHsts.^^
13.3 The necessity o f  argument
New’, in Robert E. Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (eds.) A  New Handbook of Political Science 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp. 531 — 548 at 540.
28 Fish, The Trouble With Principle, p. 63, emphasis in original.
29 Barry, Culture and ^ .quality, p. 51.
30 Ibid.
31 Samuel Freeman, ‘Liberalism and the Accommodation of Group Claims’ (pp. 18 — 30); Clare 
Chambers, ‘All Must Have Prizes: The Liberal Case for Interference in Cultural Practices (pp. 151 — 
173), in Paul Kelly (ed.) Multiculturalism Peconsidered: Culture and Equality and it its Critics (Cambridge: 
PoHty, 2002).
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This is to say that R o rt/s  claim is not that liberal principles point unambiguously in one 
direction. Both liberals and multiculturalists can be seen legitimately to appeal to the values and 
needs o f their societies. Rorty can therefore agree with Barry when he says that the point is ‘not 
who can claim most o f the tradition but who can claim the best o f  For him as much as for 
Barry, arguments have to be had about how to reform and extend its practices, and about how 
to commend one interpretation over another. Political theory in  Rorty’s formulation is not the 
crude attem pt simply to articulate the ‘reality’ o f a tradition but, as I have said, an 
interpretive, constructive activity, one which involves argument and debate. H e writes that 
‘there is no answer to a redescription save a re-re-redescription. Since there is nothing 
beyond vocabularies which serves as a criterion o f choice between them, criticism is a matter 
o f  looking on this picture and on that, not o f comparing both  pictures with the original’.^ ^
Indeed, it is only if  one held that, by articulating a tradition, one could produce a single 
interpretation would one think otherwise. Thus, Rorty would not regard the following claim, 
made by Michel Rosenfeld, as a criticism. Rosenfeld writes: ‘Assuming that different 
interpretations o f the same law would lead to different practical consequences, can recourse 
to pragmatism determine which o f the available alternatives ought to be pursued?’^ "^ Rorty’s 
response would be to say that o f course it cannot. Pragmatism does not ‘determine’ 
anything; the pursuit o f an algorithm that can be used to resolve such disputes is precisely 
what pragmatism rejects. (Indeed, this latter type o f question is the only one to which Rorty
32 Barry, Ubetty and Justice, p. 18, emphasis in original.
33 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 80.
34 Michel Rosenfeld, ‘Pragmatism, Pluralism and Legal Interpretation: Posner’s and Rorty’s Justice 
without Metaphysics Meets Hate Speech’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) ^rty: Sage Masters of Modem 
Social Thought, volume 4 (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 277 — 294 at 278.
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believes pragmatism has anything to  contribute: he writes that ‘O n  my view, pragmatism 
bites other philosophies, but not sodal problems as such /^
Rorty writes that pragmatists such as himself ‘claim no authority for our premises save the 
assent we hope they will gain from our audience'/^ The way to oppose multiculturalism, and 
the way that he adopts, is argument, to  show that it is o f no help in  securing those goals that 
liberals think important. Stuart E. Rosenbaum seeks to defend Rorty by arguing, in response 
to Bernstein’s claim that we need some way to sort out better and worse arguments, that 
‘There is no way to “hammer out” a better or a worse’.^  ^ This is however a mistake. 
Hammering out, through argument, is precisely what Rorty thinks should be done. In  the 
case o f multiculturalism, it is an argument in which Rorty’s views are m oreover very similar 
to Barry’s. Rorty thinks o f multiculturalism as ‘a morality o f live-and-let-live, a politics o f 
side-by-side development in which members o f distinct cultures preserve and protect their 
own culture against the incursions o f other cultures’.^ ® By way o f alternative, Rorty supports 
Mill’s view o f liberalism as one o f ‘richest diversity’, and claims to follow Walt W hitman in 
seeking competition and argument between different ways o f Hfe. H e denies that liberals 
need concern themselves with ‘identity’ in order to give meaning to individual freedom, and 
rejects the need for a ‘third-generation norm  o f legitimacy o f respect for cultural diversity’ by 
claiming, against writers like TuUy, that cultural questions are quite separate from economic 
questions.^^ Liberals should, Rorty argues, be concerned with human similarities, not cultural 
differences. They should attend to the factors that remain the same cross-culturaUy, such as
35 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 213.
36 Rorty, Philosop}  ^and Social Hope, p. 173.
37 Stuart E. Rosenbaum, ‘Rortian Rationality’, Metaphilosopl:^  17 (1986), pp. 93 — 101 at 98.
38 Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 24.
35 Richard Rorty, Derek Nystrom and Kent Puckett, Against Bosses, Against Oligarchies: A  Conversation 
with Pdchard Rorty (Charlottesville, Va.: Prickly Pear Pamphlets, 1998), p. 44.
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the concern to avoid pain and humiliation, concern for the one’s family, and hopes for the 
future:
These ways o f emphasising commonality rather than difference have little to 
do with “cultural recognition.” They have to do with experiences shared by 
members o f all cultures and all historically epochs, and which remain pretty 
m uch the same despite cultural change."*^
H e believes that multiculturalists conflate ‘ethnidty’ and ‘stigma’, thinking that the way to 
overcome stigma is to ‘recognise’ the cultural identity o f stigmatised groups.^^ This he rejects, 
thinking it sufficient to pursue a politics o f difference-blind individualism, which treats 
others not as members o f a particular culture but as fellow hum an beings. Farid Abdel-Nour 
has criticised Rorty on this point, for what he thinks o f as his failure to engage with ‘the 
other’s alterity’ and his ‘propensity towards other-disregard’.'^  ^As an observation rather than 
a criticism this is correct, for Rorty believes that liberals need pay no heed to the sources o f 
identity. The question though is whether this is a failing. Rorty joins Barry in thinking that 
not only is concern with the recognition o f identity something that has no significance for 
liberal politics, but that it stands in the way o f pursuing social and economic egalitarianism, 
both  by diverting attention away from that concern and by destroying the conditions o f 
solidarity necessary to  support it.'^  ^ Rorty also suggests that the Right benefits by having the
'*0 Richard Rorty, ‘Is “Cultural Recognition” a Useful Concept for Leftist Politics?’. Critical Horizons 
1.1 (2000), pp. 7 -  20 at 11.
Rorty et al. Against Bosses, Against Oligarchs, p. 24.
42 Farid Abdel-Nour, ‘Liberalism and Ethnocentrism’, Journal of Political Philosophy 8 (2000), pp. 207 — 
226 at 221, 224.
43 Barry, Culture and Equality, pp. 71—88, 325.
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Left talk about culture rather than money, since this would detract from the concern with 
egalitarianism.'^
It is then quite consistent with the Rorty’s position to recognise that the debate between 
multiculturalists like TuUy and KymHcka and Hberal egalitarians Hke Barry cannot be finally 
resolved, and to accept further that arguments such as Barry’s (and his own) against 
multiculturalism are not decisive. Political theory, he insists, 'should view itself as 
suggestions for future action emerging out o f recent historical experience, rather than 
attempting to legitimate the outcome o f that experience by reference to something 
ahistorical’.'^  ^Writers like TuUy can plausibly claim to be accommodating pluralism in a more 
consistent way than difference-blind liberal individualism, and puU up both Barry and Rorty 
on this point. W hen Rorty writes that ‘the only homogenization which the liberal tradition 
requires is an agreement among groups to cooperate with one another in support o f 
institutions which are dedicated to providing room  for as much pluralism as possible’,'^ this 
is in substance the same as Barry’s claim (discussed in chapter 5) that UberaUsm is the fairest 
way to adjudicate conflicts. Both deny that we need to see people as engaged in any 
comm on substantive endeavour, or as united in any goal beyond mutual respect for 
potentiaUy very different projects. TuUy can respond though that ‘respect’ in this sense faUs 
to accord proper respect to individuals, and H oni Haber that this position is incompatible 
with pluraUsm because it requires an ‘assimUation o f  othem ess.’'^  ^Conversely, Barry’s central 
point is his conviction that the poUcies o f the multiculturaUsts, both proposed and
Rorty et al. Against Bosses, Against Oligarchs, pp. 31—32, 45. 
'^ 5 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 272.
46 Ibid., p. 237.
47 Haber, Beyond Postmodern Politics, p. 69.
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intimated, are ‘on balance, m ore likely to do harm than good'/^ But, as Rorty readily accepts, 
such claims cannot be conclusive, and pointing to our shared traditions and practices is not 
in itself a way to resolve the conflicts that occur within them.
14. Rorty and radicalism
14.1 The relationship between philosophy and politics
Although one might concede that Rorty’s approach to political theory is not vacuous, it 
might be maintained that it is inherently conservative, and that it rules out the possibility o f 
radicalism. Many see this view as supported by Rorty’s claim that in his ideal liberal society, 
the distinction between reformer and revolutionary is aboHshed,^^ and his view that theorists 
cannot appeal over the heads o f  the beliefs and practices o f hum an beings to reality or to 
‘the facts’. His view o f political theory is furthermore one that does not satisfy those who are 
critical o f liberal societies as liberal societies since, it is said, it can only draw on the standards 
internal to a particular society, and cannot throw those standards into question altogether.
Rorty’s influence is such that he is widely discussed outside o f philosophy departments. Thus 
his political views have been commented on by those with no knowledge of, or interest in, 
his philosophical views. Some find his views congen ial.E qually , since Rorty’s politics are
48 Brian Barry, ‘Second Thoughts — and Some First Thoughts Revived’, in Paul Kelly (ed.) 
Multiculturalism 'Reconsidered (Oxford: Polity Press, 2002), pp. 204 — 238 at 205.
45 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 60.
50 See for example Jack Nichols’s review of Achieving Our Country, at
http: /  /gaytoday.badpuppy.com/garcliive / reviews /0 10499re.htm (viewed 29 July 2003).
203
‘pretty m uch those o f H ubert Hum phrey’/ ’ those to his left will certainly not find him 
radical enough/^ A t this level, discussion is for the m ost part political, as to the worth or 
otherwise o f a specific proposal or policy.
I will not dwell on these differences because, im portant as they are, my concern is rather the 
connection (if any) between his political and philosophical views. Rorty suggests that there 
are two main differences dividing him from his radical c ritic s .T h e se  are first, that the evils 
o f  capitalism are not amenable to reform but are integral to liberal societies. Those societies 
are held to be structurally defective, rather than contingently so, and thus are not open to 
piecemeal reform. Secondly, that philosophy/theory can reveal these defects, with radicals 
tending to think o f Marxist terminology as an especially useful tool in  this process. Criticisms 
o f Rorty, though many, can be said to be variations on these two themes: that he supports 
what he calls ‘bourgeois liberalism’ rather than seeking to replace it w ith something else, and 
that he denies the critical potential o f  theory, advocating instead the reformist interpretivist 
approach discussed above.
Some critics seem to think that there is a one-way causal connection between Rorty’s 
philosophical views and his bourgeois liberal views, and that the one determines the other. The 
burden o f much criticism is correspondingly that his philosophy commits him to conservatism 
in politics. For some, the rejection o f metaphysics in itself means that Rorty is incapable o f 
offering up meaningful social criticism. Justin Cruickshank writes that Rorty’s account ‘divinises 
the status quo’, since (he claims) issues o f social justice necessarily require ‘some form of
51 Rorty, Philosopf^  and Social Hope, p. 18.
52 Frank Lentricchia, ‘Rorty’s Cultural Conversation’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) Koif^ : Sage Masters of 
Modem Social Thought, volume 3 (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 363 — 366.
55 Rorty, Thugs and Theorists’, p. 568.
204
metaphysical speculation’^ '^  about the good life and the good society. Some accept Rorty’s 
protestations that he is not a conservative, but think that irrespective o f his personal 
convictions, his philosophical views commit him conservatism is politics. Ronald Lee Jackson 
argues that what he calls Rorty’s cultural relativism is inherently conservative: it ‘terminates in a 
fake objectivity, a set o f beliefs indifferent, even hostile, to the possibility o f their own 
improvement (for they do not approximate but defme rationality, and it is contingent matter 
whether they do this well or ül)’.^  ^ Others believe there is a deliberate link between the two. 
Cornel West writes that ‘Rorty’s neopragmatism is, in part, a self-conscious post-philosophical 
ideological project to promote the basic practices o f bourgeois capitalist societies while 
discouraging philosophical defenses o f them’.^  ^ For West and others, there is a straight line 
leading from Rorty’s philosophical views to an endorsement o f the status quo.
There seem to be three specific and interrelated reasons why this might be the case. First, Rorty 
is criticised for offering a liberal individualistic account, one which cannot take account o f those 
structural factors that create injustice. This point has been made by Thomas McCarthy, who 
criticises Rorty’s failure to consider anything other than freedom in terms o f relations between 
individual human beings. He writes that Rorty ‘nowhere provides a satisfactory analysis o f free 
encounters or political freedom, for the simple reason that his account o f freedom moves almost 
exclusively at the level o f the isolated individual and scarcely thematizes structures of 
intersubjectivity or institutional arrangements’.^  ^O n this account, Rorty lays himself open to the
54 Justin Cruickshank, ‘From Metaphysics to Pragmatism’, pp. 124, 125.
55 Ronald Lee Jackson, ‘Cultural Imperialism or Benign Relativism? A Putnam — Rorty Debate’, 
International Philosophical Quarterly 28 (1988), pp. 383 — 392 at 392, emphasis in original.
56 Cornel West, ‘The Politics of American Neo-Pragmatism’, in John Rajchman and Cornel West 
(eds.) Post Analytic Philosoply (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 259 -  275 at 267.
57 McCarthy, ‘Ironist Theory as a Vocation’, p. 648, emphasis in original. The same point is made by 
Terence Ball, ‘Review Symposium on Richard Rorty’, H istoy of the Human Sciences 3 (1990), p. 103.
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charge, made for example by Cruickshank, that he cannot allow for the existence o f social and 
structural inequities such as patriarchy/® lik e  McCarthy, Cruickshank believes this to be the 
case because Rorty theorises at the level o f individuals, and can allow for no social role in 
assigning gender roles. In a similar claim, Gideon Calder writes that on Rorty's account
[...] it simply cannot be the case that, say, certain economic interests within 
society might seek to promulgate self-serving mendacious accounts o f the 
utility o f  certain commodities, or the effects on the environment o f certain 
factory emissions, or the conditions under which their overseas workforce 
are employed.®^
This leads to a second criticism, that Rorty^s denial o f any extra-societal standard reduces truth 
and objectivity to Svhat we happen to think around here’, where what that ‘happens’ to be is in 
fact in the interests o f the rich and powerful, Rorty accepts that he cannot give content to free 
and unfree communication. Indeed, insofar as he defines freedom from the distorting effects o f 
power or influence, it is (again) made by reference to our own standards: ‘I do not think there is 
much to be said about what counts as “undistorted” except “the sort you get when you have 
democratic political institutions and the conditions for making these institutions funcfion’.^ °
It has further been objected that in respect o f the claim ‘a liberal society is one which is content 
to call ‘true’ whatever the upshot o f [free and open] encounters turns out to be’,^  ^ Rorty 
nowhere gives an account o f what a free encounter is hke, or how it can be distinguished from
58 Cruickshank, ‘Ethnocentrism, Social Contrast Liberahsm and Positivistic-Conservatism’, p. 16.
59 Calder, and ^ description, pp. 53 — 54, emphasis in original.
50 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 84.
51 Rorty, Ibid., p. 52, emphasis suppressed.
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one distorted by wealth or privilege. Many, including some o f Rorty^s feUow liberals, think that 
theory can play a much greater role than he will allow in such matters. They argue that it is not 
sufficient to say that liberal societies ought to live up to their own standards, because this 
cannot address the issue o f how those standards are themselves be influenced by power 
relations, through for example wealth or political infiuence.^^ Some, notably Jürgen Habermas, 
have sought to address this concern by showing how liberalism would ideally provide the forum 
for ‘domination-free’ communication, preserving the distinction between what he calls distorted 
and undistorted (or ideology-free) communication. Rorty however refuses to join Habermas in 
this attempt to define the conditions of such communication and, if  all that remains is 
‘conversation’ (the word itself taken by some critics to be suggestive o f a polite cosy chat) then 
it can be asked o f him whether we can guard against factors such as economic and gender roles 
that have routinely caused people to be marginalized and excluded from having their voices 
h e a rd .T h is  is exacerbated by Rorty’s view that nothing exists prior to its recognition. He 
accepts that this means that an injustice does not exist until it is recognised as an injustice, and 
some have inferred that Rorty cannot allow for problems like gender and race, because not only 
is he concerned only with individuals, but cannot allow for a ‘voice o f the oppressed’ or the 
‘fact’ o f oppression.^^
14.2 The separation o f philosophy andpolitics
^  Rebecca Comay, ‘Intermpting the Conversation: Notes on Rorty’, Telos 69 (1986), pp. 119 — 130; 
Ron Bontekoe, ‘Rorty’s Pragmatism and the Pursuit of Truth’, International Philosophical Quarterly 30 
(1990), pp. 119-130.
This criticism has been levelled by Henry B. Veatch, ‘Deconstruction in Philosophy’.
^  Rorty, ‘We Antirepresentationalists’, p. 41.
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In  response, I suggest that there is no necessary connection between Rorty’s philosophical 
views and his political views. It is quite consistent to endorse the former whilst rejecting the 
latter. Rorty himself agrees that there is no firm relationship between his philosophy and his 
politics; as we have seen, the priority o f democracy to philosophy is central to his position. 
Writers Hke Bernstein and McCarthy are themselves pragmatists, or are at least sympathetic 
to pragmatism, and think they can adopt pragmatism without it entaiHng what they take to 
be Rorty’s conservatism. This point has been advanced by Bjorn Ramberg, who suggests 
that, although Rorty’s personal views are not radical, his pragmatism does not preclude 
radicaHsm.^^ Ramberg constructs an alternative, which he labels ‘Radical Rorty’, a 
philosopher with exactly the same metaphilosophical views as Rorty, but who differs on 
poHtical questions by retaining ‘faith in the possibiHty o f subjecting the roots o f our social 
institutions (radix) to systematic critical scrutiny’.^ ^
Ramberg is I think quite correct to say that there is no necessary connection between Rorty’s 
philosophical and poHtical positions. As I have argued throughout this thesis, the 
philosophical views that he rejects are superfluous to poHtical and moral debate. However, a 
further point is that it is not the case that Rorty’s poHtical views are as conservative as 
Ramberg and others think. He does not think aH is weU in contemporary Hberal societies, 
and is highly critical o f the practice o f American HberaHsm. At the institutional level, he 
proposes what he variously caUs ‘a Hst o f First Projects for the left’^  ^ and a ‘People’s
Bjorn T. Ramberg, ‘Strategies for Radical Rorty (“ ...but is it progress^y, Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy (1993) supplementary volume 19, pp. 223 -  246.
66 Ibid., p. 239.
67 Richard Rorty, ‘First Projects, Then Principles’, in Victor Navasky and Katrina Vanden Heuvel 
(eds.) The Pest of the Nation (New York Nation Books, 2000), pp. 469 — 474.
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Charter’,^ ® Top o f this list should be ‘truly radical reform  o f campaign financing’^  ^ to stop 
what he calls the ‘bribes’ paid by the rich to politicians to keep socio-economic re­
distribution off the political agenda. He further proposes universal health insurance, the 
financing o f primary and secondary education, and dramatically increasing rates o f  income 
tax to pay for them.^° Thus, Shapiro’s claim that ‘Rorty does not need to posit any “ideal 
speech situation” (as Habermas does) because his benign view assumes it exists here and 
now in contemporary America — a heaven on earth’,^  ^ is doubly mistaken, assuming a strong 
relation between Rorty’s philosophical and political views whilst simultaneously 
misrepresenting the latter.
Rorty is fiiUy aware o f the restrictions that factors such as economics or gender can place 
upon people attempting to participate in  public discourse. Regarding the claim that he 
cannot even recognise the distortions caused by structural inequalities, Rorty would certainly 
respond by pointing out that of course we are able to recognise such things. Notions like 
‘distortion’ cannot be measured from a view from nowhere, but we can stiU recognise them 
when we see them. ‘We do this by starting with such obvious differences as that between 
Socratic dialogue and hypnotic suggestion. We then try to firm up the distinction by dealing 
with messier cases; brainwashing, media hype, and what Marxists call “false 
consciousness’” .^ ^
Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 99.
Ibid., p. 149, n. 14.
see also his endorsement of Ernesto Laclau and Chantai Mouffe’s book Hegemony and Socialist 
Strate^ in Rorty, ‘We Anti-Representationalists’, p. 42, and Richard Rorty, ‘Our Increasing 
Willingness To Let The Rich Take More And More From The Poor’, New York Times, March 6, 2000.
Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 40.
2^ Rorty, Contingeny, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 48.
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His point though is to doubt whether theory has anything special to tell us in pointing up 
such distinctions. Philosophy certainly has a role to play. In  Philosop!^ and the Mirror oflS^ature 
he writes that philosophers such as Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey should be used to 
edify, ‘to help their readers, or society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and 
attitudes, rather than to provide “grounding” for the intuitions and customs o f the present’.^  ^
I t is not however a privileged role and is, he argues, a role that tends to played more 
effectively by novelists, journalists, anthropologists and histonans.’"^ W hat matters are 
political notions, notably freedom o f speech, and associated economic and social freedoms. 
As he puts it, when it comes to politics, the only significant distinction is ‘that between the 
use o f  force and the use o f persuasion’.^  ^ For him, the solution is a practical matter o f 
increasing the status and participation o f those individuals and groups who suffer such 
discrimination, and his view is that at their best, egalitarian liberal democracies provide the 
means to achieve this. O ne cannot, as discussed in chapter 3, appeal over the head o f politics 
to for example the truth, because there is no test o f truth other than justification to a 
community o f inquirers. W hat is often called the pursuit o f truth entails meeting standards 
o f evidence, but these are themselves socially determined. I f  we have these things, we are 
content to call our findings true. His claim that ‘a Liberal society is one which is content to 
call ‘true' whatever the upshot o f [free and open] encounters turns out to be’ is, as I have 
already argued, not a definition o f truth, but an account o f what passes for truth in a liberal 
society. The issue then is to provide the conditions for freedom, such as a free press, an 
independent judiciary and free universities.
73 Rorty, VhilosopJy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 12.
74 Rorty, ‘Truth and Freedom; A Reply to Thomas McCarthy’, p. 642.
75 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 84.
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Although many critics address what they take to be Rorty’s blindness to ‘structural’ factors 
that give rise to such inequalities, precisely what is meant by ‘structure’ is typically left 
unspecified. ‘Structural’, Hke ‘radical’, does not name a natural kind. Critics like Calder and 
Ramberg use these terms freely, but fail to specify what they take them  to mean. If  
‘structural’ is used as a way o f noting that there are recognisable patterns that cause and 
sustain inequaHties, then Rorty can happily allow that there are ‘structural’ elements to, for 
example, racism. Rorty’s hoHsm, his view o f  the necessity o f context and situation, suggests 
that he could hardly be bHnd to the interrelations between human beings and, insofar as this 
produces recognisable patterns, this could be called a form o f structural oppression. Rorty 
does not, as McCarthy impHes, view racism as the consequence o f individuals happening to 
adopt racist attitudes, nor does he view it as caused by sheer inequaHty.^*  ^ Further, he is 
certainly not bHnd to the conditions that give rise to equaHty, and that lead to the support o f 
fascism or reHgious fundamentaHsm. H e beHeves for example that Europe is better placed to 
ward off the rise o f fascism since the European welfare states provide a security against the 
sort o f hopelessness that produces support for the far Right.^^
But if  by ‘radicaHsm’ is m eant throwing over the institutions o f Hberal democracy such as 
free elections and the welfare state, it is clear that he would not support it. Steven Best and 
Douglas KeUner write that for Rorty, ‘The “theorist” should abandon all attempts to 
radicaUy criticize social institutions’.^ ® This is correct insofar as Rorty beHeves that Hberal 
societies do not need radical criticism, for example a Foucauldian critique o f Hberal 
individuaHsm. As he puts it, in his ideal Hberal community, ‘there would be continual social
76 See for example Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 76.
77 Richard Rorty, ‘11 September’, London Revieiu of Books, vol. 23, n. 19, cover date 4 October 2001.
78 Best and Kellner, ‘Richard Rorty and Postmodern Theory’, p. 103.
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criticism, but no radical sodal theory, if  “radical” means appealing to something beyond 
inherited prindples and reactions to new developments'/^ Thus I think William Buscemi 
goes too far in the other direction by claiming that Rorty wants a ‘total transform ation’ o f 
liberal institutions. He writes that Rorty’s ‘seemingly conservative embrace o f contemporary 
institutions is seen, upon analysis, to be not an embrace but a strategy for total 
transformation o f those institutions’.®® This is clearly not what Rorty thinks, and he would 
strongly deny the need for total transformation. He differs from radicals by claiming that 
liberal soderies are unique in containing the means by which they can reform  themselves in 
order to be truer to their own self-image. This is however not a process o f  radical critidsm, 
but o f piecemeal sodal reform. Indeed, he urges that those who daim  to offer radical 
critiques are playing a role within liberal sodedes, seeking for example to assimilate Foucault’s 
books into ‘a liberal, reformist poHtical culture’,®^ even though he recognises Foucault would 
have hated the suggestion.®^
All o f this is to say that Rorty, though not a radical, is dearly not an uncritical supporter o f the 
status quo. As we have seen, he speaks o f the importance o f the creative, imaginative, aspect 
o f poHtical theorising, rather than appealing to foundations or ‘the facts’. T o  iUustrate how 
far he is prepared to chaUenge received understandings and practices, it is helpful to  examine
Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 322, emphasis in original.
*0 WilHam I. Buscemi, ‘The Ironic PoHrics of Richard Rorty’, Peview of Politics 55 (1993), pp. 141 — 157 
at 157.
Rorty, Contingeny, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 64. In part this is because Hberal reformers can use 
Foucault’s criricisms of for example bureaucrades, and partly because much of Foucault can be 
privatised, and used for person edification rather than poHtical transformation.
*2 Thus I think AHson JuHa KeUy is mistaken when she takes Rorty’s pubHc-private distinction to 
mean that challenges to the current status quo should be confined to the private sphere. KeUy, The 
Postmodern Debate and the Search for ^ .mancipation: Nationality, the Self and Politics in the Thought of Foucault, 
Derrida, Rorty and MacIntyre (PhD thesis, University of Hull, 1996), p. 142. See also Sheldon WoHn, 
‘Democracy in the Discourse of Postmodernism’, Social Rsearch 57 (1990), pp. 5 — 30.
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a discussion from contemporary jurisprudence. Ronald Dworkin advocates what he calls a 
‘charity principle’ to interpretation, in which the language o f the law is interpreted to secure 
congruence with the values o f community. Interpretation is sought in order to extend 
current practice; for Dworkin, to extend rights to previously marginalized groups like 
homosexuals is a m atter o f ‘taking rights seriously’, o f applying them  correctly given their 
meaning in order to yield the ‘right answer’.®^ Against this, Rorty o f course rejects the notion 
that one can find, and appeal to, general principles which underpin practice and which, if  
understood, can correctly guide that practice. W ith reference to homosexual rights, he claims 
that, should the Supreme Court come to reverse the decision o f Bomrs v. Hardmck in which 
the justices found there was no constitutional protection for sodomy, ‘it will not be because 
a hitherto invisible right to sodomy has become manifest to  the justices’ but because o f the 
greater willingness o f the heterosexual majority to stop tormenting homosexuals.®"^ In  cases 
where the Supreme Court makes such decisions, there are clearly prudential reasons for 
presenting the m atter in the way Dworkin proposes, namely as applying a pre-existent law. 
For Rorty this is however a time-honoured means to disguise the fact that sometimes courts, 
and not legislatures, make significant and desirable changes. H e writes that; ‘to suddenly 
notice previously existing but hitherto invisible consfimfional rights is just the quaint way in 
which our courts are required to express a conviction that the political waters badly need 
roüing’,®^ and he further endorses Richard Posner’s claim for the importance o f judicial rule- 
making.®^
83 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Bights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977).
84 Richard Rorty, ‘What’s Wrong With “Rights”,’ Harpers Magasine (June 1996), pp. 15 — 18 at 16.
85 Rorty, Philosopfy and Social Hope, pp. 98 — 99.
86 Ibid., p. 104.
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Thus, although there is no Voice o f the oppressed’, Rorty certainly supports those who seek 
to give voice to their oppression. Just as he disagrees with Dworkin’s view that extending the 
law to protect homosexuals would be a matter o f applying the law correctly, he rejects as 
pointless the claim that hum an rights existed prior to their being recognised as such. The 
im portant contrast for Rorty is not the temporal and the eternal, or the partial and the 
absolute, but the present with the future. Responding to  the charge o f conservatism and 
critical impotence, he admits that pragmatists such as himself cannot be radical, but urges 
that they can be utopian. He urges for example that;
[...] if  you find yourself a slave, do not accept your masters’ descriptions o f 
the real; do not work within the boundaries o f their moral universe. Instead, 
try to invent a reality o f your own by selecting aspects o f the world that lend 
themselves to the support o f j/o/zr judgement o f the worthwhile Hfe.®^
H e is explicit about the need sometimes to ignore traditions when there is no hope o f using 
them  to foster the sort o f change that is needed. Feminists should for example refuse to 
work within the boundaries o f that moral world, and should seek instead to create their own.
15. Political philosophy verses internal social criticism?
15.1 M ichael Walzer^s account o f  internal social criticism*
Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 216, emphasis in original.
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Rorty’s account o f the task for political theorists is very similar to Michael Walzer’s proposed 
form o f ‘internal social criticism’. Like Rorty, Walzer proposes that the social critic should 
draw on the values, or ‘shared understandings’, o f  her society to propose reform.*® Jonathan 
G. Allen has discussed Walzer alongside Rorty with respect to social criticism.*^ He treats 
them  as putting forward the same view o f  social criticism, and disparages them  both for 
what he takes to be their inability to offer genuine or meaningful criticism. I have argued that 
this last point is in fact not entailed by Rorty’s approach, and believe it to be equally untrue 
o f Walzer. My concern in the final section o f this chapter is, however, to argue that on one 
issue, Rorty and Walzer are importantly different.
Unlike Rorty, who sees himself as suggesting a view o f the nature o f political theory, Walzer 
sets up his account as an alternative to political theory. Walzer contrasts his approach with the 
‘bad utopianism’^ ° o f philosophers who ignore the particular historical circumstances that led 
to the development o f different values, and who try simply to pick and choose the ‘nicest’^  ^
without regard for context. His analysis has in turn led to his being heavily criticised by 
political theorists. Prom inent among them is Brian Barry, who regards ‘the core’ o f Walzer’s 
interpretivism to be ‘profoundly and dangerously wrong’.^  ^Against this view, I will suggest 
that in fact Walzer’s view is essentially the same enterprise as Rorty’s and Barry’s own. Paul 
Kelly has written that W alzer is concerned ... to recast political theory as internal critidsm’,^ ^
Michael Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (London: Harvard University Press, 1987).
89 Jonathan G. Allen, “‘The Situated Critic or the Loyal Critic?” Rorty and Walzer on Social 
Criticism’, Philosoply and Social Criticism 24 (1998), pp. 25 — 46.
90 Michael Walzer, On Toleration (London: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 5.
91 Ibid.
92 Barry, Liberty and Justice, p. 9.
93 Paul Kelly, ‘Contractarian social justice: an overview of some contemporary debates’, in David 
Boucher and Paul Kelly (eds.) Social Justice from Hume to Walter (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 181 -  
199 at 188.
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but although this may be his stated intention, just how far internal criticism departs from 
current forms o f political theorising is, I will show, unclear.
Walzer’s account o f internal social criticism takes as its point o f departure a rejection o f 
Thomas Nagel’s ‘view from nowhere’. Like Rorty, Walzer argues that standards o f rationality 
and o f morality are internal to a world-view, morality being the contingent background o f 
assumptions and beliefs that constitute the shared moral life o f  particular communities. 
Morality is not consciously structured, but is the result o f  the actions o f people over 
centuries. Walzer goes on to argue that the reality o f moral Hfe is very different from the 
single monistic world which he thinks Hes at the heart o f  much m odem  philosophy. That 
philosophy he takes to divide broadly into two types, ‘discovery’ and ‘invention’. Discovery, 
which can be reHgious or secular, is the task o f finding a pre-existent moraHty. It involves 
standing back from one’s own perspective, abandoning one’s particular interests and looking 
at the world from ‘no particular point o f view.’^ "^ Invented moraHty, said to be symptomatic 
o f a secular world that rejects the idea o f a discoverable divine ‘blueprint’, is m ore radical 
than discovery, entaiHng not merely the reporting on, but the creation of, a new moral world. 
Both are however united in their purported detachment from any given cultural perspective. 
It is this detachment that Walzer takes to be the failing o f  m ost m odern philosophy, for it is 
fueUed by the mistaken beHef in the existence of, and at least the possibiHty o f attaining, the 
view from nowhere.
Having set up the contrast, there is a persistent tension in Walzer’s account between the view 
that discovery and invention are distinct activities, and the view that they are themselves
Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism  ^p. 5.
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forms o f social criticism. Walzer asserts that discovery and invention wül require 
interpretation, and that interpretation, as we have seen in Rorty’s account, will necessarily be 
influenced by what Walzer calls the ‘shared understandings’ o f a community. Contrary to their 
aspirations, discoveries and inventions wUl not in fact be any more radical than internal 
criticism, because the interpretation required to give them effect will necessarily be made in the 
light o f existing views o f morality. For example, an ‘invented’ account o f equality wUl remain 
just as contested as an internal critic’s interpretation, and wiU be im pliddy informed by 
indigenous societal standards. Walzer gives the example o f Bentham who claimed to have 
discovered the foundation o f morality through the discovery o f a new psychology, and who 
argued that this led to unexpected moral principles. However, ‘[fjrightened by the strangeness 
o f their own arguments, most utilitarian philosophers fiddle with the felicdfic calculus so that it 
yields results closer to what we aU t h i n k . I t  therefore seems that, far from recasting political 
theory as social criticism, social criticism is already essentially the same thing.
However this may be, Walzer is m ore generally committed to the claim that discovery and 
invention are something different from interpretive social criticism. Discovery, he says, 
‘always’^ *^ stands in sharp contrast to old ideas and practices (although whether this is meant 
as an empirical observation or as a definition is unclear). But beyond bis claim that discovery 
and invention are something different, he tells us little. He pays little attention to spelling out 
the features o f the political philosopher, and largely defines them as the opposite o f the social 
critic. W hat he does say verges on caricature. In response to the sort o f claim made by Judith 
Shklar, that Walzer’s critical interpreter cannot be held accountable because there is no way
95 Ibid., p. 7.
96 Ibid., p. 4.
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o f ‘checking up on him ’^  ^ by reference to standards 'Other than his own, Walzer complains 
that political philosophers are in effect anti-democratic, since they ignore the opinions o f 
their fellow citizens and present something whole which they seek to impose on society. 
Similarly, responding to Ronald Dworkin’s claim that an external standard is needed, Walzer 
glosses this by suggesting that it could mean that ‘[a]U the local critics could be replaced by a 
universal Office o f Social Criticism.
The ambiguity between political philosophy as a form of social criticism and as an alternative to 
it marks Walzer’s entire enterprise. H e expresses no doubt about the value o f stepping back 
from  current circumstances in  order to gain a critical vantage point. His point is rather that 
o f to where it is possible to step back: ‘I doubt that we can ever step all the way to nowhere. 
Even when we look at the world from somewhere else, however, we are still looking at the 
world ... at a particular w o r l d . T h e  question though is whether anyone denies this. Very 
few political theorists take themselves to be offering us a view from nowhere. Walzer’s target 
o f  choice is John  Rawls, who is said to have invented a world we would supposedly all 
impartially create and willingly inhabit. Walzer believes that accounts such as that o f Rawls 
cannot respond to his question, for they do not address the particular concerns o f specific 
societies. They are, for Walzer, empty formalism, providing ‘a way o f living’ but ‘not a way 
o f hfe.’ However, since Walzer himself claims to draw on shared understandings selectively, 
he is, I win argue below, in the same fine o f business as philosophers like Rawls.
Judith N. Shklar, Political Thought and Political Thinkers (London: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 
edited by Stanley Hoffmann, p. 378. See also Charles Jones, Global Justice, pp. 191 — 192.
98 Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral Argument at Home and Abroad (Notre Dame: University of 
Notre Dame Press, 1994), p. 48.
99 Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, pp. 6 - 7 ,  emphasis in original.
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Walzer is very keen to deny that association, and at this point, despite the similarities o f their 
own approaches, a significant contrast emerges between himself and Rorty. As we have seen, 
Rorty is widely though wrongly regarded as calling for an end o f philosophy, and so it might 
be felt he would agree both  with Walzer’s general account o f philosophy, and his specific 
view o f Rawls as one o f  its m ost notable recent practitioners. However, despite their 
similarities with regard to criticism and interpretation, Rorty views liberal political thought to 
be a form o f social criticism rather than an alternative to it.
Rorty makes very similar claims to Walzer concerning the alienation o f intellectuals. 
Paralleling Walzer’s account o f Sartre as a thinker so alienated from French society that he 
was o f little use as a social critic,^°° Rorty argues that m ost o f the Left in America today has 
effectively put itself in the same position. It has become increasingly academic and 
concerned with theory, and has no suggestions for which laws need to be passed, or which 
political candidates to support. Defining the Left as the party o f hope, for Rorty it ceases to 
be a Left if  it is not an active, engaged movem ent seeking social justice. It is a central defect 
o f the Left that it has exaggerated the ‘importance o f philosophy for politics.’’”^  In  expressing 
his hope that the Left wül ‘kick its phüosophy habit’^ °^  ignoring both  religion and phüosophy 
in public discussion and ‘just get on with trying to solve what Dewey called the “problems o f 
m en’”,^ °^  he means that the Left should give up metaphysical speculation and return to ‘real 
poHtics’.^ ®'^
1°° Ibid., pp 57 — 59.
Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 37.
102 Ibid., p. 91.
103 Ibid., p. 97.
104 por this reason, I can make no sense of McLaren et al’s. claim that ‘Rorty wishes to quarantine 
political movements outside the campus lest they infect academia’. Peter McLaren, Ramin 
Farahmandpur and Juha Suoranta, ‘Richard Rorty’s Self-Help Liberalism: A Marxist Critique of
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Presented in this manner, it is clear how Rorty has attracted the criticism that he is an ‘anti­
philosopher.’ Some subtlety is however in  order. W hen Rorty discusses the Left’s turn to 
irrelevant philosophy, he is talking mainly o f Continental philosophy, and his targets include 
Foucault, Heidegger and Derrida, thinkers who, although important, have he thinks Httie or 
no political relevance. W hen attacking ‘theory’, Rorty refers mainly to the Left’s interest in 
Marx and Foucault, and specifically metaphysics. The Left has come to adopt an 
understanding o f  America that he diagnoses as metaphysical, the desire to see ourselves in 
relation to an absolute: ‘in committing itself to what it calls theory [the] Left has gotten 
something which is entirely too m uch Hke reHgion. For the cultural Left has come to beHeve 
that we m ust place our country within a theoretical frame o f  reference, simate it within a vast 
quasi-cosmological perspective.’’*^  ^ In  so doing, it has divorced itself from engaging with 
what ought to be the real object o f its concern, the problems caused by economic 
inequaHty.’°^
However, non-metaphysical philosophy has a role to play in addressing these problems. In  
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity Rorty distinguished thinkers Hke Nietzsche, Heidegger and 
Derrida whom  he sees as private inteUectuals, useful for personal edification but at best 
useless for poHtics, from theorists such as Mül and Rawls who have pubHc utüity. These 
latter thinkers remind us ‘o f the failure o f our institutions and practices to Hve up to the
America’s Most Wanted Ironist’, in Michael A. Peters and Paulo GhiraldelH Jr. (eds.), Richard Rorty: 
Education, Philosophy, and Politics (Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield PubHshers, Inc., 2001), pp. 139 — 
162 at 145.
Rorty, Achieving Our Country, p. 95.
In particular, Rorty writes that the Left needs to talk much more ahout money. Ibid., p. 91.
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convictions to which we are already committed by the public, shared vocabulary we use in 
daily life’,^ °^
15.2 On Rawls
The difference between Walzer and Rorty’s views o f  political theory emerge in  their 
respective discussions o f Rawls. For Walzer as we have seen, Rawls is a kind o f  Platonist, 
Rorty’s view is rather more nuanced. He writes that, together with many other people, he 
initially interpreted Rawls to be offering a transcendental deduction o f the principles o f 
justice, but that this was a misunderstanding, stemming in part from assuming that by 
‘reasonable’ Rawls meant an ahistorical criteria, rather than by what particular communities 
take to be reasonable, specifically ‘the moral sentiments characteristic o f  the heirs o f the 
Enlightenment’. R o r t y  has subsequently given what he calls a historidst and Deweyan 
reading o f Rawls, urging that Rawls is seeking to articulate the prindples and intuitions 
‘typical o f American liberals’. R a w l s ’s theorising is valuable, but ‘from below,’"° 
responding to the needs o f a spedfic time and place.
I f  Rorty is right, then the distinction, accepted by both liberals and their ‘communitarian’ 
critics, that there is something at issue concerning methodology between Rawls and writers 
like Walzer, largely dissolves. However, although Walzer’s view o f Rawls as a Platonist is
0^7 Rorty, Contingence, Irony, and Solidarity, p. xiv.
10® Rorty, Objectivity, Vsflativism, andTmth, p. 183, n. 21.
109 Ibid, p. 189.
110 Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Ernesto Laclau’, in Chantai Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction and Pragmatism 
(London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 69 -  76 at 75.
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clearly mistaken, for many Rorty’s account o f him as a pragmatist seems equally off target. 
Shapiro has attacked Rorty’s interpretation for this reason, writing that ‘Illuminating as this 
account is o f Rorty’s views, it is not remotely plausible as a reading o f Rawls, early or late’.^" 
Shapiro quickly moves over a catalogue o f mistakes that he finds in Rorty’s account, all o f  
which stem from Rorty’s ignorance or wüfal misreading o f A  Theory of Justice. He points out 
for example that Rawls’s theory is ‘strictly deductive’, and that he seeks to ‘strive for a kind 
o f moral geometry with aU the rigor which this name implies’. Rorty is further said to have 
ignored the fact that the principles o f justice apply wherever ‘the circumstances o f justice’ 
obtain, and that they are neutral between capitalist and socialist forms o f economic 
organisation.
Shapiro thinks it possible to reject Rorty’s account o f Rawls in one paragraph by the simple 
expediency o f quoting Rawls’s words at him. But there is reason to think Rorty’s 
interpretation deserves more careful attention than this perfunctory dismissal. Consider the 
following account o f Rawls’s position, addressed to Walzer’s understanding;
Walzer imagines that the function o f the original position in Rawls’s theory is 
to launch a system o f morality de novo. But the construction has never been 
intended to be self-subsistent in this way. Rawls starts from a num ber o f 
basic ideas that he believes his readers wiU share ... I f  Rawls is correct, we 
shall find, when we examine our moral commitments, that they drive us 
towards impartiality. We simply cannot justify to  ourselves or to others 
putting our family, religion, or ethnic group in a specially favoured position.
Shapiro, Political Criticism, p. 29.
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I f  we pull back from our partial interests, we do so not as an arbitrary act o f 
win, but because we recognize, on the strength o f some very commonplace 
moral ideas, that we cannot otherwise be true to our deepest beliefs.
This might appear to be a further misconceived attem pt by Rorty to contextuahze Rawls o f 
the sort Shapiro decries. The words are however Barry’s.”  ^ l ik e  Rorty, Barry argues 
persuasively for the importance o f interpretation in Rawlsian political theory. He stresses the 
situatedness o f Rawls’s theory, for example that it draws upon moral ideas and intuitions 
that Rawls expects his readers to hold. Shapiro might object that this merely tells us that 
Barry is as guilty as Rorty in his misreading o f Rawls. But unlike Shapiro, Barry spends some 
time justifying his interpretation. He quotes many o f  the same passages as Shapiro, for 
example the claim about ‘moral geometry’, but he stresses the need to observe their 
context.”  ^ In  this case Rawls’s point is only, Barry argues, to deduce what proposals would 
follow from the original position. Rawls that is ‘makes no claim that he could demonstrate 
the correcmess o f his theory to anyone in the world, irrespective o f that person’s existing 
beliefs’."'*
There still might be thought a difference however between Rorty (and Barry’s) view o f 
Rawls, and what Rawls himself intended. Paul KeUy has sought to  distinguish Rawls’s view 
from that o f Rorty’s own. For KeUy, the difference concerns the scope o f reason. H e writes 
that on Rawls’ account, reason is important, albeit reason which has ‘a conditional
1^2 Barry, Uberty and Justice, p. 20, emphasis in original.
” 3 Barry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 53.
Barry, Uberty and Justice, p. 120. Barry commends Rawls as a contemporary social critic, suitable for 
a place in Walzer’s The Company of Critics. Barry, Liberty and Justice, pp. 21 — 22.
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character’.”  ^For Rorty in  contrast, what philosophers have held to be the dictates o f reason 
are, writes Kelly, ‘merely what we happen to think around here'."^
There certainly is evidence that would support this distinction. In  A  Theory of Justice, Rawls 
writes that:
[...] the two principles o f justice are not contingent upon existing desires or 
social conditions ... In  order to find an Archimedean point it is not 
necessary to appeal to  a priori or perfectionist principles. By assuming 
certain general desires, such as the desire for primary social goods, and by 
taking as a basis the agreement that would be made in a suitably defined 
initial situation, we can achieve the requisite independence from existing 
circumstances.
For Rawls, the principles o f justice transcend existing conditions and desires. This 
transcendence, whilst not aspiring to the view from nowhere, constitutes the difference 
between what KeUy calls ‘a conditional character’ and what he describes as ‘merely what we 
happen to think around here’. But how far does this distinction point to a genuine difference 
between Rawls and Rorty? Given that there is a difference, as was argued above, between 
uncritical immersion in a status quo and selectively drawing on the values o f one’s time, it is 
not clear from Kelly’s essay precisely what the difference between Rawls and Rorty is
” 5 Kelly, ‘Political theory in retreat?’, p. 238. 
116 Ibid., p. 233.
11^  Rawls, A  Theoiy of Justice, p. 263.
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supposed to be; whether for example it is a difference in degree or o f kind, or whether it is a 
philosophical difference or a political one.
To examine this issue, let us consider how Rawls goes about seeking to attain independence 
from existing conditions. That independence is to be secured by positing what would be 
agreed upon by persons in a ‘suitably defined initial situation’. The suitably defined initial 
situation is o f  course the original position. Since it deprives agents o f knowledge o f  their 
social and economic status, natural endowments, and views o f the good, commentators have 
inferred that these factors are for Rawls wholly irrelevant for the deduction o f the principles 
o f justice.
In one way these factors certainly are irrelevant. The point o f the original position is to 
deprive people o f the knowledge that Rawls believes is not appropriate to calculations o f the 
principles o f  justice. However, it is im portant to ask we make these restrictions on 
ourselves w hen making those calculations, why we think it appropriate to deprive ourselves 
o f this information. It turns out that for Rawls, this is not because they are required by any 
transcendental or ahistorical demands o f reason, but because we think that it reasonable to 
exclude them;
O ne should not be misled, then, by the somewhat unusual conditions which 
characterise the original position. The idea here is simply to make vivid to 
ourselves the restrictions that it seems reasonable to impose on arguments 
for principles o f justice, and therefore on these principles themselves.^’®
Rawls, Theoty of Justice, p. 18; see also pp. 547 -  548.
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That is, Rawls seeks to secure independence firom current circumstances by drawing on ideas 
current within those circumstances about what constitutes morally relevant and irrelevant 
factors in calculating the principles o f justice."^ For this reason, I think that Andrew Jason 
Cohen fails in his efforts to distinguish this view from Rorty^s. Cohen writes that Sve are able — 
despite communitarian and Rortyan claims to the contrary — to distance ourselves fuUy from 
our ends to imagine a bare moral agent within us’J^° As was discussed in chapter 4 however, the 
notion o f a self existing prior to its ends is one that is unsustainable/^^ It is moreover a view o f 
the self that is not entailed by Rawls’s position. This point is perhaps made clearer by Rawls’s 
reference to ‘certain general desires’. I f  we pause to ask exactly whose desires these are, they can 
only be the desires that Rawls — rightly or wrongly — attributes to citizens o f twentieth century 
liberal democracies. If  we press the question o f for whom ‘it seems reasonable and generally 
accepted’ that natural fortune and social circumstances should not lead to advantage or 
disadvantage, it is dear that it is certainly not the vast majority o f the human race. In this 
context, Barry writes that Rawls, together with other liberals like Dworkin, assume the New 
Deal settlement.’^^  Similarly, Rorty writes: ‘O n my view, the frequent remark that Rawls’ 
rational choosers look remarkably like twentieth-century American Hberals is perfectly just, but 
not a critidsm o f Rawls. It is merely a frank ethnocentrism which is essential to serious.
Rawls seeks to distance himself from ‘intuitionism’. But for a discussion of Rawls’s similarities 
with intuitionism, see Joel Feinberg, ‘Rawls and Intuitionism’, in Norman Danids (ed.) fading  RzWr.- 
Critical Studies on Raivls’ ‘A  Theo^ of Justice’(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), pp. 108 — 124. On the view 
I am proposing, intuitions mean our particular, ethnocentric, un-theorised understandings, cf Walzer: 
‘[W]e are to correct our intuitions by reference to the model we construct out of those same 
intuitions’. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism  ^p. 17.
2^0 Cohen, ‘On Universalism’, p. 55.
2^1 In chapter 7 it will be argued that we are moral agents predsdy because we, embodied historical 
agents, act in this way.
2^2 Barry, Liberty and Justice, p. 119. To be sure, this is itself a controversial interpretation. John R  
Wallach writes that Rawls’s position does not depend upon any particular political settlement, and he 
cites the New Deal as one such settlement. Wallach, ‘Liberals, Communitarians, and the Task of 
Political Theory’, pp. 584 — 585.
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nonfantastical, thought’. I therefore s u re s t , contrary to what Walzer claims, that his (and by 
extension Rorty’s) approach is not an alternative to liberal political theory but is itself, as the 
case o f Rawls illustrates, what a non-metaphysical form o f political theorising amounts to. This 
view o f political theory is, furthermore, the one engaged in by philosophers Hke Rawls.
In sum, in this chapter it has been argued that the concern to articulate liberal values is, contrary 
to the claims o f both Walzer and his critics, not an alternative to political theory but a form of 
it. Rawls, Walzer and Rorty are all concerned to articulate and defend a view o f liberalism by 
drawing on the understandings to be found in liberal societies. This does not lead to 
incoherence if  it is appreciated that the interpretivist social critic is concerned not with making 
the most o f the shared understandings but with making the best o f them. Pragmatism does not 
lead to any substantial political position, either by design or by default. It does not, as I have 
argued in previous chapters, reduce notions o f truth and objectivity in politics to Svhat we do 
around here’. N or does it entail that political theorists are necessarily and thoughtlessly 
committed to the standards current in any particular society. Finally, it was argued that Rorty is 
correct to see his account o f the role o f the political theorist as the same as that o f Rawls. There 
remains, however, the scope o f liberal claims. Rorty’s defence o f liberalism is frequently 
criticised for what many take to be its parochialism. Although he thinks liberalism can be 
justified, he is said to illegitimately circumscribe the number o f people for whom  we owe a 
justification such a justification. This issue is taken up in chapter 7.
’23 Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truth, p. 30, n. 12.
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Chapter Seven
Liberal ethnocenttism and the boundaries of community
In  the previous chapter, Rorty’s view that political theory ought to be concerned with 
articulating the values latent in liberal society was examined. In  this chapter, 
consideration is given to  the question o f  w hat it is that constitutes a society, or 
community. For Rorty, there is no  standard o f  value other than that o f  hum an 
communities. O ne cannot appeal to  the notion o f  objectivity, because that notion, 
understood as it m ust be in terms o f  w hat he calls ‘solidarity’, is necessarily inform ed by 
hum an standards o f  value. Hilary Pum am  and others believe that it is at this po in t that 
Rorty becomes relativist, taking him  to regard as ‘w arranted’, or ‘justified’, whatever it is 
that a particular comm unity thinks o f  as such. I argue that this view o f  Rorty is mistaken, 
and that he seeks to  guard against warrant or justification being unacceptably parochial 
by political means. Specifically, by urging that no  standard o f  value is beyond challenge, 
and by seeking to increase the range o f  challenges and interpretations o f  those values as 
m uch as possible. Rorty captures bo th  o f  these concerns in the notion o f  w hat John  
Rawls calls mde reflective equilibrium. Against the charge that ‘we’ m ust be narrowly 
constim ted because different communities and standards o f  value are incom mensurable, 
I argue that Rorty, following D onald Davidson, has successfully shown that this notion, 
w hen understood as untranslatability, is incoherent. For Rorty, there is no  logical or 
m oral reason why the boundaries o f  the liberal ethnos cannot be (as I will go on  to  argue 
in chapter 8) potentially global.
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16. Community as foundation?
16.1 O bjectivity as so lidarity
The m ost senous challenge to  Rorty’s view o f  justification is not, I think, that he rules it 
out, bu t that for him  the standards o f  one’s com m unity serve as the last word. O ne o f  
Rorty’s responses to the charge o f  relativism is to  say that, far from  viewing truth or 
goodness as relative to a community, the pragm atist can only be criticised for taking his 
comm unity too seriously and for ignoring the standards o f  o ther communities; that is, he 
or she can be criticised no t for claiming that m oral values are relative across 
communities, bu t for saying that the standards o f  their com m unity are the only 
standards.^ Problem s seem to emerge w ith the political consequences which follow from 
w hat Rorty accepts as the fact that ‘we must, in practice, privilege our ow n group’.^  
William E. Connolly turns the charge o f  foundationalism back against Rorty on this 
point, arguing that in abandoning epistemology, he has com e instead to  privilege the 
traditions o f  a community, advancing ‘a species o f  social foundationalism ’,^  that allows 
no sense to  the idea that a com m unity which is in unanim ous agreem ent can nevertheless 
be in error.
It is im portant to  be clear that in the same way that, properly understood, Rorty retains a 
notion o f  truth, he also has use for the term  ‘objectivity’. H e writes: ‘I think you can have 
knowledge — objective knowledge — w ithout representation, realism, or correspondence’,'^
 ^Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism, and Truth, p. 30. 
2 Ibid., p. 29.
3 William E. Connolly, ‘Mirror of America’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) Rorty: Sage Masters of 
Modem Social Thought, volume 4 (London: Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 221 — 229 at 229.
 ^Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Thelma Lavine’, in Herman J. Saatkamp (ed.) Rjorty and Pragmatism: 
The Philosopher 'Responds to His Critics (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 50 — 53 at 
50.
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Rorty cannot o f  course allow for objectivity to m ean connection with Reality as It Is in 
Itself, having denied any sense can be m ade o f  that notion. Rather, objectivity stems 
from  agreement am ong inquirers, an idea that he terms ‘solidarity’. Solidarity is our 
current best idea o f  how  to explain w hat is going on, no t an attem pt accurately to 
represent reahty.
This has however led to the criticism that Rorty refuses a distinction betw een fact and 
opinion, and that he denies w hat Jurgen Haberm as calls ‘everyday realist intuitions’,^  that 
is, the difference betw een a belief that is justified by a com m unity o f  inquirers, and a 
belief that is justified because it is true. W riting o f  Rorty’s discussion o f  Orwell’s 1984, 
James Conant writes that Rorty allows no distinction betw een the questions ‘W ho 
invented the airplane?’ and ‘W ho does practically everyone say invented the airplane?’^
In  response, Rorty argues that there is no  way to  separate these two formulations. Facts 
are linguistic, form ulated in sentences. H e endorses W ilfred Sellars’s ‘psychological 
nom inahsm ’, which holds that all knowledge is linguistic. Against the obvious objection 
that, for example, knowledge o f  the sensation o f  pain is non-linguistic, Sellars 
distinguished betw een ‘awareness — as — discriminate — behavior’, the ability to  respond 
to  stimuli, from  w hat he called being ‘in the logical space o f  reasons, o f  justifying and 
being able to  justify w hat one says’^ . Sensations may cause beliefs, bu t do no t by 
themselves justify belief. Justification, as was discussed in  chapter 5, depends on  the social 
practice o f  reason giving. Language enables us to  ‘enter a comm unity w hose m em bers 
exchange justifications o f  assertions, and other actions, w ith one another’.® T hat is.
5 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, p. 32.
 ^ Conant, ‘Freedom, Cruelty, and Truth: Rorty versus Orwell’, p. 307. Conant concludes that 
‘N ot even the Party goes quite as far as Rorty!’
Cited in Rorty, Vhilosophj and the Mirror of Nature, p. 182.
® Rorty, Philosopfy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 185.
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justification involves citing reasons for a belief, and this involves language, there being 
no non-linguistic facts. There is no  such thing as a justified belief that is non- 
propositional, and no such thing as justification that is no t a relation between 
propositions.
This seems to make one’s relation to  the world (or reality) subordinate to  one’s relation 
to  a community.^ Rorty denies that this is the case, because it is impossible to  drive a 
wedge betw een w hat a comm unity thinks, and the world. Languages and beliefs are 
necessarily connected both  to a hum an com m unity and the world:
Y ou would no t know w hat you believed, no r have any beliefs, unless 
your belief has a place in a netw ork o f  beliefs and desires. But that 
netw ork w ould no t exist unless you and others could pair o ff features o f 
your non-hum an environm ent w ith your assent to  your utterances by 
other language-users, utterances caused (as are yours) by those very 
features.^®
There is no  way to contrast %eing in touch w ith a hum an com m unity’ w ith ‘being in 
touch with reality’, since to  ascribe a belief is bo th  to  have contact with the world and 
with the hum an comm unity that provides the language with which to given conten t and 
m eaning to that world. O ne cannot turn  from  seeking agreement w ith a community o f  
inquirers to ‘the facts’, because these are only given content within hum an practices. For 
this reason, however, I suggest that in  his paper ‘Solidarity o r Objectivity?’ Rorty him self
 ^This explains, I think, Putnam’s remark that ‘Rorty’s view is just solipsism with a “we” instead 
of an “I”.’ Putnam, Bjealism With a Human Face, p. ix.
0^ Rorty, ‘Universality and Truth’, pp. 15 — 16.
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set up  an unhelpful contrast, one betw een solidarity and objectivity^^ In that paper he 
w rote that pragmatists seek to  ‘reduce’^  ^ objectivity to  sohdarity, and spoke o f  his desire 
for us to  concern ourselves ‘solely’ w ith securing solidarity by ‘setting aside’ the desire for 
objectivity^^ Both claims are misleading since they imply that solidarity is som ething less 
than objectivity, which cannot be the case. For Rorty, the only possible m eaning o f  
objectivity is solidarity, which is his w ord for D onald D avidson’s notion o f  ‘triangulation’ 
— the relationship betw een speaker, audience and world. It is in fact realist accounts o f  
objectivity that are reductionist since they cut o ff one com er o f  the triangle, thinking 
tru th  to  be correspondence to  a pre-Hnguistic ‘given’. This notion is incoherent, as was 
discussed in chapter 2, because there is no  content to  the world o ther than that provided 
by hum an descriptions. Triangulation, as Davidson puts it, ‘gives us the only account o f  
how  experience gives a specific conten t to our thoughts. W ithout o ther people with 
w hom  to share responses to  a m utual environm ent, there is no  answer to  the question 
w hat it is in  the world to  which we are responding’. F o r  this reason, I w ould respond to 
critics like Thom as Nagel and suggest that Rorty’s account o f  solidarity, far from  
‘contradict[ing] the categorical statements it purports to  be about’^  ^ is, by com bining 
speaker, audience and world, the conclusion for which Nagel is him self grasping for in 
his view that the subjective is part o f  the objective.
16.2 W hat can we say to *them*?
"  Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism, and Truth, pp. 21 — 34.
2^ Ibid., p. 22.
3^ Ibid., pp. 27 — 28. In his ‘Response to John McDowell’, Rorty writes of ‘replacing’ objectivity 
with solidarity, which, though technically accurate, is perhaps also misleading, since on his 
account objectivity cannot be anything other than solidarity. Richard Rorty, ‘Response to John 
McDowell’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Rjtrty and His Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 123 — 
128 at 124.
Donald Davidson, Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), p. 129. 
Nagel, The Tost Word, p. 30.
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W hat then happens to  those w ho are no t thought of, or w ho do no t think o f  themselves, 
as part o f  our ethnos  ^ o r part o f  our community? W hat for example can be said to  non- 
hberals? The critic o f  our liberal society is, in Rorty’s words, forced to  confront the 
ethnocentric question, T )o  you have anything non-E uropean to suggest which meets our 
European purposes better?’!  ^Rorty is clearly n o t alone in accepting that one cannot and 
should no t bracket out some o f  one’s views w hen considering w hat is good or right. But 
does that entail that we m ust construe ‘reasonableness’ in the narrow, ethnocentric, terms 
that Rorty appears to? It is here that Rorty’s use o f  the w ord ‘we’ starts to  raise serious 
questions. For Rorty, ‘we’ means ‘the group to  which we think it necessary to justify 
ourselves’.^ ® Many com m entators find it easy to  present Rorty as unconcerned with 
justification beyond a very narrowly constituted num ber o f  ‘us’. O ne can see why this is 
the case. For example, he writes:
I hope ... to suggest how  ... liberals m ight convince our society that 
loyalty to  itself is m orahty enough, and that such loyalty no longer needs 
an ahistorical backup. I think they should try to  clear themselves o f 
charges o f  irresponsibility by convincing our society that it need be 
responsible only to  its own traditions, and no t to  the m oral law as well’.^ ^
The problem  here is twofold. First that the focus on a society and its traditions, with 
nothing outside, m ight be taken to  m ean that Rorty is untroubled by w hat goes on 
beyond our society, and is oblivious to those m em bers w ho are no t considered to be part 
o f  its traditions. Secondly, that it assumes hom ogeneity within forms o f  hfe. Nancy
Nagel, The View From Nowhere, pp. 25 — 27. 
Rorty, Consequences ofFragmatism, p. 174.
8^ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 177.
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Fraser thinks this the case, writing that: ‘there is no  place in Rorty’s fram ework for 
genuinely radical political discourses rooted in oppositional solidarities’.^ ® Similarly, for 
Steven Hendley, ‘Rorty’s strategy effectively draws a boundary around the democratic 
arena, claiming it for people hke us as opposed to people hke them^ ?-'^  Thus although 
Rorty is concerned in the passage quoted above to  show that, pace ironism, he is 
com m itted to w hat Alasdair M acIntyre caUs a shared way o f  hfe, convincing people o f 
his ow n m oral probity is paid at the cost o f  appearing parochial.
There is however m ore to  be said. T o  ihustrate, I whl examine Stephen MulhaU and 
A dam  Swift’s examination o f  w hat they understand to  be Rorty’s attim de to non-hberals. 
They take him  to  be saying that hberals do no t have to  worry about past o r future 
chaUenges to hberahsm  from  non-hberals, and that for him, ‘hberals need only justify 
themselves to hberals’.^  Responding to Rorty’s view that anti-hberals hke N ietzsche and 
Loyola are ‘m ad’, MulhaU and Swift criticise Rorty for (they say) claiming that we ought 
simply to dismiss such critics, and go on to say that we m ust engage w ith them . They 
write that although an Aristotehan or Samurai m oral vocabulary is no  longer a ‘real 
option’ for us, this is far from  the end o f  the story, and that this alone ‘does n o t aUow us 
to  ignore or dismiss in advance any attem pts to reconstruct o r reinterpret such m oral 
codes in ways m ore adapted to  the present tim e’, as for example M acIntyre has 
attem pted with Aristotle.^^
19 Ibid., p. 199.
20 Fraser, ‘Sohdarity or Singularity?’, p. 316.
21 Hendley, ‘Putting Ourselves Up For Question: A Postmodern Critique o f Richard Rorty’s 
Postmodern Bourgeois Liberahsm’, Journal of Value Inquiry 29 (1995), pp. 241 — 253 at 249, 
emphasis in original.
22 MulhaU and Swift, Uberals and Communitarians  ^ p. 265. Similarly, for Fraser, ‘Pohtical discourse 
in fact is restricted by Rorty to those who speak the language of bourgeois liberalism’. Fraser, 
‘Solidarity or Singularity?’, p. 316.
23 MulhaU and Swift, Uberals and Communitarians, p. 273, emphasis in original.
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Theirs is however an inadequate summary o f  w hat Rorty’s position entails, bo th  in  its 
stated intent and in its logic. They think it im portant to  engage with non-Hberals, bu t are 
mistaken to think that Rorty disagrees w ith them  on  this point. Curiously, they 
themselves quote the passage from  Rorty in which he states his actual position on  the 
question o f  addressing non-hberals Hke N ietzsche and Loyola:
W e do no t conclude that N ietzsche and Loyola are crazy because they 
hold unusual views o f  certain “ fundam ental” topics; rather, we conclude 
this only after extensive attem pts at an exchange o f  pohtical views have 
made us reahze that we are no t going to  get anywhere,^"^
It is clear from  this passage that we com e to the conclusion that such people are ‘crazy’ 
not, as MulhaU and Swift claim, because o f  the views they hold, nor do we reach that 
conclusion ‘in advance’ o f  the attem pt to converse with them . W e do so only after 
‘extensive efforts at an exchange’, one which dem onstrates their lack o f  conversabihty.
T hat hberal democracies cannot tolerate every conceivable view point is necessarily true, 
since to do so w ould m ean tolerating values that are themselves intolerant. It is by 
exploiting this truth that some critics claim that hberals are intolerant, as for example 
H oni H aber does w hen he writes that Rorty is aiding ‘the construction o f  the dom ination 
o f  normalizing and disciplinary regimes’,^  ^ som ething that he claims is ‘terroristic’,^  ^ By 
privileging hberal values, Rorty is held to be denying a voice, and a place in the 
conversation, to  critics o f  those values, Rorty’s account o f  hberahsm  does n o t however
Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truth, p, 191, Quoted by MulhaU and Swift, Uberals and 
Communitarians, p, 265,
25 Haber, Btyond Postmodern Politics, p, 54, The same point is made by Jo Burrows, ‘Conversational 
Pohtics’, p, 331 — 334,
25 Haber, Beyond Postmodern Politics, p, 63,
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rule ou t non-liberal theorising, bu t only practices that cannot be fitted into the practice 
o f  Hberal democracies. I t  does n o t rule out Marxist or fundamentaHst rehgious behef, bu t 
only behaviour that, as a consequence o f  those behefs, the Hberal democracies cannot 
accept. By using the w ord ‘terror’ to  describe the poin t that some practices cannot be 
tolerated, H aber drains the w ord o f  any meaning. However, to  address the substantive 
issue o f  how  Hberals can justify excluding the practices that they do, Hberals can, I have 
suggested, only say that those practices are unreasonable, and explain why they think this 
by reference to widely held beHefs about the im portance o f  Hberty, equaHty, etc. The 
m ost notew orthy feature o f  Rorty’s view is, as I suggested in chapter 5, that he faces up 
to  the circularity o f  this position m ore reacHly than m ost other Hberals.
16.3 Incom m ensurability and incom parability
O ne can see why MuUiaU and Swift are led to their erroneous conclusion. They take 
Rorty to be com m itted to  the view that Hberals and non-Hberals are each locked into 
their ow n particular language game, w ith the result that in some cases, two different 
vocabularies are incom m ensurable and therefore mutuaUy uninteUigible.^^ Although he is 
sometimes thought to  endorse incommensurabiHty as unintelHgibiHty,^® Rorty in fact 
joins D onald D avidson in rejecting it. As D avidson puts it, ‘[djifferent points o f  view 
make sense, bu t only if  there is a com m on co-ordinate system on which to  p lot them; yet 
the existence o f  a com m on system beHes the claim o f  dramatic in c o m p a r a b iH ty ’.^^ Rorty 
agrees, although, in a rare criticism, censures Davidson for running together
27 MulhaU and Swift, Uberals and Communitarians, p. 264.
28 McLaren et al, ‘Richard Rorty’s Self-Help LiberaHsm’, p. 147. The consequence of this is held 
to be, as Jonathan G. AUen says, that for Rorty people in different ‘forms of Hfe’ cannot 
understand each other. AUen, ‘The Situated Critic or the Loyal Critic?’, p. 35.
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‘incommensurability’ with ‘untranslatability’.^  ^ W hilst it is true that there is no ‘meta- 
vocabulary’ into which all vocabularies can be fixed, ‘no perm anent ahistorical 
metaphysical fram ework into which everything can be fitted’^ ,^ this does n o t entail that 
different vocabularies are mutually incom prehensible and thus that they cannot be 
compared, Rorty argues that it is self-refuting to say this, for the very ability to  recognise 
a language as a language in order to  make a judgem ent about translatabihty already means 
that one has ascribed it meaning. As he puts it, ‘I do no t see how  we could teU w hen we 
had come against a hum an practice which we knew to be linguistic and also knew to be 
so foreign that we m ust give up hope o f  knowing w hat it w ould be like to  engage in  it,’^  ^
O ne can com pare different practices or values or forms o f  life, no t against the G od’s Eye 
View, bu t with respect to  some particular standard or value.
For Davidson, iucommensurability is a consequence o f  w hat he calls the ‘third dogma o f  
empiricism’, the schem e-content distinction. This dogma holds that there is a separation 
between the world as it exists ‘ou t there’, and the ‘conceptual schem e’ we bring to bear in 
order to  constitute it. The ensuing talk o f  ‘conceptual relativism’ is, he thinks, empty, 
since there is no  way to specify w hen one conceptual scheme ends and another begins. 
Following Davidson, Rorty regards the schem e-content distinction as resting upon  a 
form  o f  faculty psychology, in which the a priori categories o f  the m ind organise the 
unconceptualised experience with which it is presented. H e writes that: ‘Since Kant, we 
find it alm ost impossible no t to think o f  the m ind as divided into active and passive 
faculties, the form er using concepts to  “interpret” w hat “the w orld” imposes on the
29 Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 
p, 184,
30 Rorty, Philosophj and the Mirror of'Nature, p, 302, n. 35,
31 Rorty, Objectivity, T£lativism, and Truth, p, 215,
32 Ibid., p, 215, emphasis in original.
237
latter.’^  ^ There is however no noum enal self that sits back and, guided solely by pure 
practical reason, organises experience. There is no  sense in  which unconceptuaHsed 
empirical input provides the evidence o f  our beliefs; there is, in short, no  ‘given’. As 
Rorty concludes, ‘w ithout the notions o f  “the given” and o f  “the a priori” there can be 
no  notion o f  “the constitution o f  experience” . Thus there can be no  notion o f  alternative 
experiences, or alternative worlds, to  be constituted by the adoption o f  new a priori 
concepts.’^ "^  N o  sense can be given to  the idea o f  alternative conceptual schemes dividing 
the world up in  different ways. Thus there are ‘no  such things as “concepm al schemes” 
b u t only slightly different sets o f  beliefs and desires’.^  ^ Incom m ensurability is at m ost ‘a 
tem porary inconvenience’.^ ^
It m ust be said that Rorty sometimes seems to  imply that the difference is one that stems 
from  conceptual relativism. This is seen for example w hen he distinguishes different 
vocabularies by following K uhn’s distinction betw een norm al and abnorm al discourses, 
and in his suggestion (rejected in chapter 4) that ironists can entertain doubts about their 
entire vocabulary. Hilary Pum am  criticises Rorty’s account on this po in t for treating the 
standards o f  justification within a language game as if  they were algorithms, o f  the sort 
com puters foUow w hen m aking calculations.^^ Pum am ’s discussion focuses on  Philosophj 
and the M irror o f Nature, and this criticism does not, I think, apply to  Rorty’s subsequent
Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 3,
34 Ibid., p. 5. Indeed, it is this claim that leads to relativism, for if one accepts with Kant that 
there is a distinction between scheme and content, then truth will indeed be relative to the 
scheme used. Rorty is, however, not a relativist, as he does not believe that there are different 
schemes for truth to be relative to. On this point, Rorty’s account parallels that o f Nagel who, 
like Davidson, argues that Kant opened the door to relativism and subjectivism. In contrast to 
Davidson however, Nagel, as I mentioned in chapter 3, thinks this a reason to return to a 
Cartesian view of human reason.
33 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 217.
36 Ibid., p. 216.
37 Putnam, Renewing Philosophj, pp. 67 — 69. The same point has been made by Magnus Reitberger, 
Consequences of Contingency: the pragmatism and politics of Rdchard Rorty (Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of 
Stockholm, 2000), p. 180.
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writings, where he is clear that the frontiers o f  language games are always tem porary, and 
that social norm s are, by their nature, only partially expressed in explicit criteria.^^
This po in t emerges clearly in  Rorty’s view o f  incommensurability w hen it is applied to 
culture. F or Rorty, this relies on  a mistakenly conceptualised (or as Brian Barry calls it, 
‘essentialized’^ )^ view o f  culture. Steven Lukes believes that w hat he calls ‘anti- 
universahst’ accounts such as Rorty’s rest ‘upon  a thoroughly misconceived and indeed 
inapplicable notion o f  culture, the product o f  w hat Seyla Benhabib calls a “poo r m an’s 
sociology” .’"*^ T hat is, it is a sociology that views cultures as unified and hom ogeneous, 
rather than  recognising them  as sites o f  heterogeneity and contestation, Rorty’s account 
however, as we saw iu chapter 6, assumes nothing o f  the kind. H e is clear that cultures 
are n o t structures that constrain hum an thought and behaviour, bu t are rather fluid 
patterns o f  thought and behaviour. As that behaviour changes, so do cultures. *To think 
otherwise is’, he puts it, is ‘the Cartesian fallacy o f  seeing axioms where there are only 
shared habits, o f  viewing statem ents which summarize such practices as if  they reported 
constraints enforcing such practices’."^  ^ Like languages, cultures are no t hom ogeneous, 
and they are no t governed by sets o f  criteria. Rather, they are constandy changing 
practices. T o  hold that cultures are incom m ensurable is to view them  as having a specific 
design, to  which their m em bers cannot bu t adhere, som ething which is clearly no t the 
case. T he difference betw een cultures is no t different in kind to the differences within 
them: there is no  reason to  think that any two m em bers o f  the same culture will have 
anything m ore in com m on with each other than two people from  different cultures. As 
he puts it, ‘The Tasm anian aborigines and the British colonists had trouble
See for example Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism, and Truth, p. 164. 
39 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 11.
Lukes, Eiherals and Cannibals, p. 19.
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p 26.
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communicating, bu t this trouble was different only in extent from  the difficulties in 
com m unication experienced by G ladstone and D israeh '/^
Thus, to return to the criticism levelled by MulhaU and Swift, Rorty’s po in t is no t that no  
understanding is possible betw een different value systems, bu t rather that we understand 
enough to know that no com prom ise is achievable betw een them . This, however, is a 
conclusion that we reach after ‘extensive efforts’ to  seek such a compromise. Rorty 
would be guilty o f  flouting w hat he caUs ‘the spirit o f  accom m odation and toleration’"^  ^
were he to refuse in advance any attem pt to converse with such people, b u t this is no t 
the case. The craziness o f  N ietzsche and Loyola stems n o t from  the beliefs they hold, bu t 
because those views mean, after we have tried, that we cannot get anywhere. T hat is, we 
reach that conclusion n o t because o f  the beliefs they hold, b u t because they are held 
dogmaficaUy."^ W e m ight decide that Loyola and N ietzsche are m ad after attem pting to 
converse with them  as individuals, bu t we do n o t rule out in  advance as ‘m ad’ that 
category o f  people we have defined as ‘non-liberal’. Thus, although Rorty caUs Nietzsche 
‘m ad’, he treats Nietzscheans as people w ho potentiaUy have a role to  play in liberal 
democracies."^^ There is in o ther words a difference betw een m ad beliefs and m ad people, 
bu t it is a distinction that MulhaU and Swift miss by m oving backwards and forwards 
between presenting Rorty’s account as, on  the one hand, concerning liberals and non- 
Hberals, whilst on  the other presenting it as betw een liberals and N ietzsche and Loyola. 
In the latter case Rorty does conclude that they are mad, bu t for the reasons just 
discussed this does no t m ean he views aU non-liberals in  the same way.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., p. 190.
44 The content of some beliefs, for example of the religious fundamentalist, are likely to mean 
that they are not conversable. But Rorty is clear that we should try. On this point, Rorty might 
perhaps agree with Barry that a dogmatist can be thought of not as ‘someone who adheres to a 
dogma, but someone who adheres to it dogmaticaUy.’ Barry, Liberty and Justice, p. 38.
45 Rorty, Objectivity, Lelativism, and Truth, pp. 15 — 16.
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16.4 Two attem pts to overcome ethnocentric parochialism
Many who, like Rorty, reject foundationalism  nevertheless think that Rorty’s 
ethnocentrism  comm its him  to w hat Connolly calls ‘social foundationalism ’, arguing that 
the standards upon which argum ent and justification take place are too  narrow 
(excessively ethnocentric). I will consider this concern, and how  Rorty m ight respond to 
it, in  a discussion o f  two suggestions that have been made, respectively, by M atthew 
Festenstein and Hilary Putnam.
16.4.1 M atthew Festenstein: general versus ‘substantive’ ethnocentrism
Festenstein seeks to defend an ethnocentric account by showing that ethnocentrism  
needs n o t be parochial. H e distinguishes three separate senses o f  the term: first, that 
vocabularies do no t require foundations in a metaphysical conception o f  hum an nature; 
secondly, that there are no criteria external to all vocabularies that can adjudicate disputes 
betw een them ; and thirdly, as a consequence political argum ent should be conducted by 
appeals to  local standards rather than ‘general principles’.^  ^ I f  we keep these distinctions 
in m ind, Festenstein believes that it will be seen that Rorty wrongly infers from  the 
rejection o f  philosophical foundations that aU we can do is seek justification by appealing 
to localised standards. In  Festenstein’s terms, we can accept ethnocentrism  w ithout being 
com m itted to a ‘substantive ethnocentrism ’ (the third elem ent he identifies) which is 
excessively narrow, and privileges ‘w hat we do around here’. O ne can, he writes, accept
^  Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theory, pp. 113,117.
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the ethnocentric account o f  justification Rorty offers w ithout requiring it ‘should take a 
substantively ethnocentric form, appealing only to  local convention rather than to  m ore 
general principles or truths’.^ ^^
I t is clear why Festenstein seeks to separate different elements o f  ethnocentrism , for he is 
rightly concerned to distinguish the inescapable fact that views come (so to speak) from  
som ew here from  the potentially unpalatable consequences o f  privileging the standards o f  
one particular group. However, his distinction betw een local convention and general 
principles cannot be m ade as firmly as he believes. N o  firm distinction can be sustained 
if  we accept the implications o f  the second sense o f  ethnocentrism  — the absence o f  
criteria external to  all vocabularies. T o  illustrate, Festenstein writes that despite w hat he 
takes to  be its failings, ‘substantive ethnocentrism ’ m ight still be thought to offer ‘a m ore 
persuasive way to argue on behalf o f  liberalism than arguments couched in  terms o f  
principles’.^ ®^ For Rorty however, principles are summaries o f  the m oral practices o f  
particular communities: he agrees with Michael O akeshott that ‘A t best, they are 
pedagogical aids to  the acquisition o f  such p r a c t ic e s .T h e y  can be used to  adjudicate 
betw een local conflicts, bu t they themselves emerged from  local practices, and so there is 
no  clear distinction betw een appealing to principle and appealing to  ‘w hat we do around 
here’. Rorty accepts that an individual’s beliefs are no t the last word: like Rawls’s appeal 
to an A rchim edean point, Rorty advocates abstracting away from  the subjective for 
purposes o f  public policy. B ut this is n o t to invoke a standard that is different to  ‘local 
convention’, bu t is to turn  to  a particular com m on ground:
Ibid., p. 126, emphasis in original.
48 Ibid., p. 127.
49 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 59.
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T he idea that m oral and pohtical controversies should always be 
“brought back to first principles” is reasonable if  it means merely that we 
should seek com m on ground in the hope o f  attaining agreement. But it is 
misleading if  it is taken as the claim that there is a natural order o f 
premises from  which m oral and pohtical conclusions are to  be inferred.^®
T he reasons why communities appeal to  one set o f  principles rather than another, and 
the specific interpretations we give o f  those principles, are themselves ‘substantiaUy 
ethnocentric’. The distinction then between Festenstein’s second and third sense o f  
ethnocentrism  (inescapable contextuahsm  and substantive ethnocentrism ) breaks down, 
because they are bo th  elements o f  the same thing.
For Festenstein, the concern is that on a ‘substantively ethnocentric’ account such as 
R orty’s, non-hberals are required to  m eet hberahsm on  its own narrow ground. Unless 
those chaUenges appeal to  ‘local anecdote and protocol’^  ^ that are acceptable to hberals, 
they are ruled out. In  saying this, Festenstein seems to  reproduce the error o f  MulhaU 
and Swift, since he imphes that critics o f  hberahsm are ruled out a priori. But unhke 
them , Festenstein recognises that this is no t the case, and that Rorty w ould conclude that 
som eone is ‘crazy’ only after having m ade genuine and strenuous efforts to reach 
understanding with them. I suggest m oreover that Rorty’s account is no  less open than 
Festenstein’s own view. T o  explain, Festenstein suggest that ‘w hat hberals find w rong 
with “Loyola” is that he possesses an excessively rigid and hierarchical view o f  hum an 
capabihties. This then is w hat makes him  “crazy” for hberals . . . ,  no t [as Festenstein takes
50 Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism, and Truth, p. 190.
51 Festenstein, Pragmatism and Political Theoiy, p. 117. Festenstein accepts Rorty’s view that 
ethnocentrism is very far from relativism since, if anything, ethnocentrism commits one too 
strongly to the values of one’s ethnos. He describes this refusal to meet non-hberals on anything
243
to  be Rorty’s position] the bare failure to agree’.^  ^ B ut what is the difference here? The 
failure to  agree is for Rorty n o t just a %are’ one, bu t results from  an insurm ountable 
disagreem ent about substantive beliefs, o f  which the nature o f  hum an capabilities is 
likely, in the example o f  som eone like Loyola, to  be one. Such disagreement does no t 
itself escape w hat Festenstein calls ‘substantive ethnocentrism ’, since the liberal 
egahtarian view that hum ans are fundamentally equal is itself substantively ethnocentric: 
it emerges from  a particular context, and, although it can be articulated in  term s o f  
principles, those principles are themselves, from  the point o f  view o f  som eone hke 
Loyola, pecuhar to  w hat Rorty calls the rich N orth  Atlantic democracies.
16.4.2. Hilary Putnam  on V arran ted  assertabihty’
Hilary Putnam  agrees with Rorty that reason and justification are historically conditioned. 
H e writes that: ‘O ur norm s and standards o f  warranted assertabihty are historical 
products; they evolve in fime’.^  ^ H e also accepts the coroUary that w hat counts as a 
justified behef is influenced by contingent hum an interests. A t the same time, Putnam  
worries that Rorty endorses a form  o f  com placent maj oritarianism, whereby w hat counts 
as ‘better’ is whatever a comm unity (or its majority) takes to  be ‘better’. H e thus thinks 
Rorty w ould deny a proposition that he him self holds, namely that ‘W hether a statem ent 
is w arranted or no t is independent o f  w hether the majority o f one’s cultural peers would 
say it is w arranted or unw arranted’.^ "^  This distinction grows out o f  his prior distinction 
betw een better and worse ‘epistemic situations’, a distinction which enables him  to say
other than hberal ground as ‘an unlimited anti-relativism’, p. 123, There is for Rorty only one 
standard, the hberal one, which is legitimate.
52 Ibid., p. 127.
55 Putnam, Realism With A  Human Face, p. 21.
54 Ibid., emphasis in original.
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that some audiences are better inform ed, and m ore thoughtful, than others. As Putnam  
understands him, Rorty is in contrast com m itted to  saying that whatever a particular 
audience thinks or values is necessarily o f  value; there are no  other criteria to  judge the 
standards o f  that community. Morally, this means that whatever a comm unity happens to 
think o f  as morally good or progressive is morally good or progressive, even if  this means 
the rise o f  fascism, since the standards by which morality and m oral progress is measured 
can only be that o f  the people w ho employ them  — Nazis will by definition find Nazism  a 
morally superior form  o f  life to  liberalism.^^
Putnam  argues that although standards o f  w arrant are historically conditioned, that they 
are no t simply whatever comes about. M oral im provem ent is judged:
From  within our picture o f  the world, o f  course. But from  within that 
picture itself, m  say that “better” isn’t the same as “m  think it’s better.”
A nd if  my “cultural peers” don’t agree with me, sometimes I still say 
“better” (or “worse”). There are times when, as Stanley Cavell puts it, I 
“rest on  m yself as my foundation.” *^^
W e m ust be clear w hat Putnam  means here. H e denies that to  hold ‘warranted 
assertability’ to  be different from, and often opposed to, majority opinion, reflects the 
nature o f  a transcendent reality or ‘G od’s-Eye View’. His po in t is that it is a ‘property’ o f  
the notion o f  warranted assertability that it is independent of, and can therefore be 
different to, majority opinion.^^ In  giving content to  warranted assertability, Putnam  
believes that he can say that fascism w ould no t count as progress, even if  a majority held
55 Ibid., p. 2 3 -2 4 .
56 Ibid., p. 26, emphasis in original. The same point is made by Gutting, Pragmatic Liberalism and 
the Critique of Modernity, p. 22.
245
it to  be so. A rm ed with this notion o f  w arranted assertability, he opposes w hat he takes 
to  be Rorty’s relativism in which that truth or goodness or justice is whatever we happen 
to  th ink around here.
It certainly seems as if  there is a difference betw een Putnam  and Rorty w ith regard to 
how  far w arrant is different from  w hat a com m unity takes to  be warranted. U nlike 
Putnam , Rorty seems to say that w arrant does depend upon  a (at least a sizeable) majority:
[...] maybe a majority can be wrong. But suppose everybody in the 
com m unity ... thinks S m ust be a bit crazy [to assertp \. They think this 
even after patiently listening to  S’s defence o f  and after making 
sustained attem pts to  talk him  out o f  it. M ight S still be warranted in 
asserting^?^®
Rorty is however writing here o f  warrant, n o t truth. H e goes on to  say that p  m ight be 
true, because truth is independent o f  w hat anyone thinks. W arrant is in contrast 
necessarily tied to the standards and norm s o f  a particular community, since w arrant and 
justification can, as has been argued for in chapter 5, only be a sociological m atter, made 
by reference to the standards o f  the comm unity S is addressing. For Rorty, in proposing 
the ‘G od-Eye View’, Putnam  is com m itted to agreeing with him  on this point, and he 
thinks it is only Putnam ’s fear o f  relativism that stops him  firom so d o i n g . T h e  only 
alternative sense by which S m ight be warranted is if  there were a natural order o f  
reasons that supplied criteria o f  w arrant independent o f  any such community. N o  sense 
can how ever be m ade o f  that notion. In  the absence o f  the natural order o f  reasons.
5“^ Putnam, 'Realism With A. Human Face, p. 22.
58 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 50, emphasis in original.
59 Rorty, Ohjectivity, 'Relativism and Truth, pp. 24 — 27.
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rational acceptability cannot m ean anything other than acceptance o f  a particular hum an 
community. Susan M endus, thinking Rorty m ust provide some sort o f  substantive 
criterion to the notion o f  better and worse standards o f  ‘w arrant’ and ‘justification’, 
argues that he uses the stability o f  communities as the criterion to judge their worth.^® 
W ere that the criterion, she would o f  course be correct to  go on to criticise Rorty by 
pointing out that stable societies have often been oppressive. Rorty however never cites 
this as the criterion, and in fact claims to  give no substantive account o f  ‘bettem ess’. He 
writes that ‘maybe somebody wiU come along with a better idea, a better epistemic 
community, a better form  o f  life’.^  ^ But since he cannot resort to  a transcendental 
account o f  ‘reason’, ‘fiee’, ‘open’, etc., he can only m ean that ‘better’ means ‘better to  us’ 
(and he takes it, given everything Pum am  has said about the impossibility and incoherence 
o f  the G od’s-Eye View, that he cannot consistently m ean anything other than this).
17. Extending boundaries
17.1 JustiG cation through w ide reflective equilibrium
The way to  avoid the dangers o f  ethnocentrism  is, I wiU now  argue, n o t to seek to draw 
distinctions within ethnocentrism  as a concept, or to  think o f  ‘warrant’ as a property 
which floats free o f  current practice, bu t rather to seek to extend the frontiers o f  ‘we’, to 
consider m ore and m ore people in an effort to  make the process o f  reflective equilibrium 
as wide as possible.
Mendus, ‘“What of soul was left, I wonder?’, p. 58. 
61 Rorty, “Response to Susan Haack,” p. 150.
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F or Rorty, justification entails a process o f  reflective equilibrium, in  which we seek 
coherence and consistency betw een our principles and our intuitions. As we have seen, 
Rorty values John  Rawls’s writings in part because o f  Rawls’s concern w ith reflective 
equilibrium, in which justification is a m atter o f  weighing intuitions with general 
principles. This leaves open the question o f  precisely whose intuitions these are. A 
problem  for Rorty, as it is for Rawls, is that consistency and coherence are fairly easy to 
secure if  one is prepared to  ignore o r elirninate problem atic data. I f  coherence is the only 
m ark o f  justification, there is no  reason why difficult or unwelcome viewpoints may no t 
simply be sidelined o r excluded. This concern is exacerbated once it is appreciated that 
reflective equilibrium is the m ethod n o t only by which we test our principles, bu t in 
which we decide w hat principles to test, and to  w hom  to test them ; that is, we use it to  
decide w ho does and does no t deserve a justification: ‘questions about w hom  we need 
justify ourselves to  — questions about w ho counts as a fanatic and w ho deserves an 
answer — can be treated as just further m atters to  be sorted out in the course o f  attaining 
reflective equilibrium’.^ ^
Thus although Rorty believes that Rawls does no t fall into an empty-headed relativism 
bu t stakes out a middle ground betw een relativism and ahistorical notions o f  reason and 
humanity, others have suggested otherwise. G erald Gaus believes that reflective 
equilibrium is merely inferentialist, and that unless there is some reason to suppose the 
beliefs w ith which one begins w ith are in his w ord ‘credible’, making one’s beliefs cohere 
does nothing to  produce credibility.*^^ The problem  with w hat he calls ‘political 
justification’ is that people often ignore good reasons for belief. Gaus seeks to  provide a 
theory o f  justification that specifies w hether a principle is justified or not, even if  it is no t
Rorty, Objectivity, RBÏativism and Truth, p. 193.
Gerald F. Gaus, JustiJicatoy Liberalism: A n  Esscy on Epistemolo^ and Political Theory (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1996).
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thought o f  as such. This he does by specifying, by reference to his ‘m oral epistemology’, 
w hat counts as a justified principle, which shows that some principles are justified even if  
they rem ain contested.
G aus bases his account o f  justification on  a form  o f  w hat he calls ‘weak 
foundationalism ’, which holds that some principles are self-justifying. Reflective 
equilibrium rejects the possibility o f  self-justification, bu t Gaus suggests that in fact 
coherence theories o f  justification such as reflective equilibrium are themselves 
fbundationalist, treating some beliefs as self-justifying. As such, reflective equilibrium is 
m ore fbundationalist than his own proposal which ‘restricts the principle o f  self­
justification to  a smaller set o f  beliefs’.*^'^
In  saying this he is however in error. Reflective equilibrium rejects the possibility o f  self­
justification. Rawls is clear that there are no beliefs that cannot be challenged: there are 
‘no judgem ents on any level o f  generality that are in principle im m une to  revision. Even 
the totally o f  particular judgements are no t assigned a decisive role’.^  ^Rawls thus makes 
the anti-foundationaUst po in t that there are no epistemicaUy basic beliefs; rather, as Rorty 
makes clear, all o f  our beliefs can be called into question, but no t all at the same time.^^ 
G aus’s position, which is that ‘self-justified’ beliefs have only rniriimal credibility, is thus 
very similar to  the object o f  his criticism. Both Gaus and Rawls think that every belief, 
including w hat Gaus thinks o f  as ‘self-justified’ ones, can be challenged and rejected. This 
does not, as Connolly believes, make community foundational, though it does provide the 
background against which justification takes place. In  the practice o f  justification however, 
no single communal standard is inviolate or immune to challenge.
^  Ibid., p. 94.
5^ John Rawls, “The Independence o f Moral Theory,” in Samuel Freeman (ed.) John Rawls: 
Collected Refers (London: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 286 — 302 at 289.
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This idea is captured, as I discussed in chapter 1, in Rorty’s idea o f  conversation 
replacing confrontation and argumentation. Critics such as James Kisser associate 
conversation with superficiality, contrasting it w ith the rigour and rationality o f 
a r g u m e n t . H o w e v e r ,  by conversation Rorty means openness to  o ther beliefs and 
opinions, even those that are no t currendy taken to be rational. It is therefore the ideal 
form  o f  inquiry, contrasting w ith w hat he regards as the closed-mindedness o f 
argumentation.^® Rorty accepts the point that Gaus makes, that coherence does no t 
guarantee worth. G iven the right premises, anything can be m ade to  appear rational: ‘any 
fool thing can be m ade to  seem rational by being set in an appropriate context, 
surrounded by a set o f  beliefs and desires w ith which it coheres’.^  ^ H e sees the way to 
avoid such dangers is to  adopt w hat Rawls calls wide reflective equilibrium. Rawls argues 
against the idea that reflective equilibrium is merely a m atter o f  securing coherence 
between our parochial beliefs, whatever they may be, by drawing a distinction betw een 
wide and narrow reflective equilibrium.^® W ide reflective equilibrium is m ore than m ere 
coherence am ongst beliefs, since it entails that we consider different conceptions o f 
justice, notably other views o f  justice contained in the history o f  philosophy. Similarly, 
Rorty suggests that the quality o f  justification increases w ith the greater the num ber o f  
people we take in to  account:
Justification gets better as the comm unity to  which justification is offered 
becomes m ore sophisticated and complex, m ore aware o f  possible 
sources o f  evidence and m ore capable o f  dreaming up imaginative new
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature  ^pp. 180 — 181.
James Risser, “Rortyan Pragmatism as Hermeneutics Praxis’.
68 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism p. 171.
69 Rorty, "Truth and Freedom: A Reply To Thomas McCarthy’, p. 640. 
"^0 Rawls, “The Independence of Moral Theory,” p. 289.
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hypotheses and proposals. So pragmatists place the capacity to  create at 
the centre o f  their image o f  humanity, superseding the ability to  know.^^
In  saying this, Rorty is referring to  justification for liberal societies, those which value 
open-m indedness, creativity and pluralism. T hat is, it is an account o f  justification for the 
liberal pragmatist, no t justification qua justification; justification as a concept is itself 
neutral betw een the size and quality o f  the interlocutors, there being many societies that 
do n o t think there is any necessity for that comm unity to  be imaginative or sophisticated.
I t is one thing to  claim, correctly, that tru th  is tested by reference to  current standards, 
since propositions only makes sense within a language game: TJttermg a sentence 
w ithout a fixed place in a language game is ... to  u tter som ething w ith is neither true nor 
false’.^  ^ I t  is another to say, wrongly, that those standards are all we will ever have; Rorty 
continues by saying that ‘this is no t to say that it may not, in time, become a truth-value 
candidate’. H e writes that ‘many (praiseworthy and blameworthy) social m ovem ents and 
intellectual revolutions get started by people making ^^«warranted assertions’,^  ^ that is, 
assertions that were no t justified by the standards and norm s o f  the time. In  such cases, 
the po in t o f  such m ovem ents is to  change such standards. Rorty’s com m ending to us 
‘abnorm al discourse,’ to  value new and currently (literally) meaningless statem ents as a 
way to  further our efforts at ‘coping,’ indicates his strong desire for us to  go beyond 
existing norm s.
17.2 ‘Idea l rational acceptability* as an epistem ological and as a p o litica l notion
Richard Rorty, “Pragmatism,” in Edward Craig (ed.) Rutledge Encyclopaedia of Philosophy 
(London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 633 — 640 at 637.
"^2 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 18.
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For this reason, Rorty’s account is rather to  closer to  Putnam ’s than the latter will allow. 
Putnam  holds on to the idea o f  ‘ideal rational acceptability’ but, unlike for example 
Jurgen H aberm as, rejects the idea o f  convergence at the end o f  inquiry. By ‘ideal rational 
acceptability’ he is concerned to  show that he m eans som ething very m odest, rejecting 
Peirce’s view o f  a single ideal comm unity that could justify every true statem ent and the 
view (which he attributes to  Bernard Williams) that the concept o f  knowledge itself leads 
to  convergence.^^^ In  its place, he proposes w hat he thinks o f  as the m uch m ore m odest 
no tion  o f  an ‘ideal audience’, by which he means that, for any for any given case, there 
are be tter and worse epistemic situations. H e gives the example ‘There is a chair in my 
study’, and writes that in this case, the ideal epistemic situation to  verify the truth o f  this 
statem ent would be one with the lights on or daylight entering the room , with good 
eyesight, w ith a m ind unconfused by drugs or hypnosis, etc.^^ Rorty can, as we saw in 
chapter 3, agree with the idea o f  better and worse epistemic simations if  these notions are 
construed politically; that is, if  they are viewed as m atters such as freedom  o f  speech, 
access to  educational opportunities, etc. In  response to  the claim that he cannot allow for 
w hat is true and w hat virtually everyone takes to  be true, Rorty as we have seen denies 
that tru th  is an attainable goal. W hat m atters, rather, is truthfulness:
[...] it does no t m atter w hether “two plus two is four” is true, m uch less 
w hether this tru th  is “subjective” or “corresponds to  external reahty” . All 
that m atters is that if  you do beheve it, you can say it w ithout getting 
hurt. In other words, w hat m atters is your ability to talk to  o ther people
Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 50.
Putnam, Rea/ism mth a Human Face, p. 171. 
Ibid., p. viü.
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about w hat seems to you true, no t w hat is in fact true. I f  we take care o f 
freedom, tru th  can take care o f  itself.
Putnam  however, although he clearly values truthfulness and the political conditions 
which it requires as greatly as Rorty, seems in his example to think that there is 
som ething m ore to  be said, since he views ‘ideal conditions’ no t in  pohtical bu t in 
epistemic terms. This suggests that bettem ess is a m atter o f  clarity; that is, it is suggestive 
o f  representationahsm . Against this, Rorty suggests that the only content that Putnam  
can give to the notion o f  an ‘ideal epistemic situation’ is by reference to our, liberal 
egalitarian standards. H e writes that, w ithout tru th  at the end o f  inquiry, ‘the terms 
“warranted,” “rationally acceptable,” and so on  will always invite the question “to 
whom ?” This question will always lead us back, it seems to  m e, to the answer at our 
best” .’^  ^ W hen Rorty writes o f  ‘us, at our best’, however, he claims n o t to m ean us as 
those w ho share the same substantive views as we do. H e m eans rather those ‘w ho come 
to hold beliefs that are different from  ours by a process that we, by our present notions o f  
the difference betw een rational persuasion and force, count as rational persuasion’.^ ® O ur 
putative future betters do no t necessarily hold the same substantive beliefs that we do, 
bu t hold to  a belief in the im portance o f  freedom, that is, how  it is good beliefs come to 
be held.
In his m ost recent com m entary on Rorty, Putnam  takes up this idea o f  m oral progress as 
w hat we think o f  as m oral progress, arguing that the idea o f  appealing to our future selves 
is ‘meaningless’. As far as 1 can see, Putnam ’s reason for thinking it meaningless is that, 
simply enough, we will no t be around in the future to  see w hatever the outcom e o f  time
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 176.
Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 53, emphasis in original. 
78 Ibid., p, 54.
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has brought about, let alone be able to  voice a judgem ent about it. D oes ‘it make any 
sense’, he writes, ‘to  ask w hether our present construes o f  the Am erican constitution are 
the result o f  arguments that the Founding Fathers would have recognised as appealing to 
“better versions o f  themselves”?’^  ^ Rorty’s response is that yes, it does make sense. ‘It 
seems to m e that the better sort o f  judges and politicians ask themselves this sort o f 
question all the tim e’.®® It makes sense because, if  we give up the idea o f  ahistoric rational 
criteria, we have nothing else:
O nce we give up the idea that rationality is a m atter o f  applying 
ahistorical criteria (as we have to  in order to  deal w ith the fact that 
criteria o f  choice betw een theories and policies are as m utable as the 
theories and practices themselves), we have nowhere to  turn  except to 
such stories.®^
Richard Eldridge concludes that for Rorty, ‘the criterion o f  choice am ong existing 
practices is: w hen they conflict, by and large choose the m ore recent one’.®^ Together 
with writers such as M endus w ho thinks that the criterion o f  ‘bettem ess’ is stability, 
Daniel Conway w ho wants a thicker description o f  ‘cruelty’, and (correspondingly) John  
H orton ’s request for a thicker description o f  ‘liberal’, Eldridge seeks a criterion o f  value 
in Rorty’s account where one does no t exist. T hat som ething is a recent developm ent 
does n o t m ean that it counts as m oral progress; it is obvious for example that Rorty 
would agree with Pum am  that a N azi future would n o t be a sign o f  progress. Insofar as
Hilary Putnam, ‘Richard Rorty on Reality and Justification’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) Rûrp 
and his Critics (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 81 — 87 at 85.
Richard Rorty, ‘Response to Hilary Putnam’, in Robert B. Brandom (ed.) R o ^  and his Critics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), pp. 87 — 90 at 89.
81 Ibid.
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Rorty provides a criterion o f  choice, it is ‘that which results in a free and open 
encounter’. However, he resists giving content to  this notion in terms o f  principles, or in 
term s o f  epistemic conditions, criticising for example H aberm as for his reliance on 
metaphysics to ground this principle. Rorty in contrast can only offer examples, which 
are, once again, ethnocentric. It is ‘m ore hke the twentieth century than the twelfth, m ore 
like the Prussian Academy in 1925 than in 1935.’®^
This how ever raises an ambiguity. This is that Rorty sometimes runs together two 
separate points, an account o f  w hat counts as progress for anti-foundationahsm, and 
w hat counts as progress for particular hum an beings. In  the first case, progress is 
w hatever a com m unity o f  inquirers take to be progress. Fascism is, trivially but terribly, 
progress for fascists. Rorty is however primarily concerned with w hat counts as progress 
on his liberal ironist view. This is w hat results from  free and open inquiry. However, why 
should that be seen as the way to  achieve progress? Clearly we think o f  it in these terms, 
bu t w hat if  our future selves came to  hold that w hatever results from  a different m ethod, 
such as hstening to  religious leaders, as progress? Rorty w ould probably reply that we 
w ould n o t recognise it as progress. In  that case however, Rorty clearly im poses limits on 
our better, future, selves. They are in effect only our better future selves if  they continue 
to hold at least some o f  our own views, notably about fundam ental equality; even if  our 
future selves concluded that w om en were inferior to m en, or blacks to whites, we would 
no t regard that as a m oral im provem ent, no  m atter how  free or open the conversation 
that produced it. Because he specifies this condition, I think that he gets even closer to
Richard Eldridge, ‘Philosophy and the Achievement of Community. Rorty, Cavell, and 
Criticism’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) Sage Masters of Modem Social Thought, volume 4 (London;
Sage Publications, 2002), pp. 5 — 23 at 11.
85 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, p. 173.
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Haberm as than he already thinks; that is, he ‘goes transcendental and offers principles’.®"^ 
Clearly they are n o t metaphysical principles, bu t are rather (as Rorty notes they are in fact 
for Habermas) summaries o f  Hberal views o f  the good.
17.3 D egrees o f  parochialism
Many think that Rorty’s account o f  ethnocentrism  entails that communities need only be 
concerned w ith themselves. Criticisms o f  ethnocentrism  are however often crucially 
ambiguous on im portant points. Richard J. Bernstein for example understands Rorty to 
be presenting us w ith a simpHstic choice: ‘the only alternatives open to us are either 
appealing to  w hat is local and ethnocentric or appealing to  fixed perm anent ahistorical 
foundations’.®® Similarly, Terry Eagleton writes that for anti-foundationalists, ‘the view 
from  nowhere is inevitably countered by the view from  us alone’.®*^ These com m ents are 
imprecise about w hat is m eant by ‘local’ and ‘us alone’ respectively. ‘Local’ contrasts with 
‘general’, and imphes restriction and confinement. However, all that ethnocentrism  
entails is that standards are the standards o f  some group. This does n o t m ean that that 
group has to  be small, or exclusivist.
Rorty has encouraged such an understanding by focusing in som e o f  his writings upon  a 
particular ethnos, the U nited States o f  America. Taken together w ith his view that the 
notion o f  a universal ‘hum an nature’ is empty (see chapter 8), this has led to  charges o f 
conservatism and communitarianism, that he is only concerned w ith America and
84 Ibid. There is I think some truth to Ronald Beiner’s observation that whenever Rorty 
confronts a real postmodernist, he starts to sound like Habermas and talks in terms of ‘universal 
consensus’, ‘cosmopolitanism’, etc. Beiner, ‘Richard Rorty’s Liberalism’, p. 30.
85 Bernstein, The Neiv Constellation, p. 242.
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Americans. Interpreting Rorty in this way, N orm an Geras writes that ‘[i]t is just no t 
credible that the significant threshold in  this m atter, where com passion and solicitude 
wiU go no further, lies somewhere beyond several hundred million people’.®^ Eagleton 
agrees, suggesting that a consistent ethnocentrism  could n o t sustain m oral identity and 
solidarity even at level Rorty proposes. T o  be consistent, should Rorty no t
[...] base his fellow-feeling on  some genuine localism, say the city block?
O n  second thoughts, however, this is stiU a little on  the hom ogenizing 
side, since your average city block does o f  course contain a fair sprinkling 
o f  different sorts o f  people; bu t it w ould surely be a m ore manageable 
basis for social justice than some universal abstraction hke America.®®
Geras and Eagleton bo th  fail to  distinguish two quite separate ideas: the inevitable 
connection we have to some community, and loyalty we feel to a specific community. As a 
pohtical theorist, Rorty is concerned with the former. W e are ah tied to  some particular 
standards. W e can certainly alter those ties, bu t this is to adopt some other ties, no t to 
chmb above them  to the view from  nowhere. In  contrast, as a pohtical com m entator, 
Rorty is concerned about a particular ethnos, America.®^
86 Terry Eagleton, Figures of Dissent: Critical Essays on Fish, Spivak, i i^ k  and Others (London: Verso, 
2003), p. 177.
87 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind, p. 78.
88 Terry Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: BlackweU Pubhshers, 1996), p. 114.
89 Even there though, his concern is not that Americans are not somehow of greater value than 
non-Americans, but is rather the practical one that starting with a real community is a more 
productive identity to build upon than an abstraction such as ^humankind'. Geras asks whether it 
is more offensive if an American suffers than a non-American. Geras, Solidaritj in the Conversation 
of Humankind, p. 72. Rorty would surely answer that of course it is not, but that his concern in 
writings such as Achieving Our Country is to speak of the pohtical circumstances in one particular 
country.
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In  the absence o f  any non-ethnocentric standard o f  value, and by com m ending the ‘we- 
consciousness’ that lies behind liberal democratic institutions,^® Rorty has attracted the 
further criticism that his position is a form  o f  communitarianism. Jean H am pton thinks 
this necessarily follows because o f  his denial o f  any ‘extrasocietal’ perspective standing 
over that o f  the shared understandings o f  a particular community,®^ M endus takes 
Rorty’s discussion o f  we consciousness and ‘we intentions’ to  indicate a substantive and 
therefore potentially exclusionary form  o f  m oral identification, arguing that Rorty fails to 
do justice to m oral and cultural plurality by im posing a hom ogeneous ‘w e’ that threatens 
to substitute one form  o f  essentialism with another: ‘an essentialism which consists in  the 
belief that we m ust come to  see others as like ourselves if  we are to  have any chance o f 
behaving decentiy in the w o r l d ’.^ ^  xhe point is developed by Will Kymlicka, w ho 
criticises Rorty’s account o f  ‘we intentions’ for m isrepresenting the nature o f  morality. 
Kymlicka believes that on Rorty’s account, ‘W hen we say things hke “Slavery is w rong”, 
... we m ean “W e don’t do that around here” .’^  ^ But as KymHcka notes, w hen for 
example a Muslim w om an objects that sexual discrirnination is wrong, she does n o t m ean 
W e  don’t do that around here’. Far from  it: she m eans that, despite its being done around 
here, that it is wrong. By appealing simply to com m unal standards, Rorty has no way o f 
standing apart from  or o f  criticising those standards.
Kymhcka can criticise Rorty for holding this position, I suggest, only after he has tacitly 
inserted three un-stated premises: that ‘we intentions’ specify, first, a geographical 
constituency; secondly, a substantive or ‘thick’ identification with that constituency; and 
third, a constituency with which one m ust necessarily identity. Rorty does n o t endorse 
any o f  these positions. W ith respect to the first point, he never addresses w hat it is that
^  Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 68.
Hampton, ‘Should Political Philosophy Be Done without Metaphysics?’, p. 811. 
Mendus, ‘“What of soul was left, I wonder?’, p 66.
258
constitutes an ethnos at a general, abstract level, and it is clear from  his various uses o f  that 
term  that he does no t use it to  denote any particular form  o f  community. A lthough he is 
widely criticised for his seemingly thoughtless invocation o f  term s such as ‘us liberals’ 
and ‘us dem ocrats’, such term s show at least that ethnocentrism  can equally m ean 
geographical and m oral constituencies. A t other times, m em bership o f  an ethnos seems to 
be construed in extremely broad terms, as the speakers o f  natural languages. H e writes 
that, on  his Davidsonian view which treats language no t as a m edium  o f  representation 
bu t as a tool to  cope with the world, there is ‘nothing to  reply to  “H ow  to you know that 
that’s called ‘red’?” save W ittgenstein’s: “I know English” .’^ '^  I suggest then that Rorty 
does n o t intend to  limit ethnocentrism  to  a geographical notion, and there is m oreover 
no reason to  think his claims com m it him  to so doing. Seyla Benhabib is doubly mistaken 
w hen she writes, in a criticism o f  Rorty, that ‘[t]he lines betw een us and them  do no t 
necessarily correspond to the lines betw een m em bers o f  our culture and those o f  another 
... com m unities o f  solidarity may or may no t be ethnically established’.^  ^This com m ent 
is n o t only mistaken in the assum ption that Rorty either defines, or is com m itted to  
defining, ‘u s’ or ‘w e’ geographically, bu t it also, in speaking o f  lines betw een cultures, falls 
back into the ‘poor m an’s sociology’ that Benhabib identifies and criticises in others like 
Rorty.
In  term s o f  the exact nature o f  ethnocentric identification, the identification o f  ‘we’ is, I 
suggest, very thin. It m eans primarily the ability to sympathise with those in  pain and
Will Kymlicka, Uheralism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 65.
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 144.
Seyla Benhabib, ‘“Nous” et “les Autres”: The Politics of Complex Cultural Dialogue in a 
Global Civilization’, in Christian Joppke and Steven Lukes (eds.) Multicultural Questions (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 44 — 62 at 49.
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suffering humiliation.^^ Rorty does no t believe that ‘w e’ m ust see others as people 
engaged in a com m on substantive endeavour, o r as united in  any goal beyond m utual 
respect for potentially very different projects. Thus I think he would readily agree with 
M endus about the dangers o f  positing a thicker, ‘essential’, identity (for example being a 
male or a believer). H e speaks o f  the im portance o f  separating the question ‘D o  you 
believe and desire w hat we believe and desire?’ from  the question ‘Are you suffering?’^  ^
This is, pace M endus, clearly a very thin and therefore non-exclusivist sense o f  seeing 
others ‘like ourselves’. It leaves substantive projects like pursuing one’s view o f  the good 
entirely to the individual, and claims to be blind to  cultural identity.^®
The standards o f  a particular ethnos are the semi-articulated, contested starting point to 
begin to judge the w orth  o f  things, including that comm unity itself. It is a starting point 
that we accept by virtue o f  birth, bu t is n o t one to  which we necessarily owe allegiance or 
respect. Critics sometimes claim the contrary, and that Rorty endorses values simply 
because they are ours\ R obert Heinem an writes that for Rorty, W estern liberal democratic 
‘values are the best because they are our values’.^  ^However, although nationalists such as 
D avid Miller claim to endorse such a position^®^, it is n o t one that Rorty shares. H e 
writes for example that the tunnellers under the Berlin WaU cannot be said to  have been
^  something that, as I discussed in chapter 6, he takes to be relatively fixed across cultures and 
historical epochs and which he thinks is a reason for the political irrelevance of multiculturalist 
accounts such as Kymlicka’s.
Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 198. He has recently accepted that the account he gave 
in that book of the motives of those who helped Jews escaping the Gestapo was ‘misguided. I 
think I overstated my case in those pages, and now regret them’. Richard Rorty, ‘Response to 
Norman Geras’ in Matthew Festenstein and Simon Thompson (eds.) "Richard Rorty: Critical 
Dialogues (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp. 171 — 175 at 174.
8^ For my purposes, I will leave aside the multiculturalist concern of whether it truly is blind.
Heineman, Authority and the Uberal Tradition, p. 190.
100 por Miller, the very fact that we are bom into a nation confers obligations upon us. He writes: 
‘The historic national community is a community of obligation. Because our forebears have 
toiled and spüt their blood to build and defend the nation, we who are bom  into it inherit an 
obligation to continue their work ... [it is] a community which, because it stretches back and 
forward across the generations, is not one that the present generation can renounce’. David 
Miller, Citizenship and National Identity (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 29.
260
irresponsible, because responsibility requires identification, which in this case was 
absentd®^ F or him, comm unities are o f  value solely insofar as they increase hum an 
happiness, and the sort o f  conservatism  that H einem an ascribes to  Rorty he in  fact takes 
to  be ‘perverse because it seems to  rely upon an inference fiom  the uncontroversial 
prem ise, every culture affords a means to  hum an happiness, to the obviously false 
conclusion that hum an happiness can never require the m odification or the extinction o f  
a culture’.^ ®^
W e must, Rorty insists, be equally free o f  the idea that we should subscribe to o r accept a 
universal hum an nature, and o f  societies that offer a comprehensive universal vision. T hat 
we are aU m em bers o f  m any different communities — including imaginary communities^®^ 
— and because these wiU inevitably create conflicting m oral obligations, m eans that as 
individuals we have to  choose to which communities we feel loyalty. H e writes that ^We 
have to  start from  where we are’^ ®"^, bu t he m ight also have written this stressing the w ord 
‘start’: there is a crucial difference between, on one hand, starting from  where we are, 
and, on  the other, viewing this position to be the last word. M oral progress is for him  a 
process o f  identification with other people, o f  com ing to  see the ‘o ther’ as one o f  us; 
extending ‘our sense o f  “we” to  people w hom  we have previously thought o f  as 
“they’” .^ ®5 Rorty’s ambiguity about the exact nature o f  an ethnos is thus I think quite 
deliberate, and is part o f  his quest to  broaden the ‘we’ as far as possible. Against 
Eagleton’s com plaint that for anti-foundationalists, ‘the view from  now here is inevitably 
countered by the view from  us alone’, we can agree that, in the absence o f  any absolute 
metaphysical perspective such as the view from  nowhere or the ‘G od’s-eye view’, we are
10’ Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 197.
10^  Rorty, ‘The Communitarian Impulse’, p. 58.
103 Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism and Truth, p. 21, and Rorty, Contingency, Ironj, and Solidarity.
104 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 198.
105 Ibid., p. 192.
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left w ith hum ans and hum an views, bu t note that he is mistaken for assuming that ‘us’ 
necessarily refers to a narrowly circumscribed num ber o f  people.
I have argued that there is no reason why communities need be politically exclusivist. 
Equally, there is no necessary reason why they should no t be. Haberm as is correct to say 
that there is no  reason for an ethnos to  be open, ‘no rational m otive for expanding the 
circle o f  m em bers’.^ ®*^ But again, Rorty’s point is that no  sense can be given to  the notion 
o f  rationality w hen it is conceived o f  as a capacity that exists separately to  beliefs and 
desires. His hope is that with increasing leisure and security, m ore liberal societies will 
emerge which take the concern to  pursue an ever-widening ‘w e’ to be central to  their 
self-image. T o  view Rorty as deliberately parochial is to  leave out this side o f  his 
argument. O ne o f  the reasons he privileges liberalism is that he takes it to be part o f  
liberal ethnocentrism  to be suspicious o f  ethnocentrism.^®^ Rorty notes that ‘the principal 
source o f  conflict’ ®^® betw een hum an beings and hum an communities is the belief that 
different people and communities have nothing to  say to  each other, and no  need to 
justify their beliefs to  the other. This is usually because these o ther people are no t 
regarded as people to w hom  one should be concerned to  justifying one’s beliefs; for 
many, the idea that one should even consider justifying beliefs to  wom en, or atheists, is 
ludicrous. Against this, he writes that we should seek to  justify ourselves to w hat he calls 
a c^ojTJpetent audience’.^ ®® This claim is coupled with the need to  broaden the category o f  
‘com petent’, so that includes people — notably w om en — w ho have typically been taken 
no t to  be com petent in the relevant sense.
106 Habermas, ‘Richard Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn’, p. 51. 
lo"! Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. 198.
108 Rorty, ‘Universality and Truth’, p. 15.
109 Ibid., p. 9. He continues by saying that this ‘project is not only relevant to democratic politics, 
it pretty much is democratic politics’ (emphasis in original).
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Rorty thus presents no t a view from  nowhere and im m ersion in the status quo, bu t rather 
com m ends the political option o f  increasing openness to new experiences, to enable us 
to  come to see ‘them ’ as ‘us’.
[This is] n o t a process o f setting aside our old vocabularies, beliefs, and 
desires bu t rather o f  gradually adding to and modifying them  by playing 
them  o ff against each other ... [An] alternative image [to that o f 
“climbing out o f  our own m inds”] is that o f  our minds gradually growing 
larger and stronger and m ore interesting by the addition o f  new options — 
new candidates for belief and desire, phrases in new vocabularies.^^®
M uch o f  the confusion surrounding Rorty’s account o f  ethnocentrism  and justification 
stems fiom  a m isunderstanding o f  the m eaning o f  ethnocentrism . It does n o t indicate a 
deliberate o r conscious effort to circumscribe the num ber o f  people or the size o f  the 
community to  which we seek to justify beliefs, bu t rather the recognition that, as beings 
w ho are acculturated into specific values, there is a limit to  how  far we can seek to justify 
those beliefs. However, once it is seen that ethnocentrism  as Rorty describes it should be 
as open as possible, and that Rorty’s preferred ethnos, liberalism, is characterised by him  
as being open and pluralistic, the negative connotations I think disappear. W hat D. 
V aden H ouse takes to  be the conscious limitation o f  ethnocentrism  is false.^^^ Rorty’s 
point is no t that we do not seek to  justify ourselves to  o ther because we are ethnocentric 
bu t rather, because we are inescapably ethnocentric, encountering the world fiom  a 
particular viewpoint, there are others to w hom  we cannot justify ourselves, because there 
is no t enough overlap o f  belief: ‘to  say that we m ust w ork by our ow n lights, that we
Rorty, Objectivity, 'Relativism, and Truth, p. 14.
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m ust be ethnocentric, is merely to say that beliefs suggested by another culture m ust be 
tested by trying to  weave them  together with beliefs we already have’.^ ^^  Clearly for many 
views, such weaving is simply no t possible.
In  conclusion, it was argued in this chapter that Rorty does n o t make the standards o f  
com m unity ‘foundational’, w hen that is understood as ‘final’ and ‘unchallengeable’. It is 
no t possible to appeal over particular standards to a notion o f  objectivity, since that 
no tion  m ust itself be understood as a form  o f  hum an solidarity, bu t this does n o t m ean 
that those standards cannot be challenged and reformed. F or him, this can be secured by 
securing wide reflective equilibrium. E thnocentrism  does no t circumscribe the num ber 
o f  people to w hom  we owe a justification o f  liberalism. It does no t entail a strong 
distinction between ‘them ’ and ‘us’, bu t rather a continuum  o f  variation o f  beliefs and 
desires; parochialism, that is to  say, is a m atter o f  degree. Rorty’s po in t is no t that we 
ought no t concern ourselves with those from  other communities (either geographical or 
ideological), bu t that there is a limit to  how  far we can do so, given the beliefs and values 
that constitute our final vocabulary. Nevertheless, his political concern is to  hold that 
vocabulary open, and to  com m end the task o f  increasing solidarity, to  make those 
currently thought o f  ‘them ’ as one o f  ‘us’. In  chapter 8 , 1 will take up the issue o f  how  far 
Rorty thinks we should seek to extend the ‘w e’, arguing that in one im portant sense, 
Rorty is a liberal universalist.
D. Vaden House writes that Rorty’s view of truth and rejection of metanarratives ‘leads him 
to adopt a form of ethnocentrism’. House, Without God or His Doubles: ^alism , Viilativism and Rorp 
(New York: E. J. Brill, 1994), p. 7.
” 2 Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth, p. 26.
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Chapter Eight
Liberal univers alism
In  this chapter it is argued that, despite Rorty’s hostility to  universalism and his view that 
distinctions betw een relativism, absolutism and universalism are the rem nants o f  a 
vocabulary that is better set aside, that he is a universalist in the sense that he believes in 
the desirability o f  extending the scope o f  liberal values and institutions. T hat is, he is 
critical o f  universalism in the K antian sense o f  a pure philosophy o f  right, no t in  the 
aspiration to  extend liberal freedoms as widely as possible, ideally globally. This point wiU 
be developed by com paring Rorty’s views o f  the scope o f liberalism with those o f  Brian 
Barry, w ho for m any is the archetypal liberal universalist. Despite the apparent 
differences between Rorty and Barry concerning ‘reason’ and ‘hum an nature’, 1 will show 
that there is no  substantive difference between their views. The view that Rorty’s 
philosophical position debars him  from  being able to  support measures to extend 
liberalism abroad is then considered and rejected. I t has further been argued that Rorty 
presses for the extension o f  liberaUsm by tacitly relying on  a metanarrative or, as Jo h n  
Gray puts it, a philosophy o f  history in which the world is fated to  culminate in W estern 
(or m ore specifically. N orth  American) values and institutions. 1 argue against this claim, 
showing that whilst Rorty’s account is certainly presented as a narrative, it is not 
teleological, and is rather an expression o f  his ow n hopes for the future. Finally, 
consideration is given to  how Rorty thinks we m ight press for the extension o f  
liberalism.
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18. The ‘universal validity* of liberalism
Brian Barry is often taken to  present one o f  the m ost uncom prom ising statem ents o f 
liberal universalism. H e writes that ‘I continue to  believe in  the possibility o f  putting 
forw ard a universally valid case in favour o f  liberal egalitarian principles’^  and despite his 
failure to  persuade everyone o f  this validity, he continues to  defend this aspiration against 
assorted m oral and cultural relativists, for him  a single category that is rapidly coming to  
include pretty m uch everyone except Barry himself. His concern to  stress that 
universality is such that he believes that ‘[t]he poin t o f liberalism is that it is 
universahstic’.^  Rorty in contrast writes o f  his desire to  ‘reform ulate the hopes o f  liberal 
society in a nonrationaHst and nonuniversalist way — one which furthers their realization 
better than  older descriptions o f  them  did’.^  By talking o f  ‘[ajbandoning universalism’"* 
Rorty, insofar as Barry is correct in identifying the point o f  liberalism to  be its 
universality, has excluded him self from  counting as a liberal.
However, Barry and Rorty use the term  ‘universalism’ in different ways. For Barry, it has 
two aspects. First, that within a polity everyone should face an equal set o f  laws with no 
exceptions either for individuals or for groups, a position which is perhaps m ore 
accurately described by the term  he employs elsewhere, impartiality. Secondly, that liberal 
laws should apply to  everyone in the world, where ‘should’ entails the political task o f  
com m ending liberal ideals and practices, challenging and attem pting to  override 
indigenous values where these do no t m eet the standard. O n  the form er point, I argued 
in chapter 6 that Rorty, in  his opposition to  multiculturahsm, is in  agreement w ith Barry. 
I will discuss the latter point below, but note here that Rorty’s hostility to  universalism
 ^Barry, Justice as Impartiality^ p. 3.
2 Barry, Culture and Equality^ p. 138.
3 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, pp. 44 -  45. 
 ^Ibid., p. 68.
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stems from  a rejection o f  the different, Kantian, notion o f  universal validity, in  which 
unconditional obligations follow fcom the dehverance o f  pure practical reason.
18.1 U beralism  and reason
Today the idea o f universal validity is endorsed by, am ongst others, Thom as Nagel. 
Nagel argues that w hen one considers w hat one ought to  do, one should adopt no t 
merely the ‘first personal’ perspective, bu t the perspective such that anyone else in that 
situation should reach the same conclusion. For him, reason ‘should enable anyone else 
also to  see w hat is the right thing for you to  do against that background’.^  For Rorty 
however, reason cannot yield substantive conclusions. It is no t som ething that structures 
hum an behaviour, bu t is rather an abstraction from  hum an practices, a summary o f  the 
contingent patterns o f  behaviour exhibited by hum ans w hen m oving around and coping 
with the world. There is nothing m ore to  rationality than the practices o f  reasoning 
exhibited by hum an beings in specific situations: ‘we would do well’, he writes, ‘to 
abandon the notion o f  certain values (“rationality” , “disinterestedness”) floating free o f 
the educational and institutional patterns o f the day’.^  Liberalism is no m ore rational than 
any other form  o f  hum an social organisation. There is no  final dem onstration o f  the 
rationality o f liberalism, any m ore than there is of, for example, its M arxist or fascist 
opponents. Indeed, Rorty suggests that there is no  reason to  think that ‘reason’ favours 
liberalism at aU:
5 Nagel, The Lasf Word, p. 110.
<5 Rorty, Philosophj and the Mirror of Nature, p. 331.
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O ne o f  the best examples o f  a truly intercultural universal seems to  be 
the subordination o f  wom en; this seems to  be one conviction which 
emanates, if  any conviction does, from  w hat philosophers like to  call 
“hum an reason,” rather than from  any particular historical tradition or 
cultural background/
In  its place, Rorty suggests that we focus on  reasonableness. Unlike reason, 
reasonableness is, he argues, an explicidy contextual notion, one that is necessarily 
inform ed by particular beliefs and intuitions, and is to  be understood in  political terms, 
notably o f  tolerance and open mindedness. There is, as he also accepts, no  non-question- 
begging way to  dem onstrate the virtue o f  these notions.
In contrast, Barry sometimes makes claims which indicate that he thinks reason plays a 
substantial role in justifying liberal principles. H e writes for example that liberal views o f 
‘consistency o f  treatm ent, according to intelligible criteria, could be no t unaptly described 
as a dem and o f  Reason’.® Individuals equally situated should, he says, face equal tax 
liabilities, and their no t doing so is, he continues, ‘revolting to  Reason in this sense’. 
W hilst Rorty would certainly agree that this is unreasonable (in his ethnocentric 
understanding o f  the term), the capitalisation o f  ‘Reason’ suggests that Barry intends to  
make a stronger claim, that reason itself dictates the necessity o f  consistency o f  
treatm ent. T hat is, he intimates som ething that Rorty thinks impossible, namely that 
reason alone could dem and anything.
Richard Rorty, ‘Letter 4’, in Anindita Niyogi Balslev, Cultural Otherness: Correspondence with ^chard 
Rorty (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1999), pp. 67 — 74 at 71 — 72.
8 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 16.
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T he double negative ‘no t unaptly’ however suggests equivocation in  Barry’s mind. This 
claim is, I suggest, an aberration in Barry’s writings, and that m ore generally he is clear 
that we cannot ask too m uch o f  the notion o f  reason o r rationality. In  response to 
Richard A m eson’s suggestion that states should seek to  justify their pohcies by reference 
to  neutral reasons, ‘reasons that all citizens can share in so far as they are rational’,^  Barry 
responds that ‘[t]his rules out either virtually nothing or virtually everything’. I t  rules out 
virtually nothing if  it means that a person’s actions can be understood, and that others 
can grasp the reasoning that led to  that course o f  action. Accepting this does no t 
however m ean that it is irrational to  fail to  agree that course o f  action to  be the right one.
For Barry then, reason alone cannot yield specific m oral conclusions. In  his discussion o f 
the application o f  his theory o f justice in Justice and Impartiality, he writes that ‘my 
pretensions fall short o f  universality. This arises because my argum ent presupposes the 
existence o f  [a] certain desire: the desire to  live in a society w hose m em bers all freely 
accept its rules o f justice and its m ajor institutions’."  H e does no t claim that everyone 
has such a desire, nor does he suggest that they are irrational no t to  possess it. His claim is 
rather that if  people possess such a desire, then he beheves he can show why they should 
be liberal egalitarians, and he cashes this out no t in terms o f  rationality, bu t o f 
reasonableness. And, like Rorty, he accepts that reasonableness is inform ed by specific 
notions. W hen he uses the Scanlonian device o f  reasonable rejectabihty, Barry is clear 
that the notion o f  reasonableness m ust be given content. As he says, ‘[cjlearly, I have 
introduced substantive m oral ideas in  the course o f  talking about w hat could reasonably
5 Richard Ameson, ‘The Priority of the Right Over the Good Rides Again’, in Paul Kelly (ed) 
Impartiality, 'Neutrality and Justice: 'Re-reading Brian B arb’s Justice as Impartiality (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. 60 — 86 at 67.
’0 Brian Barry, ‘Something in the Disputation not Unpleasant’, in Paul Kelly (ed.) Impartiality, 
Neutrality and Justice: Re-reading Brian B arb’s Justice as Impartiality (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1998), pp. 186 — 257 at 239.
'Bztry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 164.
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be rejected. Since ... nothing can be expected ficom the bare notion o f  rationality itself, I 
am no t in the least embarrassed by recognizing that this is so\^^ It can be said therefore 
that he makes a frank admission o f  Rorty’s point about the necessity o f  giving some 
specific content and context to  universalist claims: ‘I think that you have to  smuggle 
some provinciality in to  your universals before they do you any good’.’  ^ Indeed, in making 
his claim about reasonableness, Barry does no t smuggle it in  bu t is explicit about it.
18.2 U beralism  and human nature
A potential difference between Barry and Rorty remains. In  arguing against 
multiculturahsm, Barry sometimes seeks to  support his claims by drawing upon  a notion 
o f  hum an nature. This is seen in  his com m ents about Jam es TuUy’s book Strange 
Multiplicity. O ne o f Tully’s arguments in favour o f  multiculturahsm trades on  an analogy 
with different animals: just as different animal species need different conditions, different 
constitutional arrangements are held to be suitable for different hum an communities. In  
response, Barry argues that the analogy fails because hum ans are m em bers o f  the same 
species. H e goes on to  claim that the biological similarity o f  hum an beings has m oral 
significance, writing that:
[...] precisely because hum an beings are virtuaUy identical as they come 
from  the hand o f  nature — at any rate at the level o f  groups — there is 
nothing straightforwardly absurd about the idea that there is a single best
’2 Ibid., p. 8.
3^ Rorty TJniversahty and Truth’, p. 23.
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way for hum an beings to  live, allowing w hatever adjustments are 
necessary for different physical environments/'^
In  saying this he appears to  have a means to  defend the universal validity o f  liberalism 
that is n o t open to  Rorty, for w hom  ‘socialisation ... goes all the way dow n ... [TJhere is 
no th ing  “beneath” sociaUsation or prior to  history which is definatory o f the hum an'. 
Rorty has been widely criticised for this claim. N orm an Geras takes it to  m ean that Rorty 
denies any sense to  hum an nature, and criticizes him  for ignoring attributes that are 
shared by hum an beings cross-culturaUy and trans-historically.^^ For Geras, universality is 
prem ised n o t on  a notion o f  reason, bu t on anthropology and physiology, on  the 
existence o f  cross-cultural, biological and psychological characteristics that hum ans 
possess as a species. Against his interpretation o f  Rorty’s claim that socialisation goes all 
the way down, Geras observes that there is a limit to hum an adaptability. W e cannot, for 
example, be socialized so as to  no t feel pain or hunger. Traits such as these can, he 
argues, be used to  build up a morality that is said to be potentially universal, in contrast 
to R orty’s ethnocentric project o f  increasing hum an solidarity.
It is however unclear, in pointing out that there are traits and characteristics shared by all 
hum an beings, how  far Geras (and Barry) propose som ething that Rorty would no t 
accept. T he only content that Geras gives to  hum an nature is that all hum ans are 
susceptible to  pain and humiliation, and that our biology means that we require, am ongst 
other things, food and shelter. W ith aU o f  this, Rorty agrees. Regarding pain, he writes 
that :
Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 262.
15 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. xiii.
15 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind.
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[...] our relation to  the world, to  brute pow er and to  naked pain, is not 
the sort o f  relation we have to  persons. Faced w ith the nonhum an, the 
nonlinguistic, we no longer have the ability to  overcom e contingency and 
pain by appropriation and transform ation, bu t only the ability to  recogni^ 
contingency and pain.’^
Geras takes this to  represent a contradiction in Rorty’s argument: ‘[i]t turns out, in other 
words, that there is a hum an nature’.^ * But since Rorty has never denied the physical 
inescapabihty o f  pain, this merely dem onstrates that G eras’s criticisms are misplaced, 
since he is pointing out som ething that Rorty has never claimed to  deny.
Rorty has never denied hum an nature in  a biological sense.^^ His point is rather w hether 
it can be given m oral sense; that is, w hether biological needs are sufficient to  derive 
substantive m oral comm itm ents. This he doubts, writing that *we have a biology, a 
m orphology, and a neurophysiology “definatory o f  ‘the hum an’.” T he trouble is that 
such a physiological definition isn’t m uch use to  us’.^  This is because such a definition is 
consistent w ith different moralities. Many societies do no t take the capacity to  m eet basic 
physical needs to  be the im portant feature o f  a political regime. M any treat other 
features, such as ‘male’ or ‘believer’, as the morally significant ones, and there is nothing 
in the notion hum an nature in  itself that makes the requirem ent for food and shelter the 
morally relevant category for appraising political regimes, rather than some other. O ne 
m ight say w ith Barry that an excellent test o f regimes is how  well they m eet basic hum an 
needs, bu t there is no  reason to  think this would or should convince, for example, theists 
that they should use this, rather than strength o f  religious devotion, as the test.
Rorty, Contingency, Irvnj, and Solidarity, p. 40, emphasis in original.
18 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind, p. 109, emphasis in original.
19 Rorty, Objectivity, ^lativism, and Truth, p. 197.
20 Rorty: ‘Robusmess: A Reply to Jean Bethke Elshtain’, p. 208.
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In  making naturalist claims, Barry is clearer than  Geras that he is simply pointing out that 
which is obviously true, that all hum ans need certain basic things. There remains the 
question o f  how  this translates in to  laws and institutions. H is phrase ‘single best way for 
hum an beings to  live’ suggests, even allowing for the qualification o f  differences in the 
physical environm ent, a very specific content to  the idea o f  w hat is good for hum an 
beings. This is a strong and perhaps odd claim for a hberal to  make, and Barry 
immediately quahfies it by saying that disagreements are inevitable because o f  the 
inevitabihty o f  different views about the true rehgion and the absence o f  a satisfactory 
way o f  resolving these disagreements.^^ Given these qualifications, it is no t clear that he is 
able to  show this is enough either to  m andate hberahsm, or that it rules ou t (amongst 
others) a multiculturahst approach.
It m ight be said that naturahsm rules out certain forms o f  hfe, bu t that at best it is 
underdeterm ined, and can poin t equally towards hberal and (some) non-hberal regim es.^ 
However, if  too  m uch weight is placed on naturahsm, it is subject to  the H obbesian 
rejoinder that hum an nature is antithetical to  hberahsm. HistoricaUy, claims about hum an 
nature have been used to  justify ah m anner o f inequahties and injustices. Thus, in answer 
to G eras’s question o f  how  setting aside notions o f  a com m on hum an nature could help 
to secure justice and freedom  — ‘one may be aUowed to w onder how  setting aside the 
universahst claim o f  a com m on hum an nature, as Rorty w ith currendy so many others 
from  this rather detached miheu w ould have us do, could conceivably help ’^  — a 
plausible response is that there are ah m anner o f  abhorrent behefs that, by virtue o f  their 
regular appearance in cultures throughout history, would seem  to  arise from  hum an
21 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 263.
22 See Gray, Two Faces of Uberalism.
23 Geras, Solidarity in the Conversation of Humankind, p. 4.
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nature. A n example Rorty gives is the view that ‘it would be better to have no son than 
to  have one w ho is hom osexual’.^ "^  O ne m ight seek to  defend homosexuality by pointing 
to  its ‘naturalness’, noting for example that homosexuality has occurred in every society 
across history. B ut it is difficult to  see how  this could convince the hom ophobe, and 
indeed the appearance o f homosexuality in different cultures and throughout history has 
no t m eant that homosexuals have been treated equitably. Similar examples can, 
obviously, be given o f  the supposed naturalness o f  denying poUtical, civil and economic 
rights to  women.
Thus, w hen Barry writes o f  ‘the possibility o f  putting forward a universally valid case in 
favour o f  liberal egalitarian principles’, I take it that he uses the  term  ‘universal validity’ 
no t in the Kantian sense, bu t is rather concerned with the task o f  articulating and 
com m ending the fairness o f  liberalism to  as many people as possible, ideally to  hum anity 
as a whole, and o f  justifying the legitimacy o f  such an enterprise in the face o f  criticisms 
from  those he thinks m oral and cultural relativists. His claim about hum an nature (and 
Reason) indicate, I suspect, that he sometimes thinks it insufficient simply to  make 
claims for the political and m oral advantages o f  liberalism. F or Rorty, this is at best 
misleading:
The idea o f  a universally shared source o f  tru th  called “reason” or 
“hum an nature” is, for us pragmatists, just the idea that such discussion 
[of the relative advantages o f  different moralities] ought to  be capable o f 
being m ade conclusive. W e see this idea as a misleading way o f 
expressing the hope, which we share, that the  hum an race as a whole 
should gradually com e together in a global comm unity, a comm unity
2*^ Rorty, 'Philosophy and Social Hope, p. xxx.
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which incorporates m ost o f  the thick morality o f  the European 
industrialized democracies.^^
I suggest that, given the ‘thinness’ o f  his view o f  hum an nature, together w ith his 
acknowledgement o f  the need to  specify the content o f  reason, that Barry w ould lose 
nothing by agreeing w ith Rorty and stick to  asserting the m oral and political advantages 
o f  liberalism.
19. ‘Universal validity* verses ‘universal reach*
In  various places, Rorty hints at his desire for a global pohty,^^ but his m ost explicit 
exposition is in  his essay ‘Philosophy and the Future’. There he writes o f  the need for:
[...] a clear image o f  a specific kind o f  cosm opolitan hum an future: the 
image o f  a planetwide democracy, a society in which torture, or the 
closing down o f  a university or a newspaper, on the other side o f  the 
world is as m uch a cause for outrage as w hen it happens at hom e. This 
cosmopoHs may be, in non-political matters, as multicultural and 
heterogeneous as ever. B ut in this utopian future cultural traditions will 
have ceased to  have an influence on political decisions. In  politics there 
win be only one tradition: that o f  constant vigilance against the 
predictable attem pts by the rich and strong to  take advantages o f  the 
poor and weak. Cultural tradition will never be perm itted to  override
25 Ibid., p. xxxii, emphasis in original.
25 Rorty, Objectivity, Bjelativism and Truth, p. 212, Rorty, Achieving Our Countty, p. 3.
275
Rawl’s “difference principle,” never perm itted to  excuse inequality o f
opportunity/^
This would, I suggest, serve as an accurate summary o f  Barry’s ideal liberal polity too. It 
is universal in the relevant sense in  which rights are held irrespective o f the state or 
comm unity in which one happens to  live. It allows for diversity am ong ways o f  Hfe, bu t 
does n o t allow this diversity to  erode the notion o f  equality before the law. W hat m atters 
are the limits o f  toleration, and these for bo th  Barry and Rorty are laid down in a liberal 
fram ework o f  law.
D espite this, it is frequently argued that Rorty cannot or wiU n o t press for the extension 
o f  those advantages to  countries that are n o t presently liberal. Those w ho make this 
criticism seem to think this because o f his view that liberalism is no t grounded in reason 
but is, rather, som ething that particular communities have come to  adopt. From  there, 
com m entators seem to infer that com m ending one form  o f  life to  another is for Rorty 
impossible a n d /o r  illegitimate. For explain, Richard Rumana claims that on Rorty’s 
account, non-dem ocratic countries may ‘stumble by accident upon democracy’ bu t 
cannot be persuaded in to  democracy by an ‘outside source.’^ ® Rum ana takes Rorty to be 
denying any form  o f  cross-cultural dialogue, philosophical or political, bu t it is unclear 
w hether he believes this is for Rorty impossible^ because we cannot understand other 
cultures enough to  com m unicate with them , or illeÿtimate^ perhaps as a form  o f  w hat is 
called ‘W estern cultural imperialism’. These are, it should be noted, two different — 
though no t necessarily inconsistent — claims: it is one thing to claim that it is impossible 
because there are no universally valid standards grounded in reason or hum an nature;
27 Rorty, ‘Philosophy and the Future’, pp. 203 -  204.
28 Rumana, On Rorty, p. 88, n. 29.
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another to  urge that it is illegitimate, the im position o f  the standards o f  one society on  to 
another.
19.1 The p o ssib ility  o f  extending the scope o f  liberalism
There seem to  be two reasons why it is felt that Rorty thinks it impossible to  seek to  extend 
liberal values to  currently non-liberal societies. These are, first, that cultures are 
incom m ensurable and so no possibility exists o f  understanding betw een them , and 
secondly, that his anti-foundationalist position rules ou t the philosophical task o f 
com m ending liberalism abroad. Regarding the first point, I showed in  chapter 7 that 
Rorty does no t think that incommensurability entails incom prehension, nor does he 
endorse an ‘essentiahzed’ view o f culture. Indeed, insofar as he makes any claims for 
culture, it is his view that cultures provide the raw material upon  which to  draw to create 
an ever m ore inclusive community; he writes that: ‘Every culture, no  m atter how  
parochial, contains material which can be w oven into utopian images o f  a planetwide 
dem ocratic political community.
However, w ithout endorsing value or cultural incommensurability, Rorty m ight still be 
said to  deny the possibility o f  cross-cultural dialogue because o f  his rejection o f  a 
universal standard o f  validity. This point is argued by Paul Kelly, w ho claims that Rorty is 
unable to  press for the tru th  or goodness o f  liberalism in  societies other than those 
where it is already taken to  be true or good; liberalism on his account ‘has no 
philosophical warrant, and cannot be the basis for a philosophical imperialism o f the true
29 Rorty, ‘Philosophy and the Future’, p. 204.
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and the good’.^ ° Criticising Rorty, Harvey Siegel argues that ‘the contingency o f  a 
culture’s beliefs, values and ideals does no t entail that those beliefs, values and ideals 
have no legitimacy or force beyond the bounds o f  that c u l t u r e . S o m e  ideals, he 
continues, ‘are legitimately apphcable, and have force, ... beyond aU such cultural 
boundaries’.
Siegel however gives us no clear idea w hat he means by the term s ‘legitimacy’, 
‘applicability’, and ‘have force’. H e gives no indication o f  w hether he means that a 
standard o f  legitimacy or apphcabdity exists independently o f  w hat anyone takes to  be 
legitimate or apphcable, or w hether he simply thinks it morally acceptable to  seek to 
export ideas. Similarly, Kelly’s use o f  the term  ‘philosophical imperiahsm ’ is ambiguous. 
Philosophy can be viewed as a part o f  culture, m uch as one would identify dram a as an 
aesthetic part; writers hke John  Gray regard philosophy as an aspect o f  culture, hence his 
complaint that hberahsm is a m anifestation o f  W estern cultural imperiahsm. 
Alternatively, philosophy can be viewed as a separate concern, as the attem pt to  provide 
a purely rational justification for exporting the ideas — cultural, moral, aesthetic, etc. — o f 
one comm unity to  another. Rorty as we have seen certainly rejects this second notion, 
thinking it philosophicaUy incoherent. T he claim that hberahsm is m ore rational — w hen 
rationahty is viewed, in Barry’s term , as a ‘bare notion’ — than rehgious orthodoxy or 
fascism cannot be sustained. Rationahty m ust be given content, and this wiU be done in 
the hght o f  particular values and therefore in such a way that some will find question- 
begging. Like Gray, Rorty does no t think o f  philosophy as standing outside o f culture, 
but as a part o f it (‘culture’ being, for Rorty, a rough assemblage o f  habits). Barry agrees.
30 Kelly, ‘Pohtical theory in retreat?’, p. 233.
31 Harvey Siegel, ‘Multiculturahsm and the Possibihty of Transcultural Educational and 
Philosophical Ideas’, in Alan Malachowski (ed.) Sage Masters of Modem Social Thought, volume 4 
(London: Sage Pubhcations, 2002), pp. 25 — 44 at 40.
32 Gray, Enlightenment's Wake, p.viii.
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at least to  the extent that he takes reason to  require specific content, and all three are 
thus united in  agreeing that philosophical concerns are bound up  with cultural ones.
However, if  by ‘philosophical imperialism’ is m eant advocating liberalism as suitable and 
desirable for societies that are currently no t liberal, it is clear that Rorty endorses it. H e 
seems perfectly prepared to  be a ‘philosophical imperialist’ if  this is understood as the 
attem pt to  seek to  com m end and extend liberalism abroad. H e speaks for example o f 
desirability o f  W estern organisations such as A m nesty International, H um an Rights 
W atch, D octors W ithout Borders and the Peace Corps.^^ Thus, w hen Barry writes that 
cultural relativists think ‘that it would be “cultural imperialism” for liberals to  bring 
pressure to  bear on  regimes that violate hum an rights in an attem pt to  increase the 
num ber o f  people in the world w ho enjoy their protection’,^ '* Rorty is on  this account at 
least no t a cultural relativist.
Rorty’s view is that it is appropriate to  seek a global polity w ithout needing philosophical 
backup from  notions Hke universal vaHdity. H e urges that we should create, no t 
presuppose, universaHty, and makes this point by distinguishing ‘universal vaHdity’ from  
‘universal reach’,^  ^ and aUowing for a notion o f  ‘transcendence’ if  it means transcending 
the present in the effort to create a better future. Thom as M cCarthy seeks to make a 
contrast betw een Rorty, Jurgen Haberm as and Hilary Putnam  on  this point by 
considering their different views o f  a purportedly non-metaphysical account o f  universal 
vaHdity, which he terms a universal ‘transcultural notions o f  vaHdity’.^  ^ O n  this account, 
the issue betw een Rorty on  the one hand, and Haberm as and Putnam  on  the other, ‘is
33 Rorty, ‘The Communitarian Impulse’.
34 Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 140.
35 Rorty ‘Justice as a Larger Loyalty’, p. 230.
36 Thomas McCarthy, ‘Private Irony and PubHc Decency: Richard Rorty’s New Pragmatism’, 
Critical Inquiry 16 (Winter 1990), pp. 355 — 370 at 361.
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the context-transcendence o f truth-claims: do they or don’t they claim a validity that 
transcends the particular contexts in  which they are raised?’^  ^ M cCarthy contrasts w hat 
he takes to  be Rorty’s position, that validity reaches ‘to  the borders o f  a language and no 
further’, w ith that which he attributes to  Putnam  and Haberm as, that ‘there are no  such 
impassable borders; truth-claims can be contested indefinitely and from  an indefinite 
diversity o f  points o f  view, precisely because they claim unconditioned validity’/^
The contrast w ith Pum am  and Haberm as is no t however as strong as M cCarthy suggests. 
Rorty would agree that there are no  impassable borders insofar as there is no  limit to  the 
num ber o f  people one can talk to  w ith the hope to  reaching such agreement. H e can also 
agree with the view that truth-claims can be forever contested from  a potentially infinite 
num ber o f  viewpoints. This point can be seen if  we contrast the notion o f  ‘transcultural 
validity’ with that o f  ‘unconditioned validity’. Transcultural can be given a political sense, 
o f  seeking to  extend the ‘validity’ o f  one’s beliefs beyond one’s culture. But it cannot be 
given a transcendental m eaning as, in  H aberm as’s usage o f  the term , the transcending o f  
the tem poral w ith the eternal. T o  transcend a social practice is for Rorty to  replace it w ith 
another social practice, no t with som ething ‘unconditioned’. W e can hold open the 
possibility that everyone may come to take a belief to be vahd, and we can also hope that 
this possibility is someday realized; this is why Rorty accepts that universal reach, unlike 
universal validity, sits well w ith constructivism.^^ Thus, w hen Thom as Nagel urges us to  
‘climb outside o f  our own m inds’,"^  this stems from  his view that the order o f  reasons is 
structured independently o f  us, serving as a foundational which regulates our thoughts 
and behaviour. In  Rorty’s view, transcendence, or climbing outside o f  our m inds, can be 
given a political, bu t no t a metaphysical or epistemological, sense.
37 McCarthy, ‘Ironist Theory as a Vocation: A Response to Rorty’s Reply’, p. 646.
38 Ibid.
39 Rorty, justice as a Larger Loyalt/, p. 230.
^  Nagel, The View From Nowhere, p. 9.
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19.2 The legitim acy o f extending the scope o f  liberalism
Some however maintain that notions such as universal vahdity are im portant, and cannot 
be reduced to  purely political notions. For if  they are, then the consequence, as Rorty 
accepts, is a morality that is m andated n o t by reason o r hum an nature, bu t that is merely 
the im position o f  a particular morality upon other communities and cultures. Philosophical 
imperialists (in Kelly’s sense o f  the term) m ight avoid cultural imperialism by making a 
claim for universal validity; that is, by claiming that liberalism is no t merely a W estern 
invention. This Rorty denies, bu t Barry is m ore ambiguous. O n  one hand, he is very clear 
that liberalism arose in a particular context. Criticising Alasdair M acIntyre’s view that 
liberalism was a philosophical deduction from  the Enlightenm ent, Barry argues that this 
is a fiction, and points out that liberalism is a developm ent {not a conscious creation) o f 
the Enlightenm ent. H e also argues, as we saw in chapter 6, that liberals hke Rawls and 
Dw orkin theorise from  a particular historical context, the pohtical and econom ic 
background o f  the N ew  Deal s e t t le m e n t .O n  the other hand, he is less prepared to  
recognise the contingency o f  hberal values w hen engaging with exphcitly contextuahst 
writers such as Michael Walzer. In  a discussion o f  W alzer’s account o f  ‘internal social 
criticism’, Barry writes that w hat is at issue w hen drawing on a tradition is w ho can claim 
the best o f  it"^ ,^ bu t in so doing he leaves aside the question o f the  standard by which ‘the 
best’ is to  be measured. H e him self claims to  ‘draw upon ordinary behefs critically and 
selectively, employing a general theory o f  justice as a touchstone’,'^  ^ bu t he passes over 
exactly w hat is m eant by that generality. Clearly it is a liberal egalitarian theory, which in
Barry, Liberty and Justice, p. 119.
42 Ibid., p. 18.
43 B2Ltry, Justice as Impartiality, p. 10.
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response to  M acIntyre he is keen to  emphasise is itself inform ed by particular historical 
and socio-econom ic factors. I therefore agree w ith M att M atravers’s suggestion that 
Barry can be read in  part as attem pting to  w ork ou t the implications o f  widely shared 
beliefs about fundam ental equality.'^ This is o f  course to hit Barry where it hurts m ost for 
it is to  say, as M atravers intimates, that his account is itself a form  o f  W alzerian 
interpretivism.'^^
Barry’s position is thus rather closer to that o f  som eone like W alzer than he w ould allow. 
But recalling the distinction that Barry emphasises between a writer’s professed belief 
and the logic o f  their proposals,'^ his probable refusal to accept the similarity w ith W alzer 
is no t in itself a reason to  deny it. T hat he stresses his differences from  such writers 
stems, I suggest, from  a concern w ith w hat he takes to  follow from  their position. For 
Barry, as we have seen, their accounts do not allow for m eaningful social criticism. They 
are also said to  deny the possibihty o f  judging and criticising the standards o f  other 
societies.^^ However, this concern is eliminated if  it is correct to  say, with Rorty, that the 
locahsed origin o f  behefs carries no  necessary consequences for the extension o f  those 
behefs. It is, he argues, often the case that the best ideas are not som ehow  latent in 
hum an understanding or nature, bu t are the product o f  a very few people and societies: 
he writes that ‘ideals may be local and culture-bound, and nevertheless be the best hope 
o f the species’.*^®
^  Matt Matravers, ‘What’s ‘W rong” in Contractuahsm?’, in Paul Kelly (ed.) Impartiality, 'Neutrality 
and Justice (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1998), pp. 108 — 119 at 119.
Matravers goes on to say that Barry’s is a more sophisticated version o f Walzer’s project, 
perhaps because he takes Barry to separate two points that Walzer conflates, attachment to a 
society and preparedness to criticise it. But as was argued in chapter 6, there is no reason why 
Walzer need be committed to denying the legitimacy and desirability of the second.
46 Barry, ‘Second Thoughts — and Some First Thoughts Revived’, p. 211.
47 'Batry, Justice as Impartiality, pp. 3 -1 0 .
48 Rorty, Objectivity, Belativism and Truth, p. 208.
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Is Rorty correct to  say this? T hat he recognizes the emptiness o f notions o f  universal 
validity and yet remains convinced o f the desirability o f  exporting liberalism, has led to 
the charge that he is a ‘cultural imperialist’, either because, as M ark Taylor claims, that is 
his explicit intention,'^^ or because, as H oni H aber has it, he serves as an apologist for it/°
T hose w ho w arn against cultural imperialism however often  fail to  distinguish the various 
ways in which ideas can be ‘exported’ in an effort to  justify them  to  m ore and m ore 
people. In  the debate about extending liberal rights abroad, there is considerable 
ambiguity as to  o f  w hat this extension would consist. H aber for example does n o t seem 
to  recognise, let alone consider, the differences between: allowing A . Theory o f Justice to  be 
translated into Chinese, foreign sponsorship o f  indigenous reform ist political 
m ovem ents, support for cross-national organisations such as Am nesty International, 
hum anitarian aid, international military intervention, and wars o f  conquest. Rorty makes 
this point in a response to  M ark Taylor:
Taylor calls m e a “cultural imperialist” for saying that “tru th  and justice 
lie in the direction m arked by the successive stages o f  European 
thought” . “Imperialist” is a fighting word, in  the sense that it suggests 
images o f  the Conquistador’s horses and o f  Gatling guns. B ut I bet that 
Taylor too  thinks that tru th  lies in the direction that leads away from  
Aristotle toward Darwin, and that justice lies in the direction that leads 
away from  MarsiUus o f  Padua and toward Jo h n  Stuart MiU.^^
Mark C. Taylor, Taralectics’, in Robert P. Scharlemann (ed.) On the Other. Dialogue A nd!O r 
Dialectics (London: University of America Press, 1991), pp. 10 — 41 at 33.
50 Haber, Beyond Postmodern Politics., p. 44.
51 Richard Rorty, ‘Comments on Taylor’s ‘Taralectics’”, in Robert P. Scharlemann (ed.) On the 
Other. Dialogue A nd!O r Dialectics (London: University of America Press, 1991), pp. 71 — 78 at 77.
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Rorty’s aim, following the line developed in chapter 6 concerning the necessity o f 
argum ent and persuasion in political discussion, is to  seek to  persuade others o f  the 
desirability o f  liberal democracy. ‘I t is’, he writes, ‘self-contradictory to  think o f  im posing 
democracy by force rather than persuasion, o f  forcing m en and w om en to  be free. B ut it 
is n o t self-contradictory to  think o f  persuading them  to be ffee’.^  ^Further, by avoiding in 
the main reference either to cultural relativism or cultural imperialism, Rorty makes the 
pragmatic point that sometimes it is good to  export ideas and practices, and sometimes 
not, bu t that there is no  neutral criterion that can be used to  determ ine w hich is which.
The value o f warnings o f cultural imperialism is that they remind us that there is nothing 
intrinsically worthy about making claims for universality; liberals are joined with religious 
fanatics in viewing the scope o f their doctrine to be universal. A nd even so staunch a 
universalist as Barry recognizes that the charge o f  cultural imperialism is no t always 
misplaced. Writing o f Victorian attitudes towards clothing, he says:
O ne o f  the complaints against about Victorian “cultural imperialism” which 
is well founded is that Europeans (especially missionaries) tended to 
attribute universal moral significance to what in fact were simply the 
sartorial customs familiar to them  fiom  their own culture.
That this discussion focuses only on  clothing perhaps disguises the im portance o f  this 
com m ent by one o f  the m ost universahstic o f  liberals. Barry w ould probably accept that 
there are m any other beliefs, o f  Victorian missionaries and others, that have been 
exported, and that were no t a source o f  enlightenm ent bu t rather were an illegitimate
52 Rorty, ‘Philosophy and the Future’, p. 205.
53 Barry, Culture and '^quality, p. 287.
284
imposition. T he question therefore is no t w hether ‘cultural imperialism’ as a concept is 
morally legitimate, bu t rather how  to separate different instances: how  to distinguish 
proper m oral outrage at the practices o f  other societies from  prejudice. Barry writes that 
the difference is that liberalism, unhke fashion, is universally vahd, bu t as we have seen 
he quahfies this claim by saying it is vahd insofar as one accepts other assum ptions such 
as the desire to  reach reasonable agreement w ith one’s feUows, and that notions o f 
reasonableness m ust necessarily be fiUed out w ith specific content. H e is therefore, I 
suggest, in fact very similar to  writers as otherwise different as Rorty, Jo h n  Gray and 
Charles Taylor, w ho ah agree that w hat Barry thinks ‘the right thing to  do ’^ "^ is inform ed 
by particular. W estern, notions. W hat distinguishes Rorty from  Gray and Taylor is that 
unhke them , Rorty thinks that this does no t carry any consequences for the legitimacy o f  
extending hberahsm abroad. As he puts it, ‘the demands for reform  m ade on  the rest o f 
the world by W estern hberal societies ... are simply expressions o f  loyalty to  local. 
W estern, conceptions o f  justice ... but are none the worse for that’.^  ^ Insofar as Barry 
accepts that hberahsm  is no t a view fiom  nowhere, that it is no t neutral betw een every 
vision o f  the good hfe, and that its notions o f  reasonableness have to  be fihed out in 
accordance w ith particular values, he has joined Rorty in  becom ing ethnocentric. In  so 
doing however, he has no t disquahfied him self in any way from  m aking his claims for the 
fairness and universal desirabihty o f  hberahsm.
Rorty and Barry are thus, I suggest, substantively in agreement. For Barry, hberahsm  is 
universaUy vahd (in his non-K antian sense o f  the term) n o t because o f  the dem ands o f  
reason, bu t because it is the universaUy desirable means by which hum ans should come 
together to  organise their hves. This view stems, as I suggested in chapter 5, from  two
54 Ibid., p. 284.
55 Rorty, Justice as a Larger Loyalty’, p. 228.
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premises: a belief in the equality o f  hum an beings and the right o f every individual to  
choose her own ends, together w ith the absence o f any m eans to  determ ine a uniquely 
rational way to  judge or adjudicate betw een those ends. Liberalism is for him  not 
prem ised on  views about the ultimate source o f  value, and values freedom  and equality 
no t for doctrinal reasons, bu t in order to  give everyone a chance o f framing their own 
view o f  the good, and the opportunity to  follow and alter it. Similarly for Rorty, ‘The 
poin t o f  a liberal society is no t to  invent or create anything, bu t simply to  m ake it as easy 
as possible for people to  achieve their wildly different private ends w ithout hurting each 
other’.®^ Individuals should be left free to  create themselves; as Rawls puts it, for them  to 
be free to  frame, pursue and revise their own notions o f  the good. Rorty writes: ‘O ne o f  
my aims in this book ^Contingency, Irony, and Solidari^  is to  suggest the possibility o f  a 
Hberal utopia: one in  which ironism, in the relevant sense, is u n iv e rsa l'.Iro n ism , standing 
in contrast to  ‘com m on sense’, he takes to concern self-creation and the refusal uncritically 
to accept inherited descriptions, typically those o f  one’s community or culture. O nce we 
give up on the notion o f  a single best hum an Hfe, HberaHsm is required precisely because 
it provides the freedoms for us to  construct our own views o f  the good.
20. Achieving universality
20.1 A  libera l m etanarrative?
That Rorty continues to  argue for the universaHty o f  HberaHsm once he has 
acknowledged its contingent and local origins has led to  the charge o f  self-contradiction.
56 Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others, p. 196.
57 Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, p. xv.
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o f  his tacitly relying on assum ptions that he claims to  reject. Jo h n  Gray and Christopher 
Norris are unusual am ong com m entators because they both  recognise that Rorty seeks to 
claim that Hberahsm is o f  universal value. Gray however claims that it is contradictory to 
affirm that Hberahsm is merely one form  o f  Hfe am ong others whilst proclaiming its 
m oral superiority. ‘Rorty cannot take a fuU-bloodedly pardcularist and historicist view o f  
Hberal cultures and at the same time make the standard Hberal imperiahst claim that 
western “cultures o f  rights” are superior to  aU others’.^ ® Gray thinks that Rorty does so 
because, although historicist, his is a teleological historicism. Rorty’s account o f  
Hberahsm rests. Gray argues, on  an EnHghtenment philosophy o f  history, in which 
W estern (or m ore accurately. N o rth  American) Hberahsm is the future o f  the species. I t  is 
a philosophy o f  history in which ‘local Am erican individuahst cultural forms are 
conceived o f  as the germ, or exemplar, o f  a universal or cosmopoHtan civiHsation.^^ Thus 
although he takes Rorty to  be a relativist, his is a relativism with universahstic aspirations: 
Gray speaks o f  the ‘relativistic position o f  Rorty, in  which Hberahsm is represented as 
only one form  o f Hfe am ong others — if, as we shah see, a form  o f  Hfe with unique 
historical privileges’,^ ® the privileges being that it the destiny o f aU humankind.
Similarly, N orris thinks that Rorty rehes on a metanarrative to defend Hberahsm. Rorty is 
said to  raise ‘a specific set o f  cultural values — those o f  bourgeois Hberahsm — to  the 
status o f  a wholesale teleology and universal ethos’.^  ^ A lthough bo th  he and Gray 
recognise that Rorty claims to renounce aU metanarratives, rejecting any notion o f  history 
being shaped by forces outside o f  hum an endeavour and thus (potential) control, his 
account o f  the emergence o f  Hberahsm is nevertheless said to  rest on  a metanarrative.
58 Gray, Endgames, p. 59.
59 Gray, M ill on Liberty, p. 157.
^  Ibid., p. 151.
•5^ Norris, The Contest of Eacuities, p. 159.
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T hat is, Rorty implicitly relies on a teleological account to  back up his postm odernist 
view that denies there is any such thing as teleology.
Rorty certainly likes sweeping narratives o f hum an history, all o f  which he tells from  the 
perspective o f  hum anity having m ade progress.^^ However, although he Hkes such 
narratives, his is no t I suggest a wg/^arrative, a narrative underpinned by a teleological 
philosophy o f  history. T o  be sure, Rorty thinks that if  there is a future for humanity, it 
will come through historical developments, no t reason or hum an nature: he writes o f  his 
hopes o f a ‘historical progress that will gradually encompass aU o f  the hum an race,’^  ^
resulting in a worldwide m oral community. This is however a hope, one which is not, I 
think, based upon a philosophy o f history. O ne illustration o f  the tentative nature o f 
Rorty’s thoughts for the future is that, insofar as he ventures an opinion, it is bo th  
speculative and subdued. H e writes for example that ‘I f  I were a wagering Olympian, I 
m ight well bet my fellow divinities that pragmatism, utilitarianism and liberalism would, 
am ong mortals, be only faint m em ories in a hundred years’ time’.^  B ut that is, he 
believes, no  reason to  give up trying to  secure a better future.
That Rorty’s view o f  liberal democracy does no t depend upon  a m etanarrative can I think 
be seen if  we turn  to  another o f Rorty’s narratives, which he calls the narrative o f  ‘the 
Pragmatist’s Progress’.^  ^ This narrative, intriguingly, is a narrative o f  the developm ent o f 
how one tells narratives o f  development. A t first, one tells stories that are, Hke Hegel’s, 
teleological, in which the W orld Spirit, or hum an destiny, is working itself out through 
history. However, as one progresses, one can set aside such teleology as itself stem ming
62 For a scathing critique of Hberal humanism, see John Gray, Straw Dogs: Thoughts on Humans and 
Other Animals (London: Granta, 2002).
63 Rorty, Objectivity, Rflativism and Truth, p. 219.
64 Rorty, Philosophj and Social Hope, p. 274.
65 Ibid., p. 133.
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from  the Platonic urge for certainty, and instead tell as many stories as there are hopes to 
express. This later stage is reached w hen ‘one begins to  see one’s previous peripeties no t 
as stages in the ascent toward Enlightenm ent, bu t simply as the contingent results o f  
encounters with various books which happened to  fall into one’s hands’.^ *^ This is the 
point at which one thinks o f  oneself, and everything else, as capable o f  potentially infinite 
re-descriptions, reflecting the diversity o f  hum an interests and needs.
This is exemplified in  Rorty’s own view o f  the different plausible narratives o f  the history 
o f  W estern metaphysics. H e agrees w ith Heidegger that Platonic assum ptions about the 
need for clarity and certainty result in p ra g m a tism .T h e  history o f  philosophy shows, he 
suggests, that the only things that we can ever be sure about are our ow n needs and 
desires. Unhke Heidegger, Rorty thinks this a good thing but, m ore im portantly for my 
argument, as no m ore an accurate representation o f  the true nature o f  reahty than any 
other.^® For him, the past provides the raw materials to  draw upon, bu t that material 
provides no obhgation for it to  be used in any particular way. T he past should be seen as 
‘material for playful experimentation rather than as im posing tasks and responsibihties
>69Upon us.
Rorty claims that ‘Teleological thinking is inevitable’.^ ® It should however be relativist no t 
absolutist, in the sense o f  explaining to  our particular com m unity how  it got to  the 
position that it has, and offering suggestions for the future. In  this respect. Gray him self 
is similar to  Rorty, insofar as he him self offers a narrative. For Gray,
66 Ibid.
67 See in particular Rorty, Essays on Heide^er and Others, pp. 27 — 49.
68 Rorty suggests that in his later writings, Heidegger lapsed back into this way of speaking. Ibid., 
pp. 64 -  65,
69 Rorty, Consequences of Pragmatism, 87.
70 Richard Rorty, ‘Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin’, in Herman J. Saatkamp Jr. (ed.) Rorty and 
Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics (London: Vanderbilt University Press, 1995), pp. 
1 -  15 at 13.
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In truth, neither a return to  a pre-m odern world-view nor the post­
m odern affirm ation o f  a distinctively m odernist project are viable 
historical options for us. W e need to  consider how  to think and act in  a 
culture that has been transform ed irreversibly by an Enlightenm ent 
project that has shown itself to  be self-consuming.^^
Thus I think that the real disagreement between Rorty, Gray and N orris is that each o f 
them  have different political hopes. Gray thinks Rorty’s optim ism  misplaced, seeing the 
hopes and goals engendered by the Enlightenm ent to  be bad ones. H e writes dismissively 
o f  ‘the shallow optimistic creeds o f  our age ... for which hum an evils are to  be solved 
rather than sorrows to  be coped with or endured’.^  ^ Against them , he proposes w hat 
Heidegger called ‘releasem ent’, that ‘we let things be rather than aiming wilfully to 
transform  them  or subject them  to  our p u r p o s e s . I t  is their different visions o f  our 
contem porary condition and o f  the  future, n o t the philosophical or historical resources 
that they draw (or rely) upon  to justify them, that marks the difference betw een Rorty 
and Gray. B oth set out their views on  w hat they think will happen, w hat needs to  
happen, and what they would Hke to  happen, bu t bo th  seem to  m e to  offer relativist 
narratives, n o t absolutist metanarratives.
20.2 A ch ieving un iversality through free discussion
Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, pp. 146 — 7. 
2^ Ibid., p. 18.
73 Ibid., p. 153.
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I f  we set aside reference to the universal validity o f  liberalism, how  are we to  achieve a 
global polity? O ne way would be to  claim that liberal values form  a part o f  the value 
system o f every society, and that the task o f  the theorist ought to  be to  discover and 
propagate those values. Barry takes this approach to  be central to  W alzer’s account, and 
rejects it. Responding to  w hat he takes to  be W alzer’s view that cultures contain a 
distinct, hom ogeneous, and coherent set o f values, Barry counters by pointing out that 
‘[t]here is no  such thing as a set o f  underlying values waiting to  be discovered’.^ '^  In  saying 
this, Barry is in  agreement w ith Rorty, w ho dismisses the task o f  seeking to identify 
cultural universals as fruitless.^^ M oreover, in the face o f the fact that m ost people do not 
believe in hum an equality, Rorty writes, ‘So what? W e W estern liberals do believe in it, and 
so much the better for us’.^  ^ Ruth A nna Putnam  has suggested that this is ‘arrogant’ and 
that one should instead say ‘J  believe in  hum an equality, and 1 am glad that others do 
too’.^  ^However, from  w hat 1 have argued above, this am ounts to  exactly the same claim. 
D ropping the assum ption of, as distinct from  the aspiration to, universalism, Rorty 
substitutes the role o f  creation or invention in m oral life. H e writes that whilst his 
pragmatist account rules out the possibility o f burrow ing dow n behind appearance to 
reality, it proposes instead that we imagine a different, better future. As he puts it.
Instead o f  appealing from  transitory current appearances to  the 
perm anent reality, appeal to a stiU only dimly imagined future practice.
D rop  the appeal to  neutral criteria, and the claim that som ething large hke 
N ature or Reason or History or the M oral Law is on the side o f  the
Barry, justice as Impartiality, p. 5.
■^5 Rorty, Contingency, Ironj, and Solidarity, p. 51.
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth, p. 207, emphasis in original.
77 Ruth Anna Putnam, Democracy without Foundations’, Ethics 110 (January 2000), pp. 388 — 
404 at 401, emphasis in original. Putnam goes on to say that this criticism apphes to Rorty’s 
writings of the 1980s, and that his more recent views are not open to this objection. In contrast, 1 
do not think Rorty’s position has changed. See for example Rorty, UniversaHty and Truth’, p. 22.
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oppressed. Instead, just make invidious com parisons between the actual 
present and a possible, if  inchoate, future.^®
In  saying this, he criticises w hat he takes to  be a further problem  with K antian 
universalism, its potential conservatism. H e takes K ant to  be hostile to  diversity and self­
creation: ‘[ujniversalist philosophers assume, with K ant, that aU the logical space 
necessary for m oral deliberation is now available — that all im portant truths about right 
and w rong can no t only be stated but be m ade plausible, in language already to  hand’.^  ^
However, as the case o f feminism dem onstrates, sometimes that language does no t 
presently exist, and the purpose o f philosophy should be to  help create it.
His claim m ight then  be summarised as saying that if  a society contains values upon 
which the liberal can draw they should do so, bu t that i f  it does not, the liberal should 
refuse to  w ork within the boundaries o f  that m oral world and seek instead to  create her 
own. This position, 1 take it, is in  accord with Barry’s view that political philosophers 
may ‘with luck eventually extend the boundaries o f w hat is politically thinkable’.®® There 
is for Rorty no difference between saying that liberalism ought to  be universahstic, and 
that it ought to  be responsible to  its own, hberal, traditions, since that includes the 
attem pt to  try to  extend hberal values to  countries and comm unities that are currently 
non-hberal. N otions such as ‘universal vahdity’ are superfluous, serving at best as a 
somewhat misleading description o f  a pohtical aspiration.
Accepting the partiahty o f  hberahsm has, finally, the advantage o f consistency. Far from  
being a weakness, we can say that acceptance o f the partiahty o f  one’s views helps to  get
78 Rorty, Truth and Progress, p. 217.
79 Ibid., p. 203.
80 Brian Barry, ‘Spherical Justice and Global Injustice’, in David Miller and Michael Walzer (eds.) 
Pluralism, Justice, and Equality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 67 — 80 at 80.
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around some o f  the apparent inconsistencies presented by som e claims to  universalism. 
David Miller suggests that if  we are to take the claims o f  universalists at face value, they are 
inconsistent in their own terms. It is, he believes, inconsistent to claim to be cosmopolitan 
whilst simultaneously regarding the principle o f  national autonomy to be so strong that 
cosmopolitans are invariably opposed to  imposing their beliefs on others.®^ I f  there is a duty 
to protect basic rights wherever they are, universalists should not rule out what Miller terms 
^benevolent imperialism.’®^ Miller claims that Barry in particular draws back from  the full 
conclusions o f complete universalism, which for Miller require for example redistribution o f 
wealth between nations by taxing G D P and mineral extraction.®^ H e accepts that a 
‘universalist approach to ethics might still be the correct one,’®^ bu t his point is that either 
one accepts this, in which case one m ust fuUy accept the conclusion that national 
boundaries are o f no intrinsic significance, or, as he undertakes to  do, proposes a 
particularist position and sees if  it can be defended. H e thus finds universalists guilty o f 
failing to live up to their own professed standards. However, if  writers like Barry are 
prepared to eschew reference to the inherent universal validity o f  Hberahsm, and recognise 
its contingent historical emergence whilst not allowing this to stop them  from  seeking to 
show Hberahsm to be the best form  o f Hfe, and from seeking to convince other people and 
communities that this is the case, we can say that there is nothing inconsistent with for 
example attempting to  spread hum an rights bu t at the same time no t seeking to  tax mineral 
extraction. I f  the desire for universaHty is held as a pohtical aspiration, one coloured by 
reference to what can and cannot be achieved given the circumstances that obtain in the 
world as we find it, then such things are not inteUectual inconsistencies but are bom  rather
81 MiUer, On 'Mationalitj.
82 Ibid., p. 77. To be sure, Barry does not necessarily rule it out See for example Culture and Equality, 
p. 138 -139.
83 MiUer, On 'Nationality, p. 105, n. 33.
84 Ibid., p. 64.
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of the recognition that in practice liberalism is unable to be defended and ‘exported’ to that 
extent.
In conclusion, Rorty is a Hberal universaHst in the sense that he beUeves it desirable to 
seek to commend and extend Hberal values and institutions to non-Hberal countries. He 
does not think that one can or should attempt to do so by making appeals to reason, or 
to human nature, but rather that Hberals should do so by suggesting that Hberahsm is 
preferable to any alternative. He is untroubled by claims o f blanket ‘Western cultural 
imperiaHsm’, suggesting that, depending on the ideas to be exported, cultural imperiaHsm 
can be a good or a bad thing. In the case o f Hberahsm, he is emphatic that, despite the 
specific origins o f Hberahsm, it is desirable to export it.
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Chapter Nine
Conclusion
This thesis set out to defend Rorty’s account o f  political liberalism. It did so by rebutting 
the widely held view that Rorty’s anti-foundationalism, and consequental ironism, either 
consciously proposes, or logically entails, the denial o f  ethical com m itm ent and the 
practice o f  m oral justification. Anti-foundationalism, it is said, renders obsolete 
normativity in political theory, ruling out any role for ethical theory or social criticism. 
Rorty’s ethnocentrism  is held to exclude the possibility that the practices o f  communities 
might be judged morally unacceptable, either from  within (as a corollary o f his account 
o f  morality as V e  intentions’) or from  without, since there is no  extra-societal standard 
other than the agreement o f  a community.
I have argued, against critics w ho view Rorty as reducing m oral com m itm ent to  an 
unacceptably parochial concern, that this is to m isunderstand both  w hat is entailed by 
anti-foundationalism, and w hat Rorty comm ends in his own writings. I have argued that 
these claims are inconsistent with his own stated position, and that none necessarily 
follows from  the logic o f  that position. Rather, I have sought to show how, despite 
rejecting notions such as universal validity, as well as any constructive role for truth, 
Rorty can still claim that values have legitimacy beyond their being merely what we think, 
and that they can be extended to ‘forms o f  hfe’ other than those whose m em bers already 
(‘happen’) to  value them.
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It is for Rorty a decisive step in hum an m aturation to  accept the ‘anti-authoritarian’ view 
that there is no  way to turn  away from  those obligations by seeking recourse either in 
m onotheism , or secular counterparts such as Enlightenm ent Rationalism and scientism. 
Concern with the latter, it was argued, is a half-way betw een the need for religious 
certainty, and a fully m atured humanity that can thrive w ithout backup from  non-hum an 
authorities. Political liberalism is for Rorty the full application o f  anti-authoritarianism, 
the view that we owe no respect or obligation to  anything other than our fellow hum an 
beings.
It was then argued that ‘conversation’ cannot be guided by notions such as the natural 
order o f  reasons or o f  universal validity. In the absence o f  the sort o f  foundations Rorty 
takes philosophers typically to have sought, many claim that Rorty reduces truth, 
goodness, etc. to  a m atter o f  w hat we happen to  think around here. I have argued that this 
inference is a mistake, and that it represents a m isunderstanding o f  Rorty’s ‘ethnocentric’ 
position. For him, w hat matters are freedom  and equality, notions that m ust be 
construed politically, in particular as the sort o f  opportunities provided by liberal 
democracies (at their best). The rem oval o f  any philosophical pre-conditions o f  such 
notions does not, it was argued, m ake our comm itm ents morally arbitrary or relativistic. 
Conversation and argum ent take place by considering the concrete advantages and 
disadvantages o f  proposals, no t their philosophical status. The claim o f  m oral 
arbitrariness was seen to fail because it has no contrastive force; there is nothing that is 
not a historically contingent belief.
It has been suggested that in advocating iconism, Rorty rem oves any basis for m oral 
com m itm ent or conviction. Awareness o f contingency will, he believes, leave us with 
fears that we will be unable to dispel. However, against the fears o f  writers like Alasdair
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M acIntyre w ho think the ironic attitude to be one o f  detachm ent, it was argued that the 
sort o f  global detachm ent that ironism  (following Rorty’s definition) seems to imply is 
impossible, and that ironic doubts concern particular parts o f  a vocabulary, no t 
vocabularies as a whole. It is this doubt that makes, I have suggested, ironism  cohere well 
w ith the liberal desire to alleviate cruelty. O nce 'cruelty’ is construed as a category, one 
which is open and ideally continually revised in order to take account o f  hitherto 
unperceived instances o f  cruelty, it is clear that the ironist’s interest in o ther vocabularies 
comes together with this concern. That is n o t to  say that ironism  leads inevitably to 
liberalism. It is to suggest however that a fully-fledged liberalism should be an ironic one.
Turning to address the nature o f  Rorty’s political liberalism, I have argued that liberalism 
is no t som ething that ‘just happens’ to be valued ‘around here’. Critics have claimed that 
since w hat is believed ‘around here’ is merely what we think, there is no  possibility o f 
justifying those beliefs either to others or to ourselves. Rorty is held to have given up on 
justification by claiming either that justification falls out o f  the picture altogether, or that 
the beliefs and practices o f  particular communities are som ehow self-justifying. I have 
rejected this reading, distinguishing justification that will persuade all comers from  
everyday justification as answerability to  reasonable requests for explanation. Justification 
is im portant, bu t it is inescapably tied to the standards o f  a particular ethnos. Certainly, 
liberalism resulted from  contingent historical events, no t the inevitable unfolding o f 
history. It can however be justified, bo th  by invidious com parison with non-hberal 
regimes and, m ore positively, by showing that its emphasis on individual hberty is suited 
to societies whose m em bers belong to m ore than one form  o f  Hfe.
I then turned to address the role o f  the pohtical theorist. Rorty argues that pohtical 
theorists ought to be concerned n o t with justifying hberal democracy as a philosophical
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deduction from  w hat has come to be called the ‘Enlightenm ent Project’, bu t with 
offering a philosophical articulation o f  the practices o f  liberal societies, in so doing 
drawing attention to the ways in which the practices o f  those societies fail to live up to 
their self-image. Rorty’s position was examined and defended against two objections, 
those o f  incoherence and o f  critical impotence. It was then contrasted with Michael 
W alzer’s account o f  ‘internal social criticism’ which, though very similar, m isrepresents 
the debate between political theorists and social critics.
The parochialism implicit in ethnocentrism  was taken up in a consideration o f  to  w hom  
it is that Rorty thinks we should be concerned to justify ourselves. I considered how  an 
ethnocentric account o f justification can escape m aking the standards o f  a particular 
ethnos the last word. It is no t possible to appeal to  notions o f  objectivity, since that 
notion, understood — as it m ust be — as inter-subjectivity, is itself inform ed by hum an 
practices and beliefs. However, drawing on Rawls’s account o f  wide reflective 
equilibrium, we can seek to increase the scope o f  our ethnos.
Finally, I examined the scope o f Rorty’s claims for liberalism, arguing that although we 
cannot justify the universality o f  liberalism by drawing upon ‘hum an nature’ or ‘reason’, 
the two notions that have traditionally been called upon w hen attem pting to do so, 
Rorty holds to the possibility o f  extending liberalism beyond the frontiers o f  one’s 
community. Despite his hostility to  Kantian universalism, he is a universalist in the sense 
that he believes in the desirability o f  extending liberal values and institutions, ideally 
globally. I examined how  he suggests this should be done, by relying on political,- no t 
philosophical, arguments.
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I have suggested that a correct understanding o f  ethnocentrism  leaves a robust and 
refreshed account o f  liberalism, one which is freed o f  the legitimate criticisms that have 
been levelled against other accounts o f Hberahsm.
The m ost significant point that emerges from  this thesis, beyond w hat I hope is a m ore 
accurate and nuanced interpretation o f  Rorty’s position than is standard, is that it raises 
questions about the self-image o f  philosophers and political theorists. N otions like 
‘rationality’, ‘logical’, and ‘hum an nature’ are used freely in political philosophy, bu t it is 
unclear what substantive, as distinct from  rhetorical, w ork these com m ents do. T o  give 
one final example, Brian Barry argues that logic can play a substantive determining what 
counts as justification. He writes that it is no t sufficient to justify one’s actions simply by 
appealing to one’s culture; were one to point out that som ething is part o f  one’s culture, 
this observation, Barry writes, ‘has no bearing on the logical structure o f  your defence o f 
your actions’.^  Clearly though, for some, pointing out that som ething is part o f  the 
cultural practice o f  one’s comm unity is to justify it. M embers o f  religious com m unities 
often appeal to  cultural (as distinct from  religious) traditions in order to justify their 
practices. For O rthodox Jewish m en, the wearing o f  a kippah (skuU cap) outside 
Synagogue has no religious justification in the Torah, bu t is rather a cultural practice, one 
that is logically justified in those terms. Logic alone cannot establish w hether or n o t any 
particular factor has a bearing on justification; that is, logic cannot determine w hat counts 
as the logical structure and defence o f  one’s actions.
Barry really means that culture should play no role in justification, and to  make his point 
designates as ‘illogical’ those w ho think otherwise, persons w ho include ‘the ranks o f  ...
Barry, Culture and 'Equality, p. 253.
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political philosophers w ho have succumbed to cultural relativ ism '/ The tired charges o f 
relativism and irrationalism are however best pu t to rest. The term  ‘relativist’ is typically 
used as a term  o f  condem nation rather than for any clearly defined substantive issue/ 
marking out and castigating those w ho one thinks have reached a different conclusion 
from  oneself. For example, Barry claims that John  Gray’s account o f  strong value 
pluralism is ‘another name for m oral relativism’,"^ despite Gray explicitly claiming 
otherwise.^ Relativism conflates the empirical truth that different people hold different 
beliefs with the normative claim that some beliefs are right and others wrong, some true 
and others false, some moral and others immoral. I do no t think anyone genuinely denies 
any o f  these normative positions. The issue is rather how  far we are prepared to  go in 
challenging other people’s beliefs, and what resources we can draw upon  to do this. 
People differ over how  far judgments o f  goodness and righmess extend — to  the 
boundaries o f  a particular society, or beyond — but again, I doubt that anybody falls 
crudely into rigidly affirming either. W e all think that some things are simply and 
absolutely wrong, and that other people and communities that do not agree with us are 
by extension wrong, mistaken, or immoral. Barry him self sums this up nicely w hen he 
writes: ‘virtually everybody agrees that there are some universal standards and also that 
there are some m atters that are subject to culturally variable norm s ... The question is, 
where does one end and the other take over?’*^ Significantly, W alzer has recently made
2 Ibid., p. 284.
3 This can in part be seen in that most people accused of relativism do not identify themselves as 
relativists; Walzer and Paul Feyerabend being rare exceptions, both with rhetorical purposes of 
their own. In The Last Word, aside from a few quotations, Nagel does not argue against specific 
‘relativist’ philosophers, but attacks a generic ‘relativism’ broadly conceived. The problem with 
this broad-brush approach is that the writers Nagel cites as relativists — Hilary Putnam, Bernard 
Williams, and Rorty — are all different. In his book Renewing Philosophy, Putnam accuses both 
Rorty and Williams of relativism, but for different reasons. In turn, writing of Williams’ paper 
‘The Truth in Relativism’, Rorty says that ‘I would hold that there is no truth in relativism’. Rorty, 
Objectivity, Pjelativism, Truth, p. 31 n. 13, emphasis in original.
 ^Barry, Culture and Equality, p. 133.
5 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p. 70.
 ^Barry, ‘The Muddles of Multiculturalism’, p. 60.
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the same point: 'W e choose within limits, and I suspect that the real disagreement am ong 
philosophers is no t w hether such limits exist — no one seriously believes that they don’t — 
but how wide they are’/  B oth claims seem to  be the same as Rorty’s ethnocentric one, 
that the difference between pluralism and cultural relativism is ‘the difference between 
pragmatically justified tolerance and mindless irresponsibility’/  Rorty w ould agree with 
both  Barry and W alzer that we should be mindful o f  bo th  concerns. There are o f  course 
limits to tolerance; we should avoid, he writes, the situation where we have becom e ‘so 
open-m inded that our brains have fallen out’.^  But the limits to  tolerance are no t set, as 
Nagel for example seems to  believe, from  a neutral perspective that constitutes the ‘last 
w ord’, bu t from  a specific and ever-changing viewpoint.
The difficulty in locating Rorty’s own position in many contem porary philosophical 
debates reflects, I suggest, the inadequacy o f  many o f  the categorisations employed in 
those d isc u ss io n s .R o rty  him self has lam ented the continuing interest shown in the 
‘communitarian-cosmopoHtan debate’,”  and the so-called ‘liberal-republican debate’ 
noting, against Michael Sandel, that people are concerned both  with individual liberty to 
choose their own ends, and the need for citizen participation in governm ent. ‘They see 
no need to choose between these two definitions. Any society that does no t m eet both
 ^Walzer, On Toleration, pp. 5 — 6.
® Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. 276.
 ^Rorty, Objectivity, P£lativism and Truth, p. 203.
The ambiguity about Rorty’s position is captured in the title of Andrew Jason Cohen’s paper, 
‘On Universalism: Communitarians, Rorty and (“Objectivist”) “Liberal Metaphysicians’”. In that 
paper, Cohen argues that Rorty is not a communitarian, but that his liberalism is insufficiently 
robust.
That Rorty offers an alternative to that debate is proposed by Yong Huang in his paper, 
‘Political Solidarity and Religious Plurality: A Rortian Alternative to Liberalism and 
Communitarianism’, o f L a i v  and Religion 11 (1994), pp. 499 — 534. Rorty however, as has 
been argued throughout this thesis, clearly does not view his position as an alternative to 
liberalism. For Rorty’s rejection of the ‘cosmopolitan-communitarian debate’, see his ‘Response 
to Molly Cochran’, p. 200.
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requirements, they think, hardly deserves to be called “ free” .’^  ^ Clearly he is not alone in 
calling into question debates that are taken to  be central to  political theory; W alzer and 
Charles Taylor have for example bo th  questioned the liberal-communitarian debate/^ 
Following Rorty, I think this critique applies m uch m ore generally. In  particular, I have 
suggested that Rorty’s position dem onstrates the artificiality o f  the contrast that is held to  
obtain between liberals and those w ho would draw on the ‘shared understandings’ o f 
their own societies. W alzer is mistaken to  suggest that his proposals am ount to a 
challenge to how  political theory has been practiced, for political theory in the case o f  
writers like Rawls is itself the attem pt to  articulate the values latent in  liberal societies. 
Barry’s fears that W alzer’s approach is ‘dangerous’ are correspondingly mistaken, since 
that approach characterises his own project too.
In  making this claim, there is o f  course the danger that I am  overlooking significant 
differences between theorists and their positions. John  Searle believes Rorty does just 
this. In a discussion o f  Rorty’s view o f  the similarity betw een John  Dewey’s views o f 
higher education and the current situation in N orth  American humanities departments, 
Searle writes that Rorty’s position reminds him  ‘o f  a rem ark o f  W ittgenstein’s, where he 
says that if  you wrap up different kinds o f  furniture in enough wrapping paper you can 
make it all look the same shape’.’"^ But we can be m indful o f  this concern whilst no t 
refiaining from  challenging issues and debates, even those where battle lines have long 
been drawn. Keeping with the self-image o f  political theorists, despite his trenchant 
criticisms o f  W alzer, Barry draws on ideas current and latent in society to  back up his 
claims for egalitarianism. H e refers to the French Declaration o f  the Rights o f  M an and
2^ Rorty, ‘A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism’, p. 117, emphasis in original.
13 Charles Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in his Political Arguments 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), pp. 181 -  203; Michael Walzer, ‘The 
Communitarian Critique of Liberalism,’ Political Theory, 18 (1990), pp. 6 — 23.
14 Richard Rorty and John Searle, ‘Rorty v. Searle, At Last: A Debate’, Logos: A  Journal of Catholic 
Thought and Culture 2 (1999), pp. 20 — 67 at 30.
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o f  the Citizen, the American Declaration o f  Independence, and the Universal Declaration 
o f  H um an Rights/^ H e does so in a selective way, and, in the case o f  the French and 
American declarations, by giving a particular interpretation o f  them: as is frequently 
observed, the framers o f  those docum ents certainly had no  thought that the equaUty they 
sought to enshrine would include w om en or non-whites. Barry does no t say that current 
standards are irrelevant, rather that the best should be m ade o f  them, ‘M oral reformers, 
however radical, never start completely from  scratch. Rather, they reject some existing 
ideas while at the same time extending the scope o f  increasing the im portance o f  
others’.^  ^This I take to be in essence the same claim as W alzer’s w hen he writes that ‘We 
becom e critics naturally, as it were, by elaborating on existing moralities and telling 
stories about a society more just than, though never entirely different from , our own.’^^  
Barry would probably object that W alzer is unable to join him  in providing such a 
selective interpretation but, as I have suggested, there is no  reason why not. Barry’s point 
is that one connects with current understandings o f  justice, utilizing those 
understandings to articulate a better conception o f  justice, and W alzer seems to  be 
com m itted to the same thing.
It may seem strange and perhaps even perverse to claim as 1 have that Rorty’s position 
offers greater clarity for political philosophers. For he is critical o f  those analytic 
philosophers who present themselves as seeking greater precision, or as clarifiers o f 
concepts.^^ This, he argues, is merely a m atter o f philosophers complimenting themselves, 
assuming that they are more clear-sighted than historians, lawyers, physicists or literary
5^ Barry, Culture and 'Equality, p. 284; Barry, as Impartiality, p. 8.
Barry, Liberty and Justice, p, 115.
Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism, p. 65.
More generally, Barry makes the Wittgensteinian point that if we use the word ‘justice’ to 
describe something that no one recognizes as justice, there is no reason to use the word justice at 
all. Barry, Liberty and Justice, p. 115.
For a recent expression and endorsement of this idea, see Adam Swift, Political Vhilosophy, p. 4.
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critics. Their doing so is no t only arrogant, but m oreover rests on a mistaken view that 
concepts need clarifying. O n Rorty’s W it^ensteinian view, a concept is simply the use o f a 
word, and the ‘conceptual confusion’ from which philosophers like Swift seek to save us are 
simply alternative uses o f words. Nevertheless, I suggest that the self-image o f  theorists is 
important, and that in thinking about this image Rorty has something o f  significance to 
offer. As we saw in chapter 3, Rorty agrees with Alasdair MacIntyre that contemporary 
m oral discussion is an inconsistent mixture o f  notions — notably ‘reason’ and ‘hum an nature’ 
— that depend on an Aristotelian worldview, and a mechanistic and Darwinian view that 
implicitly refutes it. In  urging that we discard the last vestiges o f  the Aristotelian 
vocabulary, we would no t give up on notions such as reason,^^ but would treat them  not 
as philosophical honorifics, som ething that we but n o t our opponents possess, bu t rather 
as m oral virtues, o f  open-m indedness and tolerance.
This is, further, how  Rorty m ight respond to  critics o f  the Enlightenm ent like M acIntyre 
and John  Gray. For Rorty, in their respective accounts o f ‘the Enlightenm ent project’, 
these writers conflate two different ideas: that social and political life ought to  be 
reasonable, guided by principles that aU w ho live under them  can — or at least could — 
freely endorse; and that those principles have some ahistoric independence or rational 
grounding in som ething like the K antian m oral law. There is no  reason to think that the 
incoherent second idea negates the aspiration to the first. F or M acIntyre, the 
Enlightenm ent was ‘the project o f  founding a social order in which individuals could 
emancipate themselves fcom the contingency and particularity o f  tradition by appealing
20 One way of summarising this position is that I suspect Rorty would agree with an analogy used 
by Daniel Dennett in his discussion o f free will. Dennett argues that concluding that free will is a 
myth because we leam that it does not exist in the form in which it has traditionally been thought 
of is like concluding that love does not exist because one leams that it is not caused by being 
struck by one of Cupid’s arrows. Daniel Dennett, Freedom Fvolves (London: Allen Lane, 2003), pp. 
222 — 223. This analogy accurately captures Rorty’s view of notions like ‘reason’, ‘truth’, ‘clarity’, 
etc.
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to genuinely universal, tradition independent norm s’,^ ’ providing ‘a rational vindication 
o f  morality’^  free from  the contingent influences o f  traditional forms o f  Hfe. Similarly, 
Gray understands the Enlightenm ent project to  be displacing ‘local, customary or 
traditional moralities, and o f  all forms o f  transcendental faith, by a critical or rational 
morality’.^ It seems to m e that bo th  contain ambiguities over im portant terms. 
Tradition-independent rational principles are o f  course w hat K ant thought was delivered 
through the exercise o f  pure practical reason. But we could follow Rorty and reject any 
idea o f  a norm  reflecting an independent m oral order, and say simply that it has to  be 
separate from  the whims o f  political leaders, open to  scrutiny by a free press, subject to 
democratic decision making, etc. N o  sense can be m ade o f  transcending contingency 
with som ething ahistoric, bu t we can o f  course scrutinise the contingencies that m ade us 
w ho we are, and that seek authority over us.
I am  no t suggesting however that a Rorty an account o f political theory would alter the 
practice o f  political theorising. Although he seeks to overcome many o f  the oppositions o f 
philosophy, I do not think that Rorty wishes to alter the substantive role o f  the political 
theorist. H e is sometimes com pared to Michael Oakeshott, notably by adopting 
O akeshott’s notion o f  ‘conversation’, bu t this com parison should no t be pushed. 
Philosophy has for Oakeshott no social function. It cannot illuminate practice, or offer any 
help in practical matters; it is rather a ‘well-considered intellectual adventure recollected in 
tranquillity’.^ '* For Rorty in contrast, philosophy is practical or it is nothing; it is its relevance 
that makes Rawls’s writings for example im portant and ‘non-fantastical’. It is an attem pt to 
improve the hum an condition, albeit a rather peripheral one. Philosophy ought to be ‘a
Quoted in Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p. 149.
22 MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 50.
23 Gray, Enlightenment’s Wake, p. 123.
24 Michael Oakeshott, On Human Conduct (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. vii.
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m atter o f  fulfilling hum an needs and interests’, n o t ,  as O akeshott maintained, ‘an escape 
[from practical life], perhaps the only complete escape open to us.’^*^
In  part, it is this relegation (although no t negation) o f  philosophy that has led to  Rorty’s 
writings being thought o f  as dangerously subversive o f  notions o f  truth, justification, or 
the im portance o f  reason giving. I hope to have shown that this is no t the case, and that 
these notions survive for the better in the form  in which he recasts them. I suggest that 
in terms o f  the practices o f political theory, he w ould no t view him self as altering those 
practices, bu t as offering a clearer description o f  w hat it is that we are doing w hen we 
theorise. T o  illustrate, although she is critical o f  Rorty, Chantai M ouffe writes that, in 
contrast to  m ost liberal political theorists, he shows m uch greater awareness o f  the 
limitations o f  theorising about politics, and o f  the need to seek and secure allegiance to 
democratic principles and instimtions. M ouffe claims that, unlike Rorty,
M ost liberal theorists are bound to miss the relevance o f  that kind o f  
reflection because they operate with a metaphysical conception which 
sees the individual as prior to society, bearer o f  natural rights, utdhty 
maximizer or rational subject — according to  the brand o f  hberahsm that 
they foUow — but, in ah cases, as abstracted from  social and power 
relations, language, culture and the whole set o f  practices that make 
agency possible.^^
25 Rorty, Philosophy and Social Hope, p. xxvh.
25 Michael Oakeshott, Experience and Its Modes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1933), p. 
3.
27 Chantai Mouffe, Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Pohtics of Democracy’, in Chantai 
Mouffe (ed.) Deconstruction and Pragmatism (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 1 — 12 at 5 — 6.
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This picture is however a caricature o f most actual liberal theorists. Few for example 
operate with a conception o f the self existing prior to society and abstracted from the 
things that Mouffe Usts. But clearly some, such as Rawls, have said things that have led to 
their being interpreted in this way. Rorty writes o f the need to avoid such 
misunderstandings by not carelessly evoking notions Hke ‘the self. Liberals should not, 
he writes, allow themselves to be encumbered by the idea o f an unencumbered self, ‘an 
existentialist, CaHfomian, self which can somehow sit back and choose its ends, values, 
and affiliations without reference to anything except its own momentary pleasure’.^ ® My 
claim is not that Rorty differs from other liberal theorists in this way, but that he is far 
more prepared to follow through on what that acceptance entails for the intellectual 
resources upon which we are able to draw.
28 Rorty, ‘A Defense of Minimalist Liberalism’, p. 118.
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